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Abstract 
 
The Vietnam War was one of the most traumatic events ever to afflict the US 
Military.  From the ashes of this defeat, the US Military sought to renew itself.  
As part of this process of renewal, the US Army in particular engaged in 
serious soul searching as to how, and under what circumstances, the United 
States ought to commit itself to war.  The answers that were derived from this 
soul searching are known collectively as the Powell Doctrine,1 named after 
General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993).  
The elements of the Doctrine are as follows: the need for overwhelming 
force; the need for public and Congressional support; the need for clear 
objectives; the need for a clear exit strategy; and force should only be used in 
the vital national interest. 
 
This thesis will advance four principal arguments: first, that the evolution of 
the Powell Doctrine cannot be understood without reference to the US 
experience in Vietnam; second, that the various elements of the Powell 
Doctrine have a logical relationship to one another which means that the 
Doctrine as a whole should be considered as a single, integrated body of 
thought; and, third, that Colin Powell, in his Foreign Affairs article, is simply 
giving public articulation to an intellectual climate that had already become 
influential before his ascent to the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2  
And that, whilst the Powell Doctrine does deserve to be called a doctrine in the 
                                                            
1 Also sometimes referred to as the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine. 
2 Colin Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, Foreign Affairs 71 (1992), pp.32-45. 
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military sense of the word, this is not a full explanation of the conditions 
Powell has laid down as they encroach upon profoundly political issues.  And 
thus, whilst the Powell Doctrine does deserve the title doctrine, it is also an 
attempt to formulate a coherent set of principles to inform US National 
Security policy in areas that go beyond those traditionally seen as being of 
military concern.  
 
The case studies that will be used in this thesis are: the first Persian Gulf War 
(1990-1991); US policy towards Nicaragua (1979-1984); the US intervention 
in the Lebanese Civil War (1982-1984); and the US reaction to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1995).  In the conclusion of the thesis, I also deal 
briefly with the question of how the Powell Doctrine may relate to the current 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Id first like to acknowledge the enormous contribution that my family has 
made towards the writing of this thesis. My parents and my brother have 
provided emotional and at times financial support to enable me to undertake 
this project. I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Matthew Jones and 
Professor Alex Danchev, their guidance, support, and at times criticism have 
been invaluable to the project. I would also like to thanks Dr. David Milne and 
Dr. Donna Jackson, who read through large parts of the drafts of this thesis. 
Donnas advice in particular was crucial to how this thesis has been organised. 
 
Im enormously grateful to the three scribes who have typed the entire 
manuscript: Lucy Veale, Hannah Durkin and Steve Doran. These three have 
put up with my constant changes, they were available whenever I needed them, 
and often as not they were my editors of first resort. I would also like to put on 
record my thanks to Owen Butler of Nottingham University Student Support 
for organising the scribing support without which this thesis could not exist. 
 
There are also people through whose correspondence and hard work this thesis 
has benefitted enormously. In particular I would like to single out Lieutenant 
General Frederick Franks (US Army, Retired), who provided invaluable advice 
on how US Army Doctrine is written and also pointed me towards several 
books and papers which proved variously useful. I would also like to thank 
John Woolley and Gerhard Peters at the University of California, Santa 
v 
 
Barbara. Their American Presidency Project is an invaluable resource to any 
researcher of the US Presidency, and has made the writing of this thesis far 
easier than it would otherwise have been. I would also like to place on record 
my profound gratitude to the staff at the Hallward Library, University of 
Nottingham, and the British Library for running down seemingly endless 
obscure books and articles. I would also like to thank the staff at the School of 
Politics for helping me in ways too numerous to mention. 
 
Finally I would like to thank my Grandfather Sam Middup to whose memory 
this work is dedicated. Without a childhood spent listening to my Granddads 
war stories Im all but certain that I would not have had the interest that led me 
to this PhD. In every meaning of the phrase, I would not be here without him. 
 
vi 
 
Contents Page 
 
Abstract              ii 
 
Acknowledgements            iv 
 
Contents Page             vi 
 
Introduction              1 
 
Chapter 1: 
Literature Review           26 
 
Chapter 2:  
Force Should Only be Used in the Vital National Interest        58 
 
Chapter 3:  
The Use of Force Must be Overwhelming        112 
 
Chapter 4:  
US Forces Must Have Overwhelming Public and Congressional Support  162 
 
Chapter 5: 
The Objective of US Military Forces Should be Clear    245 
 
Chapter 6:  
The Need for a Clear Exit Strategy       282 
 
Chapter 7:  
Conclusion          351 
 
Bibliography          388 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
This introduction aims to do two things: first, to define the scope of the thesis; 
second, to determine whether the Powell Doctrine actually deserves the title of 
a doctrine.  The main aims of this thesis are to give an account of where the 
ideas that form the Powell Doctrine came from, to understand how these ideas 
are logically related to one another to form the Powell Doctrine, and what the 
effect of the Powell Doctrine has been on US foreign policy since the end of 
the Vietnam War.  However, what this thesis will not do is attempt to evaluate 
whether or not the Powell Doctrine is correct in what it says, or whether the 
lessons taken from Vietnam that form the Powell Doctrine were the correct 
lessons to have been taken.  The Powell Doctrine is used as shorthand to 
describe a series of conditions for the use of US Military force laid down by 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, shortly 
before his retirement.  These conditions are: that the use of force ought to be 
overwhelming; that the use of force ought to command public and 
Congressional support; that force should only be used to achieve clear 
objectives; that force should only be used in the vital national interest; that 
US Forces should have a clear exit strategy.1  This doctrine is also sometimes 
referred to as the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine (Weinberger being the 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who laid down some of these 
conditions in a speech to the National Press Club in November 1984).2  In this 
                                                            
1Colin Powell, US Forces: Challenges Ahead, Foreign Affairs 71 (1992), pp.32-45. 
2 The full text of Weinbergers speech can be found at: http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2004/January%202004/0104keeperfull.pdf. 
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thesis, we will use the term Powell Doctrine for two reasons: first, because 
Weinberger and Powells conditions do not differ from each other in any 
significant way; second, because Powell served as Weinbergers principal 
military assistant and was one of the key authors of the National Press Club 
speech. 
 
The Powell Doctrine does not spontaneously emerge in Powells Winter 1992 
Foreign Affairs article.  With this article, what Powell did was to lend the 
significant public stature that he enjoyed in 1992 as probably one of the most 
well-known US soldiers since Eisenhower to a set of ideas which had been 
written about as early as the late 1970s.  Indeed, in the early 1990s, Powells 
standing was such that a Presidential bid along the lines of Eisenhowers 
successful campaign for the Republican nomination was seen as a very real 
possibility.  Steven Stark, writing in The Atlantic magazine, quotes a prominent 
but anonymous Democratic consultant as saying, "His [Powells] potential as a 
presidential candidate is mind-boggling.  On paper, if he got the Republican 
nomination, I don't see how the Democrats could win."3  As we shall see 
throughout this thesis, Powells 1992 Foreign Affairs article drew together in 
one article a set of ideas that had emerged from an intellectual climate within 
the US Military.  
 
                                                            
3 Steven Stark, President Powell?, The Atlantic, October 1993.  Full text available at: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/policamp/powell.htm 
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The ideas that come to be known as the Powell Doctrine are mentioned in a 
body of literature created between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s which 
attempted to learn the overall strategic lessons of the Vietnam War.  It is 
important to understand that there was no systematic attempt during the 1970s 
to come up with anything resembling an official document that tried to pull 
together the strategic lessons the US Army had learned from Vietnam.  As 
Conrad Crane puts it:  
 
The U.S. Armys assessment of its Vietnam failure was quite different 
than that of the French. While a series of Vietnam studies by high-
ranking officers focusing on branch performance and tactical innovations 
was completed in the early 1970s, the Armys primary emphasis quickly 
returned to the future European battlefield.4 
 
What this leaves us with then, if we are looking to establish an intellectual 
climate that led to the Powell Doctrine, are the memoirs of those senior officers 
who commanded in Vietnam and those works of Powells contemporaries and 
near contemporaries published towards the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
attempted to spell out the lessons of Vietnam, but little in the way of an 
official response to the Vietnam War as a whole on behalf of the US 
Military. 
 
                                                            
4
 Conrad Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Armys Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, 
Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002, p.2. 
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Those officers that held senior posts in Vietnam wrote extensively on the War 
both to justify their own decisions at the time and to lay down as lessons for the 
future.  Both of the senior commanders charged with overseeing the War 
during its stage of escalation from 1965 to 1968, General William 
Westmoreland5 and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp,6 have written extensive 
memoirs.7  Many of Westmoreland and Grants subordinates have also written 
on the war, including Philip Davidson, Westmorelands G-2 [Head of Military 
Intelligence], and Bruce Palmer,8 who commanded at Corps level and went on 
to serve as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army between 1968 and 1973.  Douglas 
Kinnard only served as a Colonel during Vietnam; however, in the wake of the 
war Kinnard interviewed every General Officer who commanded in Vietnam 
from the rank of Major General upwards, and compiled the definitive survey of 
their experiences in Vietnam and their criticisms of US strategy in his book 
The War Managers.9   
 
There is a second group of work which help form the intellectual climate which 
gave birth to the Powell Doctrine.  These works were written by 
contemporaries or near contemporaries of Powell.  This work was more 
                                                            
5 Westmoreland was Commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
between 1963 and 1968. 
6 Grant Sharp was Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command (CINCPAC) between 
1964 and 1968. 
7 See William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 1st ed. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976) 
and US Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Novato: Presido Press, 1998). 
8 See Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson (Ret.), Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1988), and Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in 
Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984). 
9 Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers: American Generals Reflect on Vietnam (Hanover: Da 
Capo Press, 1991). 
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forward-looking, concentrating less on what went wrong in Vietnam and 
looking more intently at how the US ought to conduct military intervention and 
limited wars in the future.  In particular, the work of Colonel Harry G. 
Summers, who was a classmate of Powells at the Command and General Staff 
College, proved extremely influential.  It is necessary to say a brief word about 
how Summerss book came about to understand its importance.  Summers 
wrote the book whilst a member of the faculty of the Army War College, and 
was specifically tasked with writing an analysis of the failures of US strategy 
in Vietnam.  Unlike the memoirs mentioned above, Summers was a serving 
Military Officer at the time of writing.  As such, early drafts of Summerss 
work, which came to be came to be called On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of 
the Vietnam War,10 were distributed to and commented on by the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army Chief of 
Operations and Plans, and the Commandant of the Army War College.11  The 
original document that would become the book On Strategy also contained 
contributions by the CIA and the State Department.  On its publication, On 
Strategy was incorporated into the course reading lists at both the Army War 
College and the Army Command and General Staff College.  As such, 
Summerss work, much more so than the memoirs and analyses mentioned 
above, carries with it the authority of being at least a semi-official account of 
the perceived failures of US strategy in Vietnam, and has been read more 
widely within the US Armed Forces than the other works cited above.   
                                                            
10 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 
1984). 
11 At the time of writing, these were Generals Edward C. Meyer, John W. Vessey (Vessey 
succeeds Meyer as Chief of Staff), Glenn K. Otis, and Richard G. Stilwell. 
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The list of works quoted above is not meant to be an exhaustive list of every 
published work on the Vietnam War by Military Officers.  It is simply cited to 
make the point that, despite the lack of any official attempt to come up with a 
single, comprehensive explanation for US failure in Vietnam, the US Militarys 
attempt to learn the lessons of Vietnam, and to make sure that the Vietnam 
experience was never repeated did not start or end with Colin Powell.  We will 
come back to the works cited above, and others, throughout this thesis to 
demonstrate where the ideas that would emerge as the Powell Doctrine in 1992 
came from. 
 
We will see in the chapters dealing with the individual case studies how each 
element of the Powell Doctrine has its roots in work produced before Powells 
1992 Foreign Affairs article.  However, it is necessary to briefly outline how 
Powells generation of US Military Officers shared a common set of 
experiences and a common determination not to repeat what they saw as the 
mistakes of Vietnam, and thus a common determination to learn the lessons of 
that conflict that, on an instinctive and emotional level, meant that there was a 
remarkable degree of homogeneity in creating an intellectual climate that was 
determined never to repeat the experience of Vietnam.  What we will also see 
is, whilst each individual element of the Powell Doctrine had its individual 
antecedents in work produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, we will also 
outline the broad issues arising from the US experience in Vietnam, which 
were seen as issues that needed to be addressed. 
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For Powell and his contemporaries, Vietnam was the defining experience of 
their professional lives.  When talking about his role as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff during the First Gulf War, one of the case studies covered in 
this thesis, Powell had this to say about how Vietnam stayed with his 
generation of Military Officers: Vietnam is running through my mind very 
much, a situation he saw as applying to his contemporaries as much as to 
himself.12  For Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, a contemporary of 
Powells who lost part of his leg in Vietnam, the memories of that war are still 
extremely fresh: 
 
Memories of Vietnam are very sharp, clear to me, I mean with every 
other step I take I'm reminded of Vietnam and I remember the great 
soldiers that I was privileged to serve with there, those that I was in the 
hospital with at Valley Forge General Hospital, I remember those whose 
names are on the Vietnam memorial here in Washington ... no, never ... 
never far from my mind and especially during the Gulf War, we didn't 
say it to each other but I think we all felt that we're going to do it right 
this time.13 
 
                                                            
12
 Interview with Colin Powell, PBS Frontline: The Gulf War [online], Original Air Date9 
January 1996.  Full text available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 
13
 Interview with Frederick Franks, PBS Frontline: The Gulf War [online], Original Air 
Date9 January 1996.  Full text available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/franks/5.html 
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The following quotation is taken from a speech given by Lieutenant General 
Anthony Zini14 to a Marine veterans conference, comparing the occupation in 
Iraq to Vietnam: 
 
My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the 
battlefields of Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and the lies, and we 
saw the sacrificeWe swore never again would we allow that to happen. 
I ask you, Is it happening again?15 
 
Or as former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki said upon retiring 
from the army in 2004, The current war [Iraq] brings me full circle to where I 
began my journey as a soldier he said. The lessons I learned in Vietnam are 
always with me.16 
 
What these quotations illustrate is that, as well as remembering Vietnam, there 
was a conscious determination on the part of Officers who had served in 
Vietnam to make sure that, when their time came to occupy the senior positions 
within the US Military, they would not make the mistakes of the Vietnam era.  
So we can see now that there was a desire to learn from the experience of 
Vietnam.  We will look in detail in the individual case study chapters how an 
intellectual climate came to be formed that led to each of the individual 
elements that led to the Powell Doctrine.  However, what we can see here is 
                                                            
14 Former CINCCENTCOM. (Commander in Chief, US Central Command). 
15 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin Books: 
London, 2006). p.242. 
16 Ibid., p.157. 
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that, even before we deal with the specific elements of the Powell Doctrine, 
there is a common experience that underpinned the intellectual climate that led 
to the Powell Doctrine. 
 
But what were the issues that led to the formation of the intellectual climate 
that led to the Powell Doctrine?  Whilst we will look at the intellectual climate 
surrounding the individual elements of the Powell Doctrine in their particular 
chapters, there are some more general issues that underpinning this intellectual 
climate that resulted in the Powell Doctrine in its entirety.  The foremost 
question arising from the debacle of Vietnam was, how had the United States, 
one of the worlds two foremost powers, been defeated by a comparatively 
small, industrially backward nation such as North Vietnam?  As Harry 
Summers put it, 
 
On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable.  In engagement after 
engagement the forces of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese 
Army were thrown back with terrible losses.  Yet, in the end, it was 
North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged victorious.  How 
could we have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably?17  
 
The second major issue underlying the entire intellectual climate that gave rise 
to the Powell Doctrine was, how had the war in Vietnam led to a situation 
                                                            
17 On Strategy, pp.21-22. 
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where the prestige and standing of the Armed Forces held in American society 
at large been brought to such a low ebb?  Norman Schwarzkopf, even in the 
afterglow of victory from the Gulf War, still vividly remembers the sense of 
anguish within the US Officer Corps at how far the Armys standing had fallen 
as a result of the Vietnam War: 
 
It was a nightmare that the American public had withdrawn its support: 
our troops in World War I and World War II had never had to doubt for 
one minute that the people on the home front were fully behind them.  We 
in the military hadnt chosen the enemy or written the orders  our elected 
leaders had.  Nevertheless, we were taking much of the blame.  We 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were literally the sons and daughters 
of America, and to lose public support was akin to being rejected by our 
own parents.18 
 
We will look at how the individual elements of the Powell Doctrine were 
developed and relate to one another in the chapters dealing with the individual 
case studies.  However, what we can see is that there are issues in the 
background which colour the overall intellectual climate that gave birth to the 
Powell Doctrine.  First, there was a remarkably homogenous view that the 
Vietnam War was an experience that the US should never repeat, and a 
conscious determination among the generation of Officers that had served in 
                                                            
18 H. Norman Schwarzkopf,, with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It doesnt Take a Hero 
(Bantam Books: London, 1993), p.208. 
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Vietnam that when their time came to be in positions of senior leadership they 
would make sure that they had learned the lessons of Vietnam.  Second, that 
the two fundamental questions behind any investigation into what had gone 
wrong in Vietnam were, how had the US been defeated by a power that, by 
every military and economic indicator, the US should have easily defeated, and 
how had that defeat led to a public confidence and trust in the Armed Forces? 
 
This thesis will seek to advance three principal arguments relating to the 
Powell Doctrine and the intellectual climate that led to it: first, that the Powell 
Doctrine, both in the form of Powells 1992 Foreign Affairs article and the 
intellectual climate and debate that led to the article, cannot be understood 
without reference to the US Militarys experience in Vietnam; second, that the 
various elements of the Powell Doctrine and the ideas that led to the Powell 
Doctrine bear an intellectual relationship to and have influence on one another 
and should not be analysed in isolation from one another; third, that, whilst to 
some extent the Powell Doctrine, as Powell articulated it in 1992, does deserve 
the title doctrine in the military sense of the word, it also goes beyond the 
realms of what is traditionally thought of as military doctrine and could be said 
to form a coherent worldview on what an appropriate national security policy 
for the United States ought to look like. 
 
The thesis will look at how the Powell Doctrine and the intellectual climate 
within the US Military that led to it influenced US national security policy in a 
12 
 
series of case studies running from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s.   First, it 
will look at US policy towards the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-
1995) (in this case, we will be talking about the Powell Doctrine fully 
developed and as it was articulated by Powell in the 1992 Foreign Affairs 
article, because most of the period the case study is concerned with is after the 
publication of Powells article and all of the time frame of the case study is 
either after the publication of Powells article or whilst Powell is Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff).  Second, it will examine US policy in the first 
Persian Gulf War (1990-1991).  In this particular case study, we will be 
looking at the intellectual climate that gave rise to the Powell Doctrine as 
Powell had not yet published his Winter 1992 Foreign Affairs article. 
 
Third, it will look at US policy towards Nicaragua (1979-1984); fourth, it will 
examine US policy towards Lebanon (1982-1984).  In both of these cases, we 
will be looking at the intellectual climate that gave rise to the formation of the 
Powell Doctrine, rather than looking directly at the Powell Doctrine itself, as 
both of these case studies take place well before either the publication of 
Powells  article or before his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 
 
Each chapter will take the following structure: first, we will look at how a 
particular element of the Powell Doctrine, or, depending on the individual case 
study, the intellectual climate that helped to bring into being that element of the 
13 
 
doctrine, was shaped or conditioned by the lessons the US Military took from 
Vietnam, and how the US Military attempted to apply these lessons to its future 
conduct.  We will then look at how that element of the Powell Doctrine, or the 
intellectual climate that led to it, affected US national security policy in a 
particular case study.  Finally, in each chapter, we will look at how one 
particular element of the Powell Doctrine or the intellectual climate that 
inspired it is related to the other elements of the Powell Doctrine. 
 
It may seem strange to argue that the intellectual climate that gave rise to the 
Powell Doctrine created a body of thought, the various elements of which share 
a close intellectual relationship to one another and create a situation in which 
elements of the Doctrine serve to influence other elements of the Doctrine, and 
then disarticulate the analysis of each element of the Powell Doctrine, and the 
thinking that led to it, into separate chapters.  The reason for this is that most of 
the existing literature on the Powell Doctrine deals with its insistence on the 
use of overwhelming force.19  The academic originality of this thesis lies in the 
fact that it does not treat the element of the Powell Doctrine calling for the use 
of overwhelming force as being the defining feature of the Powell Doctrine, 
but rather merely as one element in a larger body of thought. 
 
                                                            
19 For example see: K. J. Campbell, Once burned, twice cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine, Armed Forces and Society, 24.3, (1998), Pp.357-374, and J. Record, Force-
Protection Fetishism. Sources, Consequences and Solutions, Aerospace Power Journal, 
(2000), Pp.4-11. 
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By giving each element of the Powell Doctrine a chapter to itself, this more 
accurately reflects the importance of each element of the Powell Doctrine, and 
the intellectual climate that created it, without privileging the element calling 
for the overwhelming use of force.  Also, despite the fact that each chapter 
deals with a specific element of the Powell Doctrine, each chapter will also 
deal with the relationships between the various elements of the Powell 
Doctrine, or the climate that led to the doctrine.  In those sections of the thesis 
where we will be examining the relationship between the different elements of 
the Powell Doctrine, we will be talking about the relationship between the most 
comprehensively articulated vision of these ideas rather than the intellectual 
climate that led to them.  This means that we will be discussing those ideas as 
expressed in Powells 1992 Foreign Affairs article. 
 
We will now move on to look at whether the Powell Doctrine in the form in 
which Powell articulates it in his 1992 Foreign Affairs article actually deserves 
the title of a military doctrine.  The 1992 Foreign Affairs article is the only 
publicly available source in which Powell himself lays down in writing in his 
own words his thoughts about how the US Military should be used when it 
comes to military intervention.  As the most complete public record of 
Powells thoughts on the subject, it should be treated as the benchmark against 
which we should judge whether the Powell Doctrine actually deserves the title 
doctrine in the military sense of that word.  Therefore, in the discussion 
below, when we refer to the Powell Doctrine we are referring to Powells 
public iteration of it directly.  The argument we will pursue here is a complex 
15 
 
one in that the Powell Doctrine does contain within it elements of a traditional 
military doctrine, but, at the same time, it also goes beyond the traditional 
definition given to doctrine in the military sense of the word.  Doctrine has a 
range of different meanings across many different disciplines but, in a military 
context, doctrine refers to a set of rules or principles by which Commanders 
should operate. This does not mean that they are inflexible diktats that a 
Commander must stick to rigidly, but instead an attempt to ensure that when 
Commanders are faced with certain situations, and access to certain 
information, they will ask similar questions and act in roughly the same 
fashion. The purpose of doctrine is to ensure that the Armed Forces act as a 
single, coherent body, rather than as a collection of units, in a context where a 
single Commander cannot possibly take charge of every single unit, or make 
every decision on a battlefield: Military doctrine is what we believe about the 
best way to conduct military affairs. 20 Even more briefly, doctrine is what 
we believe about the best way to do things.21 The introduction to the US 
Armys own study of how it developed doctrine in the 1990s defines doctrine 
as follows: 
 
Any study of war demonstrates that while there is in warfare no one 
system  there is indisputably system. Truisms of military experience tell 
us that although every battle is unique, warfare is governed always by 
                                                            
20 Dennis Drew and Don Snow, Military Doctrine, Reprinted from Making Strategy: An 
Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Air University Press, 1988), 
Chapter 11.  Full text available at:  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew1.htm. 
Italics in original. 
21 Ibid. 
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select methods and principles. Yet warfare in any age is various and 
constantly subject to change. System and enduring principles  but also 
variety and new concepts  characterize the agreed body of thought about 
military operations that at any given time in an army is called doctrine.22 
 
Doctrine is usually derived from the study of history. This means essentially 
that doctrine is an attempt to discover and specify the overarching principles 
which underpin military success. Carl von Clausewitz made the following 
observation about historys usefulness in determining the principles of war: 
 
Undoubtedly, the knowledge basic to the art of war is empirical. While, 
for the most part, it is derived from the nature of things, this very nature 
is usually revealed to us only by experience. Its application, moreover, is 
modified by so many conditions that its effects can never be completely 
established merely from the nature of the means.23 
 
There is of course an underlying tension here. Doctrine is only useful insofar as 
it helps the military prepare for the tasks it may be called upon to perform in 
the future, but doctrine is usually derived from a study of the past. Therefore, it 
is perfectly possible, indeed perhaps likely, that doctrine which proved useful 
                                                            
22 John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Military History Office, 
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command: Washington, 1996). p.6.  
23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007). p.124. On War was 
originally published in 1832. Translation Copyright 1976 Princeton University Press. This 
abridged edition, by Beatrice Heuser, uses the translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 
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in a past context is not going to prove useful in the present because of changes 
in technology, different political circumstances, the differing nature of 
adversaries, and generally the fact that each war is fought in its own unique 
context. Therefore, in order to be of any sustained use, doctrine has to be 
adaptable, and those whose responsibility it is to formulate doctrine have to be 
sufficiently self-aware to realise that doctrine will always be in need of 
modification when it comes into contact with the real world:  
 
I am tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are 
working on, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it 
does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their 
capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. It is the task of 
military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too 
badly wrong [italics in original].24 
 
So, having established what doctrine in a military sense is, and its uses and 
limitations, does the Powell Doctrine deserve its name? It has already become 
clear that it does constitute a set of principles which ought to inform the way 
the US acts when considering military intervention. However, the argument 
against referring to a Powell Doctrine is that by the nature of the questions to 
which the Powell Doctrine seeks answers, it is moving beyond the realms of 
military doctrine and into the realms of political decision making. Such a 
                                                            
24 Sir Michael Howard, The Nature of Doctrine. Full text available at: 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/374EE172_1143_EC82_2EDE0E7B4E01EC78.pdf. 
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definition would limit military doctrine to the realms of purely tactical and 
operational decision-making such as the correct way to cross rivers, and the 
coordination of different branches of the Armed Forces. However, this 
definition of doctrine is too narrow to stand on its own, because even doctrine 
that is related purely to tactical or operational matters has to derive from some 
understanding of the basic nature of what war is, what is its nature? What are 
its objectives? What is it that motivates soldiers to fight? And conversely what 
is it that destroys a soldiers willingness to fight?  These are questions that are 
too broad for us to attempt an answer in a thesis dealing with the Powell 
Doctrine.  They are noted here simply to make the point that doctrine has to 
touch on issues that are wider than tactical or operational questions.  Answers 
to these basic questions will determine the nature of every other piece of 
doctrine across the Armed Forces. This is why the answers to these basic 
questions are known as fundamental doctrine,25 because answers to these 
questions will invariably affect everything else the Armed Forces is and does. 
The following quotation is taken from a textbook used by the US Armys Staff 
College: 
 
Fundamental doctrine forms the foundation for all other types of 
doctrine. Its scope is broad and its concepts are abstract. Essentially, 
fundamental doctrine defines the nature of war, the purpose of military 
                                                            
25 Dennis Drew and Don Snow, Military Doctrine, Reprinted from Making Strategy: An 
Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Air University Press, 1988), 
Chapter 11.  Full text available at:  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew1.htm. 
Italics in original. 
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forces, the relationship of military force to other instruments of power, 
and similar subject matter on which less abstract beliefs are founded.26 
 
As can be seen from the above quotation, military power cannot be separated 
either from other elements of national power or the nations national security 
policy objectives.  Therefore, one cannot dismiss the Powell Doctrine as 
military doctrine simply because it ventures onto terrain that is not seen as 
military. A second argument which is related to, but different from, the first, 
is that the Powell Doctrine should not be referred to as a doctrine in the 
military sense because in the context of the US Constitution and political 
system, it is not the task of the military to dictate to civilians the scope and 
limits of US defence and foreign policy, rather it is the job of the military to 
follow the orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, without question. This 
argument would not deny the importance of fundamental doctrine, but rather 
the implications of this argument are that in a democratic society it is the place 
of elected civilian officials to formulate fundamental doctrine, and it is the 
place of the military to take this fundamental doctrine and apply it. The 
Constitutionality of this argument on the face of it appears unimpeachable. 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare 
war and the responsibility for the upkeep of the Armed Forces:  
 
                                                            
26 Ibid.  
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To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, 
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term 
than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy.27 
 
And Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution makes the President Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces: The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.28 
 
However, there are a number of reasons why such a strict interpretation of the 
Constitution, and indeed such an interpretation of the nature of democratic 
government, is not useful. Even leaving aside the fact that the framers of the 
US Constitution did not and could not be expected to anticipate the idea of 
formal military doctrine, and the fact that we live in an infinitely more complex 
world than that of 1789, the idea that in order for democracy to work the 
military must wait for civilians to hand fundamental doctrine to it, is flawed. 
First, because there is nothing in the Powell Doctrine that says, should civilians 
choose to ignore this then the Military should disobey orders.  In fact, the 
professional Military would be horrified by such a stipulation. Second, the 
President does not hold a purely civilian office.  By the terms of the 
                                                            
27
 The United States Constitution.  Full text available at: 
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=529. 
28 Ibid. 
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Constitution, he is also a military official; indeed, they are the highest ranking 
military official in the entire Armed Forces. Therefore, Presidents are in need 
of doctrine as much as any other military officer in terms of the need to provide 
some consistency in decision-making and setting priorities for the Armed 
Forces, otherwise the professional Military cannot draw up the kind of plans 
and budgets necessary to maintain a modern army. In other words, there needs 
to be some predictability in the decision-making process that the President as 
Commander-in-Chief is going to undertake so that subordinates can provide 
them with the information and force structure necessary to carry out military 
operations.  
 
Last, the idea of civilian supremacy uninformed by military advice on issues of 
fundamental doctrine proceeds from the rather perverse assumption that it is a 
bad thing to ask the experts for their opinion on a given subject. After all, by 
their very nature, senior military officers have spent the greater part of their 
professional lives studying and preparing to fight wars. This is after all the 
reason for the existence of the Armed Forces in the first place. Almost by 
definition a civilian cannot have had this experience. Politicians, if they are to 
succeed in their chosen career, will need to have a much broader horizon than 
simply this study of preparation for war. This is not to say that, because of their 
superior expertise, the military alone should determine fundamental doctrine, 
but it should be enough to guarantee that their opinion is heard. 
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So does the Powell Doctrine deserve to be called doctrine? In the previous 
discussion we have established that, in order for something to be called 
doctrine, a set of principles is required; the Powell Doctrine has this. We have 
seen that doctrine is formed by the study of past operations and, as we shall see 
throughout this thesis, the Powell Doctrine is a reflection of the USs 
experiences in Vietnam. We have also seen that, if doctrine is to be useful, it 
must touch on areas that are seen as political. Finally, we have seen that the 
military input into the formation of fundamental doctrine does not necessarily 
damage the principle of civilian control of the military in a democracy. For 
these reasons the Powell Doctrine does deserve the title. And to simply call it 
the Powell Principles or the Powell Rules would be to misrepresent the 
meaning of military doctrine.  
 
However, the Powell Doctrine was certainly not formulated in a way that has 
become traditional for US Army doctrine to be formulated. First, doctrine is 
traditionally disseminated through the Armed Forces by the means of field 
manuals, each of which deals with specific and discrete topics. Formulation of 
doctrine is the responsibility of the Training and Doctrine Centre (TRADOC) 
based at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Here it is the responsibility of a 
group of specially selected Officers, normally at the rank of Colonel or above, 
to draft new doctrine or update previous doctrine. The drafts of any new or 
edited doctrine are then circulated within the Army, in particular to the training 
schools and operational commands. There is then a long process of debate 
during which a variety of Officers are invited to give their opinions and a 
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number of conferences or seminars may be organised to allow the widest 
possible range of debate to take place. At the end of this process the products 
of these conferences and seminars are fed back to TRADOC whose task it is to 
write the final definitive doctrine. Once doctrine has been issued in the form of 
a field manual, it becomes part of the official policy of the US Army.29  
 
Because the politico-military lessons of Vietnam were never exposed to this 
kind of rigorous and time-honoured scrutiny, it may seem odd to some to 
codify them using the term doctrine.  However, as we can see from the 
foregoing discussion, doctrine is the only suitable term that encompasses 
both the scale and importance of these lessons. 
 
So we can see that, in a sense, the Powell Doctrine is worthy of the title of 
doctrine.  However, to simply label Powells conditions as doctrine and 
move on does not fully encapsulate their importance.  The Powell Doctrine 
may deserve the title doctrine, but it is also something with implications that 
go beyond the realms of military doctrine.  Although Powells conditions are 
laid down in the context of a discussion about when it is appropriate for the 
United States to use military force, they have implications that go far beyond a 
discussion limited to military affairs, particularly the conditions that deal with 
the need for public and Congressional support and call for a definition of vital 
national interest.  These conditions move the Powell Doctrine into a 
                                                            
29 For a detailed discussion of how the process of writing doctrine works, see: American Army 
Doctrine for the Post-Cold War Era, Pp. 79-104. 
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discussion on what role the public ought to play in national security policy 
decision-making, and the condition dealing with vital national interest 
implies a discussion of what role the United States, as the worlds only 
remaining superpower, ought to play in global affairs. 
 
So is the Powell Doctrine a doctrine or not?  The answer is that there are  
certainly elements of the Powell Doctrine that deserve this title, particularly 
those elements dealing with the need for overwhelming force, the need for 
clear objectives and a clear exit strategy, that is to say, those elements of the 
Powell Doctrine that have the most direct effect on the conduct of military 
operations certainly do deserve the title of doctrine, and to simply call 
Powells article rules or conditions would be to too narrowly define what we 
mean by doctrine in the military sense of the word.  As we have seen, just 
because these elements of the Powell Doctrine might have political 
implications is not reason enough to deny them the title doctrine, and they go 
to the heart of how military force ought to be wielded.  However, it is also clear 
that, whilst inhabiting the realm of military doctrine, the Powell Doctrine also 
moves beyond it into a discussion of what an appropriate national security 
policy for a superpower ought to be.  Not only does the Powell Doctrine 
discuss what the most appropriate strategy for military operations ought to be, 
it also discusses the circumstances under which military operations ought to be 
considered, principally in the elements calling for overwhelming public and 
Congressional support, and a clear understanding that a particular intervention 
is in the vital national interest of the United States.  These are clearly issues 
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that, whilst arguably important to formulating National Security policy, have 
no direct bearing on the conduct of military operations.  In that sense, the 
Powell Doctrine can be seen as a corporate view on behalf of the US Military 
as to what US national security policy ought to be. 
 
We will now move on to look at how the Powell Doctrine sits with theories of 
civil-military relations by reviewing the existing theoretical debates on that 
subject. 
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Chapter 1  Literature Review 
 
This chapter will aim to place the Powell Doctrine within the existing literature 
on civil-military relations; the argument here will be that although the Powell 
Doctrine draws on some aspects of existing theoretical frameworks, the Powell 
Doctrine fits completely within none of them, and therefore the existing 
theoretical framework cannot adequately explain the appearance of the Powell 
Doctrine or the influence it had on US civil-military relations between 1973 
and 2009.  To be clear, in this context we are talking about the most 
authoritative public articulation of the Powell Doctrine in Powells 1992 
Foreign Affairs article.  In this particular chapter, we are discussing the 
Doctrine in its fully formed state, not the intellectual climate that led to it. 
 
Where do the concepts of the Powell Doctrine fit in the wider body of literature 
dealing with theoretical approaches to civil-military relationships?  In order to 
answer this question, I will look at five texts which sum up different theoretical 
approaches.  The first of these texts is Eliot A. Cohens Supreme Command30; 
the argument Cohen makes can be described as civilian activist.  In other 
words, Cohen argues that civilians should be extremely active in setting the 
basic strategy that military leaders will follow because, for Cohen, there is no 
clear distinction between war and diplomacy  one is a continuation of the 
other.  The second text we will look at is Samuel P. Huntingtons The Soldier 
                                                            
30 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (The 
Free Press: New York, 2002). 
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and the State
31; Cohens work is in large part an explicit argument against 
Huntington.  Huntington argues that there is a very clear distinction between 
civilian and military authority, and that civilians should be in charge of 
deciding when to use military force, but, once that basic decision has been 
made, the military should have authority to design strategy as they see fit in 
order to achieve victory.  The third and fourth texts we will look at are works 
by John Keegan.  These are: The Face of Battle,32 and The Mask of 
Command.
33  Keegan is sceptical of the whole notion that individuals, be they 
soldiers or statesmen, can actually direct war in any meaningful sense.  For 
Keegan, once wars begin, they acquire their own logic and their own 
momentum, which means that they control the actions of soldiers and 
statesmen, rather than the other way around.  We will begin the in-depth 
literature review by looking at Cohens work, as Cohen is largely writing as a 
respondent and a critic of the other two authors.  The final work we will look at 
is Richard Bettss Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.34  As we shall 
see, Bettss chief concern is how the competition for tight budgetary resources 
between the various branches of the Armed Forces serves to influence doctrine 
and colour their advice to statesmen. 
 
The way Cohen sets out to make his argument is by looking at four historical 
case studies of statesmen at war.  For his case studies, he chooses Abraham 
                                                            
31 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations  (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1957). 
32 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (Cape: London, 1976). 
33 John Keegan, The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship, 2nd Pimlico ed.  (Pimlico: 
London, 2004). First American edition published in 1987. 
34 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 2nd edition (Columbia 
University Press: New York, 1991). First Edition published 1977. 
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Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion.  As 
should be clear from his collection of case studies, Cohen is a believer in the 
great man theory of history; this holds that history is profoundly affected by 
the actions of certain individuals, and that their mindset, background, motives 
etc play the major role in determining historical outcomes.  Cohen is very 
explicit in his belief in the great man theory of history and makes no apologies 
for it.  In fact, part of his motivation for writing his book, as he freely admits, is 
to defend the reputations of the statesmen he looks at:  I confess to a certain 
desire to enter the lists on behalf of Churchill and his colleagues in this 
book.35  Furthermore, Cohen believes that modern academia in general has 
become too much of a separate caste, which is set apart from the people and 
events it is studying, and therefore overly committed to abstraction and theory 
rather than psychological sympathy with its subjects: 
 
It seems to me that the scholarly disciplines of political science and, to a 
lesser extent, history have increasingly distanced themselves from 
psychological sympathy with their subjects.  A belief in the greatness of 
statesmen puts in jeopardy theories built on descriptions of social forces 
or institutions, or systemic explanations such as rational choice.36   
 
Having laid out his basic epistemology, Cohen then moves on to describe what 
he calls the normal theory of civil-military relations, which he ties explicitly 
to Samuel Huntington.  For Cohen, this normal theory involves the strict 
                                                            
35 See preface to Supreme Command, p.xii. 
36 Ibid., Pp.xii-xiii. 
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separation of war from politics.  To describe this theory, Cohen uses the 
metaphor of surgery: 
 
Officers are professionals, much like highly trained surgeons: the 
statesman is in the position of a patient requiring urgent care.  He may 
freely decide whether or not to have an operation, he may choose one 
doctor over another, and he may even make a decision among different 
surgical options, although that is more rare.  He may not, or at least ought 
not supervise a surgical procedure, select the doctors scalpel, or 
rearrange the operating room to his liking.37 
 
So, for Cohen, the normal theory presupposes that there is a definitive moment 
where politics stops and war begins.  Cohen sees this as a hopelessly flawed 
argument; for him, war and politics are, if not the same thing, intimately 
connected with one another.  Cohen takes what he views as a Clausewitzian 
position on war, which is to say that war is a continuation of policy by other 
means. Clausewitzs view on the relationship between war and politics can be 
summed up in the following quotation: 
 
Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its 
political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to 
be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of 
                                                            
37 Ibid., p.4. 
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effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be 
renounced and peace must follow.38 
 
In other words, wars are fought for finite objectives; they are not fought for the 
complete annihilation of the enemy, but rather to achieve specific and discrete 
political goals.  This being the case, the conduct of war cannot be allowed to 
interfere with achieving these objectives.  Because politicians are the ones who 
set the objectives, it is therefore up to politicians to make sure that strategy 
does not get in the way of achieving these objectives: 
 
The Clausewitzian view is incompatible with the doctrine of 
professionalism codified by the normal theory of civil-military 
relations.  If every facet of military life may have political 
consequences[t]he Clausewitzian formula for civil-military relations 
has it that the statesman may legitimately interject himself in any aspect 
of war-making.39 
 
Cohens reading of Clausewitz is problematic.  Although Clausewitz believes 
that war is an instrument of policy, and that civilians do have a major role to 
play in setting objectives and strategy, it is a long way from that to saying that 
Clausewitz would argue that civilians could legitimately exercise control over 
any aspect of war-making: War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and 
                                                            
38 On War. p.34. 
39 Supreme Command. p.8. 
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winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a 
serious end.40 
 
Cohens argument has other major flaws; first, because he relies so heavily on 
the greatness of individuals, he is at a loss to give much useful advice to a 
state that is not fortunate enough to possess them.  Although Cohen does 
acknowledge the problem, he does not provide the solution beyond saying that 
stronger civilian control of the military would have been a positive step in 
Vietnam.  But, assuming that Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara do not 
meet Cohens test for greatness, he leaves the following question unanswered: 
how are mere mortals supposed to exercise the degree of control that great 
statesmen do?  Are they supposed to imitate great men and, if so, how?  Or is 
there some kind of different mechanism at work for ordinary politicians?  
And if there is some different kind of mechanism at work, what is it? 
 
In relation to the Powell Doctrine, Cohens work is interesting, but it does not 
really do much to explain the Powell Doctrine.  It is useful insofar as it 
provides a framework for analysing war and diplomacy, not as two separate 
phenomena, but as continuations of one another, and Cohen in his conclusion 
does deal with the rise of the Powell Doctrine.41  However, the problem with 
Cohens argument is that he does not apply his own logic consistently.  If 
diplomacy and war are continuations of one another, and if, by consequence, it 
is proper for civilians to entangle themselves in matters of operational control, 
                                                            
40 On War. p.27. 
41 See Supreme Command. Pp.188-189. 
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then surely the same logic ought to apply in reverse, that is to say that it ought 
to be proper for the military to at least have its own corporate opinion on 
political matters.  However, Cohen does not seem to see it that way.  Rather, he 
sees the Powell Doctrine as reinforcement to the normal theory of civil-military 
relations, primarily because he sees the Powells Doctrine stipulation on 
overwhelming force as undermining Clausewitzian logic: overwhelming 
force  not appropriate force, or force adequate to meet the objectives, but 
overwhelming force.42  Cohen also sees the changes in command structure 
in the 1980s as reinforcing the normal theory: 
 
The President and the Secretary of Defense would have a single 
authoritative source of professional military advice, and even if the 
Chairman did not formally occupy a place in the chain of command 
(which ran, in theory, from the Secretary of Defense to Theater 
Commanders-in-Chief) he would, in practice, act as a conduit for military 
advice to the president, and relay orders from him and the secretary to the 
military.  The normal theory had triumphed.43 
 
Cohen has profoundly misunderstood the processes at work here.  First, by 
selecting one specific element of the Powell Doctrine, Cohen has completely 
ignored the political ramifications of the rest of the doctrine.  From Cohens 
point of view, he makes the Powell Doctrine seem as though it is advocating a 
form of total warfare which is insensitive to political needs.  However, if 
                                                            
42 Ibid., p.188. 
43 Ibid., p.188. 
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Cohen were to look at the rest of the Powell Doctrine, in particular the 
elements that are concerned with public and Congressional support, it would 
seem that the stipulation for overwhelming force, far from ignoring political 
considerations, is actually seen as a political prerequisite because the best way 
to maintain public and Congressional support is for the US to achieve its 
objectives quickly with the minimum loss of life.44  Furthermore, that public 
support is crucial if, in the context of a democracy, US policymakers are not to 
be forced to abandon a conflict before the US has achieved its objectives.  
Therefore, overwhelming force is not unrelated to specific objectives, as Cohen 
seems to imply; rather, overwhelming force is the prerequisite of being able to 
achieve an objective within the context of the US political system. 
 
Cohens commentary on the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is deeply 
flawed.  First, in practical terms it did not limit the military advice the 
President or the Secretary of Defense could receive to simply that of the 
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The chairman was now the senior 
official adviser to the President and the Secretary,45 but there is no stipulation 
in the Act that says the President must only look to his official military adviser.  
In practice, presidents can and do look outside the official chain of command 
for military advice, whether that be through retired military officers, think 
tanks, Congress etc.  The more pertinent effect of the reforms was to ensure 
that there was a single military voice that would be involved in taking the 
                                                            
44 See Chapter Three, pp.144-145 for further discussion of the linkages between these elements 
of the Powell Doctrine. 
45 Cohen also ignores the fact that the Act makes explicit provision for the President to receive 
dissenting advice from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see: Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Public Law 99-433. October 1st 1986. 
Section 203. Full text available at: http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html. 
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political decision whether or not to use force, and to ensure that the Chiefs of 
Staff could not be played off against one another as they had been in the case 
of Vietnam. The provision of the Act relating to the National Security Council 
reads as follows: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal 
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of Defense.46 What this provision effectively means is that the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff is not merely a spokesman for the 
collective will of the Chiefs-of-Staff, but an independent and statutory member 
of the National Security Council, and therefore free to give an opinion on both 
military and political matters that might come before the National Security 
Council.  
 
We will now move on to look at Samuel Huntingtons The Soldier and the 
State.  The first thing to say about this book is that it was originally published 
in 1957, and so by definition it cannot comment directly on either Vietnam or 
the Powell Doctrine. However, it is still useful work for three reasons. First, 
because of the amount of controversy it created, to a certain extent Keegan and 
Cohen are both writing in response to Huntington.  Second, Huntingtons work 
sketches both a history of the relationship between the military and civilians in 
the US up until the late fifties and by doing so gives us some background to the 
situation immediately before large scale US involvement in Vietnam began, 
and, third, Huntingtons theory of the ideal relationship between soldiers and 
                                                            
46 Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5, Clause 
151(b). Full text available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm. 
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the state has remained influential despite Vietnam and so is worth considering 
from its original source.  
 
Unlike Cohen, Huntington does not subscribe to the great man theory of 
history. Rather, Huntingtons method is to trace the historical development of 
professional militaries through European, Japanese, and American history. 
Huntington has a very precise definition of what it is to be professional. 
Essentially, in order to be counted as a professional in Huntingtons view, you 
need to possess not only a distinct set of skills, but also a distinct outlook and 
an explicit sense of belonging to a profession. He seems to imply that a 
profession carries with it a unique set of values, which distinguish it from 
society at large:  
 
The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and 
consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This 
collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training 
necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and 
the sharing of a unique social responsibility.47 
 
This definition of professionalism forms one of the key bases of Huntingtons 
argument.  A large part of The Soldier and the State is taken up with, first, 
proving that the military is a profession in Huntingtons sense of the word, 
and second, in tracing how the modern military evolved to these standards of 
professionalism. In fact, Huntington goes so far as to almost see the modern 
                                                            
47 The Soldier and the State. p.10.  
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soldier as a member of some sort of warrior caste, set apart from the rest of 
society:  
 
He [the professional soldier] normally lives and works apart from the rest 
of society; physically and socially he probably has fewer nonprofessional 
contacts than most other professional men. The line between him and the 
layman or civilian is publically symbolized by uniforms and insignia of 
rank.48 
 
Huntington sees this level of separation as a positive sign because, unlike 
Cohen, Huntington sees a sharp separation between diplomacy and war. For 
Huntington, the ideal civil-military relationship is one in which the civilians 
make the decision when to go to war and what objectives to fight for, while the 
military is given a free hand in designing strategy to achieve these objectives. 
This is not to say that Huntington is naïve enough to suppose that civilian 
policymakers and the military can operate in two distinctly separate spheres 
without the two ever interacting with one another. Rather, it is to say that 
Huntington has a clear view on where final responsibility for different 
categories of decision should rest: The military profession is expert and 
limited  The essence of this relationship concerns the relative scope of 
competence of the military expert and political expert or statesman.49 The 
limits that Huntington talks about are in his view limits which are imposed by 
what he sees as a mindset peculiar to military officers. For Huntington, the 
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prerequisite of professionalism, in a military sense, is a tendency to see politics 
almost exclusively through the prism of military security. For Huntington, the 
military officer is by nature a conservative, with necessarily limited horizons 
which have been reinforced at the higher levels of military command by 
decades of training and preparation for war: The statesman furnishes the 
dynamic, purposive element to state policy. The military man represents the 
passive, instrumental means. It is his function to warn the statesman when his 
purposes are beyond his means.50  
 
Furthermore, Huntington sees that any attempts to alter this conservatism 
would inevitably lead to the de-professionalisation of the military: the 
military acquire substantial political power only by sacrificing their 
professionalism and adhering to the values and attitudes dominant within the 
community.51 This being the case, the ideal way for the military to maintain a 
higher level of professionalism would be to lead an existence entirely separated 
from that of wider society. Although Huntington sees a degree of this, in 
practice he realises that it is not possible for the military to absolutely cut itself 
off from the rest of society. Huntington therefore sees the division of 
responsibility laid out earlier, as a means of achieving what he calls an 
equilibrium, between on the one hand a higher level of professionalism, and 
on the other hand the fact that the military does have to deal on some level with 
the rest of the society which it is supposed in the final analysis to defend.  
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Before moving on to outline some of the flaws in Huntingtons argument and 
its relationship to the Powell Doctrine, it is interesting to note in passing that 
Huntington saw the US as being particularly slow to adopt a professional 
military ethic. He puts this down to two main factors. These factors are the 
physical isolation of the US from great power competition throughout most of 
its history, and the particularly strong role that liberalism has played in shaping 
US political thought and practice:  
 
From the birth of the Republic through the Second World War liberalism 
and the Constitution were the relatively unchanging environmental 
constants of American civil-military relations ... American awareness of 
the role of power in foreign politics was dulled by the absence of external 
threats.52 
 
There are a number of major criticisms of both the theoretical framework 
which Huntington adopts, and also of the political implications that his theory 
of civil-military relations would have if it were consistently applied.  
 
The major theoretical implication of Huntingtons work is that it is extremely 
Eurocentric. What we mean by this is that Huntington effectively takes a 
European and more particularly a German model of civil-military relations and 
seems to believe that this particular model developed to meet specific political 
and cultural needs is an ideal that should be applied to all societies at all times. 
Huntington is so well disposed towards the German general staff system as it 
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evolved between 1870 and 1914 that he carries his praise almost to the point of 
hagiography: Imperial civil-military relations between 1871 and 1914 
reflected an extraordinary degree of objective civilian control and military 
professionalism.53 Even leaving aside the fact that it has been argued that this 
system played a major role in causing the First World War, it is highly 
debatable whether a system of civil-military relations founded in the late 
nineteenth century to serve the needs of an essentially conservative monarchy 
would be the most appropriate form for civil-military relations in a twentieth 
century liberal democracy. This brings us on to the potentially negative 
implications that Huntingtons theory would have were it to be applied 
consistently in practice. The idea of treating the armed forces as some kind of 
separate caste from the rest of society may not be particularly helpful, either for 
the armed forces, or for society. In the case of the armed forces, the sense of 
isolation that Huntington seems to call for may lead them to have little 
sympathy for the political or moral consensus that holds in the societies they 
are supposed to defend. This lack of sympathy runs a serious risk of 
undermining the willingness of soldiers to sacrifice their lives in defence of a 
society or a system of beliefs which they do not share, that they may not be 
sympathetic with: Today, having dissolved any connection between claims to 
citizenship and obligation to serve, Americans entrust their security to a class 
of military professionals who see themselves in many respects as culturally and 
politically set apart from the rest of society.54 
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If Huntingtons theory was carried to its logical extreme, professional soldiers 
would have completely isolated themselves from this system of belief the 
minute they reached adulthood and decided on a career. The inverse of this is 
also likely to be true. If society has no means of regularly interacting with the 
military, it is highly unlikely that society would develop any kind of 
understanding or sympathy for, the peculiarities of military life. This may lead 
to a situation where society views its soldiers as members of some kind of 
strange cult whose needs and opinions need not concern them. Retired US 
Army Colonel and military theorist Andrew Bacevich sums up the danger 
inherent in Huntingtons argument with the following observation: As with 
their favourite professional football team, Americans cheer the troops on with 
verve and enthusiasm. Increasingly, however, they have about as much in 
common with real warriors as they do with the gridiron warriors inhabiting a 
typical NFL locker room.55 
 
So, having looked at some general criticisms of Huntingtons theory, where 
does the Powell Doctrine fit into it? In a sense this is of course an unfair 
question, as Huntingtons work precedes even the earliest hints of the Powell 
Doctrine by a good ten years. Nevertheless, Huntington was, in at least one 
sense, able to anticipate the Powell Doctrine insofar as his theory 
acknowledges the fact that being a soldier is not just another job, but instead a 
distinct social and professional vocation which tends to impart certain values to 
its practitioners. As we have seen in the Introduction, one of the major driving 
elements behind the formation of the Powell Doctrine was that the experience 
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of Vietnam left so many Officers with a remarkably homogenous view of what 
the US did wrong in that war, and what it should do to correct these errors in 
the future. This level of homogeneity could only have been reached among a 
group of people who already shared a set of underlying values and assumptions 
about how the world does and should work.  
 
Where Huntingtons theory of civil-military relations and the Powell Doctrine 
radically part company is on the issue of military involvement in what 
Huntington would conceive of as political decisions. That is, when to go to war 
and for what objectives. As we have already mentioned, Huntington sees this 
as the prerogative of civilians, the Powell Doctrine sees these questions as ones 
that the military had to be involved in and indeed, cannot possibly avoid. The 
Powell Doctrine simply does not recognise and is not prepared to 
accommodate Huntingtons insistence that you can separate diplomacy and 
military action into two separate but overlapping spheres; rather the Powell 
Doctrine would see them as not just overlapping but inextricably linked to one 
another. For instance, when the Powell Doctrine asks, Is there public and 
Congressional support for military intervention?, this has strayed far from what 
Huntington would conceive as the military sphere. Yet, for the Powell 
Doctrine, such questions inevitably have military consequences. For if the 
public and Congress do not support military action, for how long will they pay 
the taxes to support it, how long will it be before the public start to protest 
against military action, thus undermining both the morale of the troops and the 
publics respect for the Armed Forces as an institution. The Powell Doctrine is 
acutely aware of the fact that civilian policymakers come and go but the 
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military has to live with the consequences of the decisions they take. Therefore, 
from the point of view of the Powell Doctrine, the military has to take a long-
term view of its own relationship with wider American society; the Armed 
Forces will not be funded and will not be respected, if the public are against a 
particular military operation. As Bacevich puts it,  
 
The message [the Powell Doctrine as Bacevich describes it] itself - 
establishing specific criteria to govern decisions regarding the use of 
force  was the uniformed militarys. Those who actually devised it did 
not direct it at any particular official. Nor did they wish to confine its 
application to a particular moment or circumstanceAny decision to 
intervene was to require policymakers first to advance a plausible case 
for meeting all of these tests. The failure to do so was to constitute a de 
facto veto.56 
 
We will now move on to look at the theory developed by John Keegan. 
Although, in the case of Keegan, anti-theorist might be a better description, 
Cohen in rather pungent language describes Keegan as a strategic nihilist.57 
What Cohen means by this is that Keegan, and those like him, reject the 
Clausewitzian idea that force is a rational instrument employed to achieve 
political ends. For Keegan, the use of force may start out that way, but in the 
heat and chaos of battle, any notion of force having a political objective, or any 
meaningful relationship to politics, is simply fanciful. For Keegan, once men 
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are actually engaged in the business of killing one another, and fearing being 
killed, then force is an end in itself and the objective, if there can be said to be 
one, is survival of oneself and ones comrades: Ordinary soldiers do not think 
of themselves, in life and death situations, as subordinate members of whatever 
formal military organization it is to which authority has assigned them, but as 
equals within a very tiny group  perhaps no more than six or seven men.58 
 
For Keegan, the fatal flaw of all writing on military affairs (presumably 
including his own as John Keegan has never been involved in, or witnessed, a 
battle firsthand), is that any account written after the fact, almost by definition, 
cannot recapture the chaos, terror or any of the other million emotions that 
would have been experienced by the participants. What accounts of battles 
written after the fact give us, is a neat chronology of events, each proceeding 
one after the other. But the reality is that, for the participants, there is no such 
logic. So what we as historians and readers end up with is an essentially sterile 
account of an event that has never actually taken place because what we read 
bears no reality to the event as it was lived by the participants. Keegan faults 
traditional military history for not focusing on the how of battles. By this, he 
means not simply describing what happened, but the processes, both physical 
and psychological, by which it actually happened. For Keegan, military history 
as an art is a hopeless oversimplification of the realities of war: It sounds 
unbelievably complicated; indeed, it reads like something from a military 
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Kama Sutra, exciting, intriguing, but likely to have proved a good deal more 
difficult in practice than it reads on the printed page.59 
 
In The Face of Battle, Keegan essentially sets himself the task of trying to 
close the gap between the realities of battle as he perceives it, and traditional 
military history. Strictly speaking, Keegans work has no direct impact on 
doctrine, or the relations between politics and combat. However, his 
description of combat and the way soldiers react to it has profound implications 
for any serious study of the relationship between force and politics because the 
essence of Keegans argument is that there is no relationship. For Keegan, 
combat is simply too confused and too dangerous for either the men directly 
involved to care about the larger reasons why they might be fighting, but just 
as critically, even higher elements of command much further removed from 
immediate danger, cannot hope to control, or even marginally influence events, 
simply because in the context of the battlefield it is too difficult to know what 
is happening. Therefore, the implication of Keegans argument is that 
Commanders do not control events to any great degree, but that events control 
them. Take for example his account of the Battle of the Somme, and in 
particular why the British continued to attack even after the slaughter of their 
initial attack: But most important of all was the simple ignorance of what was 
happening which prevailed almost everywhere on the British side of no-mans-
land throughout most of the day.60 Furthermore, this ignorance for Keegan is 
not limited to the Somme, but is a universal characteristic of all complex 
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human action because the more human beings try to anticipate events and plan 
for them, the greater the level of complexity becomes and, consequentially, 
more and more things become likely to go wrong: The effect of these 
reassurances was to complicate the plan. And the complication of a plan which 
would depend for its success on the smooth interaction of a very large number 
of mutually dependent elements invited its frustration.61  This has profound 
implications for the Powell Doctrine or any type of doctrine which asserts that 
military force has political utility.  If the true nature of war is the chaotic 
maelstrom that Keegan describes, then there is no way that force can be 
calibrated to achieve any particular discrete objective because commanders 
from the highest political authority downwards are, once war starts, prisoners 
to events that Keegan would argue they cannot control.  If doctrine as a 
concept is to have any value, it has to reflect the reality of the situation that 
soldiers and commanders find themselves in.  If it does not, then doctrine is 
nothing more than an intellectual construct pieced together after the fact as an 
attempt to give logical coherence to illogical actions. 
 
So what then for Keegan is the role of a Commander amongst this kind of 
chaos? Furthermore, is there any point to having a Commander when, 
according to Keegan, what motivates soldiers in combat is their own survival. 
In The Mask of Command, Keegan supplies his own answer. This book is a 
study of the art of Generalship using case studies from Alexander the Great to 
Adolf Hitler. For Keegan the role of the Commander has changed as the 
technology and lethality of battle has changed. Nevertheless, there are some 
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common characteristics to the Commanders Keegan has chosen to look at. For 
Keegan the first duty of a Commander seems to be to set an example to the 
men under him, and that in turn means that the Commander must be a 
reflection and an example of the values of the society he serves. For example, 
when discussing Alexander the Great, Keegan makes the point that Alexander 
was essentially leading a warrior society which placed heavy emphasis on 
notions of personal honour and bravery. This being the case, Alexander was 
required to set the example for his army to follow: I should feel ashamed after 
crossing the sea from Europe to Asia so easily if this little stream should hinder 
us I consider it unworthy either of the Macedonians or of my own brisk way 
with danger.62 
 
The second key feature for a successful Commander from Keegans point of 
view is the imagination to fill in the enormous gaps in knowledge that the 
chaos of battle described above inevitably creates. For Keegan, the truly great 
Commander must have an almost sixth-sense, being able to picture for himself 
what is going on and what the relative positions of friendly and enemy forces 
are. When discussing the Duke of Wellington, Keegan makes the following 
observation,  
 
The Duke was lying down (a favourite posture) and began a very earnest 
conversation. [We] were preparing to leave the Duke, when he says Oh, 
lie still. After he had conversed for some time with Sir G. Murray (the 
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chief of staff), Murray took out of his sabretache his writing materials 
and began to write the plan of attack for the whole army. When it was 
finished, so clearly had he understood the Duke, I do not think he erased 
one word. He says, My Lord, is this your desire? It was one of the most 
interesting scenes I ever witnessed. As Murray read the Dukes eye was 
directed with his telescope to the spot in question. He never asked Sir G. 
Murray one question, but the muscles of his face evinced lines of the 
deepest thought. When Sir G. Murray had finished the Duke smiled and 
said, Ah, Murray, this will put us in possession of the fellows lines.63 
 
The simple point that Keegan is making with this rather convoluted quotation 
is that Wellington had the unnatural ability to picture exactly where his army 
would be deployed, where the French army would be deployed and the entire 
course of how he wished the battle to run, without even the aid of a map. If the 
quotation is accurate, this is a truly remarkable feat, for not only had 
Wellington envisioned what his own army would do, but also, in his own head 
and without any apparent reference to anybody else, he imagined what his 
opponent would do over the same ground.  
 
The third consistent quality of a great Commander that Keegan highlights is the 
ability to choose skilled subordinates that a Commander can have total 
confidence in, and who have total confidence in their Commander. Keegan 
makes the following observation in the context of his discussion of the 
command style of Ulysses S. Grant:  
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What Grant had done, on his swift promotion from command of the 21st 
Illinois to rank as brigadier-general, was to cobble together a staff of men 
with whom he felt most comfortable, most of them from Galena, Illinois, 
where he had worked in his fathers shop, all of them with a background 
in small-town business or politics, none of them with any military 
experience at all.64 
 
This quotation demonstrates two things.  First, that Grant was judging the 
qualities of the people around him on the basis of their character rather than on 
their formal qualifications. Again, as with Wellingtons imagination, Grants 
judgement of character therefore is largely based on his own instinct and 
experience, rather than any predetermined set of rules, but also that Grant 
chose his staff in order to reflect the composition of the army he commanded. 
Keegan comments on Grants procedure for selecting a staff that it, tells us 
more about the total unreadiness of Americans in 1861 to wage a great war. 
Grant might have assembled a better staff had he cast his net wider than Galena 
main street. But it would have been a staff better in degree than in kind.65 
 
Keegans argument about the virtues of command essentially takes us in a full 
circle back to Cohens argument about the nature of command. Because, 
however much they disagree on the political nature and utility of war, Cohen 
and Keegan are in complete agreement over one thing, that the most successful 
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commanders are great men, that is to say, they are people endowed with 
particular qualities of intellect or temperament that could not be taught, but 
rather are unique to that individual. The upshot of this line of reasoning is to 
come close to rejecting the very idea of doctrine, for a set of doctrines cannot 
hope to instil the gifts of temperament or intellect that great men require, and 
for great men doctrine is superfluous, for such people need no such rules, their 
own innate abilities will see them succeed. From this line of argument, one can 
infer several important points regarding the usefulness of doctrine that, 
although Keegan does not explicitly state, do flow from his logic.  Keegan 
would have to not only reject the Powell Doctrine, but any attempt at doctrine 
on two levels. First, because doctrine, as a set of procedures for war, is 
attempting to impose order on something that Keegan sees as, by its very 
nature, chaotic. Second, because doctrine, by prescribing a method to 
command armies, would inevitably prevent what Keegan sees as the great 
commanders, from rising to prominence, as doctrine would act as a constraint 
upon their natural genius.  
 
The final book we will look at is Richard Bettss Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold 
War Crises.  In Bettss own words, the objective of the book is to establish the 
sources and nature of military attitudes on the resort to force, trends in military 
influence, and the degree of politicization of military advice.66  Unfortunately, 
this work has little to say directly on the subject of the Powell Doctrine, 
although it is briefly covered in the epilogue to the second edition.  However, 
there are substantial problems with Bettss description of the Powell Doctrine 
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and the implications that he draws from this description.  We will return to 
those in due course. 
 
Betts ploughs a completely different furrow to either Cohen or Keegan, and 
although he starts from some of the same basic premises as Huntington, he 
ends up coming to substantially different conclusions.  Betts has no truck with 
Cohens romantic notions about the great men of history.  For Betts, the 
opinions of military leaders are shaped by a wide variety of different impulses.  
In his book, Betts covers a range of different factors conditioning military 
advice from inter-service rivalry, the possession of certain capabilities, 
prejudice and personal experience, and also the fact that military decision-
makers in Washington are the ultimate recipients of information that has had to 
travel great distances through various different bureaucratic channels and 
layers.  We will look at each of these factors in turn, how they relate to the 
other authors we have looked at, and what their implications for the Powell 
Doctrine might be. 
 
We will begin by looking at Bettss argument about inter-service rivalry.  
Unlike Huntington or Cohen, Betts does not see the military as a single, 
cohesive body.  In fact, for Betts, military is a spectacularly inaccurate term 
for describing different agencies who are constantly struggling against each 
other for access to finite resources, most commonly money: it is necessary to 
understand the interaction of organizational interests (status, force levels, and 
missions) and ideologies (strategic and tactical doctrines) in the four 
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services.67  In other words, the different armed services are likely to offer 
advice that furthers their own agenda in terms of gaining greater access to 
funds and greater prestige.  For instance, Betts finds no coincidence in the fact 
that during the early part of the Cold War the air force would almost invariably 
offer strategic bombing as the solution to any problem:  Organizational 
interests and doctrinal radicalism fed on each other.  To make strategic 
bombing the dominant form of warfare required autonomous status, and the 
claim to autonomy was justified by the logic of the strategy.68   
 
In a sense, this argument backs up Cohens point about the need for a strong 
civilian leadership in order to arbitrate between the services and if necessary 
overrule them on the setting of strategic priorities.  However, looked at from 
another angle, Bettss argument actually undermines Cohen.  If Betts is correct, 
then one would assume that, in the context of a military-industrial complex, the 
job of setting strategic priorities would be beyond any one person, even the 
kind of genius that fascinates Cohen. 
 
We will move on now to look at Bettss argument about the roles that personal 
prejudice and the desire for advancement can play in skewing military advice.  
For Huntington, military life tends to socialise people towards a kind of 
Burkean Conservatism that stresses patriotism, selflessness, and a generally 
ascetic lifestyle.  For Betts, while there may be some truth in this argument, 
military officers are still human beings.  They still want to advance their 
                                                            
67 Ibid., p.116. 
68 Ibid., p.116. 
52 
 
careers, and are likely to try and do this by anticipating the wishes of those 
above them in the chain of command, and offering advice and perhaps more 
importantly information, which is likely to please their superiors.  To illustrate 
his point, Betts relates a story of a colonel briefing Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara on a trip to Vietnam in 1965: 
 
During a visit by McNamara to the field in 1965, for example, a marine 
colonel was giving a conventional briefing that left the secretary 
impatient.  McNamara interrupted and interpreted the briefing in his own 
statistical terms.  The colonel immediately perceived what McNamara 
wanted and spontaneously changed the script of the briefing, expressing 
everything in terms of numbers and percentages.69   
 
Note that Betts has not said the colonel has lied, or that he has presented 
inaccurate information, merely that he has picked up on what his audience 
wanted and given it to them.  This has profound implications for the 
relationship between professional soldiers and civilians, particular at the higher 
levels of command, where promotions are largely decided by civilians.  These 
implications are particularly damaging for the arguments of Cohen and 
Huntington.  From Cohens point of view, if Betts is right, this tendency to 
provide an audience with what they are looking for drives a stake through the 
heart of his argument.  Cohens great leaders are ultimately as reliant as 
anybody else on the information that others give them and, being humans 
themselves, are liable to give off all kinds of cues as to the kind of answers and 
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information they are looking for.  Again, if what Betts is saying is true, 
Huntingtons argument is in severe trouble.  Huntingtons whole argument is 
based around the idea that the best way to ensure civilian control of the military 
whilst at the same time maintaining military effectiveness is to have civilians 
make the decision about when to use force, but leave all decisions as to the 
application of that force up to military professionals.  As Betts points out, 
Careerist motives increase in wartime when the military expands and 
promotions are rapid.70  Therefore, what Huntington sees as Conservatism on 
the part of the military with regards to the likelihood of war could equally be 
seen as a careerist impulse. 
 
This argument also has quite profound implications for Keegans anti-doctrinal 
arguments.  If one combines Keegans and Bettss arguments, what one is left 
with is the inescapable conclusion that doctrine is simply a device through 
which the military renders war comprehensible to those that have not 
experienced it.  
 
The Powell Doctrine could be seen as a kind of internal correction mechanism 
for the military to overcome the innate temptation of telling civilian 
policymakers what they want to hear.  By posing a series of questions before 
military intervention is undertaken, effectively what the Powell Doctrine does 
is to throw the need for information back at civilian policymakers, putting the 
emphasis back on civilian policymakers to provide the military with certain 
information and assurances. Also, by adopting this doctrine the military has 
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subtly altered the careerist impulse that ambitious officers would feel.  Most 
military promotions are not made by civilians but by superior officers.  This 
being the case under the Powell Doctrine, the officers that are most likely to be 
rewarded are those that do not give civilians the easy answers they are looking 
for. 
 
We will now move on to look at Bettss argument about how the position of 
certain capabilities shapes the advice that military officers are likely to give. 
Bettss argument here is extremely simple: once the military have the 
capability to do something, they are more likely to recommend that this 
capability be used; conversely, they are extremely unlikely to give advice that 
would require a capability that the military does not currently possess. In 
making his argument, Betts quotes Graham Alison:71 Capabilities created to 
increase the governments options by generating information and alternatives 
that would otherwise be unavailable, also, and of necessity, create interests in, 
and lobbies for, the use of these capabilities.72  
 
This argument to some extent parallels Huntingtons in that both of them see 
the military perspective as being an inherently cautious one which is always 
looking for the maximum variety of possible capabilities and at the same time 
being cautious in offering advice that does not strain the military beyond its 
capabilities.  
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However, this argument is an interesting one to relate to the Powell Doctrine. 
As we shall see time and again throughout this thesis, despite the fact that US 
military capabilities were amongst the best, if not the best in the world, the US 
military consistently gave advice that would limit the use of that capability to a 
very narrowly defined set of circumstances. If Bettss argument is correct then 
the Powell Doctrine is a massive anomaly.  
 
We will now move on to deal with Bettss very brief direct engagement with 
the Powell Doctrine. Bettss argument surrounding the Powell Doctrine is 
fundamentally flawed, not because he misunderstands what the doctrine says, 
but because he misunderstands its implications. For Betts, the Powell Doctrine 
is the US Military attempting to remove itself more or less completely from the 
political arena:  
 
if anything, the American military sought to free itself of any 
responsibility for deciding what  commitments  were necessary or 
justifiable, and  as the Weinberger Doctrine indicated most clearly  
they demanded that they not be called upon to fight unless the  body 
politic and those officials who were responsible were united on the issue 
of necessity73. 
 
Betts has the Powell Doctrine completely backwards here.  By insisting on the 
criteria laid out earlier in this thesis, the US Military is not abdicating political 
responsibility, it is taking it. Surely by laying out a set of criteria to judge when 
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US forces should be committed is by definition a comment on the issue of 
necessity. If situations do not meet those tests then by the terms of the Doctrine 
it is not justifiable (to use Bettss words) to use military force in that situation. 
Surely a military looking to free itself of any responsibility for deciding what 
commitments were necessary or justifiable would not have bothered with 
anything like the Powell Doctrine but would simply have accepted the idea that 
a soldiers job is to go where they are ordered by civilian authority. But 
instead, as we shall see throughout this thesis, the US Military since Vietnam 
has consistently attempted to define and limit the options available to civilian 
policymakers to those in line with the Powell Doctrine.  
 
All of the theories we have looked at in this chapter have something to say in 
devising an explanation for the Powell Doctrine, certainly Cohens emphasis 
on the inescapably political objectives of war, and Huntingtons idea of the 
military profession as a separate social identity. Bettss idea of the military 
officer as a careerist also helps explain why something like the Powell Doctrine 
is needed as a corrective to limit the temptation of military officers to give the 
answers they think civilians want to hear. While Betts, Huntington and Cohen 
all contribute some insights into understanding the Powell Doctrine, none of 
these theories can entirely explain its emergence and prominence during the 
1980s and 1990s.  The theories we have looked at in this chapter all contribute 
something towards our understanding of the Powell Doctrine and its wider 
place in the history of civil-military relations in the United States.  However, as 
we shall see throughout this thesis, the Powell Doctrine was focused less on 
any theory of civil-military relations than it was on trying to assimilate what 
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the US Military considered to be the lessons of its experience in Vietnam, and 
also the Powell Doctrine was trying to come to terms with the effect the 
Vietnam War had on wider American society. 
 
In the next chapter we will begin to look at the substantive elements of the 
Powell Doctrine. We will start by looking at the element which calls for 
military force to only be used in the vital national interest. 
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Chapter 2 - Force Should Only be Used in the Vital National 
Interest 
 
Shortly after the war in Croatia began, the Yugoslav Armys high command 
commissioned a study of likely international responses to the warIn a key 
contribution to this issue, Milan Radakovic summarised the army experts 
consensus that there was little reason to expect international armed 
intervention in Yugoslavia. That conclusion was based on the recognition that 
the EC countries, through the Western European Union, could not engage in 
meaningful military operations without U.S. support, which, because the 
United States was not significantly involved, was lacking.
1
 
 
In this chapter, the case study we will investigate is the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, particularly that in Bosnia-Herzegovina2 between 1991 and 1995.  
This war will also form the case study for the chapter on the part of the Powell 
Doctrine stressing the need for an exit strategy.3  This first chapter will try to 
place US policy towards Bosnia in the context of perceived issues of national 
interest broader than the conflict in Bosnia alone.  We will then move on to 
look at how the different concepts and issues surrounding the idea of national 
interest that we describe relate to other elements of the Powell Doctrine, 
specifically the preference for the use of overwhelming force, the need to gain 
                                                            
1 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito 
to Ethnic War, Second Edition (Westview Press: Oxford, 1996), p.244. 
2 Hereafter referred to as Bosnia. 
3 See Chapter Six. 
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and hold Congressional and public support, the need for clear objectives, and 
the need for an exit strategy. 
 
In this chapter, when referring to the case study, it is appropriate to refer to the 
Powell Doctrine, as this case study largely takes place after the publication of 
Powells 1992 article in Foreign Affairs, and, through the brief period of the 
case study that takes place before the publication of the article, Powell, as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in a position to influence national 
policy directly in line with the ideas put forward in the article.  However, in 
talking about where the idea that the use of force ought to be in the vital 
national interest came from, we will look at the intellectual climate and those 
authors that influenced Powells thinking, particularly Douglas Kinnard and 
Harry Summers.  But first we will look at why the perception grew within the 
US Military that the Vietnam War was not in the United Statess vital national 
interest. By doing this we will be able to see more clearly what lessons 
regarding the USs vital national interest the US Army took from its 
experience in Vietnam. 
 
The argument we will pursue here is that at various times during the Vietnam 
War, the Johnson Administration seemed to be unsure as to whether the 
preservation of an independent South Vietnam was, or was not, in the vital 
interest of the United States. In effect, the Johnson Administration committed 
the United States to war without having made a clear and unambiguous 
decision that the preservation of South Vietnam, in and of itself, was worth the 
sacrifice of American lives. This ambiguity is underlined by the fact that 
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relatively senior Administration officials were often unsure how to explain the 
war to the American public. The following quotation is an extract from a 
memorandum to the Secretary of State written by the Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs: 
 
A public statement, either Presidential or on a high State Department 
level, should spell out some of the guidelines which will motivate our 
future actions in Viet-Nam. But this look into the future need not form 
the bulk of such a statement. Instead, the statement should be dominated 
by a simple, direct restatement of U.S. policy. This restatement should 
outline the reasons why we are in South Viet-Nam.4 
 
This memorandum was written four years after President Kennedy decided to 
send large numbers of military advisors to South Vietnam, and after the 
Johnson Administration had already made the decision in principle to bomb 
North Vietnam.  The fact that after this memorandum had been written senior 
Administration officials, including the President himself, did attempt to lay out 
various rationales for the war should in no way disguise the fact that, five years 
after the US began to dramatically step up its involvement in Vietnam, an 
official as senior as an Assistant Secretary of State should feel the need to point 
out that the public did not understand the reasons for US involvement in the 
war. Johnson did try and address this concern through a series of speeches, the 
most famous of which was his address to a graduating class at Johns Hopkins 
                                                            
4 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Greenfield) to 
Secretary of State Rusk. Washington February 16th 1965. Department of State, Central Files. 
POL 27 VIET S. Full text available at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/121_135.html. 
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University. In this speech Johnsons motivation for being in Vietnam seems 
clear: 
 
We are there [South Vietnam] because we have a promise to keep. Since 
1954 every American President has offered support to the people of 
South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. 
Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South 
Viet-Nam defend its independence.5 
 
However, in private Johnson was far less sure about the reasons for American 
involvement in Vietnam: President Johnson: Well, I know we oughtnt to be 
there [Vietnam], but I cant get out. I just cant be the architect of surrender.6 
 
What Johnson means by architect of surrender is that whatever the merits of 
US intervention in Vietnam, the US cannot be seen as losing the war in 
Vietnam without risking the credibility of its alliance commitments around the 
world. As we shall see, this was a line of argument pushed strongly by 
Johnsons Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs John 
McNaughton.  
 
                                                            
5 President Lyndon B. Johnsons Address at Johns Hopkins University. Peace Without 
Conquest. April 7th 1965. Full text available at: 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650407.asp. 
6 Telephone conversation between President Johnson and Eugene McCarthy on the 
Assassination of Dgo Dinh Diem, February 1st 1966. Conversation Number: WH6602.01. For 
full text and audio see: 
http://tapes.millercenter.virginia.edu/clips/1966_0201_lbj_mccarthy_vietnam.swf. 
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The argument that will be made here is that there was never a single agreed 
rationale for the war, and that whilst publicly the United Statess objective was 
the preservation of an independent South Vietnam, in private, within the upper 
reaches of the Johnson Administration the preservation of South Vietnam was 
not universally seen as a non-negotiable objective of the war. As we shall see, 
the Johnson Administration broke down into competing camps with different 
views as to the underlying reasons behind US involvement in Vietnam, and 
also different interpretations as to what the stakes of the war were for the 
United States. Crucially, these were not arguments that were resolved before 
the US committed itself to war, but arguments that ran right the way through 
the Johnson Administrations term in office, at the end of which the US had 
over half a million troops in Vietnam. Put another way, the United States had 
committed half a million men to battle without having an agreed upon reason 
for why they had done this. 
 
Particularly within Robert McNamaras Department of Defense, there was a 
sizeable and influential group of officials, the most prominent of whom was 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John 
McNaughton who argued that it would simply be enough for the US to have 
fought a war in southeast Asia to underline the credibility of its commitment to 
combating the spread of Communism in Asia. For McNaughton, the ultimate 
outcome of the war was almost immaterial, so long as the United States had 
demonstrated that it had done everything possible, within reason, to preserve 
South Vietnam that would be enough.  The following quotation is taken from a 
paper McNaughton co-authored with Assistant Secretary of State William 
63 
 
 
Bundy. This paper was written as part of a major policy review carried out 
between October 1964 and January 1965. This end product of this review was 
the decision to commence the systematic bombing of targets in North Vietnam: 
  
1. To hold the situation together as long as possible, so that we have time to 
strengthen other areas of Asia. 
2. To take forceful enough measures in the situation so that we can emerge 
from it, even in the worst case, with our standing as the principal helper 
against Communist expansion as little impaired as possible. 
3. To make clear to the world, and to nations in Asia particularly, that 
failure in South Vietnam, if it comes, was due to special local factors  
such as bad colonial heritage and a lack of will to defend itself  that do 
not apply to other nations.7 
 
Opposing McNaughton, and increasingly, Secretary of Defense McNamara, 
were the Joint Chiefs of Staff who argued that once any war began, its 
objectives should be the defeat of the enemy. Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis 
LeMay summed up the Chiefs view with the following observation: You 
cant get a little bit pregnant Once you get into this, youre into it.8 
 
They saw McNaughtons theory as adding up to nothing more than fighting a 
war for nothing more than the sake of fighting a war, and that struck the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body as profoundly immoral. LeMays successor, 
                                                            
7 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty. Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (Harper Perennial: New York, 1998). p.185. 
8 Mark Perry, Four Stars. The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and Americas Civilian Leaders (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1989). p.146. 
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General John McConnell, described his feelings on the decision to declare 
certain targets in North Vietnam off limits to American bombing in the 
following terms. I cant tell you how I feel. Im so sick of it I have never 
been so goddamn frustrated by it all Im so sick of it.9 Indeed it can be seen 
as one of the contributing factors of bringing the Chiefs to the point of mass 
resignation by mid 1967. 10 
 
There were also those such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who saw the war 
in Vietnam through the prism of 1930s Europe. Their view of the war was that 
it was imperative that the United States be seen as standing up to aggression. 
Men like Rusk genuinely saw the preservation of an independent South 
Vietnam as being not only of vital US national interest, but in the vital 
interests of maintaining world peace: The central objective of the United 
States in South Viet-Nam must be to insure that North Viet-Nam not succeed 
in taking over or determining the future of South Viet-Nam by force.11 
 
Perhaps the man who was most torn over these competing views was the 
President himself, both in the public and private record. Johnsons mood can be 
seen swinging wildly between doubting whether the US had any business being 
in Vietnam. Johnson biographer Randall Woods recounts a monologue Johnson 
delivered to his National Security Advisor George Bundy: 
 
                                                            
9 Ibid., p.132. 
10 Ibid., Pp.163-166.  
11 Paper by Secretary of State Rusk. Washington, July 1st 1965. Johnson Library, National 
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Full text available at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/030.html 
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I dont think its worth fighting for and I dont think that we can get out. 
Its just the biggest dammed mess that I ever saw I was looking at this 
sergeant of mine [his valet] this morning. Got six little old kids over there 
and hes getting out my things and bringing in my night reading and I 
just thought about ordering his kids in there and what in the hell am I 
ordering him out there for? What the hell is Vietnam worth to me?12 
 
On other occasions Johnson seemed to see the war as crucial to American 
security:  
 
We have chosen to fight a limited war in Vietnam in an attempt to 
prevent a larger war -- a war almost certain to follow, I believe, if the 
Communists succeed in overrunning and taking over South Vietnam by 
aggression and by force. I believe, and I am supported by some authority, 
that if they are not checked now the world can expect to pay a greater 
price to check them later.13 
 
What we can clearly see from Johnsons tone is a fear that any appeasement of 
what Johnson in this speech considers to be North Vietnamese aggression 
could lead to a replay of the appeasement on Nazi Germany in the late 1930s 
leading to World War II. As we have seen above, this was a line of argument 
put forward strongly by Secretary of State Rusk.  We will discuss the strategic 
logic of Rusks position below. 
                                                            
12 Randall B. Woods, LBJ. Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006), 
p.510. 
13 President Lyndon B. Johnsons 1967 State of the Union Address delivered on January 10th 
1967. Full text available at: http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/180.html. 
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Underlying these discourses on the US national interests was always a dark 
fear within Johnson, that one way or another, Vietnam held the power to 
destroy his presidency and his hopes for the future:  
 
If we get into this war, I know whats going to happen Those damn 
conservatives are going to sit in Congress and theyre going to use this 
war as a way of opposing my Great Society legislation. People like 
[John] Stennis [senator from Mississippi]. They hate this stuff, they dont 
want to help the poor and the Negroes but theyre afraid to be against it at 
a time like this when theres been all this prosperity. But the war, oh, 
theyll like the war. Theyll take the war as their weapon. Theyll be 
against my programs because of the war Theyll say theyre not 
against it, not against the poor, but we have this job to do, beating 
Communists. We beat the Communists first, then we can look around and 
maybe give something to the poor.14 
 
Many of the arguments surrounding how the war was to be waged ultimately 
came back to the fact that the principal foreign policy decision makers of the 
Johnson Administration  had competing views over what the basic stakes of the 
war were for the United States. If it is taken as a starting point that the survival 
of an independent South Vietnam was intrinsically important to the United 
States, then it would be logical to use every resource available to prevail, even 
potentially at the cost of provoking a war with China. The logic of Rusks 
                                                            
14 LBJ. Architect of American Ambition. p.597. 
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analogy with Europe in the 1930s would lead the United States to a position 
where it would have to be prepared to confront China in order to force it to 
back down. To men like Rusk, the lesson of appeasement was that there was an 
urgent need to confront expansionary powers early and clearly demonstrate US 
resolve. However, if it was taken as a starting point that the objective of the 
war was to maintain US credibility, it made a great deal of sense to limit the 
amount of effort expended in South Vietnam. First, preserving forces would 
allow commitments to be met in other, possibly more vital parts of the world. 
Second, if South Vietnam had to be destroyed in order to save it, how would 
this have affected the credibility of the United States? Effectively the message 
that would be sent out was that the US would maintain its commitment to its 
allies at the cost of destroying them. Or, as John McNaughton put it, the US 
needed, To emerge from (the) crisis (sic) without considerable taint from 
methods.15 
 
As the amount of blood and treasure the US expended in Vietnam increased, 
such abstract considerations in the national interest became less and less 
relevant to the problem at hand. Now that American blood had been spilt, the 
moral issue at hand resolved itself more and more as an issue of would the US 
allow itself to be beaten now that men had died for the cause. As Johnson put 
it, we will not permit those who fire upon us in Vietnam to win a victory over 
the desires and the intentions of all the American people.16 This logic had a 
cruel circularity to it. More people were effectively being asked to give up their 
                                                            
15 Dereliction of Duty. p.184. 
16 President Lyndon B. Johnsons 1966 State of the Union Address, delivered on January 12th 
1966. Full text available at: http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/179.html. 
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lives in order to make the sacrifices of those who had already given theirs 
worthwhile. Increasingly the rationale for US involvement in the war boiled 
down to the absurd notion that the US was in Vietnam because it was in 
Vietnam, and would remain in Vietnam because it was in Vietnam. As for 
McNaughtons argument that remaining in Vietnam was vital to the USs 
credibility, there is a world of difference in terms of credibility between being 
seen as helping an ally defend themselves, and the situation the US found itself 
in in Vietnam, in intervening in somebody elses civil war with allies of very 
uncertain determination.17 Looking back on his experience in Vietnam after 
having retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell observed: 
I would spend nearly twenty years, one way or another, grappling with our 
experience in this country [Vietnam]. And over all that time Vietnam rarely 
made much more sense than Were here because were here, because 
were18   
 
So what was the intellectual climate that led to the particular element of the 
Powell Doctrine calling for force to only be used in the vital national 
interest?  We can see that such an intellectual climate was a climate that was 
extremely hostile to the Johnson Administrations inability to define clear, 
consistent, and militarily achievable objectives in Vietnam.  Brigadier General 
Douglas Kinnard concluded that, almost 70 percent of the Army generals who 
managed the war were uncertain of its objectives  [this] mirrors a deep-
seated strategic failure: the inability of policy-makers to frame tangible, 
                                                            
17 For a discussion of the recurrent problems the US had trying to deal with the South 
Vietnamese government see Chapter 6. 
18 Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (Ballantine Books: New York, 
1995), p.79. 
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obtainable goals.19  Colonel Harry Summers, in An American Strategy in 
Vietnam: A Critical Analysis, points out that University of Nebraska Professor, 
Hugh M. Arnold, found that, Compared to the one North Vietnamese 
objective, he found some twenty-two separate American rationales.20  What 
we can see from this is that officers of fairly senior rank, a Brigadier General 
and a Colonel, writing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, less than a decade 
after the end of direct US involvement in the Vietnam conflict, were already 
pointing towards the Powell Doctrines insistence on policymakers being clear 
on what the stakes are for the United States in any military intervention, and 
the need to have a clear, coherent and consistent reason why US military 
intervention is necessary.  As General Bruce Palmer put it,  
 
One larger lesson concerns the national interest.  From the beginning our 
leaders realized that South Vietnam was not vital to U.S. interests ... As 
hostilities dragged on interminably, with no clearly discernible end in 
sight, more and more questions were raised.21 
 
These observations were all made more than a decade before Powell put pen to 
paper on his Foreign Affairs article. 
 
What we see in the Powell Doctrine and the intellectual climate that gave rise 
to it is a determination not to become caught in this kind of circular reasoning 
                                                            
19 See Colonel (RET) Harry G. Summers, Jr, American Strategy in Vietnam: A Critical 
Analysis (Mineola: Dover Publication, 2007), p.66.  
20 See Colonel (RET) Harry G. Summers, Jr, American Strategy in Vietnam: A Critical 
Analysis (Mineola: Dover Publication, 2007), p.62. 
21 Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1984), p.189. 
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outlined above by making sure that policy makers at the outset are clear in their 
own minds about what it is that is at stake for the United States in any potential 
military intervention: what its objectives are and what resources the nation is 
willing to commit in order to achieve them. 
 
Having observed the lessons of Vietnam, it is time for us to move back to our 
case study of US policy towards the war in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995.  
We can identify two distinct types of interest the US had in the conflict in 
Bosnia.  The first type we can call security interests.  These would be issues 
that relate to the physical security of the United States and its allies.  The 
second type of issue the US finds itself taking an active interest in is what we 
could call humanitarian issues.  These were issues that could not be said to 
affect directly the physical security of either the US or its allies, but were rather 
problems of a moral or ethical nature.  These issues included such topics as 
refugees, the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians in a 
warzone.  US action on these issues was driven by a sense of moral revulsion 
and the urge to protect what were seen as innocent people caught in the middle 
of a particularly bloody conflict.  As we shall see throughout this chapter, the 
Administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton saw these issues in a 
slightly different light and gave significantly different weight to such issues at 
different times. 
 
We will look first at the security interests.  In order to fully understand these 
issues, it is important first to set the Bosnian conflict in its historical context. 
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The peoples of the former Yugoslavia had the uncommon bad luck that the 
conflict that tore their country apart took place during one of the most profound 
shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the twentieth century.  At the same time 
as Yugoslavia entered its final collapse, the Soviet Union, for forty years one 
of the worlds two Superpowers, was also entering its terminal decline.  As 
Steven Hurst observes in his history of George Bushs brief four years in 
office, Within a year of Bush coming to office, communist governments 
across Eastern Europe tumbled, the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War 
came to an end.22 
 
This impacted on the conflict in Yugoslavia in two ways: first, it meant that the 
Yugoslavian conflict was never more than halfway up US policymakers 
agenda.23  When compared to the collapse of a nuclear-armed superpower, the 
aftermath of the Gulf War,24 the reunification of a potential great power in 
Germany, and the potential breakthrough in the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  The problems of Yugoslavia, whilst tragic and certainly 
potentially dangerous for the peoples of the region, in the eyes of most of the 
senior members of the Bush Administration were simply not on the same scale.  
One of the everyday facts of life which are frequently overlooked in academic 
analyses is that policymakers are human beings, just like the rest of us, and 
                                                            
22 Steven Hurst. The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration. In Search of a New World 
Order (Cassell: London, 1999), p. 1. 
23 An illustration of where Yugoslavia fitted in the Bush Administrations overall scheme of 
priorities is given in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbotts At the Highest Levels. The 
Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (London: Warner Books, 1993), a book that deals with 
American foreign policy between 1988 and 1992 in great detail, Yugoslavia is only referenced 
four times, and doesnt reference Bosnia at all. Bushs own memoirs of the period, George 
Bush and Brent Scowcrofts A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), only 
references Yugoslavia four times and always in the context of its relationship with the Soviet 
Union.  
24 See Chapter Three. 
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even though it sounds trite it is still true to say that there are only so many 
hours in the day. Former Secretary of State James Baker makes this point in 
diplomatic yet clear fashion: 
 
The Yugoslav conflict had the potential to be intractable, but it was 
nonetheless a regional disputeThe greater threat to American interests 
at the time lay in the increasingly dicey situation in Moscow, and we 
preferred to maintain our focus on that challenge, which had global 
ramifications for us, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, in the summer of 1991, we were already consumed by the 
Middle East peace process and close to getting the parties to the table.25 
 
These unfortunate facts led to the second consequence of the timing of the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.  US policymakers tended to see events in 
Yugoslavia through the prism of how they would affect events in the Soviet 
Union rather than on their own merits.  This leads us to the first major security 
interest that the Bush Administration felt was at stake in the former 
Yugoslavia: For America could not appear to back a breakaway province in 
Yugoslavia without setting a dangerous precedent for a Soviet Union and 
Russia that might also splinter apart.26 
 
The nightmare scenario for the Bush Administration was that the Soviet Union 
would turn into Yugoslavia writ large. Just how aware the Bush Administration 
                                                            
25 James A. Baker, III with Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War 
and Peace, 1989-1992 (G.P. Putnams Sons: New York, 1995), p.636. 
26 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace. Bush, Clinton and the Generals (Bloomsbury: 
London, 2002), p.33. 
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was of this risk can be seen by the tone of the speech given by then Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger at Georgetown University in 
September of 1990: 
 
For all its risks and uncertainties, the Cold War was characterized by a 
remarkably stable and predictable set of relationships among the great 
powers. A sudden end to the East-West standoff could bring disorder, 
leading to government crackdowns, the reestablishment of dictatorships, 
and war.27  
 
Since its inception, the Soviet Union had always had to deal with the fact that it 
was a multi-national empire.28  Although in theory the Soviet Union was a 
federation of fifteen separate republics, in practice Soviet politics had always 
been managed hierarchically through the auspices of the Communist Party.  
Once the authority of the Party began to break down, the Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev was faced with increasing demands for autonomy and then 
independence from each of the republics.  From a US point of view, this was 
potentially hugely problematic.  First, if the Soviet Union fell apart, due to the 
nature of Soviet nuclear deployment, there would be at least three new nuclear 
armed states.29  Whether these newborn states could maintain the security of 
the newly endowed nuclear forces was an open question.  Even worse, the 
fifteen republics were not ethnically homogeneous.  There were large Russian 
                                                            
27 At the Highest Levels. p.106. 
28 For a discussion of how the Tsarist Empire was reconfigured as the Soviet Union see: 
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 1899-1919 (Harvill Press: London, 1997). 
29 The vast majority of Soviet ICBMs were located on Russian, Ukrainian and Kazak territory. 
See CIA World Fact Book 1990. http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext91/world12.txt. 
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minorities in several of the republics.30  Other republics also possessed 
significant non-Russian minorities within them.  In short, it was not difficult to 
imagine a whole range of scenarios which would lead to ethnic tension and 
potentially war between nuclear armed states. Therefore, the strong preference 
of the US was that the Soviet Union should continue to exist in some form.  
Ideally, this union would be democratic with a strong degree of federalism, but 
it would also hopefully be strong enough to maintain both a monopoly on 
armed force and the ability to arbitrate between different ethnic groups. 
 
The strong desire to keep the Soviet Union together inevitably had a major 
impact on US policy towards Yugoslavia.  The US could not find itself in the 
position of supporting the dissolution of Yugoslavia whilst at the same time 
trying to keep the Soviet Union together. Just how strong this desire was can be 
seen from the fact that as late as March 1991, a month after a hard line 
Communist coup attempt had failed, and only eight months before the final 
collapse of the Soviet Union, President Bush publically refused to even 
contemplate the possibility that the Soviet Union might collapse. The following 
quotation is taken from a response to a question during a press conference: 
 
Q. Could you tell me on the eve of the Secretary's trip to Moscow 
whether you think it's in your intention for your Administration now 
reach out in the Soviet Union individually to the Republics? And do you 
think that President Gorbachev's days are now numbered in power? 
                                                            
30 Principally, the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine and Georgia). See CIA 
World Fact Book 1990. http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext91/world12.txt. 
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The President. I will continue to deal with the President of the Soviet 
Union. That is the Government that's accredited, and that is the 
Government with which the United States Government will deal.31 
 
Consequently, throughout 1990 and 1991, the official US policy was to do 
everything possible to encourage the various parties within Yugoslavia that the 
best hope for the future was to reform the federation rather than to secede from 
it.    
 
In June of 1991, Secretary of State James Baker paid a one-day visit to 
Yugoslavia as part of a tour of Europe. Baker recounts the message he gave to 
all of Yugoslavias leaders as follows: 
 
Our critical interest in the Yugoslav question is its peaceful settlement. 
We will continue to oppose the use of force or intimidation to resolve 
political differences. Unilateral acts, I reiterated, would lead to disaster, 
a point I underscored with the Slovenians and Croatians. I also said that 
while we supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and existing 
republic borders and would not accept unilateral changes, the 
international community, of course, recognized that if the republics 
                                                            
31 The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada in Ottawa, 
March 13th, 1991. Public Papers of the President. George H. W. Bush. 1991 Volume 1, p.263. 
Available at 
http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=530871389297+7+1+0&
WAISaction=retrieve.  
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wanted to change borders by peaceful, consensual means, that was an 
altogether different matter.32 
 
It is here that we see the first example of a dichotomy that was to affect US 
policymaking in the former Yugoslavia from the beginning to the end of the 
conflict.  The lower down the policymaking hierarchy, the more focused US 
attention would become.  The staff of the State Department and the CIA that 
dealt most directly with Yugoslav matters felt that trying to hold the federation 
together at this point was a fools errand and that the better policy was to try 
and ensure the peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia.  The further up the 
policymaking ladder one moved, the less officials were concerned with the 
merits of a particular policy on Yugoslavia itself and the more concerned they 
became with the merits of Yugoslav policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
 
Here, we can make our first comment on the general nature of how one defines 
national interest.  What we can see in the Yugoslav case is that national 
interest is an almost entirely subjective evaluation, and that often different 
interpretations of national interest derive not from which bureaucracy one is 
a member of, as scholars like Graham Allison33 would have it, but rather from 
how far up the hierarchy of a particular organisation people sit.  A recurrent 
feature of US policy towards the former Yugoslavia was the extent to which 
the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA all found 
themselves engaged in huge internal disputes in Bosnia between those at the 
                                                            
32 The Politics of Diplomacy. p.480. 
33 See: Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, 
Brown & Co: Boston, 1971). 
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top of the organisation, whose responsibility was to try and look at the global 
impact of particular policies, and those at a more junior level, whose job was to 
execute policy and who were much closer to the peculiarities of the situation 
on the ground of the former Yugoslavia and who tended to look at US national 
interest in terms of the situation on the ground. As we have already seen, senior 
policy makers tended to look at Yugoslavia through the prism of what was 
happening in the Soviet Union, whereas a fairly junior State Department 
official like Stephen Walker who dealt with Yugoslav affairs through the 
Europe and Canada Bureaus of the State Department, could describe what was 
happening in Bosnia in the following apocalyptic terms:  
 
Here we are, almost fifty years after the holocaust, approaching the 21st 
century, and weve apparently learned nothing. We call it ethnic 
cleansing because it sounds nicer, but it is genocide. Genocide is taking 
place again in Europe and we  yes, you and I  are letting it happen. 
Actually, were not just letting it happen, were encouraging it, were 
encouraging the war criminals, the butchers, the rapists, we are 
responsible.34 
 
Here, I believe we can make a second generalisation about how US 
policymakers tend to view what is and is not in the United Statess vital 
national interest.  That is, that US policy tends to privilege relationships with 
its potential peers.  That is to say, Russia and China are potential or actual 
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superpowers, depending on how one defines that term:  George Bush was 
so knowledgeable about China, and so hands on in managing most aspects of 
our policy, that even some of our leading sinologists began referring to him as 
the governments desk officer for China.35 
 
And its policy towards regional or civil conflict between third parties tends to 
be strongly influenced by its relationship with the other major powers, in 
particular, is a conflict occurring either within the borders or close proximity of 
another major power? And second, are other superpowers intervening in a 
conflict, or is there any likelihood that they might?  In the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, the answers to these questions were that Yugoslavia was neither 
close enough to any other major power to risk spilling over the borders, and 
there was little prospect, despite occasional bluster to the contrary, that the 
Russian Federation would intervene in the former Yugoslavia if the US chose 
not to. 
 
The second major security interest driving US policy toward the former 
Yugoslavia was the desire to try and define a limit to US involvement in 
European affairs now that the Cold War had come to an end.  This is not to say 
that the US no longer felt it had any security interests in Europe; indeed, 
maintaining and possibly expanding NATO were seen as vital elements of US 
security policy.  However, both the Bush and Clinton Administrations did not 
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want the US to be seen as the worlds policeman with the moral responsibility 
to intervene to prevent every regional conflict that came along. The following 
quotation is an extract from George H W Bushs personal diary and comes in 
the middle of a passage written at the very start of the war between Serbia and 
Croatia: the concept that we have to work out every problem, everywhere in 
the world, is crazy. I think the American people understand it I dont think 
we can be looked to for solving every problem, every place in the world.36 
Married to this was the fact that it was very difficult for US policymakers to 
judge what exactly the stakes were in regional conflicts.  During the Cold War, 
US policy towards regional conflicts was centred on the idea of preventing or 
rebutting Soviet interference and stopping any attempt by the Eastern Bloc to 
widen its sphere of influence:  
 
But the importance of Somalia had for a time [been], for reasons that had 
absolutely nothing to do with the quality of life for the people there, 
greatly inflated by the Cold War, as if the outcome of what was always 
nothing more than their indigenous struggles would in some way 
determine a large, global struggle and show which of the two giant super 
powers held the key to the future.37   
 
However, with the demise of the Soviet Union leaving the US as the worlds 
only superpower, there was now no danger of Yugoslavia in any way altering a 
European balance of power that the US utterly dominated.  If conflicts such as 
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those in the former Yugoslavia were no longer going to have even a tangential 
effect on the balance of power, did the US have sufficient interest in ending the 
conflict to be willing to risk the lives of its own troops? 
 
US confusion over the stakes of the Yugoslav conflict was matched by a new 
determination on the part of the nations of the European Union (EU) to be 
more proactive in managing European security.  With the threat of the Soviet 
Union gone, European nations were now hoping that the time had come for 
them to take the lead in settling European conflicts, and that the time had come 
for the US not to completely disengage in Europe, but to step back from what 
many in Europe saw as its micromanaging and overbearing role in managing 
the security policy of Europe. David Halberstam describes this moment of 
European hubris as, 
 
the belief among different European powers that with the end of The 
Cold War this was their own special moment in history; whatever 
happened in Yugoslavia would be on their own terrain and therefore they 
could handle it. The Europeans, eager to show the force and muscle of a 
newly unified continent, were anxious to play a decisive role in this 
issue.38  
 
In short, the Yugoslav conflict occurred at a point in history where the US was 
keen to reduce its commitments in Europe and the major European powers felt 
that after 50 years of taking a back seat to the United States they would once 
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again be able to dominate their own continent.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that, until 1995, US policy was generally content to follow the lead set for it by 
the Europeans, principally Britain and France.  A good example of this trend 
would be the decision to recognise Bosnia and Croatia as independent states.  
On this issue, US Secretary of State James Baker made it clear that the US 
would only make a decision on granting recognition once the Europeans had 
made a decision: I told the President that wed need to work with the 
Europeans to maintain a collective non-recognition policy against any republic 
that unilaterally declared independence.39 
 
There is a third generalisation to be made at this point, which is that, for a 
variety of reasons, the US did not want to be seen as the worlds policeman.  
In some ways, the Cold War had dragged a nation that historically had been 
extremely wary of foreign entanglements to a position of global pre-eminence.  
Now that the Cold War had ended, there was a strong undercurrent in US 
politics, both on the left and the right, that it was time for the US to scale back 
its overseas commitments.  On the left, the end of the Cold War promised to 
free up both financial and political capital needed to enact political and social 
reform:  
 
If you think we need to continue to spend $160 billion to subsidize 
Europe's defense against the Soviet Union, or whatever it's called now, 
put your ballot in the Bush box. But if you believe like I do that Europe 
is strong enough and rich enough and powerful enough to defend itself, 
                                                            
39 The Politics of Diplomacy. p. 483. 
82 
 
 
and that we can take that wealth and invest it in better roads and mass 
transit and education and better health care for our people, you take your 
ballot and put it in the Harkin box and come home to the Democratic 
Party.40  
 
It should not be forgotten that whilst trying to deal with Yugoslavia Bill 
Clinton was also trying to pass one of the most ambitious pieces of domestic 
legislation ever written with his plan for healthcare reform.  The rightwing 
argument articulated by former Nixon speechwriter Patrick Buchanan in his 
unsuccessful campaign for the Republican nomination in 1992, was that the 
kind of activist foreign policy pursued during the Cold War had led to the 
inexorable growth of the state, rising taxation, and the neglect of American 
competitiveness in the global economy:  
 
The first challenge we face, then, is economic, presented by the rise of a 
European super state and a dynamic Asia led by Japan. The 20th Century 
was the American Century, but they intend to make the 21st, the century 
of Europe or the Century of Asia. So, as we Americans congratulate one 
another on the victory for freedom that we, first and foremost, won, and 
won together for all mankind in the Cold War, we must begin to prepare 
for the new struggles already underway.41  
                                                            
40 This quote is taken from Senator Tom Harkin (Democrat-Iowa), announcing the start of his 
campaign for the Democrat nomination in 1992. The full text of this speech can be found at: 
http://www.4president.org/speeches/tomharkin1992announcement.htm. 
 
41 Quote taken from Patrick Buchanans speech announcing his intention to seek the 
Republican Presidential nomination, delivered on December 10th, 1991. Full text available at: 
http://www.4president.org/speeches/buchanan1992announcement.htm. 
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This message, the last point in particular, had a great deal of resonance at a 
time when the US was gradually losing pre-eminence in the global economy to 
Japan and Germany: The budget deficit was growing larger every year, as was 
the trade imbalance with Japan. Ordinary people who did not usually monitor 
such economic trends felt squeezed and believed they were working harder and 
harder just to stand still.42  
 
There was a great deal of superficial appeal in the argument that whilst the US 
had protected its Allies for the past 50 years, the nations of Europe and Asia 
had effectively taken advantage of the US by getting a free ride when it came 
to paying for their own defence and that, in return for US protection, they had 
pursued trade policies that directly damaged the US economy, and in particular 
that these policies had done enormous damage to the manufacturing base in the 
United States.  Although in this passage I have used the figures of Harkin and 
Buchanan because they were politicians seeking office during the Yugoslav 
crisis, both Harkin and Buchanan represent and are spokesmen for points of 
view that recur time and time again in debates over the direction of US foreign 
policy. 
 
Those such as George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton once he was in office who 
still wished to maintain the pre-eminence of US foreign policy had to be aware 
of the dangers posed to this policy from both left and right.  Therefore, both the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations took exceptional care to demonstrate to the 
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public at every available opportunity that the US would not and could not be 
expected to deal with every conflict in the world on its own, and also both 
Administrations took care to try and make sure that when the US did decide to 
intervene in regional conflicts such as Bosnia and Somalia, that it did so in the 
context of multinational missions that had UN approval. In answer to a 
question about why the US had not taken stronger action in the former 
Yugoslavia, President Bush responded as follows: 
 
I think the sanctions -- I'm not prepared to give up on the sanctions at all. 
They've only been in effect for a few days. As you know, first on this 
question of Yugoslavia, out in front was the United Nations. You had 
Cyrus Vance as a representative of the United Nations, did a superb job 
trying to negotiate, ably supplemented, I might say, by Peter Carrington. 
They tried to work that problem, had our full support.43 
 
The same point was perhaps made more bluntly by a senior official of the 
incoming Clinton Administration speaking on background before a visit by 
President Mitterrand of France. The question being answered is why the US 
had stopped trying to set up a no-fly zone in Bosnia?  
 
Well, we haven't given up at all. We have not yet convinced our partners 
that a no-fly zone enforcement resolution should be adopted by the 
Security Council, and I think perhaps the President and President 
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Mitterrand will be discussing that tomorrow. It's not a unilateral action 
that the United States can take.44 
 
On technical grounds this argument is clearly nonsense.  The US, with 
relatively minor assistance from the British, was able to enforce two no-fly 
zones in Iraq for twelve years. Therefore the senior Administration official 
can only be referring to the fact that the US would, on political grounds, rather 
not be seen as acting unilaterally. 
 
This kind of multilateral approach was seen as a way of being able to pursue 
US policy in a way that spread the cost and responsibility for intervention.  It 
also dealt with the second problem.  The US feared that if it did become seen 
as a global policeman this would inevitably lead to resentment by other 
nations, who could see the US as throwing its weight around and potentially, 
over time, come to see the US as an overgrown global bully. US political 
commentator Joe Klein, writing on Bill Clintons foreign policy, makes the 
following observation: he also understood the long-term value of 
diplomatic humility, of not making unnecessary enemies, of pursuing 
American interests within the context of multilateral organizations.45  
 
The perception of not wanting to be seen as a bully was particularly acute in its 
relationship with Russia and China, as these nations saw themselves as equals 
                                                            
44 Background briefing by Senior Administration Official, March 8th 1993. Full text can be 
found at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59988&st=bosnia&st1=european+union. 
45 Joe Klein. The Natural. The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton (Hodder and 
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on the world stage to the US.  The Russians in particular had a hard time 
dealing with the fact that the Russian Federation was no longer in the same 
league as the old Soviet Union.  Therefore, from the perspective of the Bush 
and Clinton Administrations, it made good long-term strategic sense for the US 
to be seen as acting in concert with other nations and sensitive to their 
opinions, particularly to those nations who could in the future become potential 
rivals.  The problem with this attitude is that, when no consensus for a 
particular action existed, what started out as a policy of seeking collective 
action became paralysis.  Also, despite the fact that the many nations would 
bemoan unilateral US action, they had become used to the idea that the US 
would take a lead on issues and that they would position themselves in 
response to what the US did:  
 
The Europeans were unaccustomed to signature American diplomats 
consulting in this manner. They were accustomed to someone like 
George Shultz or James Baker telling them in a nice way that brooked 
little disagreement what the United States of America intended to do.46   
 
When the US did not act unilaterally but sought to engage them in collective 
action, this reflex of responding to US policy was no longer available, and that 
in turn led to a great deal of resentment.  After all, the US is the superpower; 
they are supposed to take a lead. 
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We will now move on to look at the humanitarian interests that the US had in 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.  
 
Because Yugoslavia had been such an ethnically heterogeneous state, there 
were substantial minorities of Serbs living in both Bosnia and Croatia, and a 
substantial Croat minority living in Bosnia. The leaders of these groups did not 
see why Bosnia should be allowed to exercise its right to be independent of 
Yugoslavia, while the Bosnian government blocked their right to be 
independent of a Bosnian state in which they were going to be minorities. As 
Milan Martiþ, a prominent Serb separatist in Croatia put it, What cannot be 
bought is our Serb dignity. We would rather go hungry, as long as we are 
together with out Serb people. We will eat potatoes and husks, but we will be 
on the side of our people. We will remain human.47  
 
The aim therefore for both Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Croats was to carve 
ethnically homogenous states out of Bosnia which could then become parts of 
Serbia and Croatia. The inevitable consequence of these war aims was that a 
great deal of the violence in the former Yugoslavia was directed against 
civilians. As Laura Silber and Alan Little put it, Bosnian refugees were not, 
the tragic by-product of a civil war; their expulsion was the whole point of the 
war.48 The conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia gave the world the term ethnic 
cleansing; what this euphemistic term meant in practice was the forced 
deportation of non-Serb (and to a lesser extent non-Croat) populations from 
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their homes, and a systematic attempt to destroy any trace that Muslims or 
Croats had ever lived in a particular area. To this end, churches, mosques, and 
other sites of cultural significance were destroyed, along with property deeds, 
or any document that could prove ownership of land.49 Aside from these forced 
deportations, rape was used as a weapon of war, both to terrify people into 
leaving an area faster, and to try to destroy the Bosnian Muslims and the Kraija 
Croats as distinct ethnic groups.  
 
These atrocities were unusually well reported. Those perpetrating the atrocities 
took remarkably little concern to conceal what they were doing, the massive 
movement of refugees allowed easy access to witnesses, and several reporters, 
most notably Newsdays Roy Gutman and John Burns of the New York Times, 
wrote extensively on war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, indeed 
Gutman won the 1993 Pulitzer Prize for his reporting. The following quotation 
is taken from one of Gutmans articles headlined Ethnic Cleansing: Yugoslavs 
Try to Deport 1,800 Muslims to Hungary: In a practice not seen in Europe 
since the end of World War II, the Serbian-led government of Yugoslavia 
chartered an 18-car train last week in an attempt to deport the entire population 
of a Muslim village to Hungary.50  
 
Burns even managed to interview a handful of the soldiers responsible for acts 
of ethnic cleansing. The following quotation is taken from one of Burns 
interviews with a Bosnian-Serb soldier called Borislav Herak:  
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In the killing techniques he claimed to have used, including throat-cutting 
and machine-gunning, and in the apparently casual and random fashion 
in which most of his victims were selected, the young Serb's story closely 
matched accounts by thousands of Muslims who managed to escape 
Serbian offensives in the last 12 months.51 
 
As well as this media coverage, the US Government was extremely well 
informed about what was going on. The CIA in particular was able to give 
policy makers an almost minute by minute chronology of certain instances of 
ethnic cleansing. To say nothing of the fact that US Embassy officials and 
NGO workers had exactly the same access to refugees that the press did. David 
Halberstam quotes John Fox, who in the summer of 1992 was a junior member 
of the State Departments policy planning staff: There was a network of us, 
working for different agencies both in and out of government, sharing 
information and keeping each other tuned. And we had a lot of information 
very much like that which Gutman came up with about the camps and the 
atrocities.52 
 
The reaction of the US Government to these events can tell us a great deal 
about where humanitarian interests fall in the scale of national interests. 
Although both the Bush and Clinton Administrations were by no means 
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indifferent to ethnic cleansing, both Administrations consistently condemned it 
and both supported the creation of a War Crimes Tribunal.  Neither Bush nor 
Clinton ultimately sanctioned military intervention in order to prevent ethnic 
cleansing, although there is an important distinction to be drawn between these 
two Administrations. The Bush Administration was quite clear that although 
what was happening in the former Yugoslavia was deplorable and ought to be 
stopped, it was not sufficiently important to the US that it would justify the use 
of force. The way the Bush Administration seems to have viewed the former 
Yugoslavia is that although it was an important issue, it never quite passed the 
threshold of importance for military action to be seriously considered: There 
was never any thought at that time of using U.S. ground troops in Yugoslavia - 
the American people would never have supported it.53 
 
The Clinton Administration, although it did not commit to military action for 
purely humanitarian reasons, did weight the importance of humanitarian 
interests slightly differently to the Bush Administration. In stark contrast to 
Bakers standoffish attitude, Clintons Ambassador to the United Nations 
Madeleine Albright seemed in the early stages of the Administration to be 
almost evangelical about peacekeeping:  
 
The decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow 
Somalia to fall back into the abyss or to stay the course and help lift the 
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country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an 
emerging democracy. For Somalia's sake, and ours, we must persevere.54 
 
Although Clinton himself came to office without having particularly strong 
convictions on foreign policy in general, after listening to Congressman Lee 
Hamilton (Democrat-Indiana), Chair of the House Foreign Relations 
Committee, outlined some of the problems the new Administration faced, 
Clintons reply was, Lee, I just went through the whole campaign and no one 
talked about foreign policy at all, except for a few members of the press.55  
 
Several senior members of the Administration, in particular Vice President Al 
Gore, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and UN Ambassador 
Madeleine Albright, had taken a keen interest in the former Yugoslavia and 
were prepared to see the US take some sort of military action in order to 
alleviate the situation:  
 
There are people on his staff who just want to go ahead and bomb, and 
damn the consequences, said one deputy. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher was opposed, at least initially, to military action. Defense 
Secretary Les Aspin favoured action, but only with a clear-cut objective 
he could sell the chiefs, especially Powell.56 
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However, even the most hawkish elements of the Clinton Administration were 
only prepared to contemplate a very limited range of military action; in 
particular no-one at senior level advocated the large scale deployment of 
ground forces. Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant General Gordon 
Sullivan, accurately described the attitude of the Clinton Administration and its 
effect on the European allies: The Europeans were looking for leadership 
from the United States. With troops on the ground. And it was not forthcoming. 
Only air.57 This immediately touched off fierce resistance on the part of the 
Military and particularly on the part of Colin Powell.58 In the end the Clinton 
Administration came to the conclusion that the case for military intervention in 
Bosnia was not strong enough to overcome the resistance of the Military 
domestically or, just as importantly, of its European allies who had troops on 
the ground as part of a humanitarian and peace-keeping mission, and it feared 
retribution should the US undertake military action.  
 
What one can see from the Bosnian case study is not that the US is indifferent 
to violations of human rights, or that it is prepared to look the other way when 
war crimes are being committed, but that there is a distinct limit on what US 
policy makers are prepared to contemplate in order to stop such acts. The US 
under both a Republican and Democratic Administration, putting different 
emphases on the importance of human rights, came to the conclusion that they 
could not justify a military intervention in the former Yugoslavia on 
humanitarian grounds alone, despite the fact that the US could not claim to be 
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ignorant of the enormous scale of the suffering being inflicted mostly on a 
civilian population.    
 
The second humanitarian interest we can detect in US policy towards the 
former Yugoslavia is in a sense a negative one. During the Cold War both the 
US and the USSR had to weigh up the likely response of the other superpower 
should they choose to intervene in regional or civil conflicts. Superpower 
intervention always carried with it the risk that the other superpower would 
engage in counter-intervention. This was no longer a realistic prospect, as 
President Clinton put it in his address at the American University,  
 
The Soviet Union itself has disintegrated. The nuclear shadow is receding 
in the face of the START I and START II agreements and others that we 
have made and others yet to come. Democracy is on the march 
everywhere in the world. It is a new day and a great moment for 
America.59  
 
The US was now free to shape policy without the realistic threat that it would 
trigger a superpower standoff. By the end of the Cold War, the US stood as 
indisputably the strongest military power in the world and remained the 
lynchpin of a Western economic system that now dominated the globe. The 
point to be noted here is that there was nothing standing in the way of US 
intervention in the former Yugoslavia except the attitude of US policy makers 
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themselves. Because of all of these factors, wars in the former Yugoslavia 
presented a situation not only of exceptional human suffering, but also a 
situation where the US had every opportunity and every capability to prevent 
suffering. In other words, many people when faced with the question Why 
should we intervene in the former Yugoslavia?, came to the conclusion, 
Because we can.  
 
Not only did the demise of the Soviet Union remove one of the principal 
reasons why US intervention in civil conflicts has been potentially 
geopolitically risky, it also, at a stroke, removed the rationale that had 
underpinned US foreign and defence policy for fifty years. Ever since the end 
of the Second World War, US policy had been built around how the US was 
going to deal with the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War had been a time of 
great international tension it had also served as a very effective organisational 
principle for US and to an extent Western, foreign policy: 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the international order 
forever The rise of a global economy has changed the linkages 
between our domestic and our foreign policies and, I would argue to you, 
has made them indivisible. In a time of dramatic global change we must 
define America's broader purposes anew.60  
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 Policy was built around the need to contain Soviet expansionism, and prevent 
nuclear war, and grudgingly to try and reduce and then reverse, the nuclear 
arms race.  David Halberstam succinctly sums up the task facing the Cold War 
foreign policy establishment. They had come of age when you inherited a 
difficult, divided world, and if all went well during your tour of office, you 
handed to your successor a difficult, divided world.61 Now that the Soviet 
Union was gone, there seemed to be no organising principle behind foreign 
policy, there seemed to be no criteria against which to judge how the US 
should respond.  
 
The wars in the former Yugoslavia seem to offer one potential rationale for 
future foreign policy and that was to use the extraordinary power that the US 
had at that point in history, to try to create a more stable and a more just world 
order: 
  
Today, our policies must also focus on relations within nations, on a 
nation's form of governance, on its economic structure, on its ethnic 
tolerance. These are of concern to us, for they shape how these nations 
treat their neighbors as well as their own people and whether they are 
reliable when they give their word. In particular, democracies are far less 
likely to wage war on other nations than dictatorships are.62 
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In particular there was an argument that the UN could now be used as its 
authors had initially intended it should be used, as a genuine instrument of 
collective security. There was a strong argument that what was happening in 
Bosnia contravened the 1948 genocide convention63 which, simply put, placed 
an obligation on all signatories to do all in their power to prevent genocide 
taking place. The argument was made that if the US allowed what was 
happening in Bosnia to take place unchallenged, it would set the worst possible 
example for what the new post Cold War world might look like. What was 
going on in Bosnia may not have been a direct threat to the security of the 
United States, but it was certainly a direct threat to any aspiration to build a 
more just world now that the Cold War was over.  
 
These arguments are nothing new in debates over how the US should frame its 
interests. Rhetorically, the United States has always liked to see itself as a 
nation apart, as the worlds preeminent democracy and a source of hope and 
inspiration for the rest of the world. At least since Thomas Paine and the 
French Revolution this self-image has gone hand in hand with the idea that the 
US should use its power to help the spread of its ideals. As Ronald Reagan put 
it, We--today's living Americans--have in our lifetime fought harder, paid a 
higher price for freedom and done more to advance the dignity of man than any 
people who have ever lived on this Earth.64  More recently, during the Cold 
                                                            
63 For the text of the convention, see: http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html. Also see 
Samantha Power,  A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide  (Flamingo: 
London, 2003), chapters 1 and 2, for a discussion of how the convention came about and the 
arguments over its drafting.  
64 Ronald Reagan. Remarks announcing candidacy for the Republican Presidential Nomination, 
November 13th, 1979. Full text available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76116&st=city+on+a+hill&st1=. 
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War, a significant section of US elite opinion favoured a policy not of 
containment towards the Soviet Union but a policy ending in nothing less that 
the destruction of Communism and the liberation of Eastern Europe: By 
contrast many of the Reagan people had cared not just about national security 
but rather which side was right and which side was wrong.65 
 
This idealism does not sit well with the rest of the Powell Doctrine. By 
definition, if your aim is the continuous spread of democracy and the American 
ideal of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, there is no exit strategy, there 
will always be new challenges for the US to overcome by force. Second, 
although rhetorically the objective of this kind of foreign policy is clear, on a 
more practical level there are a number of important questions that this kind of 
idealistic foreign policy leaves unanswered. First, is the spreading of 
democracy the same thing as spreading American style, institutions and the 
notion of a capitalist, property owning, democratic system? And if so, how do 
you deal with the inevitable clash once these institutions are introduced into 
areas of the world that are outside of their cultural frame of reference? Also, 
the Powell Doctrines demand for continued public and Congressional support 
could be difficult to satisfy in the context of commitments which are difficult 
to justify in the absence of a direct threat to the security of the nation. As Colin 
Powell put it, even though the Military occasionally has to operate in unclear 
circumstances: 
 
                                                            
65 War in a Time of Peace. Pp.58-59.  
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Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are 
not always possible. So you bet I get nervous when so-called experts 
suggest that all we need is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. 
When the desired result isn't obtained, a new set of experts then comes 
forward with talk of a little escalation. History has not been kind to this 
approach.66 
 
Also, here we see two different concepts of the national interest in direct 
competition with one another. On the one hand, we have the desire mentioned 
earlier that the US should not find itself in a position of having to play the 
worlds policeman.  On the other hand, we see a desire to be seen as a force for 
good in the world. In the context of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, this 
contradiction tended to play itself out as a situation in which US rhetoric, both 
under Bush and Clinton, tended to outrun US actions. Time and again, both the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations would in the strongest possible terms 
condemn what was happening in the former Yugoslavia. The following 
quotation from a news conference President Bush gave in August 1992 is fairly 
typical of Bush and Clintons rhetoric towards what was happening in Bosnia:  
 
Like all Americans, I am outraged and horrified at the terrible violence 
shattering the lives of innocent men, women, and children in Bosnia. The 
aggressors and extremists pursue a policy, a vile policy, of ethnic 
                                                            
66 Colin Powell. Why Generals get Nervous. New York Times, published Thursday October 
8th 1992. Full text available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/08/opinion/why-generals-get-
nervous.html. 
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cleansing, deliberately murdering innocent civilians, driving others from 
their homes.67   
 
However, neither the Bush nor the Clinton Administration demonstrated any 
willingness to actually do anything to reverse it. In this context, the discussion 
of whether what was happening in Bosnia was sufficiently serious to be called 
genocide is extremely interesting. Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations 
went to great lengths to avoid using the term genocide, or, if they did use the 
word, they went to great lengths to ensure that it was modified, i.e. acts of 
genocide, acts tantamount to genocide, but never just the word genocide on its 
own. This is because, if the US admitted there was genocide and then did 
nothing about it, not only would it be violating its treaty commitments, but, on 
a more fundamental level, it would be violating its sense of itself as a just 
nation. As the former Yugoslavia Desk Officer Richard Johnson points out, 
admitting an unqualified genocide was taking place in Bosnia would have 
produced, more  political pressure to take effective action, including the use 
of force, to end and punish the genocide.68  
 
In the title of this chapter we used the phrase vital national interest, rather 
than national interest. This is a distinction that Powell himself uses when 
                                                            
67 George H. W. Bush, Remarks on the situation in Bosnia and an exchange with reporters in 
Colorado Springs. August 6th 1992. Public Papers of the President. 1992-3, Book II. Full text 
available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21303&st=bosnia&st1=genocide. 
68 The Conceit of Innocence, p.67. 
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talking about the doctrine in his 1992 Foreign Affairs article,69 and so it is to 
the issue of what constitutes vital interest that we now turn our attention.  
 
The first thing to be said is that vital-ness is not a fixed concept. What looks 
vital in one moment may not under shifting circumstances remain vital for 
long. Powells successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John 
Shalikashvili summed up the issue rather well: 
 
This is no longer a world where you limit yourself to vital interests. 
Today, we protect our interests when they are threatened in order to 
shape the environment to ensure that what develops is in accord with our 
goals, using American military forces in situations when lesser interests 
are threatened so they dont grow.70 
 
As we can see by looking at the Yugoslav case study, the opposite is also true.  
What looks like a peripheral interest at one point can, under changing 
circumstances, come to look vital relatively quickly. For example, in 1992 the 
Bush Administration saw its policy towards the former Yugoslavia largely in 
the context of what it considered to be its much more important relationship 
with the Soviet Union and the newly born Russian Federation. By 1995, only 
three years later, the Clinton Administration saw the situation in Bosnia as a 
key test case in forming the shape of a post-Cold War world. These differences 
can partly be ascribed to the different world views of the Bush and Clinton 
                                                            
69 Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges ahead, Foreign Affairs, 71(5), (1992), Pp.32-45.  
70 William Shawcross, Deliver us from Evil. Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless 
Conflict (Bloomsbury.: London, 2001), p.213. 
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Administrations discussed above. But they are also in large part due to 
changing international circumstances which altered the relative priorities of the 
United States. 
 
To offer just a brief list of these changes in international circumstances should 
suffice to make the point. With the deployment of a largely European peace-
keeping force into Bosnia and parts of Croatia, the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia had taken on the dimensions of an Inter-allied problem as most of 
the USs allies had committed peace-keeping forces. This would be a 
demonstration of when the dimensions of other states can be perceived to alter 
what counts as vital or not vital. Changing public awareness can also help 
decide vital-ness. In 1992 Yugoslavia was a side story in a time of profound 
change to the political landscape of the world with the end of the Cold War. By 
1995, because of the horrific humanitarian situation discussed above, the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia had become one of the leading foreign news stories in 
the United States and both public and elite opinion were now much more aware 
of the situation and much more vocal in demanding that the United States take 
action to improve it. Likewise, as the Clinton Administration was gearing up 
for re-election in 1995,71 it was acutely aware that foreign policy was not a 
highlight of the record of its first term in office. Being able to come up with a 
durable peace in the former Yugoslavia was seen as essential if the Clinton 
Administration wanted to portray itself as successful when it came to issues of 
foreign policy. Importantly, here we can see that vital-ness of an interest may 
                                                            
71 For a discussion of how Bosnia and foreign policy in general became election issues in 1996, 
see: Bob Woodward, The Choice (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1996).  
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easily bleed over into general political perceptions of the strength and 
competence of an Administration, even if the issue itself does not directly 
threaten the security of the United States.72  
 
The issue of vital-ness, as well as being in a state of constant flux, is also a 
matter of deeply subjective judgement at any given time. Certainly in the case 
of the former Yugoslavia, this subjective judgement as was briefly discussed 
above was, to a great extent, shaped by the person making it in the 
bureaucracies of the State Department, National Security Council and the 
Department of Defence. Those at the highest level of policy making have to 
consider the global and interlinked nature of the decisions that they make, for 
example what was the likely effect of US policy towards the former 
Yugoslavia on US policy towards the former Soviet Union, and was policy in 
one area likely to help or hinder the execution of policy in another area. On the 
other hand, those at a more junior level tend to see the daily impact of a policy 
on the ground in a particular country or region. In other words, as one moves 
down the bureaucratic ladder, officials are more likely to see vital US national 
interest in terms of its effect on a particular country or region rather than in 
global terms.  
 
Also, US policy towards the former Yugoslavia was marked by the interesting 
phenomenon that State Department officials, as a rule, tended to be more 
hawkish than those in the Department of Defense. It is not easy to pin down 
                                                            
72 For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of the Clinton Administrations policy towards 
Bosnia, see: Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a War. Rev. ed. (Modern Library: New York, 
1999).  
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any particular reason why this was so although certainly it was true that there 
were many more people at a senior level in the military and in the Department 
of Defense that had had some firsthand experience of the war in Vietnam, than 
there were in the State Department. What we can say for sure is that the 
subjective judgements of policy makers as to whether or not what was 
happening in the former Yugoslavia constituted a vital national interest, were 
by and large conditioned by the level of seniority they held in the policy 
making process and also it is possible that their perceptions were influenced by 
the point in time at which they entered the policy making process. What is 
certain is that Colin Powell was less than impressed with the coherence of the 
policy making process under his new boss Bill Clinton, the discussions 
continued to meander like graduate-student bull sessions or the think-tank 
seminars in which many of my new colleagues had spent the last twelve years 
while their party was out of power.73 
 
Equally, when writing his biography between 1994 and 1995, Powell was 
sceptical that any US president would ever decide that what was happening in 
Bosnia would constitute vital national interest:  
 
The west has wrung its hands over Bosnia, but has not been able to find 
its vital interests or matching commitment. No American President could 
defend to the American people the heavy sacrifice of lives it would cost 
to resolve this baffling conflict. Nor could a President likely sustain the 
                                                            
73 My American Journey, p.560. 
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long-term involvement necessary to keep the protagonists from going at 
each others throats all over again at the first opportunity.74 
 
Interestingly, Powells very gloomy prognosis was proved wrong, the Dayton 
Accords have, to date, managed to keep the peace in Bosnia, and indeed at the 
time of writing there is even the suggestion that Bosnia may join the European 
Union at some date in the not too distant future. 
 
We will now move on to look at how the different conceptions of national 
interest we have laid out in this chapter sit with the rest of the Powell Doctrine. 
We will again begin by looking at the security interests laid out at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
 
If we look first at our generalisation that the US tends to privilege its 
relationships with the other potential great powers and its possible competitors, 
this certainly has implications for the need to gain and hold public and 
Congressional support because it should be relatively straightforward to 
explain why maintaining good relations with other potential superpowers is 
important to the US. These potential superpowers constitute the only really 
plausible threat to the United States in the traditional geopolitical battlefield 
over relations between sovereign states. Therefore, it should be a relatively 
simple matter for politicians to be able to explain to the general public why 
these relationships are important, why it is in the USs interests to maintain 
them. Also, the benefits of maintaining stable relations between the US and 
                                                            
74 Ibid., p.562. 
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potential competitors are relatively tangible and easy to demonstrate in terms 
of maintaining peace between nuclear armed powers, and in terms of the 
opportunities for expanded trade and economic relations. These are all issues 
around which it ought to be possible to shape and maintain a relatively stable 
political consensus.  
 
The distinction in opinions between different levels of policy makers could 
also potentially be explained in terms of maintaining public and Congressional 
support. The higher up the policy making process one goes, the more ones 
position is dependent upon public support. The lower to mid levels of the State 
and Defense Department are by and large staffed by career officials who 
remain in their jobs regardless of which party is in power. As such they are 
relatively impervious to public opinion and also relatively anonymous. At the 
higher levels of the State and Defense Department officials rotate in and out of 
office depending on the results of elections. It is therefore essential for them to 
maintain public and Congressional support in order to win elections and 
maintain themselves in office. Also, the higher one moves up the policy 
making chain the more known one becomes to the public at large and the more 
public opinion turns against a particular policy the more likely you are to come 
up against extremely public criticism.  
 
This is most acutely true of presidents themselves. Not only is holding onto 
public support vital to maintaining themselves in office in the short and 
medium term, being able to say that their policies emerged as a result of public 
consensus is also important in terms of maintaining their historical reputation. 
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Presidents that are seen to have divided the nation, particularly if it turns out 
that their policies were not successful, are generally not fondly remembered by 
historians. In the case of Yugoslavia, George Bush was himself a keen amateur 
historian and had a very definite sense of how he wanted to be remembered by 
history. He most certainly did not want to be remembered as a President who 
divided a nation to go to war three times in one term in office.75  
 
In terms of the need for overwhelming force, again the security interests that 
we looked at earlier in this chapter would seem to have a better fit to the 
Powell Doctrine than the humanitarian interests. Because the whole rationale 
behind intervention on humanitarian grounds is to eliminate or at least 
drastically reduce human suffering, the logical coda to that is that you cannot 
use more force in an intervention than was already present in the situation as it 
stood, lest you make the situation worse and undermine the whole purpose of 
intervention in the first place. Not only does humanitarian intervention place a 
premium on the amount of force it is logically consistent to use, it also requires 
force being delivered with a high degree of accuracy, so that those causing 
humanitarian suffering are the ones that feel the consequences of any use of 
force. Time and again in the debates on whether to use force in The Former 
Yugoslavia it was argued that the use of force would exacerbate an already 
intolerable situation for the civilian population. One could argue that this 
argument, based on the limited utility of force in humanitarian interventions, 
could break down in a case of humanitarian suffering on such an overwhelming 
scale that no amount of damage inflicted by military intervention could make 
                                                            
75 The other two occasions being the US invasion of Panama and the Gulf War.  
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the situation any worse than it already is. This argument has two major flaws to 
it. First, whilst it might be easy to identify such cases of overwhelming human 
suffering in hindsight, governments have to deal with such situations in real 
time, and with necessarily limited information. Therefore it is not a 
straightforward process to clearly identify situations in which military 
intervention will clearly and unambiguously not make the humanitarian 
situation worse. Second, if military intervention is being undertaken 
exclusively to prevent humanitarian suffering, even if one accepts that a large 
scale use of force would not make the humanitarian situation worse, one could 
still argue that the inevitable destruction caused by any large military 
intervention makes those intervening at least partially responsible for causing 
the human suffering that their intervention was meant to prevent. 
 
Overwhelming force also fits in with the idea of the security interests discussed 
earlier in this chapter in that, in viewing national interests though the prism of 
security interests, one is more likely to see force as an instrument used by one 
state against another. This gives you an obvious set of targets against which 
overwhelming force can be used. It also assumes that the damage inflicted by 
overwhelming force would be enough to compel an enemy state into altering 
its behaviour. On the other hand, the humanitarian interests this chapter has 
looked at posit that it is legitimate for the US to intervene forcefully in civil 
wars. Here we see the enemy not as another state but as a civilian population 
that contains enemy elements. As can be seen by the US experience in 
Vietnam, the use of overwhelming force can have unintended and indeed 
counterproductive consequences. In particular it can create a situation in which 
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the civilian population is in fact more rather than less sympathetic towards the 
enemy. When considering the possible use of air strikes against the Bosnian 
Serbs, the US Air Force was relatively confident that taking out conventional 
Serb forces would be a relatively straightforward proposition. Their fear was 
that the temptation would then be for the Serbs to break their main force units 
into smaller guerrilla elements and continue the war intermingled with a 
sympathetic Bosnian Serb population that felt itself to be under attack by the 
West. Those opposed to air strikes never tired of reminding the world that 
Bosnia had been the site of a long, bitter and extremely bloody guerrilla war 
during the Second World War, and that the Serbs in particular had a reputation 
for being excellent guerrilla fighters.  
 
The Powell Doctrine will also be more sympathetic to a conception of national 
interests based on the security paradigm outlined earlier in this chapter on the 
grounds that the security paradigm clearly delineates clear objectives. 
Humanitarian objectives are by their very definition difficult to limit both 
temporally and specially. The time limit to a humanitarian operation is 
however long it takes to alleviate the suffering of a population. First, this is 
dependent on a number of factors beyond military control, such as weather, 
infrastructure and the cooperation of the local population. Second, the extent to 
which a situation can said to have been improved enough to allow the 
withdrawal of forces is a deeply subjective one and there is the constant 
temptation to expand the mission to achieve ever more ambitious goals. In the 
case of the Former Yugoslavia, military policy makers strongly did not want to 
repeat the experience of Somalia, where US forces had originally been 
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deployed to facilitate the delivery of food aid and the mission had gradually 
expanded until it included restoring a legitimate Somali government. It is 
difficult to spatially limit humanitarian operations because once you concede 
the point that humanitarian motives are justification enough for a military 
intervention, then as a matter of moral principle that justification holds true 
wherever and whenever there is judged to be a humanitarian crisis. This links 
back to the point made earlier in this chapter about the Bush and Clinton 
Administrations not wanting the US to be seen as the worlds policeman. 
Equally they did not want the US to be seen as the worlds nanny, a 
superpower on call to solve the worlds humanitarian ills. Yet once you accept 
humanitarianism as a motive anywhere, it is hard to rationally reject it as a 
motive to intervene everywhere.  
 
The above discussion should also make it clear that intervention on 
humanitarian grounds also makes the task of defining a clear well-defined exit 
strategy difficult. First, because it is difficult to draw a line as to exactly how 
much humanitarian suffering it is the responsibility of the US to prevent. For 
example, in the case of Somalia, the initial US intervention did prevent 
widespread famine, by ensuring that food reached those in greatest need. 
However this did nothing to solve the underlying problems of Somalia, 
principally, the lack of any kind of governing authority. Once the initial task of 
preventing famine had been achieved, there was a great temptation to try and 
expand the US mission to try and overcome the long-term problems facing 
Somalia, rather than just alleviating short-term suffering. Second, even if US 
forces were successful in re-establishing order and ensuring a humane standard 
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of living for the inhabitants of somewhere such as Bosnia, Somalia or Haiti, 
there is no way of knowing what will happen once US troops leave. After all, 
left to their own devices, these states had for all intents and purposes imploded, 
resulting in respectively, civil war, famine and dictatorship. There is a strong 
temptation in such an environment to say that once US forces have established 
order, it would be a good idea to keep them there. Part of the US Militarys 
reluctance to get involved in the Balkans was based on the fear that any 
commitment would turn into a completely open-ended venture that would last 
for decades. The US Military did not want to find itself in the same position the 
UN has found itself in Cyprus, a situation where outside military forces have 
effectively become a permanent part of the political landscape, unwilling to 
stay, yet unable to leave for the fear that any exit would lead to renewed 
violence. 
 
What we have seen in this chapter is that there is no single set of ideas and 
concepts that add up to some kind of permanent and magisterial concept known 
as the national interest. What there is, are different competing assumptions 
and world views that at any one time may legitimately call themselves 
national interests. We have seen that these concepts can be shaped by 
proximity to particular issues, by political affiliation, and by media and public 
perception. We have also seen that the Powell Doctrine sits most comfortably 
with notions of national interest that define the concept quite narrowly in terms 
of interstate relations and, particularly from an American point of view, 
relations from actual or potential peer-competitors.  Finally, we have seen that 
with the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of civil conflict and 
111 
 
 
humanitarian catastrophe, it has become increasingly difficult, in the face of a 
globalised media, to maintain this narrowly statist concept of national interest.  
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Chapter 3  The Use of Force Must be Overwhelming1 
 
The facts of war are often in total opposition to the facts of peace 
The efficient commander does not seek to use just enough means, but an 
excess of means. A military force that is just strong enough to take a 
position will suffer heavier casualties in doing so; a force vastly superior 
to the enemys will do the job without serious loss of men.
2
 
 
The first Persian Gulf War of 1990 was the first time since the end of Vietnam 
that the US undertook a combined arms operation involving numbers of troops 
in the hundreds of thousands. The Gulf War also marked the point at which 
many of the Vietnam era junior Officers moved into senior posts of command 
in a combat setting3. This conflict makes an ideal case study of one of the 
elements of the Powell Doctrine, namely, that if the US engages in hostilities it 
should first assemble a force of overwhelming strength. The purposes of this 
chapter will be to outline the lessons learned from Vietnam which contributes 
towards the shaping of this particular aspect of the Powell Doctrine; how 
Powells generation of Officers came to learn this lesson; how the idea of the 
need for overwhelming force has a long history in both US and European 
military thought and practice; how Powells insistence on the need for 
                                                            
1 Although not a direct quote, this recognizable phrase can be attributed to Powell, and is used 
in various forms by other writers in the field. 
2 Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-war Plans and Preparations, op cit., Colonel Harry G. 
Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982). 
p. 51. 
3 Colin Powell as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Norman Schwarzkopf CINC CENTCOM 
(Commander in Chief, US Central Command), Frederick Franks Commander US VII corps all 
holding the rank of Lieutenant General. 
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overwhelming force affected US policy towards the Persian Gulf prior to the 
Iraq invasion, during Operation Desert Storm, and in the wars aftermath; and 
also how the idea of overwhelming force influences the elements of the Powell 
Doctrine dealing with the need for public and Congressional support and the 
need to define vital national interest.  In this chapter, when we look at the 
lessons of Vietnam and how they influenced US policy in the First Persian 
Gulf War, we will be referring to the intellectual that brought about the Powell 
Doctrine as this case study takes place before Powells formal public 
enunciation of the Doctrine in his 1992 Foreign Affairs article.  However, it 
should be borne in mind that, whilst the Powell Doctrine had not been publicly 
enunciated, Colin Powell, throughout the period of this case study, was 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and therefore in an extremely influential 
position that allowed him to put forward and forcefully argue for those ideas 
that would go on to be enunciated in the Powell Doctrine a little over a year 
after this case study. 
 
Before we can begin to understand how the US Armed Forces recovered from 
Vietnam, we must first understand the depths to which they had sunk during 
Vietnam and the serious challenges that the Army in particular faced.  
 
The most serious problem was a breakdown of basic unit cohesion and 
discipline: Forty percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly 
hashish; a significant minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin. Crime and 
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desertion were evident in Germany, with 12 percent of soldiers charged with 
serious offences.4  
 
On top of these problems the Army also suffered from a severe shortfall of 
modern equipment, having not purchased new tanks or infantry fighting 
vehicles since the early to middle 1960s. This was because from the middle 
1960s to the early 1970s the largest portion of the Pentagon budget had been 
spent on simply maintaining the Army in Vietnam and replacing equipment 
rather than modernising it: The Soviets had exploited the Armys Vietnam 
diversion to close the gap in weapons technology. Popular opinion at the time 
did not appear to favour significant funding increases for new weaponry.5  
 
The cumulative effect of these deficiencies was to leave the US Army woefully 
underprepared to meet its NATO commitments in Europe, leaving it at a 
serious qualitative and quantitative disadvantage compared to its Warsaw Pact 
adversary:  
 
The years of fighting in Vietnam had drawn Europe based forces down to 
unacceptable strengths. Worse, the insatiable appetite for personnel had 
stripped our forces of officer leadership and almost destroyed the Armys 
professional non-commissioned officer corps.6 
 
                                                            
4 Robert Scales et al., Certain victory (Brasseys Inc: Washington, 1994). p.6. 
5 Ibid., p.19. 
6 Lieutenant General Frederick Franks with Tom Clancy, Into the Storm (GP Putnam and Sons: 
New York, 1997). p.85. 
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In a sense, this thesis is not merely about how the US Army went about 
learning the lessons of Vietnam, it is to a great extent the story of how the US 
Army managed to save itself as an institution and regain public and political 
confidence.  
 
The Vietnam experience produced several lessons relating to the need for the 
use of overwhelming force which were absorbed by the US Military. First, 
the idea of a graduated use of force of the kind suggested by academics in the 
1960s7 was discredited. Second, the idea that the best way to maintain the 
initiative in combat is to simply overwhelm any enemy that would be foolish 
enough to engage with you was reasserted. Finally, by insisting on a massive 
build-up of forces before military action was undertaken, the Military hoped 
that this would force civilian policy makers to make a clear decision on 
whether to go to war or not, and avoid the kind of incremental slide into 
conflict which was seen as marking US involvement in Vietnam. We will now 
look at where the theory of graduated response came from intellectually and 
why it was initially embraced by the US Military. 
 
 
By the early 1960s such a strategy of graduated response had become 
immensely appealing to both civilian and military leadership. Throughout the 
1950s, US Security policy had been underpinned by the idea that the US would 
                                                            
7 Two of the most interesting works in the field of limited war and the graduated use of force 
produced in the sixties are Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princetown University 
Press: New Jersey, 1960), and Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Harper 
for the Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 1957). For an overview of the effect these 
intellectuals had on US strategic policy see Fred. M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon 
(Stanford University Press: California, 1991). 
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respond to any situation where its vital interests were threatened by launching 
nuclear retaliation against its adversaries. This was known as the strategy of 
massive retaliation.  The idea underpinning it was that no potential adversary 
would dare run the risk of threatening the United States because it knew that 
the response would be devastating. Another consideration was cost.  Nuclear 
weapons are extremely cost effective in terms of the ratio between destruction 
and the cost of the weapon. It was hoped by the Eisenhower Administration 
that this strategy would allow the US to wage the Cold War whilst at the same 
time maintaining the health of its economic system.  
 
By the early 1960s, this was no longer seen as credible8. First, because with an 
expanding Soviet nuclear arsenal any nuclear exchange was likely to lead to 
the devastation of the United States and, because of this, the threat of 
immediate use of nuclear weapons was not seen as something that the US 
could contemplate. The threat of a massive nuclear response to communist 
aggression was simply no longer a threat that the United States could credibly 
make, so by the early sixties US policy makers perceived a pressing need to 
come up with alternative strategies to combat Soviet expansion in the Third 
World.  
 
The theory of graduated response was, in simple terms, the idea that US 
military action should be proportional to the incident that provoked it. The 
theory held that an opponent faced with steadily mounting pressure would 
                                                            
8 One of the fiercest critics of this strategy was former Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell D. 
Taylor. So much so that after his retirement, Taylor published a book criticising his 
Commander in Chief Dwight Eisenhower: Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet 
(Atlantic Books: London, 1959). 
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realise that the United States was serious in its intent and that the opponent 
ought to change policy before greater punishment was metered out. This theory 
is largely based on the idea that strategy is an outgrowth of economics and that 
all actors are equally rational. As a leading theorist of limited war, Thomas 
Schelling, states: If we confine our study to the theory of strategy, we 
seriously restrict ourselves by the assumption of rational behaviour  not just of 
intelligent behaviour, but of behaviour motivated by a conscious calculation of 
advantages.9  In the context of a world populated by an increasing number of 
nuclear-armed states, as a practical matter this theory had the additional 
advantage of suggesting a way in which the use of military force could still 
retain its utility without running an unacceptably high risk of any resort to 
military action leading inevitably to the use of nuclear weapons.  It suggested a 
way of containing the violence of modern warfare at a certain level of 
acceptability.  John Lewis Gaddis describes the rationale behind graduated 
response as the desire to have more options than nuclear war or surrender.  
Gaddis quotes President Kennedy as saying, We intend to have a wider choice 
 than humiliation or all-out nuclear war.10 
 
The assumption that adversaries calculate gains and losses rationally meant 
that the task of policy makers was to determine the point at which an 
opponents calculation of advantages would change in such a way that they 
would behave as the US wanted them to behave. George Herring points out 
that:  
                                                            
9 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Boston, Mass: Harvard University Press., 1999), 
p.4. 
10 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.203. 
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Such a strategy would harness the nations military power more closely 
to the attainment of its political objectives. A variety of military 
instruments, including conventional forces, would be readied to respond 
to different threats at different levels. The amount of force employed in 
any situation would be limited to that necessary to achieve political 
aims.11 
 
Or as Deputy Secretary of Defence Cyrus Vance put it: 
 
I think that a lot of us felt that by the gradual application of force the 
North Vietnamese and the NLF would be forced to seek a political 
settlement of the problem. We had seen the gradual application of force 
applied in the Cuban missile crisis, and had seen a very successful result. 
We believed that if this same gradual and restrained application of force 
were applied in South Viet Nam, that one could expect the same kind of 
result; that rational people on the other side would respond to increasing 
military pressure and would therefore try and seek a political solution.12 
 
The Military, particularly the Army, saw an additional advantage to the idea of 
limited war. A strategy of massive nuclear retaliation effectively reduced the 
Army to the role of a police force whose job it would be to secure and 
decontaminate areas devastated by a nuclear explosion. This meant that, 
                                                            
11 George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (University of Texas Press: 
Austin, 1994). p. 4. 
12 Transcript, Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview I, 11/3/69, by Paige E. Mulhollan, 
Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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throughout the 1950s, the Army had a particularly difficult time securing what 
it considered to be an adequate budget13. The same can be said to be true to a 
lesser extent for the Navy and the Air Force as they had problems securing 
funding for programs and weapons systems not related to the delivery of 
nuclear weapons14.  
 
The armys experience in Vietnam fatally undermined its faith in the notion 
that the graduated use of force was either practically possible or theoretically 
desirable. 
 
The main critique levelled against this theory was its assumption of rationality 
on the part of any and all opponents; this was seen as being simplistic and of 
ignoring complex historical and psychological factors which combined to 
provide the basis for an armys motivation and the States view of what its 
objectives should be. As Clausewitz15 pointed out as early as the nineteenth 
century, It is paltry philosophy if in the old-fashioned way one lays down the 
rules and principles in total disregard of moral values.16 In the case of the 
North Vietnamese, these moral values could be found in their absolute 
conviction that the American presence in South Vietnam was a continuation of 
                                                            
13 The following are figures taken from Congressional hearings held in 1956 to determine the 
size of the US military budget. The following figures are what each of the service branches 
received. Air Force $23 billion, Navy $13 billion, Army $12 billion. Figures taken from Henry 
A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1957). 
p.413. 
14 For an explanation of President Eisenhowers reluctance to spend large amounts on the 
military and  an account of some of the funding and political battles caused by this see Stephen 
E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume Two, The President, 1952-1969 (George, Allen and Unwin: 
London, 1984). 
15 The theories of Clausewitz and his writing are key texts to the syllabus of US staff colleges. 
16 Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 
(Princeton University Press. 1976). p.184. 
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French colonial oppression and that it was their duty to reunify the country 
under a single Vietnamese government which they would control17. Writing his 
memoirs many years later, Colin Powell was to see these moral values clearly: 
 
Our political leaders had led us into a war for the one-size-fits-all 
rationale of anticommunism, which was only a partial fit in Vietnam, 
where the war had its own historical roots in nationalism, anti-
colonialism, and civil strife beyond the east-west conflict.18 
 
Or as Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts put it: 
 
The rationale imputed to the North Vietnamese an economic motivation, 
a mechanistic calculation of costs and benefits, a logical willingness to 
lower demand as price rose. It was as if General Giap [North Vietnamese 
Defence Minister] would manage a revolution the way McNamara 
managed the Pentagon. It implicitly assumed that Vietnamese 
reunification was a relative value to Hanoi that could be relinquished as 
the pain threshold rose, rather than the absolute value it was.19 
 
As we can see both from the Gelb and Betts quotation above and by the 
discussion of Clausewitzs theories of war developed in the early nineteenth 
                                                            
17 In the late nineties a series of seminar was held which brought together senior American and 
Vietnamese historians and policy makers from the Vietnam period for a discussion of their 
different interpretations, objectives and motivations for the war. See Robert. S. McNamara et 
al. Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy. (Public Affairs: New 
York, 1999). 
18 Colin Powell with Jospeh Persico, My American Journey, (Ballantine Books: New York, 
1996). p.144. 
19 Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (The 
Brookings Institution: Wasington DC., 1979). p.139. 
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century, the idea that war is a moral and ethical contest rather than simply a 
rational transaction based on the calculation of gains and losses was not an idea 
unique to Powell.  Indeed, the intellectual climate that led to the Powell 
Doctrine saw a reassertion of the idea that war was a moral contest that, by its 
very nature, was ugly, brutal and stark.  Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, who had 
been CINCPAC20 during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, noted in 
the conclusion of his memoir, Strategy for Defeat, that, when searching for the 
lessons of the US experience in Vietnam, The application of military, war-
making power is an ugly thing  stark, harsh and demanding  and it cannot be 
made nicer by pussy-footing around with it.21  We can see here that the self-
criticisms made by the most senior officers in command of US forces in 
Vietnam foreshadow Colin Powells insistence on the need to assemble an 
overwhelming force when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the 
Gulf War. 
 
If one accepts that war is not a rational calculation of gains and losses, but 
rather a moral and ethical contest, then it is futile to try and persuade the enemy 
to act in accordance with interests that they were perceived to have had. 
Rather, the best way to achieve objectives was felt to be not to persuade the 
enemy, but simply to overwhelm them, to remove their capability to continue 
to make war. This sentiment can be summed up by the introduction to the air-
war plan in the first Gulf War: 
                                                            
20 Commander-in-Chief Pacific.  The Pacific was the theatre of operations within which 
Vietnam fell, making Sharp General Westmorelands direct superior. 
21 U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Novato Presido Press, 1998), 
269. 
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What it is: a focused, intense, air campaign designed to incapacitate Iraqi 
leadership and destroy key Iraqi military capability in a short period of 
time What it is not: a graduated, long-term campaign plan designed to 
provide escalation options to counter Iraqi moves.22 
 
 This brings us to the next lesson learnt from Vietnam that the best way to 
maintain the strategic initiative was to outnumber your opponent decisively. 
However this is not a new idea. Clausewitz has this to say when talking about 
the effect of numbers on the outcome of battle: 
 
Superiority of numbers admittedly is the most important factor in the 
outcome of an engagement, so long as it is great enough to 
counterbalance all other contributing circumstances. It thus follows that 
as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the 
decisive point.23 
 
This insight was by no means alien to the American concept of warfare.  To a 
certain extent, one can see elements of the intellectual climate that existed after 
the Vietnam War, which would lead in the 1990s to the Powell Doctrines 
insistence on the need for overwhelming force as a prerequisite for victory as 
forming a part of American thinking on warfare as far back as Grant and Lees 
                                                            
22 Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, The Generals War (Little, Brown and 
Company: Boston, Mass., 1995), p 75. 
23 On War, pp.194-5. 
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campaigns in the Civil War.  One can see a reliance on overwhelming force 
in General Winfield Scotts Anaconda plan: 
 
Let the navy  blockade the southern coasts.  The army, then, must 
drive down the Mississippi, opening the river all the way to the Gulf, 
splitting the western states from the Confederacy and holding the valley 
in such strength that the blockade of the Southland would be complete.  
With rebellion isolated, it could then be crushed at leisure.24 
 
What this quotation shows is that Scott clearly identified the decisive point of 
battle: the Mississippi River Valley.  He proposed offensive action to remove 
the enemy from this key piece of ground and then holding it with a force large 
enough to prevent the enemys return.  The above discussion also demonstrates 
the fact that the intellectual climate that gave rise to the Powell Doctrines 
insistence on the need for overwhelming force was not particularly novel, but 
that it was built on an understanding both of classic nineteenth-century 
European theories of war and also on long held American beliefs about how 
war should be practiced. 
 
As we shall see, this insight on the need for overwhelming force was not 
entirely lacking amongst US Generals of the Vietnam era, but for what were 
perceived as wider political and strategic reasons, this insight was largely 
ignored. 
                                                            
24 Bruce Catton, This Hallowed Ground: The Story of the Union Side of the American Civil 
War (London: Victor Gollancz, 1957), p.53. 
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The fact that US forces were not overwhelmingly strong compared to their 
opponent and that this might cause difficultly to the US effort in Vietnam was 
recognised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War.  
 
The Joint Chiefs correctly saw that involvement in Vietnam would 
require a full-scale war They felt, as Gen. Harold Johnson put it, that if 
the United States was not willing to go all the way it should not go in at 
all and that if military forces were committed, they should be committed 
at the most rapid rate possible and not at the rate of an eye 
dropper.25 
 
The historical record also shows that Johnsons concerns were fully shared by 
the senior US commander in the field, Lieutenant General William 
Westmoreland.  By mid-1965, Westmoreland had requested that 44 battalions 
of what were known as Free World Forces26 should be sent to Vietnam.  
However, Westmoreland realised that this number was insufficient to win the 
war:   
 
In other words, a force of 34 US maneuver battalions and 10 3d country 
maneuver battalions together with appropriate tactical air and balanced 
ground combat and logistic support will not provide reasonable assurance 
                                                            
25 LBJ and Vietnam. p. 34. For similar criticisms made by other senior military officers see 
Bruce Palmer, The 25 Year War: Americas Military Role in Vietnam. (University of 
Kentucky: Lexington, 1984), and U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect 
(Novato Presido Press, 1998). 
26 Free World, in the context of Vietnam, refers to the US, South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
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of attaining the objective you postulate (convincing the DRV/VC they 
cannot win). The DRV/VC are too deeply committed to be influenced by 
anything but application of overpowering force. Consequently, while 
infusion of US/3d country combat strength on the scale contemplated 
should reestablish the military balance by the end of December, it will 
not per se cause the enemy to back off.27 
 
However, as we shall see, for political reasons the insight of Generals Johnson 
and Westmoreland was largely ignored. The rationale given by the Johnson 
Administration for avoiding the kind of rapid build-up that Generals 
Westmoreland and Johnson advocated was fear that a rapid and massive build-
up of US forces in South-East Asia ran the serious risk of Chinese or possibly 
even Soviet counter-intervention.  Whilst US policymakers undoubtedly did 
have to keep in mind the precedent of the Korean War,28 it is doubtful that 
avoidance of a war with China could be the major reason why the Johnson 
Administration did not undertake a rapid build-up of US forces in South-East 
Asia.  Logically, if the Johnson Administration thought that the USs 
overriding strategic interest was to avoid a confrontation with China, then 
surely the Johnson Administration would not have committed itself to any 
large-scale presence of US forces in South Vietnam.  Because the US was not 
                                                            
27 Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), Saigon, June 30th 1965. Source: Center of 
Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret.  Full text 
available at: < http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/030.html>. 
28 For accounts of the origins of the Korean War and US policy towards that war in general, see 
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-
1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) and Max Hastings, The Korean War 
(London: Pan, 2010). 
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in a position to accurately predict at what point a build-up of US forces would 
trigger a Chinese intervention, therefore, any large-scale deployment of US 
forces, regardless of how rapidly those deployments were made, ran the risk of 
provoking China.  Aside from the logical shortcomings in a position that 
avoided a rapid build-up of troops in order to avoid provoking Communist 
China, there is also some evidence that the Johnson Administration knew that 
the likelihood of Chinese intervention was less than they sometimes portrayed 
it: China was reeling from the failure of what it called the Great Leap 
Forward, an experiment in social engineering that had caused thirty million 
deaths and cut the nations birth rate in half.29  The United States may not 
have been fully aware of the extent of the catastrophe that had befallen China; 
nevertheless, US policymakers ought to have been aware that China was, from 
the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, in the midst of a catastrophe.  In May 1962, at 
the height of the Great Leap Forward, over 5,000 refugees a day were 
crossing the border from mainland China to Hong Kong.30  Moyar describes 
the level to which the Chinese sought to avoid conflict with the United States 
even after the United States had directly attacked Chinese supposed North 
Vietnamese allies: 
 
Yet when the Americans bombed the North Vietnamese torpedo boat 
bases, no Chinese planes or ships attempted to defend North Vietnam or 
attack the American aircraft carriers.  Nor did the Chinese even produce a 
                                                            
29
 Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p.126.  For a discussion of the political, social and economic effects of 
the Great Leap Forward, see Frank Dikötter, Maos Great Famine (London: Bloomsbury, 
2010). 
30 Information taken from Mao Great Famine, p.240. 
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strong Verbal response, stating only that the Vietnamese would fight and 
defeat the Americans if they expanded the war but making no mention of 
a Chinese intention to participate in the fracas.31  
 
Having looked at the constraints on the size of force the US chose to commit to 
Vietnam, and how that led to a situation where the US found it difficult to 
employ overwhelming force, we will now look at how the strategy the US 
chose to pursue in Vietnam made it virtually impossible for the US to achieve 
or use overwhelming force decisively. 
 
The US from the beginning to the end of its involvement in Vietnam was on 
the strategic defensive and having to react to the moves of the North 
Vietnamese. This was partly because of political considerations. US forces 
were not allowed to attack Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, nor 
were they allowed to invade North Vietnam itself. However, it was also due to 
the fact that the US was never able to assemble overwhelming numbers at the 
decisive point that Clausewitz refers to32.  Former President Dwight 
Eisenhower, who was also a five star general, made the following observation 
to President Johnson in a letter in 1968: We cannot hit the enemy where he 
concentrates, for example, around Khe Sanh Has Westmoreland really been 
                                                            
31 Triumph Forsaken, p.320. 
32 For an interesting discussion of how the Vietnam might have turned out differently had these 
restrictions not been in place, see C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in 
Vietnam, (F.Cass: London, 2002). 
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given the forces he is asking for; if he has asked for 525000 men, why dont we 
send them sooner?33 
 
Westmoreland realised at the time that he did not have decisive numerical 
advantage over the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong:  
 
The purpose of this message is to provide an analysis of current MACV 
[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] force requirements projected 
through FY 68. Last year, when we first developed out force 
requirements for CY 67, we stated a requirement for 124 maneuver 
battalions with the necessary combat and combat service support for a 
total strength of 555,741 Subsequent reassessment of the situation has 
indicated clearly that the Program Four force, although enabling us to 
gain the initiative, will not permit sustained operations of the scope and 
intensity required to avoid an unreasonably protracted war.34 
 
In his memoirs, General William Westmoreland describes the decision to limit 
US troop numbers at 525,000 in 1968 with the following observation:  
 
While I could live with the situation and continue to prosecute the war in 
terms of the old parameters, including gradually turning the war over to 
the ARVN, failure to provide large numbers of additional US troops and 
                                                            
33 Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnsons War (WW Norton and Company: New York, 1989). p. 
167. 
34 Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to 
the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp). Saigon, March 18th 1967. Johnson Library. National 
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. LXIX. Full text available at: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/v/13143.htm. 
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exploit the enemies losses with bold new moves seriously prolonged the 
war.35 
 
In fairness to the policy makers that placed these limits on Westmoreland it 
should be noted that Westmoreland has been criticised for the strategy he 
adopted.  It has been argued that he did not make the best use of the forces he 
had available to him. This was because US forces were widely dispersed 
around Vietnam. Therefore, US forces were never able to concentrate 
overwhelming force at any particular point and therefore it did not achieve 
decisive results. Westmorelands strategy was one of strategic defence based 
on reacting to North Vietnamese moves and seeking to deflect them, whilst at 
the same time causing so much damage to North Vietnamese units as to render 
them ineffective. As a military strategy, attrition meant wearing down or 
grinding down the enemy until the enemy lost its will to fight or the capacity 
to maintain its military effort.36  As Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, a South 
Vietnamese officer writing in exile, pointed out: The Americans had designed 
a purely defensive strategy for Vietnam. It was a strategy that was based on the 
attrition of the enemy through a prolonged defense and made no allowance for 
decisive offensive action.37  It has also been argued that, because of the nature 
of the war in Vietnam, it would have been impossible to concentrate 
overwhelming force at any one particular time or place because of the lack of 
a visible enemy. 
 
                                                            
35 General Williams Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Double Day and Company: New York, 
1976). p. 359. 
36Lyndon Johnsons War, p. 20. 
37 Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, Op-Cit., On Strategy. Pp. 115-116. 
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So, would it have been possible for Westmoreland to concentrate 
overwhelming force at a particular time and place if different strategic 
choices had been made?  As we shall see, those military officers who were part 
of the intellectual climate that inspired the Powell Doctrine would argue that it 
was possible and that it should have been done. 
 
For authors such as David Halberstam and John Prados,38 the USs lack of 
overwhelming force in Vietnam was a side issue.  The line of argument these 
authors pursue is that the US, by supporting a regime in South Vietnam that 
was a legacy of French colonial rule,39 placed itself on the wrong side of 
history.  Halberstam, comparing the wars in Korea and Vietnam, makes the 
following observation: 
 
The former [Korea] was a conventional war with a traditional border 
crossing by a uniformed enemy massing his troops; the latter was a 
political war conducted by guerrillas and feeding on subversion.  There 
was no uniformed, massed enemy to use power against; the enemy was 
first and foremost political, which meant that the support of the 
population made the guerrillas way possible.40 
 
This being the case, Halberstam goes on to argue that any American military 
presence in Vietnam was inherently counter-productive to the goals the US 
                                                            
38 See John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2009). 
39 For an in-depth discussion of the nature of the South Vietnamese government, see Chapter 6. 
40 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1969), p. 212. 
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sought: The very presence of Caucasian troops was more than canceling out 
any military benefits.41 
 
The alternative view of the war, as put forward by authors such as Harry 
Summers,42 is that the Vietnam War was, in the final analysis, an act of 
aggression on the part of the North Vietnamese towards the South, and that the 
guerrilla warfare emphasised by Halberstam was only one aspect of a 
campaign waged and directed by Hanoi: 
 
By seeing the Viet Cong as a separate entity rather than as an instrument 
of North Vietnam, we chose a center of gravity which in fact did not 
exist.  The proof that the Viet Cong guerrillas were not a center of gravity 
was demonstrated during Tet-68, when, even though they were virtually 
destroyed, the war continued unabated.43 
 
If one subscribes to Summerss view of the wars nature, then the utility of 
overwhelming force becomes clear.  If the war is being directed by Hanoi 
and is ultimately reliant on North Vietnamese support to continue, then 
overwhelming US force could have been used to seal the South Vietnamese 
battlefield from the North by carrying the fight into Cambodia and Laos.  
Authors such as Mark Moyar would go even further than Summers and would 
advocate that the US ought to have used overwhelming force to not only 
                                                            
41 Ibid., p. 212. 
42 See Colonel (RET) Harry G. Summers, Jr, American Strategy in Vietnam: A Critical 
Analysis (Mineola: Dover Publication, 2007). 
43 American Strategy in Vietnam, p. 80. 
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isolate the battlefield in South Vietnam, but to have actually carried the war 
directly to North Vietnam: 
 
an American invasion followed by a North Vietnamese retreat into the 
mountains and a Chinese abstention from fighting was, for the United 
States, a far better strategic scenario than the one the Americans 
ultimately accepted by not invading  The Communists would have lost 
the supply system that began in the North and reached into the South via 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and they would have been denied the importation 
of foreign war supplies by sea into Haiphong, the Norths primary port, 
compelling them to rely on the vulnerable roads and railways from China 
for full logistical support.44 
 
It is worth noting that General Westmoreland was in no doubt that an earlier 
expansion of the war into Cambodia, Laos and possibly North Vietnam would 
have made a decisive difference: 
 
the United States made other serious strategic mistakes in Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia: waiting so long to make incursions into Laos and 
Cambodia and even when eventually doing so, reducing their 
effectiveness by restrictions; failing to demonstrate to the North 
Vietnamese that they were vulnerable just north of the DMZ.45 
 
                                                            
44 Triumph Forsaken, p.322. 
45 General Williams Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Double Day and Company: New York, 
1976). p.410. 
133 
 
  
The debate about the character and nature of the Vietnam War is one of the 
academic debates about the war that still rages.  Whilst it is outside the scope 
of this thesis to resolve this argument, it is important to know that the conflict 
in Vietnam was never as clear-cut as a dichotomy between a guerrilla war and 
a conventional war; it contained elements of both, and that other strategic 
options other than those chosen by the Johnson Administration were available 
to US policymakers, and the strategy that the US eventually adopted should not 
be seen as one that it inevitably had to adopt.  Ultimately, whether the US 
Military was right to draw the lesson that bringing overwhelming force to bear 
would have made a difference to the outcome of Vietnam comes down to 
whether you believe that the war in South Vietnam was largely an indigenous 
guerrilla war, or whether you believe the war was largely directed by North 
Vietnam with element of a guerrilla war. 
 
Whether or not the need for overwhelming force to maintain the strategic 
initiative was an appropriate lesson to be taken from the US experience in 
Vietnam, what is for certain is that the US Military, writ large, and those that 
formed the intellectual climate that informed the Powell Doctrine, certainly did 
take that lesson from Vietnam, whether correct or not.  We can see this very 
clearly in the planning of US operations in the first Gulf War. The US 
Militarys attitude can be summed up by a quotation from Gordon Trainor: 
 
In drawing up their plan, the Jedis [US army planning cell] operated 
with several key assumptions. One central presupposition was that the 
coalition ground forces should not waste men and material fighting non-
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decisive battles; military power was to be conserved for a possible fight 
with the Republican Guard, which Iraq was holding in reserve, and not 
weakened in unnecessary engagements with Iraqs regular army forces.46 
 
The third and perhaps most politically significant lesson regarding the need for 
overwhelming force that the US armed forces drew from its experience in 
Vietnam was that by laying out the full cost and magnitude of military options 
to civilian policy makers at the outset, the military could prevent the kind of 
incremental drift into conflict which marked US involvement in Vietnam. 
 
Although US involvement in Vietnam ended with the commitment of over half 
a million US servicemen and the death of nearly 50,000, the commitment 
originally began merely by the US sending a limited number of advisors to 
train and give tactical support to the South Vietnamese. As each phase of US 
involvement failed to lead to a successful outcome, policy makers were 
continually tempted to see whether just a slightly bigger US presence could 
make the difference. So there was the expansion of the US advisory effort from 
a few hundred in the late 1950s to 16,000 by 1963 to 22,000 by 1965. Then 
economic and military targets in North Vietnam were bombed.  This was 
followed by the despatch of combat troops to protect the aircraft and facilities 
involved in this bombing until finally these troops were used in an offensive 
combat role against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops.47  This is to say 
                                                            
46 The Generals War. p. 126. 
47 There are many accounts of how US escalation in Vietnam took place, some are memoirs 
and some are secondary sources. For good examples see Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: 
The Americanization of the War in Vietnam  (Norton: New York, 1982), Brian VanDeMark, 
Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Oxford 
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nothing of the fact that, between the summer and autumn of 1963, the US 
covertly encouraged the coup détat that brought down the government of Ngo 
Dinh Diem, which, in a political sense, massively increased the level of 
commitment of the United States as the Americans were at least partly 
responsible for bringing the regime that Johnson had to deal with between 1964 
and 1968 to power.  The Johnson Administration could not be seen as running 
out on an allied government that the US had played a major part in creating. 
 
This is not to suggest that US policymakers did not understand the seriousness 
of what they were doing.  Rather, the point to be noted is that, because the US 
commitment to Vietnam was increased in such an incremental way, 
policymakers were slow to realise just how deeply committed the US over time 
became to the survival of South Vietnam.  As Powell put it on returning from 
his first tour as an Adviser in Vietnam, 
 
Still, few people in America knew or cared what was happening in that 
faraway country.  Vietnam was strictly a back-burner issue.  At the time, 
the United States had 252,000 Army troops in Europe and 49,000 in 
Korea, compared to the 16,300 in Vietnam.48 
 
Because US involvement in Vietnam increased so incrementally, it meant that 
US policy makers and, to a greater extent the US public, never engaged in a 
full scale debate about whether or not preserving an independent South 
                                                                                                                                                            
University Press: New York, 1991), and Robert S. McNamara with Brian Van De Mark, In 
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lesson of Vietnam  (Vintage Books: New York, 1996). 
48 My American Journey, p.101. 
136 
 
  
Vietnam was actually worth a war. The attitude of the Johnson Administration 
can be summed up in the way in which the announcement that additional forces 
were being sent to Vietnam was made by Lyndon Johnson in 1965. Rather than 
deliver a message to Congress or ask for a declaration of war, Johnson made 
the announcement in a regular White House press conference. As Herring puts 
it, July 28th, 1965, might therefore be called the day the United States went to 
war without knowing it.49  
 
In fact, the Johnson White House went further than this in trying to close down 
public debate over Vietnam before it had begun. Internal documents show that 
steps were taken to deliberately obscure the role of American forces in 
Vietnam. The following is an extract from National Security Memorandum.50  
It is worth quoting it at some length because it demonstrates the duplicity of the 
Johnson Administration and the lengths that it went to in order to minimise the 
publics perception of how deeply committed the US was to the war in 
Vietnam: 
 
The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 
through 7 [increases in ground forces], premature publicity be avoided by 
all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as 
rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimise any appearance 
of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop 
movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of 
                                                            
49 LBJ and Vietnam. p.2. 
50 National Security Memorandums in the Kennedy and Johnson White House were 
authoritative statements of policy and laid out what the US would do in a certain situation and 
the rationale behind its actions.  
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Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The Presidents 
desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as 
being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.51 
 
This determination to minimise publicly the role the US was playing in 
Vietnam was to have a number of serious consequences on both a political and 
a practical level.  
 
On a political level the fact that there was no sense of emergency about the 
way the US entered Vietnam made it much easier for Lyndon Johnson to go to 
war without having to mobilise reserves or declare any kind of national 
emergency. From Johnsons point of view this was a relief as it meant that he 
could concentrate on passing an ambitious programme of domestic reform52 
without the war taking resources away from it. As Dale Herspring points out, 
 
Declaring a national emergency would have focused public attention on 
the war instead of on his domestic programs, probably guaranteeing that 
little more would be accomplished at home. Yet potential Congressional 
opposition to issuing a joint resolution also would be problematic. 
                                                            
51 Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1996). p.346. 
52 Much has been written on Johnsons domestic ambitions, see Doris Kearns Goodwin, 
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (St Martins Griffin: New York, 1991). Goodwin 
was granted a number of interviews with Lyndon Johnson and the book contains a good deal of 
commentary from Johnsons point of view. For more recent work see Robert Dallek, Flawed 
Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (Oxford University Press: New York. 
1998). 
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Johnson wanted both guns and butter: he was not prepared to sacrifice 
one for the other.53   
 
However, the Joint Chiefs did continue to press Johnson for at least a limited 
degree of national mobilisation.  In a crucial meeting on July 22, 1965, where 
the decision was made to grant Westmorelands initial request for 34 US 
battalions, President Johnson asked the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
David McDonald, what he thought the President should do.  McDonalds reply 
was succinct and to the point: 
 
1. Supply forces Westmoreland has asked for.  
2. Prepare to furnish more (100,000) in 1966.  
3. Commensurate building in air and naval forces, step up of air attacks 
on NVN (North Vietnam).  
4. Bring in needed reserves and draft calls.54 
 
However, immediately after McDonalds intervention, President Johnson and 
Secretary of Defense McNamara make it clear that McDonalds request is not 
likely to be granted. 
 
President: Any ideas on cost of what this would be?  
McNamara: Yes--$12 billion--1966.55 
                                                            
53 Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to 
George W. Bush (University Press Kansas: Laurence, 2005), p. 169. 
54 Notes of Meeting, Washington, July 22nd 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes 
File, Box 1. No classification marking.  Available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/070.html> 
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In bland bureaucratic language, what this exchange tells us is that, were 
mobilisation to take place, the money that Johnson had earmarked for his 
Great Society would go up in Vietnamese smoke. House majority whip Hale 
Boggs (Democrat Louisiana) points out that even this incremental increase in 
US effort played increasing havoc with President Johnsons ability to enact 
domestic policy.  
 
Well, it's strange that reaction in the House was considerably different 
from the Senate. There was much more support in the House than there 
was in the Senate. But obviously the growth of the war and the spread of 
the war and the cost of the war made our job much more difficult in 
providing the domestic programs.56 
 
However, from the militarys point of view, this method of fighting a war 
whilst maintaining a peacetime stance proved an enormous strain. First, 
because it meant that there was a huge drain on the manpower of the regular 
US army without an influx of reserves to fill potential gaps in force structure. 
Second, it meant that the normal peacetime tour of duty of one year was 
maintained. This led to a high turnover of men and officers in Vietnam and 
affected the overall cohesion of US forces in the field: 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
55 Ibid. 
56 Transcript, Hale Boggs Oral History Interview I, 3/13/69, by T. H. Baker, Internet Copy, 
LBJ Library. 
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In order to fight the war without calling up the reserves, the Army was 
creating instant noncoms. Shake-and-bake sergeants we called them. 
Take a private, give him a little training, shake him once or twice, and 
pronounce him an NCO the involvement of so any unprepared officers 
and non-coms led to breakdowns in morale, discipline, and professional 
judgement.57 
 
Apart from refusing to activate the reserve, the other major detrimental effect 
of the military maintaining a peacetime posture was that the normal peacetime 
one year tour of duty was not extended. This led to a high turnover of both 
junior officer and combat infantry. The effect of this was to replace 
experienced officers and infantry and replace them with green untested troops. 
The following quotation shows the effect this situation had on one unit, the 
First Battalion 7th Cavalry Regiment, but this was to be a situation repeated 
throughout the US military throughout the entire length of the Vietnam War: 
 
For much of this time my battalion was at, or near, its full authorized 
strength of thirty-seven commissioned officers, one warrant officer, and 
729 enlisted men. That changed in the spring of 1965, when we lost eight 
of our fifteen platoon leader lieutenantsBetween April and July we 
also lost by discharge or reassignment our intelligence officer, surgeon, 
personnel officer, air operations officer, supply officer, assistant medical 
officer, chaplain, and two company commanders.58 
                                                            
57 My American Journey. Pp. 139-140. 
58 LT. GEN. Harold G. Moore (RET) and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Onceand 
Young. (Corgi Books: London, 2002).  Pp.26-27. 
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Not only did this leave frontline units critically short of experienced personnel, 
it also meant that the training timetable for new recruits was severely 
compressed given the urgent need to deploy them to Vietnam.  The following 
quotation is taken from a White House meeting between Lyndon Johnson and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the immediate aftermath of the Tet offensive.  The 
Army Chief of Staff, General Johnson, explained the problem of sending more 
troops to Vietnam with the following observation: We have already curtailed 
training to the minimum. We must give these units proper training time. They 
are already squeezed.59 
 
There was never a serious public debate over whether Vietnam was worth a 
full scale war, because the impression was always maintained that this next 
level of escalation would be the last level of escalation needed. Congress and 
the American public increasingly came to feel that they had been duped into a 
war that they neither wanted nor had agreed to60. Furthermore, because there 
was not the kind of national mobilisation that had accompanied for example 
World War II, there was not the same kind of visceral emotion that the North 
Vietnamese were an enemy which needed to be overcome and defeated. Robert 
Murphy, an influential businessman and lawyer whom President Johnson used 
                                                            
59 Notes of Meeting, Washington, February 9th 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's 
Notes of Meetings. President's Daily Diary. Notes of the Presidents meeting with the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
60 For detailed analysis of the role of Congress in the Vietnam War, see Robert Mann,  A 
Grand Delusion: Americas Descent into Vietnam. (Basic Books: New York, 2001) and 
Melvin Small, At the Waters Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War (Ivan R.Dee: 
Chicago, 2005). For a study of how Vietnam impacted on Lyndon Johnsons relationship with 
Robert Kennedy and an argument on how this disagreement affected US policy and US 
domestic politics see Jeff Shesol, Mutual Contempt: Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy and the 
Feud that Defined a Decade (W.W.Norton: New York, 1997). 
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as an outside consultant on matters of foreign policy, put the point with the 
following observation: There is no hate complex like there was against 
HitlerHo Chi Minh is not regarded as evil in many places in the United 
States and in Europe he is regarded as a kindly hero.61 
 
By insisting on the accumulation of overwhelming force at the outset, the 
intellectual climate that created the Powell Doctrine attempted to ensure that, 
on the practical level of war fighting by ensuring the maximum commitment of 
US forces at the outset, it tried to avoid the kind of manpower and equipment 
gaps which characterised US involvement in Vietnam. These gaps would be 
avoided because the army would know ahead of time exactly the size of 
commitment that it was being asked to make and could therefore plan its force 
structure accordingly.  
 
Furthermore, in the wake of Vietnam, the armys attempts at doctrinal renewal 
were aided by changes made to the armys force structure by chief of staff 
General Creighton Abrams, to ensure that in the future it would be impossible 
for the President to commit US forces to long-term combat without both 
extending tours of duty or without calling up significant elements of the 
reserves. The way this was done was by creating what were known as 
roundout divisions, these divisions would have a spine of regular troops 
which would maintain the divisions logistics and other services during 
                                                            
61 Lloyd. C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Elephant 
Paperbacks: Chicago, 1995). p.400. 
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peacetime but would require the addition of at least a brigades worth of 
reservists in order to bring them up to full combat strength. 
 
General Abramshad insisted that the Army could not go to war again 
without the involvement and tacit approval of the American people. A 
call up of the Reserves would bring home to Americans from the 
beginning that they had a personal stake in the conflict. Therefore, 
Abrams had sought to weave Reserve forces so inextricably into 
established deployment schemes that no force would be able to fight a 
major war in the future without them.62 
 
These reforms ensure that it is impossible to go to war in the kind of furtive, 
almost secretive way in which the Johnson Administration entered Vietnam. 
Instead, future Administrations would be required to engage in public debate 
about the objectives of any conflict and the American people would be fully 
aware of what was being asked of them and what price they could potentially 
be asked to pay.  What we can see here in the very early days of the post-
Vietnam era Army is General Creighton Abrams, as Chief of Staff of the 
Army, setting the organisational conditions within which the ideas that would 
go on to become the Powell Doctrine, particularly its insistence on 
overwhelming force and the need for public support, could flourish. 
 
Having looked at the lessons the US military drew from Vietnam, we must 
now look at how the concept of the need for overwhelming force relates to 
                                                            
62 Certain Victory.  p.18. 
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other elements of the Powell Doctrine. In particular we will see how this need 
for overwhelming force can help to achieve consistent Congressional and 
public support and how the expense of possessing overwhelming force serves 
to compel policy makers into deciding what the vital interests of the United 
States are. 
  
First, as has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, the use of 
overwhelming force is the best way to ensure that a conflict is short and that 
the outcome is in the United States favour. And, as the quotation that we 
began this chapter with demonstrates, it is also seen as the best way of 
minimising your own casualties at the same time as successfully obtaining 
objectives. All of these things are important in maintaining public and, through 
that, Congressional support for the commitment of US troops to a particular 
theatre of operations. Schwarzkopfs deputy Lieutenant General Calvin Waller 
stresses the importance Schwarzkopf gave to maintaining public support for the 
war:  
 
I think politicians who say Norman Schwarzkopf was reluctant to fight 
this war are sadly mistaken. Norman Schwarzkopf didn't want to enter 
into another military war where the resolve of the people was not to stick 
it out, so he was concerned, you know, the ghost of Vietnam, entering 
into a conflict not having the support of the people concerned him, but 
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once we saw the overwhelming support from the people of America who 
were behind all of the coalition forces.63 
 
In announcing that the war had begun, President Bush went to great lengths to 
reassure the American people that everything possible was being done to 
minimise US casualties, indeed he explicitly evoked the memory of Vietnam 
and contrasted it against the war in the Gulf. 
 
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military 
commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as 
possible, and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American 
and allied service men and women. I've told the American people before 
that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our 
troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they 
will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I'm 
hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will 
be held to an absolute minimum.64  
 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were extremely diligent in stamping out the notion 
that defending Saudi Arabia and/or liberating Kuwait could be done lightly. 
Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an unnamed senior Administration 
official said that 50,000 troops would be required to defend Saudi Arabia. The 
                                                            
63 Interview with Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, PBS Frontline: The Gulf War [online], 
Original Air DateJanuary 9th 1996.  Available at: 
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64 President George H. W. Bush. Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in 
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reaction of the Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, at what he 
considered to be a distressingly low figure was described by Bob Woodward as 
being that: 
 
The operation, now dubbed Desert Shield, could sour on the question of 
expectations and credibility. With the White House and political 
leadership concealing facts and risks, creating false hopes for a small, 
short-lived operation, he heard echoes of Vietnam.65   
 
This quotation demonstrates both that the senior military is keenly aware of the 
danger of starting out with a relatively small commitment of troops and 
resources which has gained public support because of its smallness, and then 
the military is sucked into an ever-increasing commitment because the initial 
small deployment did not do the job. This then creates a situation where the 
public feels that it has been misled as to the overall cost of a particular 
commitment. And perhaps more damagingly, it leads to an erosion of trust 
between the general public and senior military figures. So, from the militarys 
point of view it is better to overestimate the numbers of troops and resources 
necessary to successfully complete any given mission and then try and build 
public and Congressional consensus around that figure so that the public will 
on the one hand feel fully informed and consulted about the potential costs and 
risks of military operations: 
 
                                                            
65 Bob Woodward, The Commanders (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1991), p.279. 
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The Army chief recognised that Operations Plan 90-100266 put the 
military in for the long haul  months and months, if not longer. No one 
knew how long the deployment might last. If the media and therefore the 
public didnt feel they were getting the facts, there was no chance of 
maintaining public support. Such a massive deployment could not be 
concealed; orders were going to units in dozens of states. The big 
question is the political will question, Vuono told his staff.67 
 
The requirement for overwhelming force also reinforces the element of the 
Powell Doctrine which states that military force should only be used to defend 
the vital interests of the United States.  
 
Acquiring overwhelming force, even against a relatively small adversary, is 
expensive, and it is expensive in a number of different ways. In terms of 
manpower, gaining overwhelming advantage means calling up reservists, thus 
disrupting the economy and pulling people away from their families. In terms 
of both purchasing the equipment all of those troops will need and then 
transporting it to where it is needed, and finally in terms of political capital in 
order to have the finances to pay the troops, move the troops, buy the 
equipment and supplies and then transport them. This costs a great deal of 
                                                            
66 The plan to defend Saudi Arabia from an invasion from Iraq, drawn up first in the early 
1980s and updated on a regular basis all the way up to the invasion of Kuwait. This plan 
provided a number of different options for troop levels depending upon the political objectives 
US policy makers wanted to achieve. These numbers went from 50,000 to 250,000. 
67 Ibid., p. 279. 
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money which had to be found from somewhere.68 The first Gulf War provides 
a good example of the huge costs involved in assembling a force thought to be 
overwhelming. On October 30th 1990 Colin Powell outlined the offensive plan 
to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, 
 
The defensive force Bush had approved in August, totalling 250,000 
troops, would be fully deployed on schedule by December 1, he said. The 
war plan would require at least another 200,000, plus six carrier task 
forces and additional aircraft. If the president gave the order now, the 
offensive option would be in place by January 15.69 
 
 The funds to equip and maintain such large forces could be raised through tax 
or through cutting other spending programmes. Either way, such a huge 
commitment was going to place the Presidents hopes for the future and his 
own political standing at present in question. 
 
Therefore, a President and the advisors around him have to think very carefully 
about whether a particular foreign policy problem means that much to them 
that they are prepared to pay these costs in order to achieve their objective. 
This was precisely the reaction of National Security advisor Brent Scowcroft70: 
 
                                                            
68 In constant dollars, the first Gulf War cost $102 billion.  See Stephen Daggett, Cost of 
Major U.S. Wars, Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2010.  Full text available at: 
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69 Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 2006). p. 
200. 
70 For Scowcrofts own views on the Gulf War see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World 
Transformed (Vintage; New York, 1999), Chapters 13-19. 
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Scowcroft was taken aback by the size of the attack force Powell was 
proposing. The military, he felt, had moved from reluctance to undertake 
an offensive operation at all to a deliberately inflated plan designed to 
make the president think twice about the effort.71  
 
Certainly in President Bushs mind, there was no doubt about the seriousness 
with which he viewed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The following quotation is 
taken from his address to the nation on August 8th, announcing the initial 
deployment of US troops to defend Saudi Arabia.  
 
In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what 
we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy. But today as 
President, I ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for 
what's right and condemn what's wrong, all in the cause of peace.72  
 
What is interesting is Powells response to Scowcrofts concerns. This is 
effectively to say that if the objective of US forces is as important to the 
security of the country as Scowcroft says it is, no one will care how much it 
costs so long as US forces succeed: 
 
Dont worry about the numbers, he said. Deploying too few troops would 
risk a prolonged battle, higher casualties and even failure. After a victory, 
                                                            
71 Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, p.200. 
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no one would argue that the force had been too big; people would say 
they had been prudent.73 
 
Although in one sense Powells answer to Scowcrofts concerns is reassuring, 
on another level it does force Scowcroft and others holding his opinion that 
force is the best way to end the Gulf conflict to explain the reason why they 
think that force is the most appropriate way of ending the crisis in the Gulf.74 
Because if such a huge commitment was made and then it was later found out 
that this was unnecessary, what looked to be a prudent commitment of force 
then instead looks excessive, expensive and unnecessary, and certainly not in 
the vital interests of the United States. 
 
So the need that Powell sets out for American forces in the Gulf to be 
overwhelming places any advocate of the use of force in a position where they 
have to be certain that force is not only legally and morally justified. It also 
asks the advocate of military force to justify why a military solution is the best 
way of ending a conflict. Also, and perhaps more importantly, it forces policy 
makers to make an explicit decision about when a particular outcome is so 
important to the United States that it justifies this huge expenditure of men and 
material.  
 
                                                            
73 Solider: The Life of Colin Powell. p. 200. 
74 Many people argued that a prolonged blockade of Iraq would be the best way of bringing the 
crisis to an end. Among those arguing for such a course were former Defence Secretaries 
Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral William Crowe. 
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This attitude on the use of force effectively means that US policy makers are 
asked to place foreign policy objectives into two distinct categories: those 
circumstances where they are prepared to use an overwhelming amount of 
force, and those circumstances in which they are not prepared to use that 
amount of force, with little room under the Powell Doctrine for any 
intermediate categories75. Wisconsin Congressman Les Aspin, who was 
Chairman of the House Armed Forces Committee at the time of the Gulf War 
and who went on to serve as President Clintons first Secretary of Defense, was 
critical of the way the Powell Doctrine attempted to divide foreign policy into 
these two categories.  
 
He evidently believed that such a constraint would limit the military's 
usefulness in achieving policy objectives to only extreme cases. Such 
conditions could lead to the military becoming like nuclear weapons in 
the Cold War--important, expensive, but not useful.76 
 
Whether one subscribes to the Powell Doctrines insistence on dividing foreign 
policy issues into those where overwhelming force could be contemplated, or 
Aspins criticism of the Powell Doctrine, depends largely on what we take to 
be the militarys purpose. If one takes the view that the militarys role in 
foreign policy is strictly limited to the destruction of the conventional armed 
forces of other states, then for reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, one 
                                                            
75 For criticisms of this distinction see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as 
Secretary of State (Charles Scribners Sons: New York, 1993),  p.84 and p.103 and Madeleine 
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would always seek overwhelming force. However, if we subscribe to the view 
that the range of tasks the military ought to be asked to perform go beyond 
conventional war fighting, then from this point of view, Aspins criticism 
makes much more sense. In the context, for example, of military assistance to a 
civil power, such as the US intervention in Haiti in 1994, overwhelming force 
is not necessary and indeed could be viewed as counterproductive. In this 
instance the militarys objective is not to overwhelm the enemy, but to support 
a civilian led effort to restore basic institutions of government and the 
economy. Therefore, an overwhelming large military presence would tend to 
defeat the purpose of rebuilding civil capacity.  
 
The issue of whether the mission of modern militaries is to engage in a wide 
range of security related operations, or whether the proper use of military force 
is strictly related to war fighting is outside the scope of this thesis, but it is 
worth noting for the record, that since the first Persian Gulf War, the US 
military has found itself having to act in support of a civil power, much more 
than it has found itself fighting wars.   
 
So far in this chapter we have looked at the lessons of Vietnam as regards the 
idea of overwhelming force and how the idea of overwhelming force fits into 
the wider context of the Powell Doctrine. Before concluding this chapter, we 
need to look at criticisms of the Powell Doctrines insistence on a need to build 
up overwhelming force. 
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The working assumption of US planners was that the Iraqi armed forces would 
prove a formidable opponent for the US led coalition. Schwarzkopf himself 
was in no doubt that the Iraqis would prove formidable opponents: They had 
the capability to be quite a formidable enemy and, of course, you do judge your 
enemy based upon capabilities, not intent, you have to look at the enemy and 
really almost make a worst case call every time.77  
 
While we now know that this did not turn out to be the case, there was in fact 
evidence available at the time that Iraqi forces were not as capable as they were 
portrayed as being. Iraq had already been involved in a vicious and prolonged 
war with its neighbour Iran for most of the 1980s. This war had been closely 
observed by the United States as well as many other western nations because of 
their substantial strategic and economic interests in the region. As Dilip Hiro 
noted, Iraqs military performance in this war had been less than impressive:  
 
Baghdads reverses had resulted from a combination of logistical, 
military and political factors. Its forces performed well only as long as 
they were near their own border. Once deep into Iran their 
communications and supply lines became overstretched, and the high 
command had difficulty in redeploying forces quicklyThe deployment 
of Popular Army78 units complicated the situation. Many regular army 
                                                            
77 Interview with General Norman Schwarzkopf, PBS Frontline: The Gulf War [online], 
Original Air DateJanuary 9th 1996.  Available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/1.html. 
78 A militia made up of Baath party members.  
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officers considered these inexperienced reservists more of a cumbersome 
liability than an asset, more inclined to surrender than fight.79 
 
There were also more contemporary signs that the Iraqi army was simply not in 
the same league as the coalition it faced. In late January 1991, the Iraqis 
launched a limited offensive from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, briefly capturing 
the town of Ras al Khafji. After a few days of fierce fighting, Saudi and Qatari 
units drove the Iraqis back across the border. Commenting on Iraqi 
performance, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor had this to say: 
 
Throughout the battle, the Iraqis had great difficulty in coordinating their 
actions. Allied signal intelligence revealed virtual command chaos. Iraqi 
unit commanders lost control of their subordinates and most of the time 
were unaware of events beyond their line of sight. Artillery failed to 
coordinate with ground attacks and was incapable of shifting fire in a 
fast-moving situation. Logistics were unresponsive to the needs of the 
combat units.80 
 
However, this poor Iraqi performance did not cause US planners to make any 
alterations to their estimates of the size of the force that the coalition needed to 
use in order to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait, nor did it alter their plan as to how 
allied forces were to operate. This failure to assimilate readily available 
information raises a number of questions about the Powell Doctrines reliance 
                                                            
79 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (Grafton Books: London, 
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80 The Generals War. p. 287. 
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on overwhelming force and the effect that this had on the mentality of US 
planners. We have already spoken about the perceived need for overwhelming 
force in order to maintain the initiative in combat and the perceived damage 
that the absence of overwhelming force did to US forces in Vietnam. One is 
justified in asking the question; were US planners more interested in re-
fighting the Vietnam War than in fighting the Iraqis?  
 
By painting the Iraqi army in the most threatening hue possible, Powell and 
Schwarzkopf could gain justification for the demands for large numbers of 
troops, aircraft and other equipment. This is not to say that Powell or anyone 
else deliberately lied to or misled anyone. However, this belief in the fighting 
prowess of the Iraqis served to justify the need for overwhelming force and this 
may have prevented US planners from looking past their preconceived notions 
of what kind of opponents the Iraqis would be. 
 
The second point to make is that the idea that military force should only be 
used in an overwhelming fashion may in itself have contributed to there being 
a Gulf crisis in the first place.81  Throughout the August of 1990, the American 
intelligence community received continuous signals indicating a build up of 
Iraqi forces along the Kuwait border. In response to these reports, there were 
discussions at a senior level of a number of options involving the movement of 
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various military units to attempt to signal to Saddam Hussein that from an 
American point of view, an invasion of Kuwait would be unacceptable: 
 
What the United States could have done unilaterally it had not done. No 
bombers had been despatched to Diego Garcia. The Maritime 
Prepositioning Ships had not been sent toward the Gulf. There were no 
amphibious forces in the region.82 
 
It is not surprising that the US military did not wish to undertake this kind of 
reinforcement. It bore too many surface similarities to the slow, steady, 
graduated use of military power seen in Vietnam, and it risked the kind of 
stealth escalation which had done so much to damage the armed forces morale 
and to undermine their public credibility. Although we can of course never 
prove what Saddams reaction to these American moves would have been, it is 
not unreasonable to think that Saddam would have noticed increased American 
military muscle and that this would have entered into his calculations. We can 
be reasonably sure of this because the Iraqi dictator made substantial efforts to 
reassure the Bush Administration of his benign intent prior to the invasion. The 
extent of this can be seen in a cable sent by US ambassador to Iraq, April 
Glaspie to the State Department recounting a meeting she had had with 
Saddam on the 25th July 1990: 
 
Comment: Saddam, who in the memory of the current diplomatic corps, 
has never summoned an ambassador, is worried. He does not want to 
                                                            
82 The Generals War. p.28. 
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further antagonize us. With the UAE manoeuvres83, we have fully caught 
his attention, and that is good.84  
 
Glaspies cable indicates that Saddam had no interest in antagonising the 
United States and that he was fully conscious of US actions in the region. So it 
is reasonable to assume that further, larger scale, and perhaps more public US 
military moves would have affected Saddam Husseins thinking and may have 
provided an incentive for him to negotiate his problems with Kuwait, rather 
than risk invading. 
 
Another criticism frequently levelled at the US performance during Desert 
Storm was that senior commanders were so obsessed with not repeating the 
mistakes of Vietnam that they failed to take advantage of major tactical 
opportunities as they presented themselves. The biggest of these mistakes was 
said to be the fact that General Franks VII corps moved too slowly, which 
allowed major elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard to escape destruction 
and thus Iraq continued to pose a threat to its neighbours. This criticism was 
particularly strong because it was not made simply after the fact  General 
Schwarzkopf was stinging in this criticism of General Franks rate of advance 
during Desert Storm. The following quotation is Schwarzkopfs recollection of 
a conversation that he had with General Franks concerning Franks attack 
against the Republican Guard: 
 
                                                            
83 This is referring to a series of joint air exercises conducted between the United States and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
84 The Generals War. p. 22. 
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The first thing he brought up was his concern that some Iraqi units hed 
bypassed might come up to hit him on the flank. He wanted them 
destroyed before his forces turned to the Republican Guard, and therefore 
was about to order an attack towards the south. Fred, I interrupted, for 
chrissake, dont turn south! Turn east. Go after em!85 
 
General Franks has argued that the speed of his advance had little to do with 
the amount of resistance the Iraqis were putting up. The greater problem that 
Franks had was trying to manoeuvre an armoured corps in a relatively confined 
space.  
 
Finally and perhaps most tellingly for the future the decision to halt the allied 
ground defensive after one hundred hours allowed many Iraqi units to escape 
relatively unscathed from the fighting. These units were to prove invaluable to 
Saddam Hussein in defeating the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings which took 
place immediately after the wars end. This meant that Saddam would continue 
to be a thorn in Americas side for the next decade. Richard Haass, the Middle 
East Director of the National Security Staff, summed up the first Bush 
Administrations view of Saddams likely future: 
 
The one fly in the ointment was obviously that Saddam was still in 
power. It was our view that that likely scenario is that Saddam would be 
overthrown by his own people, probably from the military, who would 
have essentially have been fed up with the fact that this character had 
                                                            
85 Doesnt take a Hero. p.570. 
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twice marched them off into disaster within a decade. And our view was 
that whilst we couldn't guarantee it that was the most likely course of 
action. Events were simply left to themselves.86 
 
In a sense the 2003 invasion of Iraq87 was the conclusion to a story that began 
in 1990.  Perhaps the biggest criticism that can be levelled at the Powell 
Doctrines insistence on overwhelming force is that in the first Gulf War the 
US and its allies had this overwhelming force in place and did not use it to best 
effect.  The USs obsession with not allowing itself to slide into war in the way 
that policymakers in Vietnam had allowed themselves to drift incrementally 
towards disaster meant that after the liberation of Kuwait there was no political 
or military appetite to expand the coalitions objectives to include the 
overthrow of Saddam Husseins regime.  
 
Secretary of State James Baker sums up the Administrations attitude towards a 
potential occupation of Iraq as follows: 
 
How many more American lives would have been lost? How far beyond 
our authority from the UN would we have been acting if we had 
prolonged the war further, if we had occupied Southern Iraq, if we had 
gone to Baghdad? How long would we have to fight a guerrilla war in 
Iraq if we'd occupied any of the territory? A whole host of factors. People 
                                                            
86 Interview with Richard Haass, PBS Frontline: The Gulf War [online], Original Air Date 
January 9th1996.  Available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/haass/1.html. 
87 See Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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also forget that it was never a war aim or a political aim of the United 
States to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime.88 
 
 This left the US and its allies in a situation of having to live with and attempt 
to contain a regime that had twice invaded its neighbours and was in the 
unique position of having used chemical weapons against not only its 
neighbours but also its own people.89  Although answering a counter-factual 
question is by its very nature impossible, one is at least justified in asking the 
question, could the United States have saved itself and the Iraqi people a great 
deal of pain and expense by removing Saddam Hussein when it had the 
opportunity in 1991? 
 
In this chapter we have demonstrated the following: first, that although the idea 
of outnumbering and overwhelming an enemy dates at least from the 
nineteenth century, both in European military thought and American military 
practice, it took the US experience in Vietnam to make the American military 
reassess the value of having overwhelming numbers and having them at the 
earliest possible point on the modern battlefield. Also, we have shown that 
Vietnam helped to re-orientate American strategic thinking away from 
strategies aiming to persuade an adversary to undertake certain actions back 
towards strategies aimed at compelling an enemy to undertake certain actions. 
We have seen how this strategic change was brought about both by the 
                                                            
88 Interview with James Baker, PBS Frontline: The Gulf War [online], Original Air Date
January 9th1996.  Available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/baker/1.html.                                                      
89 For good journalistic accounts of how the policy of containing Iraq worked in practice, see 
Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession, new ed. (Verso; 
London, 2002), and Con Coughlin, Saddam: The Secret Life (Pan: London, 2007). 
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empirical lessons that the US Military chose to draw from Vietnam.  We have 
also seen that whether these were the correct lessons depends on whether you 
think of the Vietnam War as a revolutionary struggle internal to South 
Vietnam, or externally directed aggression.  What we have also seen is that, 
within the US Military, the intellectual climate that led to the Powell Doctrine 
came down very firmly on the side of the argument that the war in Vietnam 
was by and large driven by North Vietnamese aggression.   
 
We have seen the emergence of what will be a recurring theme throughout this 
thesis, namely that the Powell Doctrines requirement for overwhelming force 
has a relationship to the other elements of the Powell Doctrine, in particular, 
that it helped in maintaining public support for military action and it forces 
civilians to give some kind of definition of what constitutes US vital interests.  
 
Finally, we have seen that the supposed need for overwhelming force can 
potentially have adverse results for US interests. In particular, we have seen 
how it can lead to an overestimation of enemy capabilities and how it can 
prevent the use of military power as a deterrent.  Perhaps most telling for the 
future, the insistence on overwhelming force may have been a contributing 
factor in inhibiting the US from removing the Iraqi regime in 1991 and thus 
storing up a great deal of trouble for itself in the future. 
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Chapter 4  US Forces Must Have Overwhelming Public and 
Congressional Support 
 
The military subculture was deeply affected by the Vietnam War and the 
anti war movement... One of the main redoubts of the Vietnam syndrome 
today lies within the officer corps of the US military. US military officers 
today who came of age during the Vietnam War are overwhelmingly 
opposed to doing battle on ambiguous operational and military turf. They 
are deeply suspicious and sometimes plainly hostile to civilian judgement 
with respect to the use of force, and they are sensitive to the reality that if 
civilian strategists and politicians lack support  for a military campaign , 
it is they, soldiers in combat, who will end up paying the price for 
vacillation and error
1
.  
 
The need for public and Congressional support is a unique element to the 
Powell Doctrine and the intellectual climate that engendered it. While the rest 
of the Powell Doctrine, and its intellectual climate, represents the military 
proactively learning and asserting the lessons of Vietnam to civilian policy 
makers, the stress on the need for public support is a reactive response on 
behalf of the military towards changes in American society, changes in the role 
that Congress saw for itself in the making of foreign policy, and changes in the 
law. This is not to say that public support was unimportant in all wars prior to 
Vietnam, rather it is to say that public support became harder to achieve in the 
                                                            
1 Adam Garfinkle, Telltale Hearts. The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement 
(Macmillan Press: London, 1997), p. 278.  
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post-Vietnam era and also that public support became that much harder to 
maintain over the long run. The other important distinction to draw between 
the pre and post-Vietnam eras is that the military tended to see public support 
for military action as something which must exist a priori, rather than 
something which could be mobilised after the President had already made the 
decision to commit US troops abroad. The following quotation is taken from a 
speech Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had delivered to the National 
Press Club in November 1984: before the United States commits combat 
forces abroad, the US Government should have some reasonable assurance of 
the support of the American people and their elected representatives in 
Congress.2 
 
In this chapter, we are talking solely about the intellectual climate that led to 
the Powell Doctrine as the events in this chapter take place well before the 
publication of either the 1992 Foreign Affairs article or Powells term as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 
In this chapter we will look at the lessons Congress and the American public 
took from Vietnam and how that led to a change in attitudes towards military 
intervention in particular in the developing world. We will also see how during 
the Nixon Administration and beyond, Congress became more assertive about 
its role in the making of foreign policy and passed a number of measures which 
                                                            
2 Caspar W. Weinberger, The Uses of Military Power, National Press Club, Washington, 
D.C., Nov. 28, 1984. Emphasis added. 
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fundamentally changed its role in the decision making process leading up to the 
deployment of US forces for combat overseas.  
 
The case study this chapter will use will be an examination of US policy 
towards Nicaragua between 1979 and 1984. The selection of this case study 
allows us to look at the different approaches of two Administrations of 
different parties and ideological points of view. Also, it allows us to look at the 
differences between dealing with an insurgency and trying to overthrow the 
Marxist government that resulted from this insurgency. 
 
Before moving on to look at the lessons of Vietnam, we need, for purposes of 
comparison, to look at how the public and, in particular, Congress saw its role 
in formulating foreign policy before Vietnam.  
 
The early Cold War saw a shift in the balance of power between the Presidency 
and Congress in the making of foreign policy. With the US now a global 
military power for the first time, and with the advent of nuclear weapons 
making speed of decision making vital, the important foreign policy decision 
making tended to drift away from Congress where debate and parliamentary 
procedure could hold up the decision making process, towards the executive 
where a small group of Presidential advisors could make decisions quickly. It 
was also felt that the executive had better access to information than Congress. 
This was not a process which in any way was forced down Congress throat, 
but a process which Congress largely accepted as necessary and sensible. 
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Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex) explaining his support of President Trumans 
decision to send troops into Korea without consulting Congress said: 
 
If a burglar breaks into your house, you can shoot him without going 
down to the police station and getting permission. You might run into a 
long debate by Congress, which would tie your hands completely. You 
have the right to do so as Commander-in-Chief and under the UN 
Charter.3 
 
This quotation very aptly demonstrates the idea that the Cold War had created 
a state of permanent national emergency, in which the President could 
justifiably act outside of the normal constraints of everyday politics and 
legislative procedure.  This sense that, in the early 1950s, senior policymakers 
in the United States saw themselves as being locked in a life and death struggle 
with the forces of totalitarian Soviet Communism was vividly expressed in the 
now famous policy paper blandly titled NSC-68: 
 
The design [referring to Soviet plans and intentions as perceived by the 
authors of NSC-68], therefore, calls for the complete subversion or 
forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of 
society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by 
an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the 
Kremlin.  To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the 
                                                            
3 Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion. Americas Descent into Vietnam (Basic Books: New York, 
2002), p.38-39.  
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domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal 
center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to 
Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality 
must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is 
to achieve its fundamental design.4 
 
These fears were only heightened by the recent Soviet acquisition of nuclear 
weapons: 
 
The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its 
design, and Increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to 
the uneasy equilibrium without order which exists in the world and raises 
new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this 
tension without moving toward some kind of order, on somebody's 
terms.5 
 
Despite this sense that the United States was locked in a life or death struggle 
with the Soviet Union, successive Presidents were still eager to prove that this 
new found freedom in the making of foreign policy had a constitutional basis. 
Presidents from Truman onwards pointed out that the constitution gave the 
President the title of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and that, under 
                                                            
4 For the full text of NSC-68, see http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/pdocs/nsc68.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
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this authority, the President was entitled to send troops anywhere in the world 
without needing legally to consult Congress6.  
 
Although there was widespread initial support for Trumans decision to 
commit troops to Korea, as it became apparent however that US forces were 
not going to achieve a quick victory, Republicans felt increasingly free to 
attack Trumans handling of the war safe in the knowledge that they could not 
be counter attacked because Truman had not consulted them prior to his 
decision to commit troops7. 
 
Therefore, when situations arose during the 1950s that seemed to require the 
use of US military force, such as the 1958 crisis in Lebanon or the Quemoy-
Matsu dispute between China and Taiwan8, Eisenhower used Congressional 
resolutions as a way of indicating Congressional support for his policies 
without asking for a formal declaration of war. The novel aspect of these 
resolutions was that, unlike a declaration of war, these resolutions gave the 
President the power to act in situations which had not yet arisen. Also, these 
resolutions were extremely vaguely worded and gave the President wide 
latitude to interpret exactly what they meant. For example, the Formosa 
Resolution dealing with the defence of Quemoy and Matsu read:  
                                                            
6 This overlooks the fact that the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8) gives Congress the sole 
power to declare war and issue letters of Marque and reprisal.  The full text of the US 
Constitution can be found online at: http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=529. 
7 For a discussion of how these Republican attacks wounded Truman and the Democratic Party 
and how they eventually led to the McCarthyite witch hunts see, David M. Ofshinsky, A 
Conspiracy so Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy, (Free Press: New York, 1983). 
8 For detailed accounts of these crises and the Eisenhower Administrations response to them, 
see Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. Volume two, The President, 1952-1969 (George Allen & 
Unwin; London, 1984), and Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles: The 
Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era (Little, Brown: Boston, Mass., 1973).  
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Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, that the President of the 
United States be hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the 
United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing 
and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this 
authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions 
and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such 
other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the 
defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. This resolution shall expire 
when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area 
is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the 
United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.9 
 
Under this Resolution the President alone decides when it expires, and it is the 
President alone who decides exactly under what circumstances US forces will 
be used to implement this resolution. Effectively, these resolutions act as a 
blanket grant of authority on the part of Congress to the President limited only 
by geographical area. Senator William Fulbright (D. Ark) expressed deep 
concern about the constitutional propriety of granting such authority to a 
President outside of wartime:  
 
                                                            
9 The text of the resolution is taken from: http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2016.htm 
(link no longer active).  Emphasis added. 
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Shall we strike down the Senates rights and duties in the conduct of 
foreign affairs, as defined by 168 years of constitutional practice?... Shall 
we say yes to a radical proposal whose adoption would mean that we are 
abandoning our constitutional systems of checks and balances; that from 
now on, naked Executive power will rule the highest and most fateful 
interests of the nation?10 
 
Given the enormous authority Congress was giving to the President, it would 
be reasonable to expect these Resolutions to be the subject of heated debate 
and a close vote. However, this was far from being the case. The Formosa 
Resolution was passed by House vote 409-3 and by the Senate vote 85-311. 
President Johnson used very similar language to the Formosa Resolution when 
drawing up the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which in addition to Johnsons 
power as Commander in Chief, allegedly provided the legal justification for the 
presence of US forces in Vietnam.  
 
This happy consensus over the role of the President and the role of Congress in 
foreign policy making was to be shattered in Vietnam in a debate about the 
proper balance between executive and legislative authority which continues to 
the present day12. 
                                                            
10 A Grand Delusion. p. 205. Fulbright later put forward his views on the failings of American 
foreign policy in general and what Congress proper role should be in making foreign policy in 
a book: J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (Cape: London, 1967).  For a more in-
depth discussion of how Presidents were able to dominate foreign policy debates between the 
end of World War II and the mid-1960s, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989). 
11 These voting records are taken from: http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2016.htm (link 
no longer available). 
12 A Commission supported by the Miller Centre of the University of Virginia chaired by 
former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher recently issued a report 
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As Americas involvement in Vietnam deepened and the costs (both human 
and financial), mounted, Congress, and in particular the Senate, began to regret 
the casual way in which they had granted Johnson the authority to wage war. 
This regret extended beyond the end of the war. Many, particularly in the 
Democratic Party, felt that the time had come for Congress to reassert a more 
active role in the making of foreign policy. The Congressional elections of 
1970, 1972 and 1974, bought into Congress a new generation of politicians 
who were much less willing than their predecessors to defer to the judgements 
of the Executive on matter of foreign policy, and were much more reluctant to 
consider potential American military involvement overseas: 
 
The 1972 elections, and especially the 1974 midterm elections, brought 
into the Congress scores of Democrats (and some Republicans) opposed 
to the war, many of whom  like Al Gore, Jr., and Stephen Solarz  had 
been involved in years past in the antiwar movementthe level of 
Congressional activism with respect to the war increased yearlyThe 
precedent had been set on December 22, 1970, when the Congress voted 
to cut off all funds for US operations in Cambodia and Laos.13 
 
Congress not only voted against further funding for operations in Cambodia 
and Laos, but over the coming years a series of bills was introduced which 
sought to end the war, or limit its scope. By the time the Paris Peace Accords 
                                                                                                                                                            
recommending new legislation to spell out the roles of Congress and the President in deciding 
when to undertake military action. The full text of their report can be found at: 
http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/pdf/National_War_Powers_Commission_Report.pdf. 
13 Telltale Hearts. p.199. 
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was signed in 1973, it had become a real fear among the senior members of the 
Nixon Administration that if no peace treaty were signed, Congress would 
move to unilaterally end US involvement.14 
 
The most radical piece of legislation that congress passed to limit the freedom 
of the executive branch in its ability to use military force was the 1973 War 
Powers Act. The sponsors of this legislation hoped that it would reassert 
Congress traditional power to declare war in a modern context: 
 
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers 
of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective 
judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.15  
 
The resolution was drafted in such as way as to make it legally impossible for 
the President to deploy US forces overseas without Congressional approval, 
and perhaps more importantly, the law required that this approval be 
ascertained by a process of ongoing consultation between Congress and the 
President. However, there is another way to interpret the legislation. One could 
argue that it actually gave the President more power rather than less. Nowhere 
                                                            
14 For a vivid account of how real that fear had become and the role it played in US decision 
making see: Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in 
and Extrication from the Vietnam War (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2003). 
15 Full text of The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542, 
November 7, 1973 can be found at: http://www.thecre.com/fedlaw/legal22/warpow.htm. 
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in the Constitution does it say that the President shall have the power to deploy 
troops for up to sixty days, yet the War Powers Act grants him that right16. 
 
Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or 
into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President 
shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such 
hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of 
such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such 
hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less 
often than once every six months.17  
 
The real teeth of the Act comes from the fact that if Congress has not approved 
the deployment of troops, they will be withdrawn sixty days after the President 
first reported to Congress that the deployment of troops was necessary. This 
period can be extended to ninety days if the President deems the situation to be 
an emergency or if withdrawal after sixty days is not logistically feasible18.  
  
The War Powers Resolution was passed over Richard Nixons veto and has 
never been invoked. Many scholars and policy makers have questioned its 
constitutional validity.  
 
                                                            
16 This was pointed out by liberal democratic senators Thomas Eagleton and Frank Church 
among others. See LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer, Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator 
Frank Church (Washington State University Press: Pullman, Washington, 1994). 
17
 Full text of The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542, 
November 7th, 1973 can be found at: http://www.thecre.com/fedlaw/legal22/warpow.htm. 
18 Ibid. 
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The argument over whether the War Powers Act is constitutional hinges on the 
US Supreme Courts ruling in the case of INS v. Chadha.  In this case, the 
Supreme Court held that Congressional vetoes of executive action, such as that 
contemplated by the War Powers Act, were unconstitutional because they 
violated Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, which reads: 
 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of 
the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return 
it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, 
who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to 
reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall 
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the 
other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved 
by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.19 
 
In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the right 
to pass legislation or veto executive action without following the procedure 
laid down in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution:  
 
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement 
that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was 
uniformly accepted by the Framers. Presentment to the President and the 
                                                            
19 US Constitution, Acticle I, Section 7.  Full text available at: 
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html 
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Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took 
special pains to assure that these requirements could not be 
circumvented.20 
 
This court ruling sets a precedent for the War Powers Act as the resolutions to 
approve or disapprove the commitment of US forces are not subject to a 
Presidential veto by the terms of the Act.  In INS v. Chadha, Associate Justice 
Byron White, dissenting from the majority of the Court, pointed out the 
implications of the Courts ruling for other acts of Congress, and indeed White 
specifically cites the War Powers Act as being amongst the acts of Congress 
likely to be imperilled by the Courts ruling in INS v. Chadha:  
 
Accordingly, over the past five decades, the legislative veto has been 
placed in nearly 200 statutes. The device is known in every field of 
governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war 
powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the environment, and the 
economy.... [italics added].21 
 
Despite the doubts raised about the War Powers Acts constitutionality by the 
verdict in INS v. Chadha, it should be noted that the constitutionality of the 
War Powers Act has never directly been put before a court and that, despite the 
insistence of various administrations22 that the Act is unconstitutional, it 
                                                            
20 INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  Full text available at: 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/chadha.html 
21 Ibid. 
22 President George H. W. Bush argues strenuously in his memoirs that, in the context of the 
Gulf War, he held the Constitutional right to act without Congressional approval.  See George 
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remains on the statute books.  Indeed, the threat of the Act being invoked by 
Congress has meant that in every instance of US forces being sent into combat 
overseas except Grenada and Panama, which in any case did not last long 
enough for the Act to be an issue, Presidents have sought Congressional 
approval and have got it. Whatever the legality of the War Powers Act, the 
very fact that it passed over President Nixons veto is indicative of the fact that, 
by the early 1970s, Congress had become much more strident in demanding 
that its voice be heard in matters relating to foreign policy and National 
Security. 
 
The change in Congressional mood was to a certain extent driven by the 
general disillusionment of the American public with the Vietnam War. 
Although there had been antiwar protest movements in America long before 
Vietnam, the Vietnam antiwar movement was different in its size and intensity. 
Its overall effect on US policy is hard to measure in any simple sense. What 
makes it so difficult to judge its effectiveness is that the antiwar movement was 
an enormously broad coalition of groups and interests ranging from the 
totalitarian left23 through religious pacifism to disillusioned liberals. These 
groups had massively different criteria for success and whilst the more 
hardcore, left wing of the antiwar movement tended to alienate mainstream 
                                                                                                                                                            
Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 1st Vintage Books ed.  (Vintage: New 
York, 1999), Pp.397-398. 
23 For a radical account of the Vietnam antiwar movement see Fred Halstead, Out Now! A 
participant's Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War (Monad Press: New 
York, distributed by Pathfinder Press, 1978). Halstead was a member of several Trotskyite 
groups and helped organise antiwar demonstrations in Washington and New York. 
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American society, the more liberal element served to legitimise dissent on the 
issue of the war24.  
 
What can be said with certainty is that as the war dragged on, more and more 
people became disillusioned with the US presence in Vietnam:  
 
The limited patience of the American people affected all Nixons 
Vietnam strategies from 1969 through 1973. By spring of 1968, a 
majority of Americans thought that getting involved in Vietnam had been 
a mistake. They did not call for immediate withdrawal  only a small 
minority of Americans ever favoured that option  but they desired an 
end to the war and the unprecedented societal dislocation that had come 
with it.25 
 
The nature of this disillusionment was not uniform. Some people questioned 
the whole basis of US involvement in the war, whilst others wanted the US to 
adopt a more aggressive strategy in order to win the war more quickly. 
Whether hawks or doves, there was one common feature of growing 
disillusionment with Vietnam which began with the Johnson Administration 
and reached toxic proportions during the Nixon Administration: people of 
whatever shade of opinion no longer trusted or believed what they were being 
told by Government. This breakdown of trust between citizens and 
                                                            
24 For a more left liberal analysis of the antiwar movement see: Melvin 
Small, Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds, 
(Scholarly Resources: Wilmington, Del., 2002). 
25 Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 
Kansas, 1999). p.66. 
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Government was not helped by the Watergate scandal or by the revelations of 
the CIAs domestic activity.  
 
This phenomenon has come to be known as the credibility gap. We have 
already seen in chapter three how Lyndon Johnsons desire that Vietnam not 
affect his domestic programmes led to limitations on the way the war was 
fought. This same impulse led Johnson and his Administration to consistently 
overstate how well the war was going. This led to a situation in which a large 
section of the press no longer believed Government statements on the war 
which were flatly contradicted by reporters on the ground in Vietnam. As 
Stanley Kutler notes,  
 
The problem was serious, and went beyond simple matters of personal 
tastes and preferences. The credibility of the President  and, in effect, of 
the United States government  was on the line. The battles with the 
press, George Reedy (President Johnsons press secretary) noted, became 
battles with important segments of the public.26 
 
Just how serious the credibility gap became can be demonstrated by the fact 
that even President Johnsons closest aides, men who had access to the latest 
intelligence on Vietnam, no longer believed what they were being told. The 
following is the recollection of Presidential Special Council Harry McPherson 
to the news of the Tet offensive. It is worth quoting at length because it 
                                                            
26 Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (W. W. Norton: 
New York, 1992). p.20. 
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underlines just how far public trust in the Government had been undermined by 
over-optimistic official assessments of how well the war was going, and also 
demonstrates the enormous power the modern media, and in particular 
television, has in shaping the public consciousness: 
 
I would go in two or three mornings a week and study the whole cable 
book and talk to Rostow [Walt. W. Rostow  the National Security 
Advisor] and ask him what had happened the day before, and would get 
from him what almost seemed hallucinatory from the point of view of 
what I had seen on network television the night beforeWell, I must say 
that I mistrusted what he said, although I dont say with any confidence 
that I was right to mistrust him, because, like millions of other people 
who had been looking at television the night before, I had the feeling that 
the country had just about had it, that they would simply not take any 
more I suppose, from a social scientist point of view, it is particularly 
interesting that people like me  people who had some responsibility for 
expressing the Presidential point of view  could be so affected by the 
media as everyone else was, while downstairs, within fifty yards of my 
desk, was that enormous panoply of intelligence-gathering devices  
tickers, radios, messages coming in from the field. I assume the reason 
this is so, the reason I put aside my own interior access to confidential 
information and was more persuaded by what I saw on the tube and in 
the newspapers, was that like everyone else who had been deeply 
involved in explaining the policies of the war and trying to understand 
them and render some judgment, I was fed up with the light at the end of 
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the tunnel stuff. I was fed up with the optimism that seemed to flow 
without stopping from Saigon.27 
 
This credibility gap was not simply a problem for Johnson personally, or even 
his Administration. The nature of the relationship between a President and the 
press was changing throughout the 1960s. With the advent of television and the 
improvements in communication technology, information could be relayed 
much faster. Also, this increasingly meant that television became the dominant 
source of news for many people. This meant that newspapers and magazines 
were under increasing pressure to deliver sensational news and deliver it 
quickly. The upshot of this was that news became much more difficult for 
government to manage effectively:  
 
The modern President and the media have a symbiotic relationship. The 
President carries a publicity train in his wake; he needs a flow of 
information to his public constituency. Media workers are conduits, 
sometimes allowing free flow, sometimes selecting, sometimes adding 
their own gloss. Meanwhile, White House announcements and printouts 
gush like a torrent.28 
 
With the White House alone putting this amount of information into the public 
domain, coupled with the fact that most large media organisations can have 
reporters covering the Pentagon and the State Department exclusively, and the 
                                                            
27 Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1977), Pp.81-82. 
28The Wars of Watergate, p.168. 
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fact that they can have correspondents on the ground around the world, taken 
together all this means that the chances of being able to run any kind of foreign 
policy covertly for any prolonged period of time are extremely small. The 
public will eventually find out about most of the activities their government 
undertakes, and it is by no means certain that they will find this out from an 
official source.  
 
Given these enormous changes in the social and political context in which it 
had to operate, it is not surprising that many within the US Armed Forces came 
to see the unambiguous support of Congress and the public as being 
indispensable. The following quotation is taken from an unpublished 
manuscript of a dissertation undertaken by a US military officer undergoing 
General Staff training. The context of the quotation is a discussion of what 
constitutes the Powell Doctrine and whether this can be squared with the 
policies of the second Bush Administration: 
 
Take on only commitments that can gain the support of the American 
people and the Congress.  Reasonable assurance of public support is vital 
to the success of any military commitmentit is the underlining force 
multiplier in obtaining a military end-state, that being success or 
failure.29   
 
                                                            
29 Lieutenant Colonel Herb Brown, USAF, Lieutenant Commander Mark L. Bowlin, USN, and 
Major Scott C. Sheltz, USA, How the Bush Doctrine of Preemptive Strike Meets the Test of the 
Powell Doctrine, Joint Forces Staff College. Joint and Combined Staff Officer School. 
September 6th 2002. Full text available at: 
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/bush_
doctrine.doc. 
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When we look at the intellectual climate that informed the Powell Doctrine 
and, indeed, the intellectual climate that still informs the attitude of the Military 
to public and Congressional opinion up to the present moment, we can see that 
the need to both gain and hold public support over the long-term ranks high on 
the list of priorities.  It is also not surprising that, given the state of 
Congressional opinion and the importance of the media outlined above, that the 
Military sees the maintenance of public support over the long term as 
something which is difficult to maintain: Our impatient domestic population 
may find it hard to maintain support for a Long War, as the end may not be 
readily in sight, the objectives may be vaguely defined, and the enemy may be 
obscure.30  This is not just a recent observation made in connection with the 
War on Terror.  Harry Summers also makes the point that maintaining public 
support military intervention over the long-haul must be considered vital: 
They [senior military officers] needed to tell him that it would be an obvious 
fallacy to commit the Army without first committing the American people.31  
Indeed, General Westmoreland, looking back on Vietnam in retirement, notes 
the failure to win and maintain public and Congressional support over Vietnam 
and the corrosive effect it had on the war effort: By failing to level with the 
people and failing to impel the Congress to commit itself, the President 
                                                            
30 Lance Luksik, LCDR, USN, Eric Moses, Maj, USAF, and John Woodward, MAJ, USA, 
Keeping the Fire Lit. Democracy and the Long War, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and 
Combined Warfighting School. June 2nd2008. Full text available at: 
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Keepi
ng_the_Fire_Lit%20_Democracy_and_the_Long_War.doc. 
31 Colonel Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Presido 
Press, 1982), p.35. 
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allowed public opinion to become a leaden liability.32  The reasons why 
Westmoreland felt that a lack of public support became such a liability were:  
 
When the President and his Administration failed to level with the 
American people about the extent and nature of the sacrifice that had to 
be made, they contributed to a credibility gap that grew into an 
unbridgeable chasm.  A low-key approach means that some make 
sacrifices while most do not, and even those who make no sacrifice 
dislike it because their consciences trouble them.  If a war is deemed 
worthy of the dedication and sacrifice of the military services, it is also 
worthy of the commitment of the entire population.33 
 
What the above discussion shows is that the Powell Doctrine and the 
intellectual climate predating it in the late 1970s and early 1980s saw that 
mobilising and maintaining public support was a vital constituent of military 
success, and what the discussion also shows is that this concern over what 
public opinion will and will not stand continues to be a subject of intense 
concern within the US Military. 
 
Before moving on to look at how the perceived need to win and maintain 
public support affected US policy towards Nicaragua, it is worth pausing to 
examine what we mean by public opinion, its nature, its impact, and the role 
it ought to play in deciding on an appropriate national security policy.  We will 
                                                            
32 General Williams Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Double Day and Company: New York, 
1976), p.412. 
33 Ibid, p.411. 
183 
 
  
first look at the profound pessimism surrounding the nature and utility of 
public opinion expressed by scholars such as Walter Lippman, Don Oberdorfer 
and John Mueller.  We will then move on to look at those scholars who are 
more optimistic about the consistency, utility and nature of the publics 
engagement with national security affairs such as Bruce Jentleson, Stephen 
Kull and I. M. Destler. 
 
Early scholars of public opinion had a very low opinion both of the publics 
comprehension of public policy and the publics ability to express consistent 
and logical preferences over a prolonged period of time.  Walter Lippman, 
writing on the subject of public opinion in 1922, expressed the view that, 
because public opinion was always based on imperfect information, and, 
particularly in matters of foreign policy, because the general public has no 
first-hand experience of either foreign lands of warfare, public opinion in 
Lippmans mind is largely derived from a series of stereotypes that the public 
holds, rather than any kind of logical deduction: 
 
Each of us lives and works on a small part of the earths surface, moves 
in a small circle, and of these acquaintances knows only a few intimately.  
Of any public event that has wide effects we see at best only a phase and 
an aspect.  This is as true of the eminent insiders who draft treaties, make 
laws, and issue orders, as it is of those who have treaties framed for them, 
laws promulgated to them, orders given at them.  Inevitably our opinions 
cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, 
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than we can directly observe.  They have, therefore, to be pieced together 
out of what others have reported and what we can imagine.34 
 
For Lippman, what makes public opinion reached by process outlined above so 
unstable is that the stereotypes the public bases its opinion on are fed to the 
public at large through the press.  The press being a marketplace means that 
publications are constantly having to fight for market share and survival: The 
object of every publisher is, therefore to turn his circulation from a medley of 
catch-as-catch-can news stand buyers into a devoted band of constant 
readers.35  This means that the press have a strong incentive to feed the public 
the news that the public wants to read about: The newspaper deals with a 
multitude of events beyond our experience.  But it deals also with some events 
within our experience.  And by its handling of those events we most frequently 
decide to like it or dislike it.36  If Lippman noticed this phenomenon among 
newspaper publishers in the 1920s, Don Oberdorfer, in his account of the Tet 
Offensive, noticed a similar phenomenon, whereby television network news 
competed with each other to produce the most sensational and exciting stories: 
 
The Tet story had suspense, high drama and enormous public interest.  
The United States and its allies were not the inevitable winners in every 
battle; the Communists had taken the initiative.  The plans and purposes 
of the United States hung in the balance; political and military 
                                                            
34 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (1922; LaVergne: Greenbook Publications, 2010), 47. 
35 Public Opinion, 171. 
36 Ibid., 173. 
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reputations were at stake; there was an enveloping aura of controversy at 
home and in the field.37 
 
If Lippman and Oberdorfer are correct and the press, through market forces, 
are driven toward parochialism or sensationalism, they are hardly the best 
sources of information on which the public can base ordered, logical policy 
preferences.  
 
However, if the press is an unhelpful means by which the general public can 
form policy preferences, there is also the possibility that the publics 
underlying biases and stereotypes that Lippman takes for the basis of public 
opinion may also be prone to alarmingly rapid shifts.  John Muellers work 
looks at public support for the wars in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.  Muellers 
argument is that there is a direct statistical relationship between public support 
for any of these wars and increases in American casualties.  According to 
Mueller, this relationship is impervious to the existence or non-existence of an 
anti-war movement or how the public perceives the stakes for the United 
States.  According to Muellers argument, the relationship between public 
support and casualties is an inverse one: as casualties go up, public support 
goes down: American public opinion became a key factor in all three wars 
[Korea, Vietnam and the Second Iraq War], and in each one there has been a 
simple association: as casualties mount, support decreases. Broad enthusiasm 
                                                            
37 Don Oberdorfer, Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1984), 160. 
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at the outset invariably erodes.38  Also, Mueller is intensely critical of what he 
sees as the extreme artifice of the whole notion of sampling public opinion on 
any subject at any particular time: 
 
The interview situation is an odd social experience.  The respondent, on 
his doorstep or in his living room, is barraged with a set of questions on a 
wide variety of subjects by a stranger  Few people are accustomed to 
having their every utterance faithfully recorded and many find the 
experience flattering.  And, aware that their views are being preserved for 
the ages, they do not wish to appear unprepared at that moment.  Under 
these circumstances it is not surprising to find respondents pontificating 
in a seemingly authoritative, if basically truthful, manner on subjects 
about which they know nothing or to which they have never given any 
thought whatsoever.39 
 
So, Mueller as an expert statistician and follower of public opinion is 
essentially supporting Lippmans argument that public opinion is no more than 
a snapshot of the stereotypes and biases of whoever is being sampled, and that 
the problem is less that the general publics opinion of important policy matters 
is wrong, but that, on a wide variety of subjects, the general public simply does 
not have what could be thought of as a considered opinion.  The relationship 
between this observation and Muellers observation that support for war is 
generally inverse to the numbers of casualties suffered and that, initially, 
                                                            
38 John Mueller, The Iraq Syndrome, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6 (Nov/Dec 2005), pp.44-
54. 
39 John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1985), p.1. 
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Korea, Vietnam and the second Iraq War were met with broad public support, 
is easy enough to explain.  The initial broad public support is generated by an 
instinctive wish to support the President and the country, the so-called rally 
around the flag effect: 
 
Partisan differences were relatively small at the beginning of the wars 
[Korea and Vietnam], presumably under the influence of a sort of 
nonpartisan consensus at a time of national emergency.  Differences 
broadened considerably once the wars were underway, becoming entirely 
unambiguous after the Chinese intervention in Korea and by the second 
year of the war in Vietnam.40 
 
Once this initial effect has subsided, then, Mueller would argue, that public 
weariness over increasing casualties reasserts itself in a drop in support for the 
war. 
 
Lippman is sceptical of the value of democratic decision-making when it 
comes to detailed matters of public policy and would favour a foreign policy 
made largely by the executive with the minimum amount of input from the 
general public.  Indeed, Lippman spends a good deal of time describing how, 
ideally, public policy ought to be made.  He pays particular attention to the 
distinction between those whose job it is to make policy and those whose job it 
is to implement policy: 
 
                                                            
40 Ibid., pp.116-117. 
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The more subtle the elements that enter into the decision, the more 
irresponsible power the expert wields.  He is certain, moreover, to 
exercise more power in the future than ever he did before, because 
increasingly the relevant facts will elude the voter and the 
administrator.41 
 
We will now move on to look at whether Lippmans rather gloomy assessment 
of how public opinion is formed and the limited utility it has toward 
policymaking is in fact borne out. 
 
Certainly, members of Congress and the Executive branch seem to have a 
fairly dim view of the publics level of interest and intellectual engagement 
with politics in general, and foreign policy in particular.  Research carried out 
by Steven Kull and I. M. Destler asked members of Congress, their staff, and 
serving and former members of the Executive branch of Government to 
describe how they thought the general public thought and felt about foreign 
policy.  The results would seem to be very much in line with Lippmans 
concept of public opinion.  Certainly, insofar as they see the public as being 
overwhelmingly self-interested: 
 
I think thats a traditional American nationalism or isolationism, caused 
by our history and our geography, which is interrupted when we feel 
ourselves menaced by outside forces: Hitler, Communism, whatever  I 
think the traditional American feeling is, mind your own business, take 
                                                            
41 Public Opinion, 201. 
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care of your own problems at home, and dont worry about the carnage in 
Bosnia or Haiti.42 
 
The aim of Kull and Destlers research was to find out whether policymakers 
preconceived notions of the public actually matched reality.  In order to test 
this, Kull and Destler designed a series of focus groups across the USA to give 
them a rough sample of the America population.  Kull and Destler then asked a 
series of questions, both on the general role the public saw the United States as 
playing in International Relations and a number of questions dealing with more 
specific topics, such as what the relationship ought to be between the United 
States and the United Nations.  Kull and Destler on the whole found that the 
American public were much more willing for the country to play a proactive, 
and indeed altruistic, role in world affairs than in either Lippmans theory of 
public opinion or than the policymaking elites would have expected.  For 
instance, the following question was asked: do you think it would be best for 
the future of this country [the United States] if we [Americans] take an active 
part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?43  In answer to this 
question that was asked by four different polling organisations between 
October 1990 and September 1996, support for an active American role in 
world affairs never fell below 57%, and peaked at 79%.44  This support for 
American engagement in Kull and Destlers research seems to flow from a 
public understanding that Americas prosperity and security is intrinsically 
dependent on the security and prosperity of the rest of the world.  To quote a 
                                                            
42 Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 37. 
43 Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public, 42-43. 
44 Figure 2-1, Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public, 43. 
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participant in one of Kull and Destlers focus groups, I say invest foreign aid 
to help people get an education, give them tools to work  and then they begin 
to build, and then they develop, and they end up buying goods from us, we buy 
goods from them, they defend us; we defend them.45  The very fact that Kull 
and Destler went into the level of detail that they did, asking their focus groups 
not only what they thought but why they thought it, perhaps goes some way to 
criticising the artifice inherent in polling that John Mueller was so sceptical of 
earlier in this discussion.  The work of Bruce Jentleson on the attitudes of the 
American public towards the use of force in the post-Vietnam era could be 
seen as supporting Kull and Destler.  Jentlesons central premise is that there 
are two typologies of the use of force.  One is to coerce an adversary not to 
threaten the United Statess interests; the other is the use of force to achieve 
political change within another country.  Jentleson himself explains his 
dichotomy in the following terms: 
 
The key distinction is between force used to coerce foreign policy 
restraint by an adversary engaged in aggressive actions against the 
United States or its interests, and force used to engineer internal political 
change within another country whether in support of an existing 
government considered an ally or seeking to overthrow a government 
considered an adversary.46 
 
                                                            
45 Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public, 54. 
46 Bruce W. Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on 
the Use of Military Force, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 
49-50.  Full text available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600916 
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Jentleson finds that, through looking at a study of the mean public support for 
various foreign policy issues that might have required a military response 
throughout the 1980s, those that commanded the highest amount of public 
support over the longest period of time were those engagements where those 
engagements where the US was seeking to alter or restrain the behaviour of 
another power, and those scoring the lowest public support were for those 
issues where US military support was being considered to either remove or 
sustain a foreign government.  So the average support that Jentleson finds for 
airstrikes against Libya in response to terrorist actions supported by the Libyan 
Government was 65.2% pre-bombing and 70.9% post-bombing.  In 
comparison, only an average of 27.3% supported aid to the Contras over forty-
three public opinion polls conducted on the subject, and an average of 19.7% 
of respondents over seven polls conducted supported a US-led invasion of 
Nicaragua. 
 
So Jentlesons work very much reinforces the point that Kull and Desler found 
in their focus groups.  The general public may not have a great deal of 
knowledge about detailed matters of national security policy, but this is not the 
same thing as saying that the general public do not have preferences over how 
the general types of engagement they want to see the United States involved in, 
and that these preferences do have an underlying logic to them.   
 
The publics attitude towards military intervention seems to follow consistently 
from the publics desire to be engaged in international affairs, both for reasons 
of self-interest and altruism.  In response to the question, how much should 
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the US spend for defense?, the answers were 10% - only enough to protect 
itself, 17% - to protect itself and other countries on its own, and 71% - 
enough to protect itself and join in multilateral efforts to protect others.47 
 
What we see from Kull and Destlers research is that, actually, the publics 
attitude towards what US foreign policy ought to be seems to, in contradiction 
of Lippmans theory, come from a fairly logically consistent set of 
propositions: that the US should be involved in world affairs because it is in its 
own self-interest; that other countries are prosperous and secure enough to 
trade with and form alliances with the United States; and therefore, that the US 
should encourage and play its part in a multilateral system of global security. 
 
Interestingly, however, this is not how the policymaking elite see the public.  
According to Kull and Deslers research, the policymaking elite would tend to 
see the public conforming more to the model Lippman lays out.  One 
explanation for this apparent misreading of large swathes of US public opinion 
might be down to officials treating the most vocal elements of the electorate as 
though they were the majority.  A former Executive branch official described 
this phenomenon as follows: Americans who tend to be antiengagement tend 
to be stronger in their views than those who are proengagement.  That has been 
my experience and Congress has always been sensitive to stronger voices.48  
This is perhaps an understandable phenomenon.  Both Congress and the 
Executive branch would need to take into account not only how the majority of 
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48 Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public, 213. 
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the public feels but how those whose votes are most likely to be influenced by 
a particular issue are likely to respond.  In other words, in a democracy what is 
perceived as being public opinion may not actually be the opinion of the 
majority but the opinion of the loudest, best organised, most passionate 
advocates of a certain position. 
 
So where does that leave us in terms of the intellectual climate that led to the 
Powell Doctrine, and where would that sit in the debate of the pessimism of 
Lippman, Oberdorfer and Mueller as to both the consistency, utility and 
validity of public opinion as a means of evaluating alternative policy options, 
and the optimistic view of public opinion of Kull, Destler and Jentleson, which 
says that whilst, by definition, the general public are not experts on particular 
areas of national security policy, they are engaged in international issues in the 
broad sense of the term, and that the general public has strong, consistent, and 
logically formed preferences over the types of policy it wishes the United 
States to pursue?  Certainly, the adherence of the ideas that would go on to 
become the Powell Doctrine were acutely concerned about the volatility of 
public opinion and would agree with Lippman and Mueller up to a point that 
public opinion is susceptible to violent shifts between strong support for a 
policy and strong opposition to a policy, and understood how much it could 
hurt the Armys reputation and standing to be on the wrong side of a public 
opinion that had shifted violently against a particular policy.  Norman 
Schwarzkopf can clearly recall, on his return from Vietnam, thinking, I am in 
the nations capital, wearing the uniform of the United States Army, and the 
people around me see me as some kind of monster! The mood of the country 
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had turned ugly.49  And, certainly, as we have already seen in Chapter 
Three,50 one of the perceived advantages of the use of overwhelming force is 
the perceived ability to minimise your own casualties.  This would certainly 
indicate an acknowledgement of John Muellers point that public consent to 
military action is tied to maintaining relatively low casualties.  However, whilst 
adherence to the intellectual climate that formed the Powell Doctrine might be 
sceptical of the publics endurance for prolonged military engagement, the 
insistence on the need for public support presupposes that public support can 
be maintained and won, and the public does have underlying logical 
preferences about the kinds of military operations it wants to see the US getting 
involved in.  As Powell himself puts this, when we go to war, we should have 
a purpose that our people understand and support.51  This implies that the 
public in general are capable of maintaining a consistent position based on 
underlying preferences so long as the original objective of any military 
intervention meets with public approval. 
 
There is another argument connected with the role of public opinion in foreign 
and national security policymaking that we have yet to address.  Even if we 
accept that the public care about the USs role internationally, and even if we 
accept that the public are capable of determining their broad policy preferences 
in a logical manner, it does not follow necessarily that these preferences would 
                                                            
49 H. Norman Schwarzkopf,, with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It doesnt Take a Hero 
(Bantam Books: London, 1993), pp.202-203. 
50 See pp.144-145. 
51 Colin L. Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1996), 143. 
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actually be in the national interest of the United States.  The diplomat and 
historian George Kennan sums up this dilemma with the following observation: 
 
A democracy is peace-loving.  It does not like to go to war.  It is slow to 
rise to provocation.  When it has once been provoked to the point where 
it must grasp the sword, it does not easily forgive its adversary for having 
produced this situation.  The fact of the provocation then becomes itself 
the issue.  Democracy fights in anger  it fights for the very reason that it 
was forced to go to war.  It fights to punish the power that was rash 
enough and hostile enough to provoke it  to teach that power a lesson it 
will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again.  Such a war 
must be carried to the bitter end.52 
 
Notice that nothing that Kennan has described is illogical or necessarily subject 
to violent changes in public opinion.  After all, it is perfectly logical to say that, 
because wars are painful, they ought to be avoided, and that when war is 
necessary those who cause it should be punished.  However, Kennans point is 
that, whilst his position may be logical and may make a degree of moral sense, 
it is not necessarily in the USs interest to behave this way.  For instance, 
Kennan has this to say about the USs role in the First World War: 
 
In any case, once we were at war, it did not appear to us that our greatest 
danger might still lie precisely in too long a continuation of the war, in 
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the destruction of Europes equilibrium, and in the sapping of the vital 
energies of the European peoples.  It did not appear to us then that the 
greatest interest we had in the war was still that it should be brought to an 
end as soon as possible on a basis involving a minimum maladjustment 
and as much stability as possible for the future.53 
 
In order to have perceived the true stakes for the US in the First World War 
and to come to the conclusion that Kennan comes to, one would have to either 
be looking back on the First World War in hindsight or be possessed of a high 
degree of knowledge of various European cultures and European political 
history.  It is not reasonable to expect the majority of people in a democracy to 
have these attributes.  Therefore, if we accept Kennans argument, foreign 
policy ought to be made primarily by a diplomatic elite sensitive to the 
countrys true interests by virtue of their knowledge of history, their cultural 
sensitivity, and their diplomatic skill.  Presumably in the American system of 
government, this elite would reside in the Executive branch of government.  If 
we follow Kennans argument, this elite would make policy with little regard 
to the public opinion of the moment, but would instead be focused on longer 
range American interests.   
 
The problem with Kennans argument is twofold.  First, on a theoretical level, 
if you follow what Kennan is saying to its logical conclusion, it undermines the 
very basis of democracy.  If the general public is unable to see what is good for 
itself and needs to rely on a self-selected elite to make its foreign policy, why 
                                                            
53 Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, 66. 
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would the same not hold true in domestic policy.  In his more melancholic 
moments, Kennan recognised this shortcoming himself.  Kennans biographer 
Nicholas Thompson describes an essay Kennan wrote called The 
Prerequisites.  Thompson describes the argument of the essay as follows: 
 
He [Kennan] did not want a dictatorship but, in full misanthrope mode, 
he declared that this dreadful country needed the firm hands of a group of 
young, dedicated, organized, and highly educated men.  The new order 
would deny suffrage to immigrants, women, and blacks.  Clear-sighted 
white men would make decisions wisely and quickly for the general 
good.54 
 
Fortunately for Kennans reputation, this essay was not discovered until the 
1970s and the essays extreme tone can be excused as a letting off of steam by 
a fairly misanthropic intellectual in a bad mood.  However, the implication of a 
more authoritarian system of government than most Americans would 
recognise or be prepared to contemplate is still at least present in the 
background of Kennans views on the correct way of making foreign policy.  
The second flaw with Kennans argument is, even if we were to accept for a 
moment that his way of making foreign policy was desirable, and even we 
were to accept that a democracy in domestic affairs tied to an elite-led foreign 
policy were possible, it is unlikely that the American public, raised on the 
political idea that they live in the worlds greatest democracy, would actually 
                                                            
54 Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History 
of the Cold War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2009), 41. 
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be prepared in the real world to accept the state of affairs that Kennan asks 
them to accept.  Nevertheless, as we shall see later in this chapter, Kennans 
idea of a foreign policy decided by those in the Executive branch of 
government most qualified has an enduring appeal.  However, advocates of 
the Powell Doctrine would argue, as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
did argue, that, whatever the theoretical merits of Kennans position, given the 
changing nature of the press and Congresss willingness to assert itself in 
foreign policy, following Kennans model was not a practical proposition in the 
modern world. 
 
We have looked at how public, Congressional and media attitudes changed 
during Vietnam.  Also, having looked at how public opinion on foreign policy 
matters and the role public opinion ought to play in foreign policy matters, it is 
time to turn our attention towards the case study for this chapter, which is US 
policy towards Central America between 1979 and 1984. Before we can 
discuss US foreign policy towards the region during this period and why the 
public debate over the issue raised so many of the ghosts of Vietnam, we must 
first look at the historical context that this policy was made in.  
 
The United States has traditionally seen Central America as its geo-political 
backyard. This should not be surprising, given the geography of the region and 
the enormous economic leverage that the US could wield. By the end of the US 
Civil War the United States was ready to become the pre-eminent power in the 
western hemisphere: 
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 By the 1890s, the primary North American influence in the region was 
rapidly growing investments in banana and coffee plantations, railroads 
(to haul the bananas, not people), gold and silver mines, and, a little later, 
utilities and government securities.55 
 
With growing economic interests came increasingly frequent military 
interventions in order to protect those interests, both from the British, who, in 
the late nineteenth century, were seen as potential competitors, but more often 
from local political instability and civil war. Theodore Roosevelt declared that 
The United States had to assume an attitude of protection and regulation with 
regard to all these little states56.  This policy was known as the Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine.57  Roosevelt described the policy in the following terms: 
 
Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our 
hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with 
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it 
keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the 
United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a 
general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as 
elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and 
in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the 
                                                            
55 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolution : the United States in Central America,  2nd ed., rev. 
and expanded  (W.W. Norton: New York, 1993). p.31. 
56 Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (Free Press: 
New York, 1996).  p.4. 
57 The Monroe Doctrine declared that any attempt by European nations to establish new 
colonies in the Americas would be treated as a threat to the United States.  For the first 
elucidation of the Doctrine, see James Monroes Seventh State of the Union Address, 2 
December, 1823.  Full text available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465&st=&st1=. 
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Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in 
flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 
international police power.58 
 
Roosevelts expansion of the Monroe Doctrine meant not only that the US 
would seek to prevent European involvement in the Americas but that in effect 
Roosevelt speech unilaterally gave the United States the authority to in large 
measure regulate the domestic politics and economies of the states of Central 
America. 
 
The Administration of William Howard Taft sent two and a half thousand 
marines to Nicaragua in 1912, to put down a rebellion against a government 
friendly to the US. Taft claimed that the US had a moral mandate to exert its 
influence for the preservation of the general peace of Central America which is 
seriously menaced by the present uprising.59 US Marines were constantly 
deployed throughout Central America, particularly Nicaragua, throughout the 
1920s and 1930s. The point to be taken is that US has a long history of military 
intervention in Central America and an even longer history of economic and 
strategic interests in the region.  
 
If one wanted a more recent example of US military intervention in 
neighbouring states in Central America and the Caribbean, one need look no 
further than the decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The 
                                                            
58 Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, 6 December, 1904.  Full text available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545&st=&st1= 
59 Ibid., p.6. 
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Dominican intervention took place at precisely the same time that Lyndon 
Johnson was taking the fateful decisions that would commit the US to war in 
South-East Asia. There are a number of striking parallels between the situation 
in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Nicaragua in 1978-79. In both cases 
the US had to deal with the aftermath of long periods of dictatorial rule. Jerome 
Slater, one of the earliest authors on the Dominican intervention, describes the 
presidency of Rafael Trujillo as thirty years of one of the worst tyrannies of 
the twentieth century.60 Bernard Diederich explains how, In essence, the 
Somoza doctrine didnt change for the next twenty-seven years. In practice, 
however, all it meant was that only the Somozas had the right to abuse whom 
they liked  all in the name of anticommunism.61 
 
In both cases the US was seen as having endorsed, supported and at times 
propped up, both Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and the Somozas of 
Nicaragua. Diederich writes that the departure of US marines from Nicaragua 
in 1932 left two legacies: The National Guard they created and trained and the 
man who was later referred to as the last Marine, Anastasio Somoza García 
(Tacho I*), who was immediately appointed jefe director of the guard at the 
age of thirty-seven.62 In the case of Trujillo, Abraham Lowenthal refers to the 
fact that, Trujillo assiduously maintained his contacts with American Marine 
                                                            
60 Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation. The United States and the Dominican 
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officials and subsidized extensive lobbying operations of various types to 
advance his personal and political interests.63 
 
There was concern that a broad based opposition movement to dictatorship 
could be hijacked by Communist elements:  
 
The leaders included at least two prominent members of ex-President 
Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party: Jose Francisco Pena, a 
skilled and eloquent agitator, and Miguel Soto, who directs the party's 
affiliated labor federation. Both are identified with the party's left wing 
and both have been suspected of ties to the extreme left. Available 
information indicates that individuals identified with the pro-Castro 14th 
of June political movement were also involved, along with 
representatives of extremist student groups.64 
 
Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TEX), summed up the conservative view of 
the opposition to the Somozas with the following observation: 
 
Twenty years ago we believed Castro when he stated that he was neither 
a communist nor a socialist Look we were wrong from the beginning 
to the end. We sympathized with the Castroites because of the human 
rights issue and we destabilized Somozas regime because of the same 
                                                            
63 Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (The Johns Hopkins University Press: 
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64 Telegram from the White House Situation Room to President Johnson at Camp David. 
Source Johnson Library, National Security File, Dominican Republic, White House Cable, 
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issue. Now we are condemned to lose both. On the one hand our friend 
and ally and on the other hand the Nicaraguan people will not enjoy 
human rights.65 
 
 However, this is where the similarity between the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua ends. The US took the radical step of invading the Dominican 
Republic with 22,000 marines, installing a provisional government largely of 
its own choosing, and holding elections that resulted in a democratic, but 
decidedly pro-American government. The US intervention in the Dominican 
Republic took place without the approval of the Organisation of American 
States (OAS). The initial intervention involved US troops exclusively.  
 
As we shall see, US policy towards the situation in Nicaragua never moved 
close to this level of aggressive involvement. Of course the one major 
geopolitical difference between these two cases was that the Dominican 
intervention took place contemporaneously with US involvement in Vietnam. 
The Nicaraguan revolution of 1978-79 took place in the aftermath of the end of 
US involvement in Vietnam. As we have already seen in this chapter, Vietnam 
had a profound impact on Congress and the general publics appetite for US 
military interventions.  
 
We will now move on to look at the situation in Nicaragua between 1979 and 
1984, and how the Carter and Reagan Administrations chose to cope with the 
emergence of a Marxist Government in mainland Central America. 
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The argument under consideration is not that the US tried but failed to follow 
through on a policy of military intervention, but rather that the US government, 
knowing that it would not be able to rally public support, never seriously 
considered the option in the first place.66  As we have seen, this reluctance to 
contemplate military intervention in Central America goes against the grain of 
past US policy dating from at least the nineteenth century.  This led to a 
situation during the Reagan Administration in which a President desperate for a 
solution to what he viewed as a pressing problem would resort to covert and 
eventually illegal action. The watershed moments we will look at are the 
coming of the Sandinistas to power in 1979, the early deliberations of the 
Reagan Administration in 1981, concern in the possibility of overt intervention 
in Nicaragua, and the undertaking of covert action against Nicaragua from 
1981-1984.  
 
The events of 1979 could not possibly have come at a worse time for the Carter 
Administration. Already buffeted by events in Iran and Afghanistan, Carters 
beleaguered foreign policy team now had to turn their attention to events closer 
to home. Nicaragua at this point was not a subject that merited much serious 
public attention, the only exception being when US citizens found themselves 
caught in the crossfire between government and rebel forces. Therefore, policy 
makers were initially free to devise a strategy toward Nicaragua without having 
to take public opinion into account. The divisions within the Carter 
                                                            
66 The curious exception to this rule was Ronald Reagans first Secretary of State Alexander 
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Nicaragua but throughout Central America, and did so both publicly and privately.  
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Administration soon became apparent and deeply entrenched. The State 
Departments view was that the best way to deal with the situation was to 
accept the change of regime as a fait accompli on the grounds that the US was 
in no position to reverse the outcome of the revolution and that hostility 
towards the new government was only likely to push it towards Cuba and the 
Soviet Union. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance summed up the state 
departments position in a memo to President Carter: Our ability to exert 
influence during this formative period is contingent on their belief that our 
policies are not aimed against them 67 The State Departments view of the 
Sandinista regime was that it could be manipulated by the giving or 
withholding of aid: 
 
There were likely to be some important differences say between Tomás 
Borge, who had been a member of the communist party and the rest of the 
leadership, which was young, less educated and unlikely to have deep 
doctrinal convictions The question was, who would prevail and whether 
ideology could be moderated by a tolerant US policy.68  
 
The National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued that the 
revolution in Nicaragua was part of a pattern of Soviet expansion in the Third 
World and that the US should do everything in its power to make sure that a 
friendly regime was installed in Nicaragua. Brzezinskis preferred solution was 
that the US should intervene as part of a regional multilateral force, but he was 
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prepared to consider unilateral intervention, should that be the only option 
open:  
 
On the other side of the debate in June 1979 was Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
who now took a more direct role in the brewing Nicaraguan crisis. 
Brzezinski shared neither Vakys [Viron Vaky, assistant Secretary of 
State for Latin America] hopes for moderating the Sandinista revolution, 
nor his pessimism about the possibility of preventing a Sandinsta 
victory Brzezinski had argued that Soviet Military activity and by 
proxy in the Third World require a strong American response69.  
 
Brzezinskis proposal was that the US ought to intervene as part of a 
multilateral force under the authority of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS). In order to be a credible proposal this required significant participation 
by other Latin American States, and this was not forthcoming because most 
Latin American States had a visceral aversion to US intervention in their 
internal affairs and because the Sandinistas were seen as preferable to the 
previous regime.  Given the lack of OAS support, the US was left in the 
position of having to intervene unilaterally in order to prevent the Sandinista 
victory.   
 
There is no evidence that this possibility was seriously considered by anybody 
other than Brzezinski at a senior level of the Administration. Considering its 
history in the region and given the fact that there is simply no way that the 
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Nicaraguans could have offered any meaningful resistance, intervention, on the 
face of it, would seem to be the preferred US policy. The fact that the US did 
not intervene, coupled with the fact that this prospect was never even seriously 
contemplated, leads to only one conclusion. In the wake of Vietnam, senior US 
policymakers were simply not prepared to engage in overt military intervention 
in the developing world to prop up a friendly but corrupt regime with a poor 
human rights record.   
 
The point to be noted here in terms of winning and holding public support for a 
military intervention is that, if one subscribes to the model of public opinion 
put forward by scholars such as Lippman and Mueller, public opinion on 
National Security policy is essentially a formless series of images and 
stereotypes that is waiting for Executive action to mobilise and mould in a 
certain way.  Then before one can get to the point of talking about public 
opinion on the subject of military intervention in Nicaragua, there is a 
requirement that the Executives branch of Government should have a clear 
idea and a consensus within the Executive branch ought to exist about what 
policy ought to be pursued if public opinion is going to be mobilised.  Because, 
when it came to Nicaragua, the Carter Administration never came close to 
achieving this kind of consensus, public opinion, as described by Lippman and 
Mueller, never had a settled view on military intervention on Nicaragua.  If one 
subscribes to the notion that the actions of the Executive provide a strong lead 
to public opinion, then the lack of will among the members of the Executive 
branch of Government to pursue a line of policy has the consequence that 
public opinion will not come to support that policy option by itself. 
208 
 
  
 
What we can also see is that part of the reason for the reticence of senior US 
officials to even consider the possibility of military intervention was that they 
saw a strong parallel between what was going on in Nicaragua and Vietnam.  
The majority of the Carter Administration rejected intervention in Nicaragua 
on those grounds.  Some in the Reagan Administration were keen for military 
intervention on those grounds.  Some hoped that Nicaragua would be the 
turning point beyond which the US could lay the ghost of Vietnam to rest. 
President Reagans First Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, summed up how 
Central America could be used to erase the mistakes of Vietnam: A quick 
victory in Central America would begin purging the national psyche of the 
Vietnam syndrome, rebuilding the pre-Vietnam consensus for aggressive 
containment.70 
 
The US Military also clearly understood the parallel between Central American 
and Vietnam:  
 
Many of the senior military had feared a Central American Vietnam and 
by making their fears known in advance, they had sought to shape the 
debate to pre-empt certain policies. Most important, the military had 
advised publically against the commitment of US combat forces in the 
region except in certain conditions  conditions developed with an eye to 
avoiding another Vietnam.71 
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We can see here a fundamental difference in views between Haig and senior 
Military Officers.  Implicit in the two quotations given above are different 
views of the Vietnam War.  For Haig, the USs commitment to Vietnam was 
the correct strategic decision for the United States to take at the time, and part 
of what he calls aggressive containment, which had marked US policy 
towards the Soviet Union since the late 1940s.  For Haig, one of the factors 
driving his view of Central American policy was to re-establish an atmosphere 
in the US that was conducive to the pursuit of aggressive containment.  On 
the other hand, according to the senior Military figures that Gacek is quoting 
the US decision to intervene in Vietnam was not strategically correct, nor 
would they necessarily see the US strategy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia as 
being central to containing the Soviet Union.  The entire point of drawing 
parallels between the situation in Central America and the situation in South 
Vietnam was to avoid creating an atmosphere in which the pursuit of Vietnam-
style strategies of aggressive containment could be pursued.  Interestingly, 
the general public took the side of the senior Military officials.  Gallup found, 
in polling done between 1981 and 1983, between 62 and 74% of the public 
who knew about the situation in El Salvador thought that it had the potential to 
turn into a Vietnam-style situation.72 
 
Having seen that both civilian policy elites, the Military and the general public 
all saw that the situation in Central America at least had the potential to turn 
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into another Vietnam-type situation, we will now go on to look at how the 
Carter Administration dealt with Central America for the remainder of its time 
in office, and how the transition between Carter and Reagan fundamentally 
changed US policy towards Central America. 
 
In the absence of an acceptable way of preventing the Sandinistas coming to 
power, the US policy for the remainder of the Carter Administration was to 
extend a limited amount of aid and to maintain polite but non-committal 
diplomatic relations in the hopes of moderating Sandinista behaviour. In this 
policy too we can see an attempt to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam when the 
US perceived the North Vietnamese as irrevocably hostile and made no effort 
to establish any kind of a relationship.  
 
The transition between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan was one of the 
starkest changes in philosophy between two Presidents. Jimmy Carter 
represented the political zenith of the idea that Vietnam should mark a 
fundamental transition in the way US foreign policy was conducted. Carter 
believed that US foreign policy should be less militaristic, less obsessed with 
the threat of global communism and more attentive to the promotion of 
democracy and human rights. Ronald Reagan was, in contrast, the arch cold 
warrior. To him, Vietnam was a temporary aberration, an example of what 
happens when politicians lacked the will to do what was necessary to stand up 
to the expansion of global communism. These philosophical differences were 
to have a major impact on every facet of US foreign policy, none more so than 
in US dealings with Nicaragua:  
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The transition from Carter to Reagan was the most dramatic changing of 
the guard of the Cold War era. The contrast between the man who had 
warned against an inordinate fear of communism and the old 
Republican anti-communist who warned against insufficient vigilance.73 
 
Although Reagan had a very definite idea about what his foreign policy 
objectives should be, he also had to face the political reality that, although he 
personally had won in a landslide against Carter,74 he had not been able to 
carry Congress with him. The House of Representatives remained in 
Democratic control, with no immediate hope of this being over turned. Despite 
a slim Republican majority in the Senate, the presence of a small group of 
moderate Republicans meant that in order to achieve both his domestic and 
global goals Reagan would have to engage in coalition building.  
 
Central American problems were high in the in-tray of the incoming 
Administration. The Nicaraguan revolution had given left-wing guerrillas in 
the region, particularly in El Salvador, inspiration, and had also provided an 
important logistical staging area for the smuggling of arms from Cuba. The 
early months of 1981 were spent in furious internal debate, the outcome of 
which would shape policy for the remainder of Reagans seven and a half years 
in office. On the eve of Reagan coming to office left-wing guerrillas in El 
Salvador stepped up their campaign against the right-wing government there: 
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Through no direct fault of Ronald Reagan, Central America became a front 
burner issue.75 
 
It is in this context that we see for the first time a real debate between those 
who favoured direct military intervention in Central America, represented 
principally by Reagans first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, and those 
who were much more wary of the idea of military intervention, represented 
principally by Reagans Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, and it is this 
debate that we will now look at in detail. 
 
Alexander Haig was the most senior advisor who advocated a military solution 
to US problems in Central America, having served in Vietnam as a Colonel and 
in Washington as a military aide to Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger. 
Haig was intimately familiar both with the military and political history of US 
involvement and with extrication from Vietnam. From this experience Haig 
drew lessons that were to inform his approach to Nicaragua and Central 
American issues in general:  
 
From these two miscalculations, the first in Korea and the second in 
Vietnam, one can draw two morals: 
i) He who refuses to believe the evidence before his eyes in order to 
protect an illusion will suffer for his mistake 
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ii) A President who does not know the whole truth cannot enjoy a full 
range of policy choices.76 
 
Haig viewed world affairs as a zero sum game involving the US and the USSR. 
The North Vietnamese, in Haigs view had been proxies of the Soviet Union 
and the biggest single mistake the US made in Vietnam was not addressing the 
source of the problem. Instead of bombing targets in North Vietnam, the US 
should have put more pressure on the Soviets to cease the economic aid, which, 
in Haigs view, kept the North Vietnamese economy going. The US could have 
killed as many North Vietnamese troops as it liked; the fundamental problem 
was that the Soviet Union would make sure that their replacements were 
always properly supplied.  
 
When it came to Central America then, Haig was not keen to see US Marines 
patrolling the Nicaraguan jungle. This for Haig would have been buying into 
the illusion of what the USs problems really were in Central America. 
Nicaragua was not the problem. It was the Soviets and the Cubans who 
provided support for Nicaragua that were the real problem. Rather, he felt that 
the focus should be on removing the logistical support from Central American 
leftists by taking strong action against Cuba. Shortly after his inauguration, 
Haig asked his assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Enders, 
to draw up a list of options for retaliatory action against Cuba. The most severe 
option that Haig favoured was a reintroduction of the 1962 blockade. Haig was 
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aware that such action had the potential to raise tension with the Soviets to 
dangerous levels but from his point of view this had its advantages. First, it 
would signal to the Soviets that the US had recovered from its post Vietnam 
malaise and was prepared to assert itself when its interests were threatened. On 
a more regional level, it would prove to the Soviets that the US took the 
potential spread of communism in Central America as a matter of the highest 
importance, and that if the Soviet wanted progress on other issues they should 
not interfere in Central America.  
 
Haig had no time for the argument that such a high-risk policy was impractical 
because it would not command public or Congressional support. In Haigs 
view, the executive should decide what the best policy is in terms of national 
interest and then worry about selling it to the public. Haigs attitude can be 
summed up by a passing comment he made in his memoirs on what the priority 
for the in-coming President ought to be The new President, in his first days, 
had to move against the uncertainty. He had to act decisively and directly on 
the Soviet Union77. In this short passage Haig shows that it is up to the 
President and those around him to act decisively and with speed and public 
opinion is an issue to be addressed later, very much in line with the views of 
George Kennan, discussed earlier in this chapter. Haig also believed that public 
disenchantment with Vietnam was not due to the US being overly aggressive, 
but was in fact due to the opposite. Haig argued that up until the US began 
withdrawing troops, the majority of the American public was in favour of more 
forceful action in Vietnam, not less. Haig was confident that in the final 
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analysis if the Administration could present its case as to why Central America 
was so important the American people would support tough action.  As we 
have seen earlier in this chapter, the intellectual climate nurtured by people like 
Summers, that led to the Powell Doctrine, would hold the opposite opinion to 
Haig.78  In terms of the intellectual climate that engendered the Powell 
Doctrine, public support is not something you go out to win after deciding what 
policy ought to be.  For advocates of those ideas that formed the above 
intellectual, a level of public support ought to exist for a policy before it is 
embarked upon.  We will now move on to see how Haigs argument was 
challenged by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who, as we have 
already seen, was to articulate in 1984 a version of those ideas that would go 
on to form the Powell Doctrine. 
 
Haigs opponents on this debate alongside Weinberger were the Presidents 
domestic policy advisers James Baker, Michael Deaver and Edwin Messe. 
 
Weinbergers chief concern was to re-establish strategic parity with the 
Soviets. Any course of action that threatened to derail his spending and policy 
priority, he was opposed to. Weinberger knew that military action in Central 
America had the potential to become a sinkhole down which the extra billions 
of the Reagan defence build-up would be poured. Aside from this argument, of 
all the people who held the office of Secretary of Defense, Weinberger was 
probably the one most sympathetic to the militarys point of view. One of 
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Weinbergers chief priorities in restoring the militarys effectiveness was to 
rebuild its public image and re-establish trust between the military and the 
American people. One of the worst things that could happen from Weinberger's 
point of view was that the military would once again be bogged down in an 
open-ended, complex and morally ambiguous war in Central America: You 
had to have some reasonable anticipation of the support of the American 
people and the Congress. You couldnt fight a war against an enemy here and 
against the American people at home.79  Whereas Haig saw public opinion 
and Congress as essentially passive institutions waiting for the Executive to 
decide on matters of foreign policy, Weinberger saw the Legislative and 
Executive branches of the US Government as being jointly responsible for the 
conduct of foreign policy and that, not only are they jointly responsible for any 
decisions taken, but that the evolution of policy is a process of ongoing 
consultation between the two branches: 
 
there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the 
American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This 
support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the 
threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and 
close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home 
while asking our troops to win a war.80 
 
                                                            
79 Reagan Oral History Project, Caspar Weinberger, Tape 2 of 4, Interview with Caspar 
Weinberger, by Stephen Knott, & Russell L. Riley [online], 19 November 2002, Miller Center 
of Public Affairs.  Available at: 
http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2002_1119_weinberger.pdf. 
80 Ibid. 
217 
 
  
Weinberger was not alone in believing this.  In 1983, recently retired Chief of 
Staff of the Army Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer commented that 
military intervention in Central America should not be undertaken unless there 
is ''a consensus within the United States that what we're doing is sufficiently 
important that American soldiers go there.''81 
 
The Presidents domestic advisers worried that a strong stand in Central 
America would distract Congressional attention away from the ambitious 
programme of economic reform that Reagan hoped to pass. The polls would 
certainly give the Presidents domestic advisors cause for serious concern 
about the publics attitude towards Nicaragua. A poll conducted for the ABC 
television network and The Washington Post newspaper found that in 1983 
only 13% of respondents favoured overthrowing the government of Nicaragua, 
while 78% were against US involvement in any change of regime82. Reagans 
domestic policy advisors knew that Central America was an issue that was 
likely to split the fragile coalition that they had managed to assemble between 
conservative Democrats and Republicans.  
 
Nicaragua was an issue where Congressional opinion was very evenly divided 
between those in favour of the US supporting a change in regime, and those 
                                                            
81 Norman Podhoretz,Military Intervention in Nicaragua?, New York Times, 24 July 1983.  
Full text available at: http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/02/21/specials/podhoretz-
central.html. 
82 Richard Sobel, The Polls (A Report). Public Opinion about United States Intervention in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, Public Opinion Quarterly. 53 (1), (1989), Pp. 114-128. These 
particular numbers were taken from a poll conducted in May 1983, the sample for the poll was 
1,501, the exact question asked was, Should the US be involved in trying to overthrow the 
government of Nicaragua? Or not? The highest percentage in support of overthrowing the 
Nicaraguan government recorded using this question was 29% when asked in August 1987. 
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that believed that the US ought to stay out of Nicaraguan politics.  In the 98th, 
99th and 100th Congress, 70.5% of all Members of the House of 
Representatives had a perfectly consistent voting record when it came to 
Nicaragua.  That is to say, their votes for and against the Contras did not 
change at all in any of the House floor votes.83  The swing votes that did exist 
were overwhelmingly those of Southern Democrats and a few Northern liberal 
Republicans in the House.  The group of Southern Democrats that constituted 
the bulk of the swing vote on the Nicaragua issues also constituted the group 
that gave President Reagan a working majority in a Democrat-controlled 
House.  As William LeoGrande put it, The success of Ronald Reagan's 
legislative program was largely due to his ability to win the support of these 
conservative southern Democrats.84  Since Reagan needed the support of these 
Southern Democrats on a wide variety of domestic and foreign policy debates, 
the constant raising of the prospect of intervention in Central America, an issue 
which the Democratic leadership in Congress felt extremely strongly about, 
could only serve to strain the fragile coalition between Republicans and 
Southern Democrats, which was key to controlling the House of 
Representatives.  Therefore, Reagans political advisers wanted to put as little 
strain as possible on this coalition, and wanted to avoid protracted debates on 
Central American issues, particularly any inference that the US was 
considering direct intervention. 
 
                                                            
83 Data taken from William M. Leogrande and Philip Brenner, The House Divided: 
Ideological Polarization over Aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), p.110.  Full text available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/440028 
84
 Ibid., p.112. 
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As we can see, Haig was badly outnumbered in this debate and his preferences, 
particularly with regard to Cuba, were quickly swept aside. This left the 
Reagan Administration in a quandary; it wanted to take some form of strong 
action that would stand the tide of Communist expansion it in its own 
backyard, but at the same time it feared that to do so was to invite rancorous 
public debate and distract it from other priorities: 
 
At the White House a troika of senior staff members Edwin Messe, 
James Baker and Michael Deaver dominated Administration decision 
making  These men were intensely sensitive to the pubic mood and 
reluctant to take any action that might alter it in the Presidents disfavour. 
Every day they put their finger to the wind to see what the people 
wanted.85   
 
We can see here how the intellectual climate that gave rise to the Powell 
Doctrines insistence on public support before overt military action can be 
undertaken has had profound effect on US policy. Because President Reagan 
realised that his Secretary of Defense was not likely to go along with overt 
military intervention in Nicaragua without overwhelming public support. This 
led President Reagan to turn towards the CIA and a programme of covert 
action to achieve his objectives in Nicaragua.  
 
We will now move on to look at the reasons why covert action was a way for 
the Reagan Administration to pursue its desired policy objectives in Nicaragua, 
                                                            
85 Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. p.84. 
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whilst at the same time avoiding the Militarys objection to the lack of public 
support for overt intervention.  However, we will also see that the resort to 
covert action created a situation whereby the Department of Defenses input 
into policy debates over Nicaragua became sharply circumscribed. 
 
One of the principal advantages of covert action is that, because such 
operations by definition take place in secret, it would not be necessary to have 
public support before undertaking them.  Normally the logistical support for 
such operations would be provided by the Department of Defense, but because 
such support might have rung alarm bells in Congress, in the case of Nicaragua 
this support was provided by third parties  in particular Honduras and 
Argentina86.  Ironically, this resort to covert action made gaining public 
support for any consideration of overt action in the future that much more 
difficult to gain because the Reagan Administration had to take care not to 
reveal too much of its policy towards Nicaragua for fear of exposing its covert 
operations, and this therefore restricted its ability to shape the debate over what 
the US ought to do about the situation in Nicaragua.  
 
By 1984, the CIAs operations in Nicaragua had expanded massively and the 
Contras were able to support and maintain a force numbering several thousand 
in the field at any one time. However, the Nicaraguan government was no 
closer to being overthrown and, disturbingly from the CIAs point of view, still 
                                                            
86 For a detailed discussion of this relationship see: Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The 
Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987 (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1988), 
Chapter 1. 
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had access to overseas aid and trade. In order to remove this lifeline a plan was 
hatched to mine Nicaraguas main harbours:  
 
Clarridge [Duane Clarridge, Director of Operations, Latin America and 
the highest ranking CIA officer to deal directly with the Contras] drew up 
a plan to attack the Nicaraguan coastal fuel depots, but not with half-
assed amateur Contras in operational roles. The CIA would run and co-
ordinate it. Clarridge hired so-called unilaterally controlled Latino 
assets. These were full time agency Latinos who might give it a more 
Contra feel.87 
 
By undertaking this operation, the CIA had placed itself in a role which 
violated international law, and would be seen by the world as an act of war. If 
this operation was blown there was every chance that the Nicaraguan 
government would have retaliated directly against Americans. This retaliation 
could possibly have taken the form of kidnapping American citizens or 
officials, or stepping up support to guerrilla organisations in the region etc. The 
intellectual climate within the US Military that led to the Powell Doctrine, 
wholly supported by Secretary Weinberger, had ruled out the overt use of 
military force by the United States. In order to achieve its objectives the 
Reagan Administration had undertaken covert action, which had far fewer 
institutional restraints on it and did not require public support. Nevertheless, 
this action could have placed the US in a state of war. Because of the 
                                                            
87 Bob Woodward, Veil: The secret wars of the CIA 1981-1987. (Headline: London, 1987), p. 
336. 
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straightjacket restrictions of the Powell Doctrine, and, because of its own 
internal division, the Reagan Administration had placed the United States in a 
situation where its covert military involvement meant the US could have found 
itself at war without the public, Congress or even the Military having been 
consulted. Clarridge himself takes a somewhat more relaxed view of how 
serious the situation was: 
 
People seem to get all bent out of shape about sea mines. Sea mines 
damage property primarily, but somehow they have been pegged as 
dastardly, inhumane weapons. Like chemical and biological warfare, sea 
mines have become ordnance pariahs that civilized nations somehow 
should be above usingIn fact, fewer people have been killed by sea 
mines than by any of the other means of destruction we have invented 
over the centuries. Mining is one of the least cruel and most economical 
means of warfare, especially if you warn your enemy and interested third 
parties that an area is mined.88 
 
These mines were not intended to destroy ships, they were intended to frighten 
the Captain and crew and raise the insurance rates on cargoes travelling to 
Nicaragua to unaffordable levels. Under international law, the laying of mines 
is an act of war. The CIAs cover story for this operation was that the Contras 
themselves laid the mines. However, this story was fatally undermined by the 
fact the mines were of US manufacture and the explosive used was US-made 
                                                            
88 Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for all Seasons. My Life in the CIA (Scribner: New York, 1997), 
p. 269. 
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Military issue. What is startling about this episode is that the CIA conceived 
and executed the entire project entirely off its own back. Although the US 
Military supplied the explosives, they did not know what they were supplying 
them for. Not only was the US Military kept in the dark, but also the 
Congressional Intelligence Committee was informed of the mining in such a 
way that it was almost inevitable that the true implications would be missed. It 
is not a stretch of the imagination to see why the CIA did this89. Had senior 
Military Officials been aware of what was happening, they would have been 
duty bound to have reported the fact that Weinberger, who in all probability, 
given his previous record, would have done everything he could to have the 
operation stopped. The Militarys intense desire not to get into a war that did 
not command public support meant that it was cut out of the policy-making 
loop.  
 
The case study of US policy towards Central America 1979-1984 clearly 
demonstrates the emphasis the US Military placed on public and through that, 
Congressional support.  Witness Weinbergers flat refusal as Secretary of 
Defense to countenance any intervention in Central America that did not carry 
public support.  Also witness the attitude of General Edward C. Meyer, the 
recently retired Chief of Staff of the Army90, who, as we have seen, supported 
Weinbergers stance.  Witness also, in terms of creating the intellectual climate 
that gave birth to the Powell Doctrine, in work published only a few years prior 
to the beginning of this case study, as we have seen, William Westmoreland 
                                                            
89 This account of the mining fiasco is taken from: Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-
1987, pp. 387-396. 
90 See p.217. 
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and Harry Summers place a high premium on the need to obtain public 
support.91  However, it also demonstrates that the need for such support can 
hang like a weight around the Militarys neck. Because Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger was reluctant to engage in any activity that did not have 
overwhelming public support, he found himself in the position of being cut out 
of the decision making loop and US policy towards Nicaragua became more 
and more the preserve of the CIA. Also because US involvement in Nicaragua 
was covert, the Reagan Administration was not forced to clearly articulate what 
its goals were. So whilst the Administration knew that it did not like the 
Sandinistas and wanted to prevent the spread of Communism in Central 
America, it was never clear whether its objective should be the removal of the 
Sandinistas from power or whether its objectives should be simply to prevent 
the export of the Sandinista revolution. 
 
We must now turn our attention to how the need for public and Congressional 
support affects the other elements of the Powell Doctrine. First, we will look at 
how the need for public support makes clarity of objectives even more 
important and then we will look at how the need to sell policy to the public 
helps to define what counts as a vital interest. 
 
It is important to understand in the context of US policy towards Central 
America what we mean when we are talking about the need for public support.  
Clearly, covert action, by its very definition, does not require public support, as 
the public does not and should not know about it.  In a discussion of the 
                                                            
91 See pp.180-182.. 
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Reagan Administrations policy lacking public support, what we are talking 
about in this context are the overt acts of policy or discussions of policy 
alternatives that the public did see.  So, in the context of Nicaragua, the overt 
options that were under consideration, as we have already seen, were overt 
military intervention and overt support for the Contras insurgency against the 
Sandinista Government and the elements of the CIAs operations against the 
Sandinistas which were briefed to Congress. 
 
One of the reasons why the Reagan Administration consistently struggled to 
win public acceptance of its overt policy towards Nicaragua92 was that it was 
never entirely clear exactly what the Reagan Administration was hoping to 
achieve. Was it trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua? Was it 
trying to persuade the government of Nicaragua to moderate its behaviour 
internationally? Or was it trying to promote democracy in Nicaragua? Roy 
Gutman, a journalist and author specialising in Central American affairs, 
characterised the debates taking place within the Reagan Administration about 
what US policy towards Nicaragua should be in the following way,  
 
It was a classic Washington power struggle. Each side could block the 
other. The hard right was a broad, informal, and shifting group. All 
processed, and most shared, Reagans ideology  in particular his 
anticommunism and his deep distrust of the Soviet Union Enders 
                                                            
92 In a series of polls conducted by the Harris Polling Organization between October 1984 and 
July 1987, never less than 51% of respondents opposed the sending of aid to the Contras.  The 
highest figure for opposition was 74% in a poll conducted in June 1987.  The mean average 
opposition to Contra aid taken from all these polls was 62.7%.  See Richard Sobel, A Report: 
Public Opinion About United States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua, The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), p.124. 
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[Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America] and the Central America 
specialists at State who backed him up certainly were not soft on 
communism, but they tried to preserve flexibility in policy that would 
allow occasional testing of the possibilities for a peaceful solution.93 
 
The Reagan Administrations public rhetoric and its private discussions at 
different times support all three interpretations. For instance, the first finding94 
on Nicaragua justified the operation in terms of recruiting Nicaraguan fighters 
in order to prevent arms smuggling between Nicaragua and El Salvador. Yet, 
the operations the Contras undertook seemed to suggest that the objective was 
to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. At the same time, Assistant 
Secretary of State Enders was travelling to Nicaragua to attempt to negotiate a 
settlement with the Sandinistas to reduce armed smuggling to El Salvador.  
 
Reagan was not beyond using sweeping, not to say bloodcurdling, rhetoric in 
order to justify US support of the Contras:  
 
I must speak to you tonight about a mounting danger in Central America 
that threatens the security of the United States. This danger will not go 
away; it will grow worse, much worse, if we fail to take action now. I'm 
speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only 2 
hours' flying time from our own borders... Gathered in Nicaragua already 
are thousands of Cuban military advisers, contingents of Soviets and East 
                                                            
93 Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987, p.89. 
94 A finding refers to a document signed by the President which gives the CIA authority to 
undertake a specific operation. These findings must be reported to the Congressional 
intelligence committees within 30 days of being signed. 
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Germans, and all the elements of international terror -- from the PLO to 
Italy's Red Brigades. Why are they there? Because as Colonel Qadhafi 
has publicly exulted: Nicaragua means a great thing: it means fighting 
America near its borders, fighting America at its doorstep.95 
 
One can certainly be forgiven for being confused over how such rhetoric was 
supposed to square with the idea that CIA support for the Contras was limited 
to simply stopping arms smuggling across Nicaraguas borders.  
 
As late as 1986, there was still confusion between the Reagan Administration 
and Congress over what the US objective in Nicaragua was  six years after 
the Reagan Administration had first begun to grapple with this problem. Time 
magazines chief diplomatic correspondent Strobe Talbott summed up the 
Administrations problem in an article connected to an upcoming 
Congressional vote on restoring American funding to the Contras:  
 
The starting point for a fresh approach has to be a consensus about what 
Shultz's [Secretary of State George Shultz] depiction of the Sandinistas 
as unacceptable means, not in terms of anyone's tastes and preferences 
but in terms of a policy that can be carried out in the real world: What is 
it that the U.S. cannot accept about the junta in Managua? And what must 
                                                            
95 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua. March 16th 1986. The Public Papers of 
President Ronald W. Reagan.  Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.  Full text available at: 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/061287d.htm. 
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the U.S. do to transform the Sandinista regime into something the U.S. 
can live with?96 
 
That the media felt that the Administration had to clarify such basic questions 
over its policy towards Nicaragua, six years after taking office, would tend to 
suggest that at least certain sections of the media were confused about what 
Reagans policy towards the region was. 
 
These contradictory activities tended to suggest that the Reagan Administration 
itself did not know what it wanted to achieve. The consequence of this was that 
it sent out mixed messages to various foreign and domestic audiences. All this 
activity served merely to confuse Congress as to what exactly it was being 
asked to support. At best the Administration looked evasive, at worst it looked 
like it did not know what it was doing. A clear example of this is the different 
recollections that members of the Congressional Intelligence Committees have 
of their briefing on the aims and objectives of CIA operations in Nicaragua: 
 
Some members of the committee later claimed that Casey did nothing to 
suggest an anti-Sandinista political dimension to the covert program. 
Others recall that he did Congressman Lee Hamilton wrote years later 
that Casey told the committee there would be a military arm and a 
separate political arm which would attempt to secure support from other 
nations.97 
                                                            
96 Strobe Talbott, Essay: Why Congress Should Approve Contra Aid, Time. March 24th 1986. 
Talbott later went on to serve as President Clintons Under Secretary of State, 1993-2001. 
97 A Twilight Struggle, p. 206.  
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It is of course arguable that the Administrations goal from first to last was 
perfectly clear.  It wanted to remove the Sandinistas from power.  However, 
from what we now know of the internal discussions, which took place within 
the first year of the Reagan Administration, it does seem that, at least initially, 
the USs objective was something short of overthrowing the Sandinista regime.  
Thomas Enders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
described the initial covert plan of action for Nicaragua presented to Ronald 
Reagan as, a lowball option, a small operation not intended to overthrow, 
and which would harass the government, waste it.98  And William Casey, in 
his first description of the CIAs role in arming the Contras, described it as a 
small number of paramilitary fighters who would be rained and armed to 
conduct raids against the Sandinistas supply of arms to the Salvadoran 
guerrillas.99  Even if one were to accept the argument that the Reagan 
Administration, whatever it said to Congress and the press, always, in the final 
analysis, wanted to remove the Sandinista regime, because these were not the 
terms in which the policy was sold, either to Congress or the public, at the very 
least the Reagan Administrations public rhetoric was not consistent with the 
more limited objectives it claimed to be interested in.  At the very least, in the 
public and Congressional minds, this made the Reagan Administration look as 
if it did know what it wanted to achieve, because its means and its rhetoric 
were out of step with one another. 
 
                                                            
98 A Twilight Struggle, p.202. 
99 Our Own Backyard, p.286. 
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The idea of what constitutes vital interest is, almost by definition, an 
extremely vague and nebulous one. Perhaps one of the best ways of defining it 
is, what does the public and its elected representatives think is vital. Nicaragua 
clearly did not fall within the definition of vital for a large part of the 
American public or many members of Congress.100  
 
The reason for this is not hard to find. The further south and west one moves, 
the closer to the Mexican border one gets and the more Central America seems 
ominously close at hand. It was a constant feature of Reagans public rhetoric 
to point out how close Nicaragua was to the United States. The following 
quotation is taken from a speech Reagan delivered to Congress on the need to 
resume funding of lethal aid to the Contras:  
 
Ive asked for $100 million and well fight for it you cant stop tanks 
and gunships with bandages and bedrolls. Defeat for the Contras would 
mean another Cuba on the mainland of North America It would mean 
consolidation of a privileged sanctuary for terrorists and subversives just 
two days driving time from Harlingen, Texas.101 
 
Reagan was not above using even more blatantly anti-immigrant rhetoric to 
justify US involvement in Nicaragua:  
                                                            
100 In a series of polls conducted for ABC News/ The Washington Post between November 
1983 and March 1986, in a response to the question, Would you say that the situation in 
Nicaragua is a threat to the security of the United States or not? (Is that a major threat or a 
minor threat?), never less than 51% said that the situation posed a minor or no threat.  The 
highest response rate for minor or no threat was 65% in March 1986.  The average response for 
no or minor threat was 58.4% of all respondents.  See A Report: Public Opinion About United 
States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua, p.121. 
101 Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination (Simon & Schuster: New 
York, 2006), p.313. 
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Should that [Reagan is referring to the consolidation of Soviet and Cuban 
influence in Central America] happen, desperate Latin peoples by the 
millions would begin fleeing north into the cities of the southern United 
States or to wherever some hope of freedom remained.102 
 
However, even with this strategy of playing on the fear of the domestic 
repercussions of events in Nicaragua, the Reagan Administration was never 
able to convince the majority of the American people that the Sandinistas 
posed a real threat to national security.103  This is something that the Reagan 
Administration acknowledged, at least in private. A National Security Council 
memo noted that the Administration had, Failed to make the case that the 
Sandistas are indeed a sufficient threat to our national security that justifies a 
major covert action/paramilitary program.104 
 
In order to have gained the public support necessary for a major overt military 
intervention or a ramping up of aid to the Contras, Reagan would have had to 
have convincingly demonstrated that events in Nicaragua posed a major and 
imminent threat to the United States as a whole. This would have been in itself 
                                                            
102 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua. March 16th 1986. The Public Papers of 
President Ronald W. Reagan.  Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.  Full text available at: 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/061287d.htm . 
103 A majority of Americans in polls conducted between 1983 and 1986 by ABC Television and 
the Washington Post, 50-55 percent of respondents said that the greatest danger to the United 
States lay in the United States becoming too entangled in internal Central American problems 
as a result of trying to stop the spread of communism. A Report: Public Opinion About 
United States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua, p.116. 
104 Nicaragua Options Paper, January 15th, 1985. Full text available at: 
http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp, with valid username and password.  
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a hard task given the enormous disparity in relative power between Nicaragua 
and the US.  
 
As we have already seen the second strategy which the Reagan Administration 
used was to ignore the local implications of the Nicaraguan conflict, and 
instead focus on how events in Nicaragua formed part of a greater Soviet push 
for influence in Central America. This was an argument that the Reagan 
Administration made with much fanfare and great gusto. However, a number 
of problems stood in its way. First, however hard the Reagan Administration 
may have insisted to the contrary, what the US was doing in Nicaragua was not 
defensive. It was trying to remove a leftist regime already in power. Second, 
whilst the Soviets were prepared to supply the Sandinistas with arms, they 
went to great lengths not to supply them with anything that could be perceived 
as an offensive threat towards the United States. For example, when the US 
protested against the delivery of high performance military jets105, their 
delivery was swiftly cancelled. Finally, the Soviets themselves seemed eager 
for a solution to the Nicaraguan problem. From a Soviet point of view, the 
revolution in Nicaragua was a mixed blessing. On the one hand it provided the 
Soviets with a potential new ally in the western hemisphere, on the other it 
provided them with another ally far from their own shores which would 
demand the same economic aid received by Cuba and Soviet satellites in 
Eastern Europe at a time when the USSR could scarcely afford another drain 
on its resources. In summation, the Reagan Administration was never able to 
                                                            
105 For an account of the diplomacy surrounding Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua see: 
Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 
London, 1984), p.109, and George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of 
State (Charles Scribner's sons: New York, 1993), Pp.424-425. 
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form a public consensus around the idea that events in Nicaragua represented a 
vital interest, not because the public or Congress were stupid or uninformed, 
but because there were solid reasons why Nicaragua was of no more than 
marginal strategic interest to the United States.  Clearly, what constitutes 
national interest is always a matter of debate and contestation.  The point to 
be noted here is that the Reagan Administration failed to win that debate in the 
minds of a large majority of the American public when it came to Nicaragua. 
 
The case study of US policy towards Nicaragua throws up one of the most 
interesting philosophical questions this thesis will tackle. Namely, what 
happens when the foreign policy objectives of a democratically elected 
Administration fall outside the scope of what the Powell Doctrine is prepared 
to contemplate. As we have seen, the Reagan Administrations policy towards 
Nicaragua fails at least three of the tests laid down by the Doctrine. It did not 
have public and Congressional support, its objectives were neither clear nor 
consistent, and the issue of whether events in Nicaragua fell within the scope of 
the United States vital interests was debateable at best.  
 
Having looked at the relationship between the element of the Powell Doctrine 
calling for the need for public support and the elements of the Powell Doctrine 
that call for military intervention to have clear objectives and that military 
intervention should be in the vital national interest, and how the overt policy 
of the Reagan Administration failed to address all three of these points, we 
must now look at the covert policy the Reagan Administration pursued and 
why that made it even harder to gain public support for its overt policies. 
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If overt military intervention was not a viable option and overt support for the 
Contras was at least controversial, then the next best option from Reagans 
point of view was some form of covert action which would hopefully bring 
down the Nicaraguan government, or at the very least destabilise it enough that 
accommodation with the US would be possible. Better still, from the 
Administrations point of view, covert action by its very nature is conducted 
without wide public knowledge and what the public do not know about they 
are not required to support: 
 
For Reagan officials, one of the main virtues of the new covert program 
was that it required no public explanation, no public debate, and no 
public vote by Congress. The Administration had only to inform the 
intelligence committees in both houses of the new finding and gain their 
quiet acquiescence.106 
 
However, as we shall see, this reliance on covert action would only serve to 
make gaining public support for those overt actions that the Reagan 
Administration wanted to undertake even more complicated and even more 
difficult to secure. 
 
In the wake of the domestic spying scandals and revelation of CIA plots to 
assassinate Fidel Castro in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress in 1976 
                                                            
106 A Twilight Struggle, Pp. 204-205. 
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held a series of investigations into the CIAs activities.107  This resulted in the 
passage of the Foreign Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.  As a result of this 
Act, the President now had to sign a formal document know as a finding, 
authorising any covert action the CIA undertook.  The CIA Director was then 
required by law to inform House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) of these 
findings within a specified timeframe.  Whilst this clearly did not make covert 
action impossible, it meant that there was a far greater and institutionally 
embedded oversight structure that did not exist in 1954, or, for that matter, in 
1973.  Whilst the CIAs covert action capability was not exactly open to full 
public scrutiny, if the Executive obeyed the law it did mean that Congress had 
a statutory right to request and require the CIA to provide it with information.  
This clearly meant that the Executive branch of Governments room to 
implement covert action without scrutiny had been circumscribed and, as we 
shall see, Reagans first CIA Director, William Casey, ran into almost constant 
trouble with these two committees as to the candour and veracity of the 
information he supplied to them. 
 
Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz)s reaction to what he felt was an inadequate 
briefing on the mining of Nicaraguan harbours sums up the distrust that 
mounted against the Administration when it was seen as not being 
forthcoming. The following quotation is from a letter Goldwater wrote to CIA 
Director William Casey:  
                                                            
107 For the full text of the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, also known as the Church Report, see 
http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports.htm 
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The President has asked us to back his foreign policy. Bill, how can we 
back his foreign policy when we dont know what the hell he is doing? 
Lebanon [Goldwater was referring to the deployment of US marines in 
Lebanon, see Chapter 5], yes, we all knew that he sent troops over there. 
But mine the harbours of Nicaragua? This is an act violating international 
law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I dont see how we are going 
to explain it.108 
 
Interestingly, Clarridge maintains that both the Senate and the House 
Intelligence Committee were fully aware of his activities, and those of the 
Contras, and that Goldwater and the rest of his Committees indignation had 
much more to do with the reaction of the Press when it found out about the 
mining of Nicaraguan ports, than it did with being uninformed. Clarridges 
argument is somewhat undermined by the fact that he has a somewhat elastic 
definition of what informed means: 
 
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was briefed about the 
mining on multiple occasions. Maybe Casey didnt make a big deal of the 
mining, but he didnt make a big deal of a lot of things. That was his way 
of presenting a briefing, and he was already notorious for it.109 
 
                                                            
108 Theodore Draper,  A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (Hill and Wang: New 
York, 1991), Pp. 21-22. 
109 A Spy for all Seasons, p.274. 
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Clarridge believed that if members of the Intelligence Committee were 
ignorant of the CIAs activities, it was because they chose to be: 
 
That the mining wasnt highlighted in yellow, spelled out in capital 
letters, and stuck on the front page of their agenda doesnt mean we were 
trying to obscure what we were doing. Even if the senators themselves 
didnt get it when Casey said it, they had hot- and cold-running staff 
members who were paid to cull this kind of information from the briefing 
materials we prepared.110 
 
Clarridges defence is utterly flawed. As this chapter already pointed out, 
whatever his views on the effectiveness of sea mines, the act of mining ports is 
internationally recognised as an act of war. This is not something one should 
have to fine-comb a briefing for in order to find out, and it is not the sort of 
thing that should only be brought up before a select group of Congressmen and 
Senators. Apart from being flawed, this argument also misses the point. 
Congress and the American public are unlikely ever to react well to the 
impression of being kept in the dark on issues of this importance. 
 
What we can see from Goldwaters letter111 is the vicious circle the Reagan 
Administration had got itself into. It could not win public support for its overt 
Nicaraguan policies, therefore it resorted to covert methods that did not require 
public support, and when the public learned of these methods it became even 
                                                            
110 Ibid., p.274. 
111 See p.236. 
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more suspicious of the Administrations overt policies. It was virtually 
inevitable that the public would, sooner, or later, learn what the CIA was up to, 
for the simple reason that in order for the kinds of activities the CIA were 
conducting to have any impact, they would have to be carried out on a scale 
that meant that somebody sooner or later was going to notice what was going 
on. 
 
The Reagan Administration had some cause for optimism about the efficacy of 
covert action. The US had a long history of successful covert interventions in 
the region, notably in Guatemala in 1954, and in Chile in 1973.112 However in 
the aftermath of Vietnam  the prospects for successful covert action were 
greatly diminished. 
 
Vietnam and the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 raised the spectre of US 
sponsored covert action failing and then drawing the US into greater 
involvement than it didnt plan for. In the case of Vietnam, we can see this in 
the case of the US complicity in the overthrow of President Diem113. The CIA 
was aware months in advance of the actual coup that senior members of the 
South Vietnamese military were prepared to move against the President yet did 
nothing to warn Diem or do discourage the plotters, in fact they did precisely 
the opposite assuring the coup leaders that the US would look favourably on a 
                                                            
112 For an account of the history of CIA covert actions see, John Prados, Presidents' Secret 
Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf. 
Rev. and expanded ed.  (Elephant Paperbacks: Chicago, 1996), and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The 
CIA and American Democracy. 3rd ed., [with new pref. and prologue],  (Yale University Press: 
New Haven, 2003). 
113 For an account of the American and in particular the CIAs role in Diems overthrow and 
assassination see, Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and 
JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003). 
239 
 
  
new government. As a result of this, when Diem was overthrown, the US in a 
sense was obliged to support his successors. Many in Congress saw a danger 
that by supporting covert aid to the Contras the US would eventually be drawn 
in to the Nicaraguan conflict in a more direct way. This concern was not 
without justification. One of the consistent objectives of the Contras was to 
take and hold a small enclave of Nicaraguan territory so that they could declare 
themselves a provisional government and appeal to the US for direct military 
support. Finally, as Secretary of State Haig pointed out, in order to make a 
meaningful difference to the outcome in Nicaragua, US aid had to be on a scale 
which by definition could not be kept covert. Therefore sooner or later 
Congress and the American public were going to find out what the 
Administration was doing in Nicaragua.  
 
The point to be taken from this is that Vietnam not only impacted on future 
Administrations ability to use overt force, it also limited future 
Administrations ability to use covert action to replace or complement more 
traditional forms of intervention. 
 
For these reasons it was a constant uphill fight for the Reagan Administration 
to keep the US in the business of supplying the Contras with military aid. 
When Congress moved in late 1984 to shut of funds for these activities, the 
Reagan Administration instead of closing down its Nicaraguan operation, 
continued to support the Contras in expressed defiance of the will of Congress 
and the law of the land. This was done through a variety of means. Soliciting 
funds from third countries, funnelling the profits from illegal arms sales to Iran 
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to the Contras, and all of this was done through the National Security Councils 
staff that Congress was not mandated to oversee because they were the 
personal staff of the President.114  
 
The point to be noted here is that the Powell Doctrine and the intellectual 
climate that influenced Powells thinking, by in practice limiting the options 
open to the President as Commander in Chief, helped compel Reagan to 
undertake a covert and eventually illegal course of action. This is important 
because the militarys desire for public support perversely led to an important 
element in the nations foreign policy being taken in secret, without 
Congressional approval or oversight, and without public knowledge much less 
support. Reagans Contra policy was eventually exposed and halted and many 
of those most closely involved with it were the subject of criminal prosecution. 
But suppose for a moment that this policy was never exposed and that the 
Contras succeeded with the help of illegal US support. Might not future 
Presidents when faced with the constraints of a military reluctant to be used 
except on its own terms, be tempted to resort to measures outside of the 
Constitution in order to achieve the objectives they had been elected to pursue.  
 
                                                            
114 The literature on the Iran Contra scandal is large and growing. Some of the best accounts of 
what happened and what the consequences were; A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs, 
Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: the Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (W. W. Norton: New 
York, 1997), and Robert C. McFarlane; with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (Cadell & Davies: 
New York, 1994). The report of the special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh has also been 
published, Lawrence E. Walsh,  Iran-Contra: The Final Report (Times Books: New York, 
1994). 
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The Powell Doctrine and the intellectual climate that led to its insistence on 
public support raises a second fundamental question about the nature of the 
publics participation in foreign policy decisions in a democracy. In an ideal 
world, the President, the Congress and public opinion would always be bound 
by some consensus as to what an appropriate foreign policy for the nation 
should be, and this consensus would be created by informed public debate. 
However, real world experience tells us that this is not always the case. First, 
the level of public knowledge about foreign policy matters varies widely 
between different issues and over time. Second, Congress is composed of 535 
individuals, each with their own political priorities, ideologies and moral 
compasses. To expect such a disparate group to reach a consensus on most 
issues is not realistic. Of course there are exceptions to this general rule but 
they are almost always situations where the US and its citizens have been 
directly attacked, or a short term impulse on the part of Congress to support a 
President in a crisis. Such support nearly always dissipates after time. There are 
times when Congressional and public support for a course of action does not 
exist a priori, however the President may be able to create that support by 
taking bold military action and acting to shape public and Congressional public 
support.  
 
Although writing in the context of the Clinton Administration, David 
Halberstam sums up the dilemma facing the post Vietnam presidency when it 
comes to creating a public consensus around foreign policy objectives and the 
huge pressure that modern polling and modern communications technology 
places on politicians: 
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Because of modern technology, the two most important developments in 
American politics were the use of polling and television advertising, both 
of them joined together in zeroing in on and then manipulating what the 
voting public thought at a given moment. But did the voting public really 
feel that way, how deep were those feelings, and did the public always 
want to be catered to so instantaneously? If the public seemed to want its 
politicians to bend, a month or two later it might be sceptical of any 
politician who was so readily bent.115 
 
In this chapter we have seen that the Powell Doctrine and the intellectual 
climate that gave birth to an insistence on the need for public support was 
created less by imperatives originating from within the military than by a 
broader change in social and Congressional attitudes towards the Presidency 
and the military in the mid to late 1970s. We have also seen how the lack of 
clear support for Administration policy in Nicaragua effectively killed US 
military intervention as a viable option before it had been seriously discussed. 
Finally, we have seen how the demand for public support has the potential to 
lead to one of two extremes  - on the one hand forcing the President towards 
covert and possibly illegal action in order to achieve foreign policy goals they 
consider vital, on the other hand we have seen how insistence on public support 
before the fact makes the President dependent on a consensus that may never 
                                                            
115 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (Bloomsbury: 
London, 2002), p.208. 
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emerge and in fact renders his constitutional position as Commander in Chief 
of the armed forces practically meaningless.  
 
Having a public that is willing to make the sacrifices that prolonged military 
action requires is vital for success, but the key element that the Powell Doctrine 
and the intellectual climate that brought it about miss is that they seem to 
assume that Presidents can only react to public and Congressional opinion, 
rather than shaping it. Whether he was right or wrong about the particular 
instants of US policy towards Central America, Alexander Haig was right to 
point out that sometimes Presidents cannot afford to wait for public opinion to 
swing behind them. Sometimes a President has to act and then explain and 
bring the public along behind a course of action. Haigs immediate successor 
George Shultz summed up the problem that relying on consensus for foreign 
policy decisions poses: his [Shultzs] most important remark was a statement 
made in passing that decisions to use force cannot be tied to opinion polls,116 
and the military should be very weary about demanding that the public support 
any action before it is taken  as we have seen this can lead to them being 
marginalised and we have also seen that insistence upon prior public consensus 
can lead to a situation where the temptation to act covertly is strong and that 
when such covert action goes wrong or is revealed, it makes the consensus 
which the Powell Doctrine seeks even more difficult to establish.  Ultimately, 
despite the concerns about the ability of the public at large to make rational, 
consistent foreign policy choices in the national interest raised by scholars 
such as Walter Lippman or practitioners such as George Kennan, in the modern 
                                                            
116 The Logic of Force, p.265. 
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era it is simply not possible to either conduct national security policy in a 
way that the general public will not eventually become aware of.  Because this 
is so, it is difficult to conduct national security policy in a way that the 
general public sees as being inconsistent with its preferences and values.   
 
The lesson that the Reagan Administrations policy towards Nicaragua teaches 
us is that the Powell Doctrine and its preceding intellectual climate are 
essentially correct insofar as they acknowledge the importance of public 
support, although they are incorrect in that they assume that public support 
must exist a priori and cannot be built, and that policymakers should avoid the 
twin extremes of either trying to execute policy by stealth or by pandering the 
interest group that shouts loudest and longest about a particular policy.  
Instead, an administration should realise that a public, whilst not knowing the 
intricacies of foreign policies debates, do have underlying preferences about 
how they see themselves and their country.  Policy should be made in such a 
way as to conform as closely as possible to these preferences. 
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Chapter 5 - The Objective of US Military Forces Should be Clear 
 
The Commission concludes that the "presence" mission was not 
interpreted in the same manner by all levels of the chain of command and 
that perceptual differences regarding that mission, including the 
responsibility of the USMNF for the security of Beirut International 
Airport, should have been recognized and corrected by the chain of 
command.
1
 
 
In this chapter, the case study we will use is the US intervention in Lebanon 
between 1982 and 1984.  What we will see from this case study is that, in both 
Vietnam and Lebanon, the US Military and Colin Powell personally were 
extremely critical of the lack of a clear, militarily achievable objective being 
set for intervention and insisted that in the future the US policymakers must set 
clear, unambiguous and militarily achievable objectives for any intervention.  
And how, to some extent, what happened in Lebanon served as further 
reinforcement to the lessons that those who created the intellectual climate 
behind the Powell Doctrine took from Vietnam. 
 
In this chapter, we will again be dealing with the intellectual climate that led to 
the Powell Doctrine because the events of this chapter take place before either 
the publication of Powells 1992 Foreign Affairs article or Powells term as 
                                                            
1 The Commission in the quote refers to the Long Commission of enquiry established by 
Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger in the aftermath of the attacks on the marine barracks 
in Beirut in October 1983, chaired by Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN (Ret). The full text of 
the report, along with appendices can be found at: 
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/Beirut-
1.html. 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  However, in this chapter, it is 
appropriate to refer to Powells personal opinions on the decision to intervene 
in Lebanon, and subsequent decisions as to how that intervention was carried 
out, as Powell was in a position to closely observe these events as a Military 
Assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.  What we will see is 
that, in terms of developing the intellectual climate that led to the creation of 
the Powell Doctrine, the experience of the US Marines in Lebanon tended to 
act as a reinforcement and reminder of lessons that first emerged out of the US 
experience of the Vietnam War. 
 
When looking at how the US intervention in Lebanon actually played out on 
the ground, it is important to realize that there were actually two separate US 
military missions to Lebanon: the first took place in August 1982, and its 
purpose was to provide security for the safe evacuation of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisations (PLO) fighters and leadership from Beirut. I will 
argue that this mission was largely undertaken for reasons of prestige and that 
the US wanted to restore its position as a credible mediator and partner in the 
wider Middle East, which had been damaged by Israels unilateral decision to 
invade Lebanon. I will also argue that, whilst this first intervention can 
technically be seen as a success, because of poor co-ordination between the US 
military and diplomatic strategies, this first intervention did not achieve what 
was hoped for it, or indeed the objectives which US negotiators had in mind for 
it. The caution of US commanders on the ground, coupled with the Secretary of 
Defenses disinclination to be involved in Lebanon in the first place, caused the 
US to fold the first international force in Lebanon before its task had been 
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completed. The second intervention was undertaken from September 1982 to 
February 1984.  Intervention, it will be argued, had no clear objective and was 
largely undertaken because of President Ronald Reagans moral revulsion at 
the suffering of Beiruts civilian population, and that, because of these failings, 
both missions constituted a serious intellectual disagreement with the climate 
that led to the Powell Doctrines insistence on the need for clear and achievable 
objectives. 
 
We will then move on to discuss how the need for clear objectives relates to 
the rest of the Powell Doctrine, paying particular attention to how it relates to 
the need for a clear exit strategy and the need for public support.  But first, in 
order for us to understand the Reagan Administrations decision to intervene in 
the Lebanese conflict, we need to understand the context in which this decision 
was made. 
 
Lebanon has, since its creation in 1919, been an unstable mix of various 
religious and ethnic groups. The political history of this small nation could fill 
many theses by itself, but there are a couple of crucial things to know about 
Lebanons political history if we are to understand the events of 1982-1984. 
First, Lebanon was established as a majority Christian state. But, by the time of 
the Israeli invasion, this was no longer the case. This change in the balance of 
population had led to a vicious civil war breaking out in 1975. Second, Syria 
had never recognized Lebanons right to exist. Syria regarded Lebanon as part 
of its own national territory which had been stolen by the French at the end of 
the First World War. Syria had used the Lebanese civil war as a pretext to 
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station a large military force in Lebanon, ostensibly to keep the peace but, in 
reality, this force served to bring Lebanon under much greater Syrian influence 
and helped guard against an Israeli strike at Syria through Lebanon. Third, 
since the mid 1970s, the South of Lebanon had become a focal point for 
Palestinian terrorism, directed against Israel. Lebanon represented the last 
secure haven that the PLO had which bordered Israel. For this reason, tension 
between Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians had been growing and the south 
of Lebanon had become the scene of many small scale military clashes 
between Israel and the PLO.2  
 
In order to understand Americas role in Lebanon in 1982, it is first crucial to 
take into account the context in which American diplomacy was forced to 
operate. We therefore need to look in detail at the situation in Lebanon and 
Israel in early 1982.  
 
By the summer of 1982, the situation facing Israel had become increasingly 
complex. The Syrian presence in Lebanon had been maintained and 
strengthened, despite the fact that the Civil War had settled into a state of 
uneasy truce, a UN force (United Nations Force In Lebanon  UNFIL) had 
been deployed in Southern Lebanon, with the aim of providing a barrier 
between the PLO and Israel. However, the PLO regularly infiltrated into 
                                                            
2 The following is just a sample of a wide body of literature dealing with Lebanese political 
history and culture: Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil 
War (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1993); Richard Augustus Norton, Amal and the Shia 
Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1987); Richard Gabriel, 
Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israel-PLO War in Lebanon (Hill and Wang: New York, 
1984); and Jonathan Randall, Going all the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and 
American Bunglers (Viking Press: New York, 1983). 
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UNFILs area of operations but the presence of UN troops made it politically 
sensitive for the Israelis to strike back at the PLO.  
 
Also, by 1982, there was a new Israeli government led by the hard line Likud 
Party. The Likud had first come to power in the 1977 elections; this first Likud 
government contained a number of more moderate members who had switched 
parties from the dominant Israeli Labor Party. Also, the coalition that Likud 
headed depended for its survival on the support of small Centrist Parties. This 
first government also contained many members whose first career had been in 
the military, in particular Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister 
Ezer Weizman. This first government had in fact concluded the first ever peace 
treaty between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors by signing the Israeli-
Egyptian Peace Treaty in 1979. The Likud was returned to power in 1980, but 
the make-up of the second government was very different. Although still led by 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and although this government in common 
with all Israeli governments was a coalition, because of the death of Dayan and 
Weizmans retirement, this government had far fewer members with direct 
military experience and Begin had been forced by political expediency to give 
the post of Minister of Defense to Ariel Sharon. Sharon was a man who raised 
very strong feelings among those who knew him: 
 
Many Israelis viewed him as in one writers words, an ultra-hawk with 
tendencies towards extreme action. In time he would make a powerful  
and overwhelmingly negative  impression on American Diplomats. 
Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger was among the more restrained 
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in describing Sharon as a bull in the china shop and a rogue elephant 
who would hear what he wanted to hear.3 
 
Sharon had additional clout in that the Israeli elections of June 1981 had left 
the Likud party with a plurality of only one seat and Sharon controlled at least 
three votes. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Begins decision to 
appoint Sharon in the first place had been the result of political blackmail. 
Boykin quotes US Ambassador Samuel Lewis: Arik [Sharons nickname] 
controlled three Likud votes  his own and two others. He threatened Begin 
that if hed not become defense minister, he and his two friends would take a 
walk and make the Likud a minority party.4 
 
Sharon believed that it had been a grave mistake for Israel to have allowed the 
Syrians to intervene in Lebanon in the first place:  
 
But before long they [the Syrians] were demonstrating that their true 
interests had nothing to do with an independent Lebanon. (In fact Syria 
had never recognized Lebanon and continues to formally regard the 
country as part of greater Syria) with the strategic objective of 
establishing dominance in Lebanon, Syrian tactics changed according to 
the needs of the moment.5 
 
                                                            
3 John Boykin, Cursed is the Peacemaker. The American Diplomat versus the Israeli General, 
Beirut 1982 (Applegate Press: Belmont, 2002). p.48. 
4 Ibid., p. 49. 
5 Ariel Sharon and David Chanoff, Warrior: An Autobiography, (Simon and Schuster: New 
York, 1989), p.424. 
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Linked to this, Sharon had also been a long term advocate of what Israelis 
called The Peripheral Strategy:  
 
The fact was that every Israeli government has wrestled with the 
profound difficulties of existing in isolation amid a sea of enemies. For 
Begins predecessors as Prime Minister, and mine as defense minister, 
one answer has always been to look for allies among the peripheral 
nations.*6   
 
In simple terms, this strategy was the idea that Israel should support other non-
Arab minorities within the greater Middle East. As part of this strategy, Sharon 
stepped up Israeli contact with the Christian forces inside Lebanon. Such 
contact had been going on since 1976 and Christian forces had even received 
Israeli supplies of light arms and a limited form of military liaison had been 
maintained. Sharon added a significant amount of fuel to this fire; he 
personally travelled to Lebanon to meet with the Christian leadership, 
particularly with Bashir Gemayel, leader of the largest Christian faction. These 
discussions centered on the role that Lebanese Christian forces would play in 
the event that Israel launched a large scale invasion of Lebanon: 
 
Escorting him throughout his tour was Bashir Gemayel, who showered 
his distinguished guests with every type of respect Sharon lectured that 
there was no point in an action in Lebanon unless it was a thorough one, 
                                                            
6 Ibid., p.422. 
* Sharon is referring to non-Arab nations on the edge of the Greater Middle East  examples 
include Iran, Sudan, Chad, and, crucially, Lebanon. For a critical analysis of the evolution of 
Israeli security doctrine, see: Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab world (Penguin: 
London, 2001). 
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and no action against the PLO would be thorough unless it drove the 
terrorists out of Beirut.7 
 
It is also clear from the account of this visit who Sharon expected to take care 
of matters in Beirut. Schiff and Yaari quote Sharon as saying the following: 
We should let the phalange [Gemayels Christian militia group] take Beirut. 
We wont have to enter the city at all; theyll capture it instead.8 
 
Throughout 1981 and the first six months of 1982, tension between Israel, 
Lebanon and Syria steadily mounted. So much so that President Reagan 
appointed Special Envoy Philip Habib to negotiate a ceasefire and prevent a 
much larger confrontation. What Habib managed to negotiate was a simple 
ceasefire in place, in other words the PLO would not shell Israel from 
Lebanon, and the Israelis would not attack the PLO in Lebanon. From Sharons 
point of view, this ceasefire was fatally flawed. He pointed out that it did 
nothing to address the problem of PLO terrorist activity outside of Lebanon, 
but it tied Israels hands in terms of responding to it because the PLOs 
headquarters and leadership were in Lebanon.  
 
Even 25 years after the event, it is still extremely difficult to ascertain precisely 
what happened next. What we know for certain is this  In May 1982 Sharon 
visited Washington and had a series of meetings with US Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig. We know that in these meetings Sharon outlined the problems 
he saw with the ceasefire that Habib had negotiated, and he laid out how Israel 
                                                            
7 Z. Schiff and E. YaAri, Edited and translated by Ina Friedman, Israels Lebanon War 
(Simon & Schuster: New York, 1984), p.49. 
8 Ibid., p.49. 
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intended to respond to any further PLO terrorist action. Recollections of 
exactly what Sharon told Haig vary according to the participant. However, 
what all the participants are in agreement with is that Haig said that the US 
would only support Israeli action if there was an internationally recognized 
violation of the ceasefire: 
 
Late in May, while on an official visit to Washington, General Sharon 
shocked a room full of State Department bureaucrats by sketching out 
two possible military campaigns: one that would pacify Southern 
Lebanon and a second that would rewrite the political map of Beirut in 
favour of the phalange. It was clear that Sharon was putting the United 
States on notice; one more provocation by the Palestinians and Israel 
would deliver a knockout blow to the PLO.9 
 
Haigs reaction to this surprising news was a mixture of shock and anger:  
 
In a strenuous argument with Sharon, in the presence of my staff, I 
challenged these plans, after the meeting, so that there could be no 
question that I was playing to an audience, I invited Sharon into my 
office and told him privately, in the plainest possible language, what I 
had repeated to him and Begin and their colleagues many times before; 
unless there was an internationally recognized provocation and unless 
Israeli retaliation was proportionate to any such provocation, an attack by 
                                                            
9 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 
London, 1984), p.335. 
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Israel into Lebanon would have a devastating effect in the United 
States.10 
 
Interestingly in light of all the subsequent claims of misunderstanding, 
Sharons account of the meeting is not dissimilar to Haigs: Both Habib and 
Haig stressed that there would have to be an internationally recognized 
provocation and that if Israel took any kind of disproportionate action it 
would create the most severe consequences within the United States.11 
 
Sharon does not seem to have been intimidated by Haigs dire threats. I had 
not come to Washington to get American approval for whatever we decided to 
do, but to let them know, as friends and allies, exactly where we stood.12 
 
In early June the Israeli ambassador in London was assassinated by Palestinian 
terrorists. Although the evidence seems to suggest that the PLO was not 
involved in the assassination, at the time there was at least enough doubt about 
who was responsible to make the Israeli Cabinet consider retribution against 
the PLO: Scotland Yard had yet to issue a formal statement on the episode, 
but the attack was most probably the work of the terrorist group headed by Abu 
Nidal13: the Israeli Cabinet was no in the mood for convoluted explanations 
about the differences between various Palestinian groups. What they knew for 
certain was that an ambassador had been assassinated and that this constituted 
an attack on the state of Israel. Before Israeli officials could begin to explain 
                                                            
10 Ibid., p.335. 
11 Warrior, p.451. 
12 Ibid., p.451. 
13 Israels Lebanon War, p.98. 
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the evidence, Prime Minister Begin pronounced theyre all PLO.14 Chief of 
the defense staff Raphael Eitan was even less interested in nuance. Before 
entering the cabinet room, he had been informed by one of his intelligence men 
that Abu Nidals men were evidently responsible for the assault. Abu Nidal, 
Abu Shmidal, we have to strike at the PLO!15  
 
The Israeli Cabinet decided to approve air strikes on PLO targets in Beirut, 
something it had only ever approved once before. These air strikes provoked 
the inevitable Palestinian response and towns and settlements all across 
northern Israel sustained prolonged artillery bombardment. Shortly thereafter 
Israeli troops crossed the Lebanese border in three main thrusts; one column 
headed up the coast towards Beirut, the other two columns moved to cut the 
main highway between Beirut and Damascus. This inevitably led to 
confrontation with the Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon, who were in 
imminent danger of being cut off.  
 
By early August the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had reached the outskirts of 
Beirut. They had linked up with Christian forces and were now faced with the 
problem of how to remove several thousand PLO fighters from a city with a 
population of over half a million. 
 
US diplomacy in the run up to the Lebanon war had been characterized by a 
deteriorating relationship with Israel that was punctuated by the Israelis 
repeatedly ignoring their closest ally and now the USs greatest friend in the 
                                                            
14 Ibid., p.98. 
15 Ibid., p.98. 
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Middle East was poised on the brink of attacking an Arab capital for the first 
time in its history in full view of the worlds media. 
 
It is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that part of the motivation for 
the USs subsequent military involvement in Lebanon was due to a desire to 
show on the one hand that the Israelis were making a sizable mistake by 
ignoring the US and to demonstrate to the rest of the Middle East that the US 
was not complicit with or beholden to the Israelis. Vietnam era diplomat 
George Ball caustically sums up the predicament the Reagan Administration 
found itself in: an even larger question is of course why the Reagan 
Administration meekly ignored so many broken promises without bringing 
Israel up short.16 On top of this was the realisation that Israel was involved in 
a brutal siege on an Arab capital using mostly American manufactured 
weapons. The consequences for the USs diplomatic position in the Middle 
East, should this situation be allowed to stand, could have been potentially 
catastrophic. As well as this stark geopolitical reality was the fact that the siege 
of Beirut was broadcast live around the world and senior American policy 
makers, particularly President Reagan, felt a sense of moral outrage at what 
Israel was doing.  The following is an extract from President Reagans diary 
kept during his time in office: I told Begin it had to stop or our entire future 
relationship was endangered.  I used the word Holocaust deliberately. 
Menachem, this is a Holocaust.17 These factors taken together serve to 
                                                            
16 George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon (Foundation for Middle East Peace: 
Washington DC, 1984), p.38. 
17 Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2005), p.124. 
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explain why the Reagan Administration undertook its first military intervention 
in Lebanon. 
 
It is at this point that the role of the United States changes from that of being an 
observer and mediator towards active consideration of military involvement in 
the situation in Lebanon. It is at this point that we can move on to discuss how 
the lack of clearly defined, militarily achievable objectives bedeviled the US 
both in Vietnam and in Lebanon, and how Powell and other senior military 
officers attempted to ensure that in future operations clear objectives would be 
set.   
 
The idea of deploying some kind of international force to Beirut had obvious 
appeal to anyone trying to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the siege. The 
Israelis would not end the siege until the PLO had been evicted from Beirut 
and preferably the whole of Lebanon, and the PLO was not going to leave 
Beirut unless it had some guarantee of safe passage for its fighters and some 
assurance that the civilian Palestinian population would be safe from 
retribution after they had left.  
 
An international force could provide the means by which the PLO could safely 
leave by placing itself between them and the Israelis. President Reagan had, 
from an early point, been willing to consider the commitment of US troops in 
order to police a settlement. When Ambassador Habib began to float the notion 
of an international force, he asked both the Joint Chiefs of  Staff in Washington 
and the Lebanese Government to estimate the size of the force that would be 
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needed to permit the safe evacuation of PLO fighters and to provide temporary 
security to the civilian population of Beirut. The Lebanese Government came 
back with a figure of 250,00018. Although the figure from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff was not quite this high, it was not far off. Habib dismissed the quarter of a 
million figure as ridiculously over the top and completely impractical. Instead, 
he settled on a force of 800 Americans, 800 French and 600 Italian soldiers.  
 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was deeply skeptical about the idea of 
putting US troops in Lebanon. First, because he believed that the US interest in 
the outcome of the Lebanese crisis was not strong enough to merit the risk to 
US personnel; second, because he believed that the US might find itself in a 
situation where it was engaged in hostilities against an Arab enemy, as this 
would serve to undermine the US position in the Middle East. Finally, because 
Weinberger feared that the deployment of small numbers of US troops to such 
a volatile part of the world carried with it the risk that the US would get sucked 
into deeper and deeper commitment, and that this would distract funding and 
political attention away from the enormous defense build-up that the Reagan 
Administration was undertaking. Weinberger himself is tight lipped about the 
reasons for his opposition to American participation in the Multinational Force, 
limiting himself to saying that: General Vessey [General John Vessey, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I argued that we should not be one 
of the participants; but this argument we lost19. 
                                                            
18 This argument between Habib and the military rumbled on for some time before Habib just 
announced what the final figure would be in a plan he came up with entirely by himself. For a 
painstaking review of this argument see: John Boykin, Cursed is the Peacemaker: The 
American Diplomat versus the Israeli General, Beirut, 1982 (Applegate Press: Belmont, 2002). 
19  Caspar Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (Warner 
Books: New York, 1991), p.44. 
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At this point, we will look at how the US mission in Lebanon was seen as 
lacking clear, well-defined, militarily achievable objectives, and how this 
criticism leveled at the US mission in Lebanon tended to reinforce lessons 
already learned by those who would contribute to the intellectual climate that 
produced the Powell Doctrine, and how the perceived mistakes made in 
Lebanon tended to act as confirmation of the validity of those lessons, and how 
and why, despite misgivings from the Military because of the lessons of 
Vietnam, the US intervention in Lebanon was still undertaken. 
 
In analysing the Marines mission in Beirut in retrospect, certain members of 
the US Military have been scathing in their criticism of what they see as a 
poorly defined, open-ended mission: 
 
 The introduction of U.S. forces into Lebanon without a thoughtful risk 
assessment by senior leaders and in the absence of a realistic and unified 
strategic concept of how they should be employed was a miscalculation 
of considerable proportion.  When coupled with an inability to 
simultaneously and effectively use the other elements of power in 
connection with the military application, it was clearly a recipe for 
disaster.20 
 
                                                            
20 The quote is taken from an unpublished manuscript of a study undertaken by Lieutenant 
Colonel John E. Kasperski USMC and Major Benjamin D. Crockett USA, as part of a course at 
the Joint Forces Staff College: Joint and Combined War Fighting School in March 2004. The 
full text can be found at: 
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/US_In
volvemement_Lebanon_4-7-04.doc. 
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Commander Steven K. Westra, writing in the US military journal Small Wars, 
goes even further in criticising what he sees as the simultaneously grandiose 
but uncoordinated strategy of the Reagan Administration: 
 
These goals, by any standards of foreign policy, were highly aggressive 
and extremely difficult to achieve.  There existed no coordinated plan on 
how to resolve the complex religious and political antecedents of the civil 
war itself. American policy pursued the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian 
forces from Lebanon.21  
 
Just how ill-defined and sweeping US goals in Lebanon were can be seen by 
the National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) issued by Reagan. These 
documents are supposed to be the official and unambiguous statements of 
policy on which all government departments should base their actions. The 
following quotation is taken from NSDD 64, the first Directive issued by 
Reagan concerning Lebanon: 
 
Our strategy for this next phase in the restoration of Lebanon has two 
principal objectives. First, we seek, and we will facilitate, the prompt 
disengagement and quickest orderly withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and 
Palestinian armed forces from Lebanon. Second, we must strengthen the 
                                                            
21 Lieutenant Commander Steven, K, Westra, USN, Beiruts Lesson for Future Foreign 
Policy, Small Wars, (1993). Full text can be found at: 
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/westra.htm. 
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ability of the Government of Lebanon to control, administer, and defend 
its sovereign territory.22 
 
Here we can see a clear parallel between Lebanon and Vietnam.  National 
Security Action Memorandum 288 (NASM),23 issued by Lyndon Johnson in 
1964, gave similarly sweeping objectives for US forces to achieve in Vietnam: 
 
We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam.  We do not 
require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western 
alliance.  South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside 
assistance as required to maintain its security.  This assistance should be 
able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also 
police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.24 
 
It is interesting to note that neither the NSDD issued by Reagan or the NSAM 
issued by Johnson spelled out in any detail how the deployment of US troops 
was related to the broader National Security objectives set for the United 
States. 
 
                                                            
22 NSDD was the designation used by the Reagan Administration for national security policy 
documents; other Administrations have used different acronyms. The Directives were issued in 
chronological order, rather than by subject area. Not all of Reagans Directives are publically 
available and some are only available in heavily edited form. The online source of all 
publically disclosed Directives is: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html. The Reagan 
Presidential Library also holds paper copies of all NSDDs. 
23 National Security Action Memoranda perform the same function as NSDDs performed in the 
Reagan Administration.  
24 Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers: American Generals Reflect on Vietnam (New York: 
Da Capo Press, 1991), p.18. 
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Kasperski and Crockett clearly see the major political implications behind the 
rather bland and bureaucratic language used in Reagans Directive.  
 
American policy sought to end the civil war, secure the withdrawal of 
Israeli and Syrian forces, prop-up the minority Maronite Christian 
government, secure a homeland for the Palestinians, and win a de-facto 
victory over the Soviet Union by evicting the Syrians from Lebanon.25 
 
The notion that objectives for US military intervention ought to be maintained 
within the realm of what it is possible for military force to achieve on its own 
goes back to the attempt by the US Army to try and understand the lessons of 
Vietnam, and was an important component in creating the intellectual climate 
that created the Powell Doctrine.  Summers notes that, when it came to trying 
to define US goals in Vietnam, the guidance the Johnson Administration gave 
to its commanders was at the very least divergent: 
 
Even a cursory mission analysis reveals two divergent specified tasks.  
The first specified task  To assist the Government of Vietnam and its 
armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist 
subversion and aggression  is clearly a legitimate military objective, 
albeit one difficult to accomplish.  The second specified task  to attain 
an independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment  is 
more a political than a military objective.  The confusion over objectives 
                                                            
25 Kasperski and Crockett. 
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inherent in the MACV mission statement was to plague our conduct of 
the war.26 
 
In a series of interviews conducted with officers holding the rank of Major 
General or above during the Vietnam conflict, Colonel Douglas Kinnard, in his 
attempt to evaluate the lessons that the Senior Officer Corps in Vietnam drew 
from its experiences, found that US objectives in Vietnam were vague to the 
point that 68 per cent of the most senior officers managing the war either did 
not understand or only partially understood what US objectives were.  Two of 
the most striking comments recorded by Kinnard on an anonymous basis 
conveyed just how little understood US objectives were: The national 
objective in Vietnam was never clear to anyone and Objectives lost meaning 
and were modified to justify events.27  Given these lessons taken from 
Vietnam, it is easy to see why the likes of Westra, Kasparski and Crockett, plus 
Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell, as we shall see later, were extremely 
reluctant to commit US troops to Lebanon and absolutely determined that, if 
the US Military was forced to enter Lebanon, it would be there for the shortest 
amount of time possible. 
 
Secretary of State George Schultzs department had a somewhat different view 
of the Marines utility in Lebanon. The new Secretary of State supported the 
idea of US troops being sent to Lebanon because he agreed with Habib that US 
participation was the only way that the international force would be credible to 
                                                            
26 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell 
Publishing, 1982), p.144. 
27 The War Managers, p.25. 
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all sides of the conflict. On a more general philosophical level, Schultz was a 
firm believer in the idea that, in order to be successful, diplomacy in the final 
analysis had to be backed up by military force and that this held true not just in 
the context of a major crisis with the Soviet Union but for US diplomacy in 
regional conflicts around the world:  
 
A stable Lebanon could be a bridge country in the middle east; a 
Lebanon dominated by Syria and the Soviet Union would contribute to 
tension and constitute a site for threats against Israel. Lebanon had taken 
the brunt of turmoil from Middle East problems. Peace in Lebanon could 
contribute to peace elsewhere.28 
 
Ultimately what guaranteed that the US would participate were not the 
diplomatic or military arguments between Shultz and Weinberger; rather, it 
was President Reagans dismay at the brutality of the siege of Beirut and 
revulsion at the prospect at what might happen if the siege was not brought to a 
peaceful end:  
 
During that period the President was increasingly worried and unhappy 
about the fate of the people living in Beirut, including many American 
citizens. He was very critical of the Israelis use of force and particularly 
their use of the CBU or cluster bomb units, which had been given to 
Israel to use in their own defense; they had used them in urban areas, 
                                                            
28 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, (Charles Scribner's 
Sons: New York, 1993), p.232. 
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inflicting heavy casualties on civilians. As a result the President was a 
strong supporter of the plan to send in the first MNF.29 
 
We will now see how US participation in the first MNF played out on the 
ground. 
 
The two most important conditions attached to US participation were that, the 
French contingent would arrive and deploy a week ahead of the Americans in 
order that US troops could deploy in an environment that was relatively secure. 
This had a number of implications for the evacuation. The Israelis did not trust 
the French, seeing them as pro-PLO and unlikely to be strict about disarming 
Palestinian forces before they were evacuated. This meant that the Israelis 
refused to allow the evacuation to commence before the American contingent 
arrived, which in turn meant that the relationship between the MNF and the 
IDF got off to an acrimonious start. The second major caveat that the Pentagon 
placed upon US involvement was the agreement of all parties that the MNF 
would not remain in Lebanon longer than thirty days after the completion of 
the removal of all PLO fighters from Beirut. This arrangement meant that at the 
end of the thirty day period there would be nobody, apart from the enfeebled 
Lebanese Government, to provide security to the civilian Palestinian 
population. This in an atmosphere in which Lebanons other ethnic and 
religious groups, in particular the Christians, bore a deep resentment towards 
Palestinian refugees and wished, if possible, to remove all Palestinians from 
                                                            
29 Fighting for Peace, p.144. 
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Lebanon. Ambassador Habib was acutely aware of the danger of a security 
vacuum developing in Beirut:  
  
Intrinsic to his [Habibs] plan all along had been the idea that the MNF 
would be on the ground for about 30 days. The presence for three weeks 
or so beyond the evacuation was to serve two purposes. To help smooth 
the transition from Anarchy to Lebanese rule, and to protect the 
remaining Palestinian civilians. Once the PLO fighters were gone, the 
families that they left behind would have no other protection from their 
enemies, the Israelis and the Phalange. The PLO fighters would not have 
left without Habibs guarantee of the civilians safety.30 
 
The Marine commander, Col. James Mead, was in no doubt about how 
strongly Habib felt on this issue: 
 
Habib was absolutely furious when there was any discussion of not going 
the full 30 days. We told our chain of command hey, we need to hang 
tough here for a little bit longer to get done what the ambassador wants 
done. But no, boom, we got the order.31 
 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger had a very different view of how complete 
the Marines mission in Beirut was. Weinberger was determined that the 
Marines should leave as soon as the evacuation of the PLO was complete: 
 
                                                            
30 Cursed is the Peacemaker, p.266. 
31 Ibid., p.266. 
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I judged the MNF action to be a complete success because with virtually 
no losses, we had not only taken out the PLO army, one of the principal 
magnets for an Israeli house to house attack through Beirut, but we had 
removed a principal cause of instability in Lebanon itself. With this first 
MNF, we also had greatly eased conditions for all the people living in 
Beirut.32 
 
Weinberger persuaded President Reagan to withdraw the Marine contingent 
from Beirut only seven days after their deployment. 
 
This ignored both the text and the spirit of the agreement that Ambassador 
Habib had spent the better part of three months arranging, and which was a 
complex series of interlocking obligations and agreements between all parties 
to the conflict. Once the US had made the decision to withdraw, the French and 
Italian contingents had no choice but to follow suit. And ten days after the end 
of the evacuation, the first multi-national force in Lebanon folded.  
 
The MNF withdrawal left a complete security vacuum in west Beirut. This 
potentially dangerous situation exploded into violence with the assassination of 
President-elect Bashir Gemayel. Gemayel had been one of the key leaders of 
Lebanons Maronite Christian community and head of its militia, The 
Lebanese Forces.33 He was a charismatic, if somewhat bloodstained politician. 
His supporters believed that he would end the domination of the ageing 
political class that had governed Lebanon since its independence. They also 
                                                            
32 Fighting for Peace, Pp.144-145. 
33 Also known as the Phalange. 
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believed that he would rid Lebanon of the Palestinian refugees they blamed for 
causing the civil war. Even his opponents believed that he was the best man to 
be President of Lebanon at the time because he was the only Christian 
politician with enough popularity to convince the Christians that they would be 
better off living in a united and pluralist Lebanon instead of a Christian mini-
state. Exactly who was behind the assassination is a matter of controversy but 
what happened next is a matter of certainty. 
 
The IDF occupied west Beirut in order to maintain order. However, the other 
powerful motivation for this occupation was Sharons conviction that the PLO 
had left behind a substantial number of fighters in the Palestinian refugee 
camps. The prospect of Israeli troops having to fight in the refugee camps was 
one of the key reasons why the Israelis were persuaded to accept the PLOs 
evacuation. The Israeli plan now was to use their allies, The Lebanese forces, 
to fight for them. Predictably given the atmosphere, the operation to clear the 
Palestinian refugee camps turned into a complete slaughter with many innocent 
civilians being deliberately murdered. The following is a note taken by an 
Israeli officer serving in Lebanon. This note was later entered in evidence as 
part of the official Israeli inquiry as to what happened in the camps:  
 
During the night the Phalangists entered the Sabra and Shatilla refugee 
camps. Even though it was agreed that they would not harm civilians, 
they butchered. They did not operate in orderly fashion but dispersed. 
They had casualties, including two killed. They will organize to operate 
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in a more orderly manner - we will see to it that they are moved into the 
area.34 
 
As this quotation makes clear, although the Israeli Army was not directly 
responsible for the massacres, it certainly knew of them, and was complicit 
because it did nothing to stop them. 
 
The withdrawal of the multinational force was one of the major contributing 
factors to this massacre. Because of the withdrawal there was no neutral force 
capable of providing security in west Beirut. The multinational force, had it 
been on the ground, could easily have been redeployed to the refugee camps to 
ascertain what truth, if any, there was to Sharons suspicions. The PLO would 
have had no interest whatsoever in opening fire on Western troops and thus 
alienating American and European opinion at the very moment when it was at 
its weakest having just been thrown out of the last country which bordered 
Israel that would allow their presence. The same logic holds equally true for 
the Lebanese Forces. They would have had no interest in antagonizing the US 
right at the moment that they were leaderless with no guarantee for the future 
of the Christian community in Lebanon. But the US military establishments 
fear of expanding a mission once its objectives had been achieved, proved 
stronger than its ability to see the need for a third party to provide minimal 
security during the transition between the PLOs evacuation and the re-
establishment of some kind of Lebanese government authority.  
 
                                                            
34 Report of the Kahan Commission on the Sabra and Shatila Massacres, February 7th, 1983. 
Full text available at: http://www.mideastweb.org/Kahan_report.htm.  
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After the appalling loss of life in the camps, President Reagan authorised a 
second multi-national force to establish a presence in Beirut, and to help the 
Lebanese government regain control over its territory. I will now move on to 
look at how US participation in the second MNF played out, and how the US 
role in Lebanon came to a tragic end. The objective for US forces was, again, 
both vague and sweeping at the same time.   
 
The following were the orders issued to the Marines outlining the nature and 
scope of their mission: 
 
To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed 
Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When 
directed, USCINCEUR [US Commander in Chief Europe] will introduce 
U.S. forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to 
occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from 
south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of 
the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, 
conduct retrograde [logistical] operations as required.35 
 
The idea of a presence mission was an entirely new concept. The Marine 
commander on the ground Colonel James Mead appears to have been pretty 
much left to make up his own mind on a definition of his mission: 
 
                                                            
35 Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23rd, 
1983. Full text available at: http://ftp.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-
1984/DOD-Report/Beirut-1.html. 
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The imprecision of the presence phase in Col Jim Meads mission 
directive provided this able and ambitious officer with a crucial role in 
the command structure reaching down from the Oval Office. Indeed, 
Meads responsibility for conducting US foreign policy in Lebanon 
became, at the turn of a phrase, unique in modern American military and 
diplomatic annals.36 
 
Despite the occasional verbal slip in press conferences by President Reagan, 
the mission of US forces in Lebanon was never one of peace keeping. There 
were far too few troops committed to the force to make that practical. The US 
contingent of the second MNF was deployed at Beirut International Airport, 
with a small force detailed to protect the US Embassy. The deployment of the 
second MNF was in many ways everything the US Military had come to fear 
after the end of Vietnam. Civilian policy makers had no idea how to solve 
Lebanons considerable problems, they had no idea what they wanted from US 
involvement in Lebanon, but the images of suffering that came from Lebanon, 
and the possibilities that the Soviets might exploit this for their own ends, plus 
their own revulsion at what they were seeing, led them to the conclusion that 
the US had to do something and had to be seen doing something about the 
situation. Therefore, they would commit a small number of troops in order to 
demonstrate their commitment, and with the vague hope that somehow this 
deployment would act as a spur to re-start diplomacy.  
 
                                                            
36 The Root: The Marines in Beirut, p.38. Emphasis in original. 
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For the Marines on the ground, their nebulous mission was both frustrating and 
potentially dangerous. On the one hand, the fact that they were in Beirut at all, 
made them tempting targets for any Lebanese faction that wished to put 
pressure on the US. This was equally true of the Syrians who, since the Camp 
David agreement, had been trying to force the US to take it seriously as a 
regional power. The Syrians engaged in a complicated game with the US in 
Lebanon. They supported the various anti-American groups in Lebanon, just 
enough so that they would make the US presence difficult to maintain, but not 
enough to lead to a complete breakdown in their relationship with Washington. 
In addition to this already combustible mixture, the Iranian government, seeing 
an opportunity to hurt the US, who was at that time supporting their Iraqi 
enemies, began to spend substantial amounts of money and personnel to train 
various militant Shia groups. Colin Powell from his position as Weinbergers 
military aide considered the Marines mission in Beirut moronic: 
 
What I saw from my perch in the Pentagon was America sticking its hand 
into a thousand year old hornets nest with the expectation that our mere 
presence might pacify the hornetslives must not be risked until we can 
face a parent or a spouse or a child with a clear answer to the question of 
why a member of that family had to die. To provide a symbol or a 
presence is not good enough.37 
 
The US Marines in Beirut were operating according to peacetime rules 
governing the use of force and combat readiness because the Reagan 
                                                            
37 Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (Ballantine Books: New York, 
1996), p.281. 
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Administration did not want to make it seem like US forces were actively 
involved in a foreign civil war. This placed the Marines in an entirely reactive 
posture. They were only allowed to return fire at clearly identifiable targets, 
they were only permitted to return fire to the extent necessary to guarantee 
their own safety, and they were not allowed to initiate any kind of combat or 
action which might lead to combat. This set of restrictions totally seeded the 
initiative to whatever group wished to use Marine casualties to make a point. 
Yet at the same time, sooner or later, when the Marines did act to defend 
themselves, this would be taken by all parties to the conflict as a sign of 
American partiality38. 
 
The Americans also had their share of problems with the Israelis. Because the 
mission of the Marines was so ill defined and because the conditions under 
which they could employ force were so strict, the Americans often ended up 
acting as a buffer between the Israelis to the south of Beirut airport, and the 
Muslim militia to the north. This meant that the Israelis could not effectively 
return fire at enemy targets without running the risk of catching the MNF in 
crossfire. There were also repeated incidents of Israeli tanks deliberately 
encroaching on the airport perimeter which led to increasingly bitter 
arguments, and, in at least one case, a stand-off involving loaded weapons. As 
Hammel puts it: 
 
                                                            
38 The exact text of the Marines rules of engagement can be found in the Long Commission 
Report The full text of the report, along with appendices can be found at: 
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/Beirut-
1.html. 
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American political requirements of the day  had a definite anti-Israeli 
bias, at least insofar as it was important for the US MNF contingent to 
show no favoritism toward the mission or aspirations of the IDF. As a 
result of the clear divergence of the missions of the two forces, there 
were several ludicrous exchanges, some muscle-flexing by both forces, 
and, alas, the creation of a powder-keg mind-set that was very nearly 
detonated.39 
 
With the deployment of the second MNF, Ambassador Habib began a 
second frantic round of shuttle diplomacy to try and secure the mutual 
withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. The Israelis would not withdraw 
without a peace treaty with Lebanon and assurances that southern Lebanon 
would be demilitarized, and that the Syrians would leave. The Syrians 
would not withdraw unless the Israelis withdrew first. They would not 
accept a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel and rejected any Israeli 
attempt to dominate southern Lebanon. By May 7th 1983, Habib had agreed 
a rough framework by which the Israelis would withdraw, but they would be 
allowed to continue to supply Christian forces in southern Lebanon, and an 
agreement on limited diplomatic recognition and the movement of goods. 
However, this agreement was subject to the Syrians agreeing to withdraw at 
the same time; this effectively gave Syria a Veto which it promptly used by 
refusing to withdraw its forces. The failure of the May 7th agreement 
removed the last possible logical reason why the MNF should remain. There 
was now no prospect of foreign forces withdrawing from Lebanon, or of the 
                                                            
39 The Root, p.60. Hammel provides several detailed examples of incidents between US and 
Israeli forces at various points in his work. 
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Lebanese government re-establishing its authority. There would be no 
environment in which the MNF could provide any kind of meaningful 
assistance to the Lebanese government and there was no thought of making 
the MNF large enough or giving it a mandate to forcibly role back the 
occupying armies. 
 
Secretary Weinberger was very well aware of the fundamental flaw in using 
the presence of American troops as a lever to try and extract a diplomatic 
solution:  
 
The problem, of course, was that there was not an agreed-upon 
withdrawal When the second Multinational Force landed, there was 
still not an agreement for withdrawal. Indeed, a tentative, wholly 
unworkable agreement was reached only eight long months later, during 
which period the Syrians, whose air force had been largely destroyed and 
its army weakened by the Israelis, were rearmed by the Soviets. 
Meanwhile, and as a result, the tasks assigned to the elements of the 
MNF were very limited and circumscribed.40 
 
Why then did it take until November 1983 for the second MNF to be 
withdrawn? Here again we see eerie parallels to Vietnam and the reasons why 
the US remained committed in spite of the fact it had no clear or achievable 
objective.  
 
                                                            
40 Fighting For Peace, Pp.152-153. 
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First, in both cases there was the hope that some new factor or diplomatic 
initiative would come along and change the situation for the better and that the 
mere presence of US forces in whatever number or capacity would give 
Washington an important bargaining chip in some hypothetical future 
negotiations. The problem with this line of argument is that no-one in the case 
of either Lebanon or Vietnam had the faintest clue where this new initiative 
would come from, or what it might look like. The reaction of high powered 
politicians in both cases was all too human. The belief that if they just hung on 
a little bit longer, some drastic new development would come and spare them 
from the painful admission that they had been wrong in the first place and that 
US casualties had been in vain: 
 
What the president did not want to do, above all, was to pull out of 
Lebanon immediately, to be seen as running away as a result of the 
tragedy that had taken place. To the contrary, the barracks bombing 
seemed to strengthen his resolve to stay.41  
 
These casualties themselves were an important factor in the stubborn refusal to 
withdraw. Once blood had been shed, both Presidents Johnson and Reagan 
were keen to show that they would not be intimidated by the death of US 
soldiers and that they personally were tough enough to accept losses and not be 
deflected from the right policy. These casualties also made it harder to 
withdraw because there is a sense in which politicians want to be able to give 
meaning to the sacrifices that they have asked for. Nobody wants to admit that 
                                                            
41 Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (Cadell & Davies: New York, 1994), 
p.268. 
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they asked another man to die for an unclear and unachievable objective. The 
problem with both lines of logic is that one death does not justify more death, 
and that there is a difference between being intimidated and simply doing the 
right thing once the facts on the ground change.  
 
Finally, there was a sense in both Lebanon and Vietnam that the world was 
watching and that other nations would judge their future actions by what they 
saw the US doing. The USA could not afford to be seen as weak; in Vietnam it 
needed to show that it was capable of standing up to Communist aggression, 
and in Lebanon it needed to show that it was not so traumatized by the 
experience of Vietnam that it could not resort to military measures when the 
situation required it. Additionally, in both cases, there was a sense in which the 
US was attempting to draw a line against a new type of threat. In the case of 
Vietnam this meant Communist revolutionary warfare, in the case of Lebanon 
it meant terrorism. The problem with this logic is that it assumes that vastly 
different regional and global problems are somehow related and that, because 
of this, the US has no freedom of action to respond to different situations in 
different ways, and second it assumes that the wider world only respects US 
strength and not US discretion. There is nothing wrong with great powers 
carefully choosing to intervene in those situations where their intervention can 
make a difference, and refusing to intervene in those situations where it can 
make no positive contribution.  
 
We will now move on to look at how the insistence on clear objectives relates 
to the rest of the intellectual climate leading to the Powell Doctrine, in 
278 
  
particular how it relates to Chapter 6, the need for an exit strategy, and 
Chapter 4, the need for public support.  
 
The linkage between the need for clear objectives and the need to build public 
support should be clear enough. It is hard to build public support around ideas 
that you cannot succinctly and clearly put across. The public are more likely to 
support action where the aims of the US are easily understood and Congress is 
more likely to vote to fund operations that they can see have some clear 
purpose. The drawback to this is that the need for clarity may tempt the 
President to paint the mission of US forces in overly stark terms in order to 
make it easy for the public to understand why US forces are involved in a 
particular situation. For example, President Reagans repeated statements in 
press conferences that US forces were in Beirut on a peace keeping mission 
may have been clear and concise, but they were also somewhat misleading in 
that US forces were not committed to a traditional peace keeping role and 
indeed, as we have already seen, the mission as it was described to US 
commanders was unclear to the point of being vague. In other words, just 
because a President can put things across in simple and clear terms, it is not the 
same as them being simple and clear to the Military on the ground, and a 
search for clarity can easily turn into gross oversimplification of complex and 
evolving situations.  
 
The need for public support and the need to state the mission to US forces 
clearly  both of these elements of the intellectual climate leading to the Powell 
Doctrine can be used to help define a third element: the idea that US military 
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intervention should be in the national interest. If the national interest cannot be 
objectively defined, then perhaps the closest any Administration can come is to 
gain public support for an honest and clear plan of their intentions. The 
decision to send the Marines to Beirut clearly did not follow this logic. The 
Reagan Administration was never able to accurately and coherently explain 
what their purpose was. The reason it was never able to explain to the public 
the purpose of the Marines presence was that the Administration itself was 
divided on what that purpose was or should be.  
 
The intellectual climate leading to the Powell Doctrine also calls for US forces 
not to be deployed overseas without a clear exit strategy being defined. To 
put it in simpler terms, the US should never commit forces to a situation if it 
does not know how it is going to get them out again. The need for clear 
objectives can be seen as a prerequisite to this. If you do not know clearly what 
it is that you wish to achieve, how can you ever say that you have been 
successful or, indeed, how can you ever say you have failed. Thus policy 
makers have no point of reference to decide when it is time for American 
forces to leave. The second MNF is a classic example of this logic breaking 
down. Because the Reagan Administration did not really know what the 
Marines wanted to achieve in Beirut there was no way of putting any kind of 
time scale on their presence. There was not even a set of criteria under which 
the Marines could be said to have succeeded in their mission. Consequently, 
Marines occupied positions at Beirut airport, month after month, while 
Washington hoped that their presence would produce some kind of a result 
right up until the Marine Barracks were bombed, there were no plans to 
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withdraw US troops. The fact of the matter is that US forces were forced out by 
the weight of domestic opinion demanding that they come home. Had the 
bombing not taken place, there is no telling how long the Reagan 
Administration would have maintained a US military presence in Lebanon or 
what it would have been able to achieve. 
 
Of course the problem with having preconceived notions of what it is that you 
want to achieve is that they do not actually correspond to the situation on the 
ground. We can see this clearly in the first US mission to Lebanon in 1982. 
The Military has a preconceived notion that all it was in Lebanon to do was to 
guarantee the safe evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. However, as we have 
seen, this preconception completely ignored not only Lebanons complex 
political situation but both the text and spirit of agreements that the US had 
actually entered into. What this shows us is that, whilst it is important, the 
Military should only be used in situations where its use has some clear purpose. 
It must also be flexible enough to adapt to conditions on the ground.  
 
What we have seen in this chapter is that, in spite of the US Militarys 
determination not to repeat what was commonly regarded as the mistakes of 
Vietnam, the Militarys reticence could ultimately be overcome by a 
Commander in Chief determined to act.  What we have also seen is that the 
mistakes made in Vietnam and Lebanon over how the US defined the 
objectives of military intervention were very similar to one another.  What we 
have also seen is that the US commitment of Marines to a peacekeeping role in 
Lebanon was undertaken without a thorough analysis and an agreed upon 
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definition of what it was exactly that the United States was trying to achieve in 
Lebanon, and without sufficient thought being given to how a deployment of 
only 800 Marines could bring about what were, as we have seen, very 
sweeping, very nebulous goals that the Reagan Administration set itself.
282 
  
Chapter 6  The Need for a Clear Exit Strategy 
 
How do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam? How do you ask 
a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?1 
John Kerry 
 
In this chapter we will look at the element of the Powell Doctrine that calls for 
a clear exit strategy for US forces.  We will look at how, in the case of 
Vietnam, the US failed to define and execute a viable exit strategy, and the 
impact that this had on the Armed Forces and the formation of the Powell 
Doctrine.  We will then move on to look at how the Militarys insistence upon 
a viable exit strategy was to influence the debate over US policy towards 
Bosnia.  In this chapter, we will look mostly at the policy decisions that took 
place during the Clinton Administration2, as this was the period during which 
military intervention was most actively discussed as a potential policy.   It will 
be necessary to review the Clinton Administrations Bosnia policy in extensive 
detail, as the argument made in this chapter is not so much that the US failed to 
come up with an exit strategy for its commitment to Bosnia, but that, by the 
spring and summer of 1995, other concerns had come to outweigh the 
Militarys concerns about them not having an exit strategy for any commitment 
to Bosnia.  These concerns, as we shall see, centred on the continuing 
credibility of NATO in post-Cold War Europe, the credibility of the United 
                                                            
1 This quote is taken from testimony by John Kerry to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
April 23rd 1971. The full text of Kerrys testimony can be found at: 
http://usliberals.about.com/od/extraordinaryspeeches/a/KerryVietnam.htm. 
2 For a discussion of Bosnia policy under George H. W. Bush, see Chapter 2. 
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States as a leading actor in European security issues, and Bill Clintons 
credibility as Commander-in-Chief.  To understand how and why these 
concerns became so important, it is necessary to review the events leading up 
to the summer of 1995 in some detail. 
 
Finally, we will look at how the element of the Powell Doctrine calling for a 
clear exit strategy relates to the other elements of the Powell Doctrine, 
principally the need for clear objectives and the need for public and 
Congressional support.  But first we need to define what we mean by exit 
strategy.   
 
In this chapter, it is appropriate to talk about the Powell Doctrine, as the case 
study largely takes place after the publication of Powells 1992 Foreign Affairs 
article and Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for part of the case 
study period, between 1991 and 1993.  But we will also look at the intellectual 
climate that arose out of the way the US went about extricating itself from 
Vietnam that led to the insistence of the Powell Doctrine on a viable exit 
strategy. 
 
In his 1984 National Press Club speech, perhaps the most public enunciation of 
the ideas that would form the Powell Doctrine before Powells article, 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, although he never explicitly used the 
phrase exit strategy, did say:  
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We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic 
questions: "Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national 
interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are 
"yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be 
in combat.3 
 
What we can see from this quotation is that Weinberger, with Powell as his 
Military Assistant, is clearly acknowledging that policymakers must have 
some notion of when and under what circumstances they would wish to end 
US involvement in a particular conflict.  The logic of Weinbergers 
statement leaves three options for US disengagement.  The first and most 
obvious one is that the US achieves whatever objectives it sets itself.  In 
other words, the US wins.  The second option is that the US decides that 
the conflict is no longer in its national interest,4 and therefore is free to 
disengage at its leisure.  The third option is for an Administration to 
conclude that winning is either too costly or not feasible, but that the 
reading of the national interest that led to a conflict in the first place is still 
valid.  The only option logically left open is to try and alter the nature of the 
conflict so that the US can leave without damaging its national interest.  
This could be done in one of two ways: a negotiated settlement that ends a 
conflict on terms not catastrophically damaging to the national interest, or 
the US is able to pass on responsibility for its part in the conflict to a third 
party.  The logic of what Weinberger is saying must either lead to victory 
                                                            
3 Caspar W. Weinberger, The Uses of Military Power, National Press Club, Washington, 
D.C., Nov. 28th 1984.  Full text available at: http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2004/January%202004/0104keeperfull.pdf 
4 See Chapter two. 
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withdrawal, a negotiated settlement, or the transfer of the USs 
responsibilities to a third party.  Either a negotiated settlement or a handing 
off of US responsibility could be said to constitute an exit strategy, that is 
to say, a means by which the US can end direct involvement in conflicts 
without undermining either its future credibility or the objectives the US set 
itself when it originally entered a conflict.  As we shall see in the case of 
Vietnam, the US attempted both to negotiate an end to the war and to hand 
off responsibility for any future fighting to the South Vietnamese. 
 
By 1968, it had become clear that the war in Vietnam had essentially reached a 
point of stalemate5.  The commitment of US forces had prevented the 
Communists from overrunning South Vietnam, but by the same token it 
appeared that no commitment of military force or money could induce the 
South Vietnamese to create either armed forces or a government that was 
capable of victory.  The stark alternatives facing the new Administration were: 
an open-ended commitment of US forces on a large scale, which neither US 
public opinion or the state of the US economy could sustain; alternatively, the 
Administration did not feel capable of simply withdrawing from Vietnam and 
letting events take their course.  To do so would have been seen by Richard 
Nixon as abandoning a commitment made by his four predecessors.  To 
Nixons eyes, the risk of this was a fatal breach in the credibility of US 
commitments around the world.  I rejected this option, to [withdraw]As 
                                                            
5 There is much historical work detailing US strategy in Vietnam and the events in 1968, which 
forced US policy makers to the conclusion that the war was a stalemate.  See Larry 
Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (W.W. Norton: New 
York, 1989) and Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam 
(Elephant Paperbacks: Chicago, 1997). See in particular Clark Clifford, A Vietnam 
Reappraisal, Foreign Affairs, 47(4), (1969), Pp.601-622. 
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President, I continued to believe that the moral and geopolitical reasons behind 
our intervention remained valid.6 
 
The third alternative was to slowly pull US forces back as South Vietnamese 
forces became more capable of taking over greater responsibility for the war 
effort.  Running parallel to this was a negotiating effort that the Administration 
hoped, by a combination of great power, pressure, inducements and threats, to 
end the war. 
 
This alternative was what we have come to call Vietnamization.  Lieutenant 
General Phillip B. Davidson MACV G-2 (Head of Military Intelligence) 
describes Vietnamization in the following terms:  
 
The central thrust of the new strategy, then, would concentrate on 
improving ARVNs [Army of the Republic of Vietnam  South 
Vietnamese Army] capabilities and strengthening the government of 
South Vietnams control over the population so that they could 
eventually oppose the Communists alone.  American forces would 
provide the shield behind which this enhancement would take place, and 
they would be withdrawn when the RVNAF [Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Vietnam] and GVN [Government of Vietnam] could defend 
themselves.7 
 
                                                            
6 Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (W. H. Allen: London, 1986). p.104. 
7 Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson (Ret.), Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1988), p.476. 
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There are three major reasons to believe that this was a doomed effort from the 
start.  First, it ran up against a perennial problem that all US policy towards 
Vietnam had founded on.  Namely that, however much training, money and 
expertise the US was prepared to throw at Vietnam, it could not force the South 
Vietnamese people or government to act as the US wanted them to act.  
Testifying before the House Appropriations subcommittee, the deputy director 
of AID (Agency for International Development) in South Vietnam described 
the corruption in South Vietnam with the following anecdote:  
 
For example, speculators hoarded imported American fertilizer and 
created artificial shortages that sent prices skyrocketing.  One of the most 
notorious speculators was the brother-in-law of General Nguyen Van 
Thieu [the President of South Vietnam, 1967-1975]But he was piker 
[small-time thief] compared to Thieu himself, who carried away millions 
of dollars in gold when he fled Vietnam in April 19758.  
 
Added to the problem of simple venality was the fact that the South 
Vietnamese government never created a sense of national purpose or an 
ideology that a large number of the South Vietnamese people could support.  
Consequently, the best way for it to keep itself in power was by the use of a 
complicated system of patronage.  Continuing the testimony in the above 
quotation, the AID administrator described South Vietnams political system as 
one which was based primarily on a style of secular simony [a form of tithe], 
                                                            
8 William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and 
Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965-January 1968 (Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, 1995), p.424. For a discussion of just how pervasive and engrained in South 
Vietnamese politics corruption had become, see Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, 
The United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (Phoenix Press: London, 2001). 
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trafficking in jobs that gave their subordinates the opportunity to make 
money.9  The practical effect of this system was to ensure that corruption ran 
from the very bottom of the administrative and political system to the very top.  
In order for the system the AID administrator describes to work, even 
individually honest members of the government had to engage in a certain 
amount of corruption in order to pay off their superiors so that they could keep 
their job.  The US was further hampered by the fact that, although South 
Vietnam was overwhelmingly dependent on US aid, it was in a legal sense a 
sovereign country.  Therefore, the US could not insist upon the removal of 
corrupt officials.  It could merely point out examples of corruption to the South 
Vietnamese government and hope that action would be taken.  Given the 
situation outlined above, this very rarely happened.  Instead, the tendency was 
for a game of musical chairs to take place.  The US would point out corrupt 
officials; the South Vietnamese government would dismiss them.  Then they 
would be reappointed to another post that would not bring them into contact 
with the Americans who complained about them in the first place. 
 
In theory at least, the US could always threaten to cut off the supply of aid to 
South Vietnam.  But in the context of Vietnamization, this was never a 
practical option.  Such a withdrawal or conditioning of aid would have slowed 
down or prevented any improvement in the technical capabilities of either the 
South Vietnamese armed forces or the South Vietnamese government.  In that 
situation, the US would either have had to halt the process of withdrawal or 
effectively cut its losses from South Vietnam by accepting that the South 
                                                            
9 The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, p.424. 
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Vietnamese government could not properly use the aid it was given.  For 
reasons outlined above, the second option was never seriously contemplated by 
the Nixon Administration.  We will come to the reasons why the first option 
was never contemplated in a moment. 
 
The first reason why the US could never slow down the rate of Vietnamization 
was that public opinion at home was becoming increasingly polarized between 
the two extreme options of either total victory in Vietnam, with all the risk that 
that entailed of a wider war, or a fast, complete withdrawal from Vietnam.  The 
only way the Nixon Administration could maintain a tenuous hold on public 
opinion was constantly to reassure the public that the strategy of slowly turning 
the war over to the Vietnamese was working.  The most public way to 
demonstrate this success was through continued withdrawal of troops.  Henry 
Kissinger in his memoirs describes the trap the Nixon Administration had set 
itself with a tone of bitter regret: 
 
The withdrawal increased the pressures from families whose sons 
remained at risk.  And it brought no respite from the criticsAs a result, 
the Nixon Administrations commitment to unilateral withdrawal would 
come to be seen, at home, abroad, and particularly in Vietnam, as 
irreversible.10 
 
Kissinger was also in no doubt of the effect that this irreversible withdrawal 
was having on North Vietnamese policy: 
                                                            
10 Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of Americas Involvement in and 
Extrication from the Vietnam War, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2003). p.84. 
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The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, were not interested in symbols 
but in the balance of forces on the ground.  They coolly analyzed the 
withdrawal, weighing its psychological benefits to America in terms of 
enhanced staying power against the decline in military effectiveness 
represented by a shrinking number of American forces.11 
 
The second factor that made American withdrawal from Vietnam irreversible 
once it began was a defence budget that was rapidly declining.  In constant 
dollars, the budget fell from $346.90 billion in January 1969 to $278.80 billion 
in October 1975, a difference of $67.1 billion.12  On the face of it, this decline 
would seem natural.  After all, US forces were being withdrawn, reducing 
overall costs.  But the sting in the tail was that the Defense Department 
budgeted on the assumption that US forces would be withdrawing.  This meant 
that any attempt to slow down or reverse the withdrawal would mean that the 
defence budget would remain the same but the expected savings from the 
withdrawal would not materialise, meaning that any shortfall would have to be 
found by cuts to non-Vietnam-related expenditure.  This system of budgeting 
effectively allowed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to pose a cruel dilemma 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Yes, they could slow down the rate of withdrawal 
from Vietnam, but they would have to sacrifice a large amount of expenditure 
                                                            
11 Ibid., p.84. 
12 http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=55. This website records quarter by 
quarter US Defense expenditure from January 1947 to October 2008.  It does this in constant 
2008 dollars. 
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elsewhere, particularly in the Defense Departments research and development 
programmes.13 
 
What Vietnamization amounted to then was an exit strategy that was based on 
hope rather than expectation.  It was a strategy whose success depended not on 
the efforts of the US but on a complete root and branch overhaul of the South 
Vietnamese system of government and politics.  Ultimately, as Kolko points 
out, the war in Vietnam was more than just a military struggle: In wars against 
revolutionary movements, between social systems and ideologies as well as 
armies, major changes in either sides social and economic power can critically 
affect the outcome of the struggle14.  As the US withdrew its troops from 
Vietnam it not only lost leverage over the military situation but also lost what 
little leverage it had over the evolution of South Vietnamese politics. The US 
withdrawal from Vietnam in the final analysis was conditioned much more by 
domestic political and economic considerations rather than any measure of how 
well South Vietnam could survive without massive US assistance. 
 
We can see then that Vietnamization did not constitute a viable exit strategy 
in the sense that, whilst it provided cover by which the US could terminate its 
involvement in Vietnam, it did not, and, more to the point, could not provide a 
means by which South Vietnam could defend itself.  This is not a judgement 
made in hindsight but, as we can see from the quotations given above, even 
                                                            
13 For the most detailed account of Laird machinations with the JCS, see Mark Perry, Four 
Stars: The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America's 
Civilian Leaders (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1989). Chapter 7. 
14 Anatomy of a War. p.483. 
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those charged with implementing Vietnamization had the gravest about its 
usefulness as an exit strategy. 
 
However, it is important to stress that the Nixon Administration had to 
improvise the best exit strategy it could because no-one had thought ahead of 
time how US forces could be withdrawn from Vietnam if total victory for the 
US seemed impossible. 
 
As early as 1965, shortly after the commitment of large-scale US combat 
forces, US diplomats were commenting on the fact that, in spite of a massive 
financial, moral and recently-added military assistance, the government of 
South Vietnam remained fundamentally weak.  The following quotation is an 
extract from a cable sent by Maxwell Taylor, the US Ambassador to South 
Vietnam, commenting on the relative merits of the newly-installed Prime 
Minister, Air Vice Marshal Ky, who was installed after a bloodless military 
coup: 
 
He is completely without the background and experience necessary for 
an assignment as difficult as this one. The American General Officer 
closest to him describes him as a proud man and a fine military 
commander, although a naive, inexperienced politician and civil affairs 
administrator. I believe he will do his absolute best to succeed in his new 
position, but he will require a lot of technical assistance, moral support 
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and a normal amount of conscientious understanding. We will do our 
best to provide these missing ingredients.15 
 
Although the commitment of half a million US troops had managed to stave off 
the immediate threat of South Vietnam being overwhelmed by Communist 
forces, the fundamental weaknesses of the South Vietnamese political system 
and its leadership were to remain an endemic problem that both the Johnson 
Administration and the Nixon Administration completely failed to remedy.  As 
well as the inherent corruption in the system discussed above, another major 
weakness was the corrosive effect of religious, ethnic, and regional divisions. 
 
The following quotation is taken from an assessment the US Embassy carried 
out in 1965, assessing the potential strengths and weaknesses of the South 
Vietnamese Government.  The quotation demonstrates the innate mistrust 
between a small but influential Catholic minority and the Buddhist majority of 
the South Vietnamese: 
 
A potential opposition grouping lies in the recent temporary alliance of 
Catholics with southern regionalists. This coalition might tend to regard 
present GVN as being in a sense Quat's [former Prime Minister of South 
Vietnam, who had been removed in the coup that had put Ky in power] 
spiritual heirs. One of major roots of Catholic enmity towards Quat had 
been belief that he was in league with leaders of central faction of UBA 
                                                            
15 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, June 17th, 1965.  The 
text of the telegram is taken from the series: The Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Johnson Administration, Volume III, document 5, full text available at: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/index.htm. 
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(Tri Quang-Thien Minh) [key Buddhist leaders] and was consolidating 
his power through backing of coalition of Generals and police officials 
whose hostility towards Catholics they believed was clear. 16 
 
Essentially, while the US saw everything that happened in Vietnam through the 
prism of anti-Communism, the South Vietnamese themselves were fighting a 
number of different conflicts, some amongst themselves, to define South 
Vietnamese identity and nationhood.  These conflicts tended to baffle and 
infuriate the Americans in equal measure, but worst still, once the Americans 
were committed to large-scale military action, it essentially became possible 
for the South Vietnamese to leave the war against the Communists to the 
Americans, while they got on with their own conflicts. 
 
Nixons Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, summed up the 
difference between a US view of the conflict and the South Vietnamese view 
of the conflict with the following observation: Were engaged in fighting a 
limited war, for limited objectives, and with limited resources.  At the same 
time were advising and supporting the Vietnamese in their efforts to carry out 
 carry through  a social revolution.17  Left unanswered by Bunker was the 
question of whether or not the US and South Vietnamese had the same ideas 
about what this revolution ought to look like, or what the outcome should be. 
 
                                                            
16 Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, June 21st, 1965.  The 
text of the telegram is taken from the series: The Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Johnson Administration, Volume III, document 9, full text available at: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/index.htm. 
17 Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of Americas 
Last Years in Vietnam (Harcourt Brace & Company: New York, 1999). p.113. 
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The larger point here is that, although the Nixon Administrations policy of 
Vietnamization was unlikely to be successful because of the structural 
weaknesses of South Vietnam, these weaknesses were not in any way new, nor 
were they entirely of the Americans making.  One of the fundamental flaws of 
US policy towards Vietnam, and one of the principal reasons why the Powell 
Doctrine was to insist upon a clearly defined exit strategy was because no-one 
at the time of the initial commitment of large-scale US troops to Vietnam in 
July 1965 had considered the underlying weakness of South Vietnam as a 
nation, and no-one had seriously considered how this weakness might impact 
upon the length and depth of the US commitment to Vietnam.  The underlying 
assumption of US policymakers seems to have been that, with a large enough 
commitment of US manpower and resources, the US could shape the future of 
South Vietnam regardless of any underlying weaknesses in its South 
Vietnamese allies. As one of the chief architects of Americas Vietnam War 
Robert McNamara would later put it, We viewed the people and leaders of 
South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for  
and a determination to fight for  freedom and democracy. We totally 
misjudged the political forces within the country18. McNamara also 
acknowledges that US policy suffered from the hubris of thinking that there 
was no problem that America could not solve:  
 
We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of 
life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions. 
For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of 
                                                            
18 Robert McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of 
Vietnam (Vintage Books: New York, 1996). p.322. 
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problem solving, this is particularly hard to admit. But, at times, we may 
have to live with an imperfect, untidy world19.  
 
The US commitment to South Vietnam had been designed in such a way that 
there was no exit strategy that the Nixon Administration could have chosen 
which would have stood a high chance of success.  The US could withdraw 
from Vietnam, but it could not exit from Vietnam in such a way as to not 
undermine its initial objectives, because the success of those objectives 
depended upon the South Vietnamese carrying through Bunkers social 
revolution, and this was something that, no matter how much advice the US 
gave or however many resources would be dedicated to it, had to be a task 
primarily for the South Vietnamese.  If the US was not able to convince the 
South Vietnamese to undertake this revolution whilst providing half a million 
troops for its defence, it was even more unlikely to persuade the South 
Vietnamese to undertake a revolution whilst these troops were going home. 
 
Of course, the argument that Vietnamization did not and in fact could not work 
is not without its critics. These critics fall into two main groups. First, there is 
the argument that Vietnamization had succeeded but was then fatally 
undermined by a Congress that refused to support a large but steadily declining 
programme of aid to South Vietnam. The second school of thought is that the 
war could have been won without Vietnamization and that instead of 
withdrawing, the Nixon Administration should have pursued the war more 
aggressively, and that in particular it should have recommenced the bombing of 
                                                            
19 Ibid., p.323.  
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North Vietnam, and it should have used US forces to invade and permanently 
occupy Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Both of these schools 
of thought are fundamentally flawed. We will deal with the argument that the 
Nixon Administration should have been more aggressive first. The argument 
for invading and remaining in Laos and Cambodia with substantial numbers of 
US troops runs something like this: Indochina is effectively one theatre of 
operations, the North Vietnamese presence in Laos and Cambodia renders any 
neutrality meaningless, and the only way to prevent resupply and 
reinforcements going to South Vietnam from North Vietnam was to cut the 
supply routes through Cambodia and Laos. As Dale Walton puts it,  
 
To secure the South Vietnamese countryside, it was necessary to cut the 
Communists off from the north and grind them down. There are strong 
reasons to believe that the United States could have performed the former 
task in Laos and the northern RVNIndochina was a unified theater of 
war. The leadership in Hanoi was entirely cognizant of this fact and 
North Vietnam formed a cogent warfighting strategy that involved 
operations in all four of the countries of Indochina. US policymakers 
preferred not to dwell on the strategic unity of the theater, and sustained 
an intellectual fiction  the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos20. 
 
As should be clear from the above quotation, the operations that the US did 
mount against Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos were not 
sufficient. First, because the operation in Laos was only mounted with South 
                                                            
20 C. Dale Walton. The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam (Frank Cass: London, 2002). 
Pp.78-79. 
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Vietnamese troops, and second because in neither instance did the US or allied 
forces remain in Cambodia or Laos.  
 
The Nixon Administration was certainly tempted to take a more aggressive role 
in hopes of ending the war quickly. One of the initial negotiating scenarios 
drawn up by Kissinger envisaged a situation where the US would make the 
most generous offer it could, consistent with not overthrowing the government 
of South Vietnam. If the North Vietnamese refused to negotiate on this basis, 
the Americans would take a number of steps to dramatically extend the scope 
and intensity of the war. As Jeffrey Kimball describes it, the plan was:  
 
To make the most sweeping and generous proposal of which we were 
capable, short of overthrowing an allied government but enduring a free 
political contest. If it were refused, we would halt troop withdrawals and 
quarantine North Vietnam by mining its ports and perhaps bombing its 
rail links to China. The goal would be a rapid negotiated compromise21. 
 
Although Laos and Cambodia are not explicitly mentioned  in this scenario, if 
the overall aim of the plan was to cut off the Communists ability to supply 
themselves, then an offensive against the sanctuaries would certainly have 
made a great deal of strategic sense.  
 
Perhaps if this course of action had been taken from the outset of the war, it 
may have stood a chance of success. However, for the Nixon Administration to 
                                                            
21 Jeffrey Kimball, Nixons Vietnam War (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 1998). p.159. 
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have undertaken it in 1969 would have been folly. First, because as we have 
already seen in this thesis22, by the time the Nixon Administration entered 
office, the domestic political atmosphere in the US had already become 
poisonous. Such an expansion of the war would only have led to even greater 
protest and division. This was a point that Nixon himself recognised. I 
doubted whether I could have held the country together for the period of time 
needed to win in view of the number of casualties we would be sustaining23. 
The second point that Walton fails to address is that had the US invaded 
Cambodia and Laos24, it is perfectly possible that the Communists would have 
simply been able to move their sanctuaries and supply lines further to the west. 
Any limited invasion would effectively be an invitation to the enemy to simply 
shift their supply system out of the area that was being invaded. This course of 
action would have had the additional problem that it pushed Communist forces 
that much closer to Thailand, the USs main ally in south-east Asia, and would 
have offered the North Vietnamese greater incentive to have offered more 
support to what was then small scale Communist insurgency in north-western 
Thailand. Had the US decided to completely occupy Cambodia and Laos, this 
obviously would have required a major increase in US troop levels and would 
have further complicated the pacification of South Vietnam as now it would 
have to compete for resources for the pacification of Laos and Cambodia.  
 
The argument that Vietnamization had effectively worked, and that an 
isolationist Congress undercut a successful policy by refusing to properly fund 
                                                            
22 See Chapter 4. 
23 No More Vietnams. p.102. 
24 For a detailed discussion of US planning regarding policy ground action in Cambodia and 
Laos, see William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Doubleday: Garden City, 1976). 
Pgs.271-272, 314, 346 & 410. 
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it, can be considered one of the great myths of the Vietnam War and Henry 
Kissinger one of the chief mythmakers.  Kissingers argument is that South 
Vietnam would have survived had the US Congress been willing to grant 
greater amounts of ongoing aid, and that the Nixon Administrations ability to 
lobby successfully to get this aid was critically undermined by the Watergate 
scandal and a basic collapse in confidence and trust between the executive and 
legislature:   
 
Support for military or economic assistance to Indochina was 
disintegrating.  Appropriations for Vietnam had been reduced by 50 
percent each year since the signing of the Paris Agreement, from $2.1 
billion in 1973, to $1.4 billion in 1974, and to $700 million for fiscal year 
1975.25 
 
Kissinger is in no doubt as to what caused the steady decline in US funding: 
 
Only two years earlier, in the Presidential election of 1972, George 
McGovern had been defeated in the second largest landslide in American 
history importantly over the issue of Vietnam.  In the Congressional 
elections of 1974, in the aftermath of Nixons forced resignation, his 
erstwhile supporters prevailed on the issue of Watergate and emerged in 
a position to reverse the voters earlier verdict on Vietnam.26 
 
                                                            
25 Ending the Vietnam War. p.493. 
26 Ibid., p.500. 
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In this view, the steadily declining aid to Vietnam had a crippling effect on 
South Vietnams military capability, fatally undermining its ability to replace 
destroyed or damaged equipment, or to replace stocks of ammunition.  
According to South Vietnamese general Cao Van Vien, ARVN required US 
support in three crucial areas: tactical and strategic air, to include troop 
transport; sea transport; and the replacement of weapons, materials, and 
supplies27.  The provision of air and naval support was already ruled out by the 
terms of the Paris Peace Agreement and now, according to this argument, the 
steady reduction of funds was making the third condition more and more 
difficult. 
 
This argument that South Vietnam was strangled by American tight-fistedness 
is fundamentally unconvincing for two reasons: first, for reasons outlined 
above, it is unlikely that larger amounts of US aid would have been used 
efficiently, and in fact, during the last days of South Vietnams existence, a 
team of experts was dispatched from the Pentagon to recover sensitive US 
military technology from South Vietnamese stocks28.  This team found that, in 
terms of equipment, the South Vietnamese army was still well supplied.  The 
problem was that, due to the corruption outlined earlier in this chapter, the 
supplies never actually reached the front line.  The second reason why this 
argument is unconvincing is simply that during the final North Vietnamese 
offensive most South Vietnamese units did not actually engage the enemy.  In 
order for Kissingers argument to hold any water, it would require that South 
Vietnamese units had attempted to fight but had been overwhelmed due to lack 
                                                            
27 Cao Van Vien, op-cit., A Better War. p.373. 
28 For a detailed account of this mission and its findings, see Alan Dawson, 55 days: The Fall 
of South Vietnam (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1977). 
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of supplies when the truth is, in the majority of cases, the South Vietnamese 
army simply disintegrated.  In these circumstances, the amount of US aid 
would have made very little difference.  If the South Vietnamese army refused 
to fight, then any additional US aid would simply have been wasted. 
 
So what does the above discussion tell us about the need for an exit strategy?  
First, that Vietnamization, that is to say, the idea that the US could hand off 
responsibility for the war to the South Vietnamese, was not in the long run a 
viable exit strategy because it depended ultimately on the will of the South 
Vietnamese to actually shoulder a greater burden.  As we have seen from the 
above discussion, the basic social, political and economic weakness of the 
South Vietnamese state meant that, in the first place, it was unlikely to be able 
to shoulder a greater burden, and second, that, no matter how much time, 
money and effort the US was prepared to throw at the problem of creating a 
viable South Vietnamese state, they were ultimately dependent upon the ability 
and will of the South Vietnamese to put in at least as great an amount of effort 
as the US in creating a viable state, and the South Vietnamese political elite 
simply was not prepared to do this.  So Vietnamization could not work as an 
exit strategy because it was ultimately dependent upon factors outside of 
direct American control.  Henry Kissinger, one of the principal architects of the 
US withdrawal from Vietnam, recognised the idea that the US could or should 
exert decisive influence over the internal affairs of its allies was dangerous 
hubris: America cannot  and will not  conceive all the plans, design all the 
programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free 
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nations of the world.29  More to the point, in the developing intellectual 
climate that led to the Powell Doctrine, Caspar Weinberger, at a conference in 
1986 to address the issue of counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict, had 
this to say on how the US ought to go about conducting counterinsurgency and 
the limits of American power: 
 
if our interests justify intervention . . . if the leadership of the country 
threatened is capable of using our assistance to proper effect, which is to 
say for the security and wellbeing of the nation, rather than merely to 
sustain itself in power and to reinforce those abuses which may have 
contributed to the nation's difficulties from the beginning. We must 
decide whether an existing leadership is better or worse for its people and 
our interests than possible alternatives . . . . We must decide what form 
intervention should take, if we are to intervene, and by what means, and 
through which agencies.30   
 
It should not be forgotten that, whilst Caspar Weinberger was making his 
remarks, Colin Powell was Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and, 
as such, had a hand in writing the vast majority of the Secretarys public 
remarks. 
 
As Powell himself put it, the prospect of getting involved in somebody elses 
civil war was not one that should be taken lightly and that the ability of the 
                                                            
29 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 298. 
30 D. Michael Shafer, The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency, Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), p.76. Full text available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151141 
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United States to shape the political systems or sensibilities of other cultures 
deeply entrenched conflicts: 
 
The crisis in Bosnia is especially complex. Our policy and the policy of 
the international community have been to assist in providing 
humanitarian relief to the victims of that terrible conflict, one with deep 
ethnic and religious roots that go back a thousand years. The solution 
must ultimately be a political one. Deeper military involvement beyond 
humanitarian purposes requires great care and a full examination of 
possible outcomes.31 
 
Second, what the above discussion demonstrates is that victory as an exit 
strategy was, by 1968, extremely unlikely and that, although the process of 
US withdrawal from Vietnam was halting and erratic, it nevertheless gained 
irreversible momentum, which meant that, whether or not the US had a 
strategy, it was certainly exiting Vietnam: 
 
The new concept of Vietnamization was essentially a cut and run 
strategy, designed by and for the United States.  Vietnamization was 
dictated not so much by the increased potential of the South Vietnamese 
as shown at Tet  but by the collapse of the will to support the war 
among the decision-making elite in the United States.  American 
policymakers approved and supported the policy of Vietnamization 
without any assurance that it would leave South Vietnam capable of 
                                                            
31 Colin Powell, Why Generals get Nervous, New York Times, Thursday October 8th 1992. 
Full text available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/08/opinion/why-generals-get-
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defending itself.  To the American leadership this was not its primary 
purpose.32 
 
The final point to be taken with this discussion was that it was not completely 
the fault of the Nixon Administration that, whilst the US left Vietnam, it did 
not pursue a viable exit strategy.  The lack of an exit strategy was woven 
into the very fabric of the initial decision to commit US forces to Vietnam.  US 
policymakers in the Johnson Administration were aware of the endemic 
weakness of the South Vietnamese state, yet chose to commit US forces in 
spite of this weakness.  From the very first, then, US policymakers made any 
viable exit strategy other than victory extremely unlikely: 
 
South Vietnam, comprising Cochin China, centered about Saigon, and 
Annam, centered about Hue, lacked political and social cohesion, having 
no history or tradition as a unified nation or as a united people.  Leaders 
were scarce and generally came from the privileged class.33 
 
So what was the kind of intellectual climate that arose from Vietnamization 
and what were its implications?  First, that US policymakers in future needed 
to have a clear understanding of the local political situation and the history of 
any particular region before they undertook any intervention.  Such an 
understanding would allow foreign policymakers to frame US objectives in 
such a way that they were actually achievable and not to be overconfident in 
                                                            
32 Vietnam at War, p.477. 
33
 Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1984), p.174. 
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the ability of the US, despite its enormous power and wealth, to stamp its 
authority on a foreign culture.  Looking back on Vietnam after retiring as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Powell made the following observation: 
 
I recently reread Bernard Falls book on Vietnam, Street Without Joy.  
Fall makes it painfully clear that we had almost no understanding of what 
we had gotten ourselves into.  I cannot help thinking that if President 
Kennedy or President Johnson had spent a quiet weekend at Camp David 
reading that perceptive book, they would have returned to the White 
House Monday morning and immediately started to figure out a way to 
extricate us from the quicksand of Vietnam.34 
 
Second, the US policymakers should not find themselves committing to a 
military intervention that they could not get out of.  This requires that 
policymakers think about how they could extricate themselves from a 
particular theatre of operations before they enter it.  As we have already seen in 
Chapter 3, the US Military after Vietnam was profoundly sceptical of an idea 
of an incremental use of force.  Another reason for this scepticism is that 
policymakers may be tempted to use incremental force without thinking 
through all of the possible ramifications of their actions because a gradual 
incremental use of force does not seem like an irrevocable commitment of US 
resources or prestige.  David Halberstam reports the following exchange 
between Powell and Clintons first Defense Secretary, Les Aspin: 
 
                                                            
34 Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (Ballantine Books: New York, 
1995). p.143. 
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On one occasion when they had been talking about Bosnia, Aspin said 
something rather casually to the effect that the United States ought to hit 
the Serbs hard and see if it worked. And if it doesnt work? Powell 
asked him.  Then well try something else, Aspin said.  So Powell 
quoted to Aspin what he believed was a paraphrase of a remark made by 
General George Patton Jr.: When you put your hand to the thing, make 
sure that the thing works.35 
 
The major problem with this line of thinking is that the difficult questions 
always have to be answered by those that advocate intervention, whilst those 
that advocate non-intervention are always asking the questions.  Those 
advocating non-intervention can always point to the otherness of any other 
country the US might intervene in, and also those advocating non-intervention 
can always point to the intractability of any problem and the limits of the 
United Statess ability to change the situation in another country, whereas those 
advocating intervention have to try and demonstrate the counter-factual is that 
US intervention can work before it has taken place.  In short, those advocating 
intervention will always be treated sceptically; those opposing intervention will 
always have the advantage of being able to ask question rather than having to 
answer them. 
 
We will now move on to look at how US policy towards Bosnia and the 
Clinton Administration was shaped, and what role these lessons from Vietnam 
played in shaping it.  It will be necessary for us to look at US policy towards 
                                                            
35 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (Bloomsbury: 
London, 2001). p.247. 
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Bosnia in detail because the argument that will be made here is that the Clinton 
Administration was never able to fashion a policy towards Bosnia that had at 
its core a viable exit strategy.  It is necessary to look at policy towards 
Bosnia in some detail to examine why this was so.  It is also necessary to look 
at US policy towards Bosnia in some detail because the second argument I will 
make is that, eventually, the perceived need for an exit strategy was rendered 
less important by the perceived need to maintain the credibility of NATO, the 
United States, and Bill Clinton as Commander in Chief.  In order to understand 
how these different pressures accumulated over time to eventually come to be 
seen as more important than the need for an exit strategy, it is necessary both 
to see how US policy towards Bosnia developed and the context within which 
it developed. 
 
There are two further reasons for the profound reluctance on the part of the US 
Military to get drawn into the conflict in Bosnia in the mid-1990s.  The first 
answer to this question is simply a matter of time.  Those junior officers who 
had served in Vietnam and had witnessed the catastrophic effect on morale and 
combat effectiveness that the prolonged withdrawal from Vietnam had created 
were determined that, when it was their turn to move into senior positions of 
command, they would do it better.  In the words of Powell himself, I had gone 
off to Vietnam in 1962 standing on a bedrock of principle and conviction.  And 
I had watched the foundation eroded by euphemisms, lies, and self-
deception.36  Powell certainly saw a connection between Bosnia and Vietnam: 
When the nations policy was murky or nonexistent  the Bay of Pigs, 
                                                            
36 My American Journey. p.140. 
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Vietnam, creating a Marine presence in Lebanon  the result had been 
disaster.  In Bosnia, we were dealing with an ethnic tangle with roots reaching 
back a thousand years.37 
 
The second major cause of concern for a generation of officers who had served 
in Vietnam was the potential for guerrilla warfare. Bosnia is extremely 
mountainous, with few large cities; in other words, the ideal terrain to mount 
guerrilla warfare. In fact, so well suited to the task was Bosnia, that before the 
break up of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Armys plan to defeat an invasion from 
either east or west was to fight a delaying action in the rest of the country and 
withdraw to the Bosnian mountains. Also, Yugoslavia had a proud and famous 
history of guerrilla fighters. In World War II, Titos partisans managed to tie 
down six German divisions in anti-guerrilla operations. And lastly, there 
seemed to be little idea of what US objectives would be in Bosnia. In her 
biography of Colin Powell, Karen DeYoung sums up his view of what doing 
something might actually mean:  
 
His view that limited air strikes would accomplish little in getting the 
Serbs to behave had not changed As soon as they tell me it is 
limited it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. 
As soon as they tell me surgical, I head for the bunker38. 
 
Added to these concerns was the fact that the Clinton Administration did not 
seem to place a high priority on matters of foreign policy. Certainly Bosnia had 
                                                            
37 My American Journey. p.544. 
38 Karen DeYoung, Soldier. The Life of Colin Powell (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 2006). 
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proved a useful stick to beat Bush with39, but that did not necessarily mean that 
Clinton was going to actually do anything about the situation. Emblematic of 
the new Presidents lack of interest was the last minute way in which the 
Administrations foreign policy team was thrown together. Warren 
Christopher, the Secretary of State, who had denied wanting any job in the 
Administration all the way through the transition period, was then offered the 
job which he accepted at the last minute. David Halberstam sums up how 
difficult it was for the incoming President to find a Secretary of State and the 
rather haphazard way Warren Christopher eventually got the job: 
 
The damage done by Vietnam had effectively wounded some in the 
ascending generation. Some of the men coming of age, in their late fifties 
to early sixties, were in general too close to the now contaminated policy 
makers of that era, and the next generation was, as Jordan [Vernon 
Jordan, co-director of Clintons presidential transition] suggested, still 
too young.40 
 
Jordan raised the subject of becoming Secretary of State with Christopher in 
blunt terms: he wanted to raise Christophers name for Secretary of State. It 
was speak now or forever hold your ambition. Do you want the fucking job? 
Jordan asked. Yes Christopher answered41. 
 
                                                            
39 All references to Bush in this chapter refer to George H. W. Bush. 
40 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace. Bush, Clinton and the Generals (Bloomsbury: 
London, 2002). p.172. 
41 Ibid., p.173. 
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 The job of National Security Advisor went to Anthony Lake, who had been 
Clintons principal foreign policy advisor during the campaign: 
 
He had passed a crucial test during the campaign as an architect of the 
policy that helped neutralize Bushs greater national security experience. 
Lakes interest in foreign policy also paralleled that of the new president 
and his quite influential wife, who thought of it in humanitarian and 
moral terms rather than in old-fashioned strategic geopolitical ones42. 
 
 Lake had been one of the Kissinger aides who resigned in protest over the 
decision to invade Cambodia, and was well aware of the dangers of the US 
getting sucked into foreign conflicts it did not understand, and that were not 
vital to its interests. On the other hand, Lake personally had a strong Wilsonian 
streak: He was ambivalent about the use of power; he both liked it and was 
apprehensive about using it. His view of foreign policy had always had a 
certain moral rectitude43.  
 
Lake had also long believed that how the US dealt with conflict in the Third 
World and the newly emerging Europe would define American foreign policy 
well into the twenty-first century. Lake had also held a ringside view of the 
bitter dispute between the State Department and the National Security Advisor 
during the Carter Administration. He was determined that on his watch there 
would be a smooth relationship between Clintons foreign policy team. Writing 
in the mid-1980s about how to improve the quality of national security decision 
                                                            
42 Ibid., p.190. 
43 Ibid., p.287. 
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making, Lake had this to say about the ideal relationship between Presidential 
advisors: The President should therefore choose his lieutenants not only for 
their separate talents, but with an eye to how they will work together44. 
Overall, Lakes position on Bosnia was a deeply ambivalent one. On the one 
hand he felt the US ought to do something, both for humanitarian reasons, and 
for what he perceived as reasons of national interest. On the other hand Lake 
was not going to get too far ahead of the Presidents willingness to act, nor was 
he going to propose a course of action that would upset a harmonious 
relationship with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense.  
 
Clintons first Secretary of Defense would be Wisconsin Congressman Les 
Aspin. Aspin had been the long-time Chair of the House Armed Services 
Committee, and as such had a deep well of knowledge about issues of strategy 
and national defence. Before entering Congress, Aspin had served in the 
Pentagon as one of McNamaras whiz kids. Although Aspin had served in a 
very junior post in the Office of Systems Analysis, nevertheless he too was 
aware of the danger of the US making small commitments which gradually 
snowballed into large ones.  
 
Also, Aspin had ambitions to seriously reduce the Military budget. Although 
with the end of the Cold War, the Bush Administration had cut the defence 
budget by $300 billion over ten years, Aspin believed that there were further 
cuts that could be found. To say the least, this was not an attitude which was 
likely to endear him to the Joint Chiefs; however, it did mean that they had a 
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readily formed argument against any intervention in Bosnia. They could, and 
did, say to Aspin, you can cut the budget, or you can intervene in Bosnia, but 
you cannot do both: Putting a division into Bosnia would require a so-called 
rotational base of three divisions; that, in turn, would prevent Clinton from 
[reducing] the Army as much as he aims to45. Aspin was not fated to have a 
very easy relationship with the uniformed Military in general; for years, Aspin 
had been the Congressman who had demanded answers from the Military and 
on more than one occasion had embarrassed the Military through his dogged 
questioning of witnesses. It was perhaps too much to ask that they now 
embrace him as Secretary of Defense: Powell and Aspin had fought 
constantly about a number of issues, and Aspin had often seemed in the past 
like a man going round with a butcher knife to cut force levels46. Added to 
this was the fact that Aspin had a rather relaxed style that tended to irritate the 
Military. The Secretary frequently showed up late to meetings, and was not a 
man who seemed to take a great deal of pride in his appearance. This ran 
counter to the Militarys ethic of efficiency and immaculate uniform: He 
could not run the Pentagon because he could not run himself. Stories of 
Aspins lack of discipline flooded the building from the first day  of his 
exploding in a rage at a subordinate over some minor infraction47. 
 
To sum up, the key players of the Clinton Foreign Policy team were a 
Secretary of State who had taken the job at the last possible second, a Secretary 
of Defense who had a difficult relationship with the Military, and a National 
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Security Advisor, who at least to begin with would not force the issue of 
Bosnia onto the agenda. 
 
On top of these personal and bureaucratic issues, the Clinton Administration 
was not free to make policy towards Bosnia in a vacuum.  The 
Administrations views on foreign intervention, particularly in the area of 
multilateral peacekeeping operations, were heavily influenced by the events of 
October 1993 in Somalia.48  Here, the US had sent a limited peacekeeping 
force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the US had found itself 
over a period of time drawn into the Somali civil war.  This involvement 
eventually led to the deaths of eighteen American troops and the wounding of 
seventy-five.  This led to the US mission to Somalia folding shortly afterwards.  
In the aftermath of the Somalia fiasco, President Clinton ordered a review of 
US participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations of the kind that 
would, in all likelihood, need to be undertaken in the event of a ceasefire being 
agreed in Bosnia.  This led to what became known as Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 25.49 
 
PDD 25 expressly limited the role and timescale US forces would be deployed 
on in US peacekeeping operations and was crystal clear in stating that, before 
the US would even consider committing troops as part of a multilateral 
                                                            
48 For an account of the entire Somalian intervention, see John L. Hirsch, and Robert B. 
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peacekeeping force, there would need to be an exit strategy in place.  The 
exact language the Directive used is as follows: The operation's anticipated 
duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the 
operation.50  From this quotation, we can clearly see that PDD 25 as 
established US policy was clearly intended as a break on open-ended US 
operations by ensuring at the outset that there existed realistic conditions for 
bringing the operation to a close.  PDD 25 also put other roadblocks in the way 
of US participation or, indeed, the employment of any effective peacekeeping 
force to Bosnia, by the US pledging to use its veto to prevent the UN from 
taking money from other areas and loaning it to peacekeeping missions and 
also by insisting that Congress would have to approve of any peacekeeping 
deployments.  What we can see clearly from PDD 25 is that the need for clear 
objectives and a definable exit strategy were established as clear criteria 
which needed to be fulfilled before the US would make a commitment to any 
peacekeeping force anywhere in the world, and, as we shall see from our 
discussions below, none of the peace plans or military operations considered by 
the US in Bosnia had such clearly definable end-states. 
 
Added to all this was the fact that the Clinton Administration faced a far more 
complex situation on the ground than the situation which had confronted Bush. 
Desperate to show that they were not impotent in the face of a crisis, the 
Europeans, in particular the British and the French, had deployed troops to 
Bosnia as part of a UN peace keeping force. This force was wholly 
                                                            
50 Presidential Decision Directive 25, "U.S.Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations," The White House, Washington, May 6, 1994.  Full text available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm 
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inadequate either to end the fighting or to provide protection to the civilian 
population. The best that this force could do was to provide an armed escort for 
humanitarian supplies:  
 
Mr Major [British Prime Minister, John Major 1990-1997] pledged 1,800 
British troops for Bosnia, under the UN flag and ready to provide 
protection to UN relief convoys. Under the rules of engagement, the 
soldiers would be able to return fire in self-defence if a convoy was 
attacked, but could not fight their way throughThe UN had scrapped 
ambitious plans for a peacekeeping force of 100,000, in favour of a 
6,000-strong force compatible with Britains offer51.  
 
This force, known ironically as the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR), massively complicated the task of anybody advocating 
stronger military intervention to end the fighting. The peacekeepers were 
spread out all over the country in small units, and in line with their mandate 
they were not heavily armed. This made them extremely vulnerable to hostage 
taking. The Commander of the UN force in Bosnia between the end of 1993 
and 1995, Sir Michael Rose, commented on the difficulty of the US using air 
power while the UN force was still on the ground: The peacekeepers referred 
to this new policy as stay and pray, observing that it was, after all, their lives, 
not American lives, that were put at risk by this policy 52.  
 
                                                            
51 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell. Understanding Bosnias War (Simon and Schuster: London, 
1994). p.159. 
52 General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace. Lessons from Bosnia (Warner Books: 
London, 1999). p.13. Italics in the original. 
317 
  
The nightmare scenario for London, Paris, and a host of European capitals, was 
that the US would bomb the Serbs in a hope of either altering their behaviour 
or forcing them to the peace table, and the Serbs would react by killing or 
kidnapping peacekeepers. This in turn posed a problem for the US: supposing 
that the situation actually came to pass, what would the US response be? If the 
bombing was stepped up, that would only increase the risk to any hostages. If 
the bombing was stopped, then the point would have been made loud and clear 
that all you had to do was kidnap some blue helmets to get your way. Any 
rescue attempt would be risky to execute, and even if successful, would 
escalate the level of US involvement in the conflict. On the other hand the US 
would be morally obligated to do something. After all it would be US actions, 
either unilaterally, or through NATO, that would bring this situation to pass:  
 
In Christophers view [Secretary of State Warren Christopher], a pullout 
or collapse of the UN protection force would be a disaster and had to be 
avoided at all costs because it would obligate the United States to live up 
to its commitment to supply the 20,000 troops to cover a retreat. Clinton 
could renege, but at the risk of destroying NATO. It would be 
unthinkable to abandon NATO, the most important alliance in the post-
World War II period53. 
 
The deployment of European peacekeepers to Bosnia meant that any 
conceivable US action in Bosnia had to consider more than just an air 
campaign. If the European allies were ever to be sold on the concept of military 
                                                            
53 Bob Woodward, The Choice (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1996). p.257. 
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intervention, there would need to be some guarantee that the peacekeeping 
troops would either be able to defend themselves, or could be safely 
withdrawn. In either event, this seemed to imply a massive show of force on 
the ground by NATO, inevitably with US involvement.   
 
The new Administration also found itself in the awkward position of having to 
either endorse or reject the latest peace plan for Bosnia within a few weeks of 
taking office.  Since the previous spring, former British Foreign Secretary 
David Owen and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had been trying 
to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the European Union and the UN 
respectively.  The plan they came up with would retain Bosnia as a sovereign 
entity but would divide the country internally into a series of cantons.  Each 
of these areas would have broad authority over domestic and policing affairs, 
whilst leaving the federal government in Sarajevo to deal essentially in foreign 
affairs and monetary matters.  Each of the cantons was divided along ethnic 
lines so there would be majority Serb, majority Muslim, and majority Croat 
cantons.  On the one hand, the plan had the advantage of being the first 
comprehensive plan to end the fighting in Bosnia and reach some kind of a 
political settlement, and it seemed to meet the basic demands of all sides.  
From a Muslim point of view, it guaranteed Bosnias continued existence.  
From a Serb and Croat point of view, it promised autonomy bordering on 
independence. David Owen described the principles of his plan in the 
following way: 
 
319 
  
[The plan] defines Bosnia and Herzegovina as a decentralized state, with 
guaranteed freedom of movement throughout. [The plan] gives 
substantial autonomy to the provinces while denying them any 
international legal character. [The plan] provides for democratically 
elected national and local government and a mechanism for resolving 
disputes between them. [The plan] stresses strong, internationally 
monitored human rights provisions54. 
 
However, from Washingtons point of view, the plan had a number of serious 
defects.  First, the cantonal borders reflected gains on the grounds that the 
Serbs had made rather than the pre-war division of population.  So the plan 
seemed, at least implicitly, to reward the Serb aggression that candidate 
Clinton had spoken so strongly against: They were uncomfortable with a 
settlement that seemed to legitimize Serbian gains made at gunpoint. To do so 
would not jibe with their campaign rhetoric55. Second, the plan had no 
mechanism for its policing and implementation.   How exactly were the 
boundaries between the cantons to be enforced, and what would be the future 
of the armed forces of each faction?  The only logical answer to this question 
was that some kind of military intervention would be necessary in order to 
separate the warring parties and keep the borders intact.  This task would in all 
likelihood fall to NATO, so this would require some kind of U.S. participation. 
David Owen acknowledges that a substantial military force would have been 
required to enforce his plan: It is often forgotten that implementation of the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan in January 1993 did not involve NATO troops, but 
                                                            
54 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (Indigo: London, 1996). p.94. 
55 War in a Time of Peace. p.198. 
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envisaged a deployment of 15,000 UN troops, later revised upwards to 
25,00056.  What Owen neglects to mention in his outline of the plan is that it 
lacked any exit strategy.  The plan essentially would have resulted in the ethnic 
hostilities that had started the war being frozen in place by the new Cantonal 
boundaries he was proposing.  What the plan lacked was any means by which 
Bosnias different ethnic communities could live together in peace without 
outside military forces separating them.  Owens plan was seemingly 
predicated on the idea that the UN would remain in force in Bosnia for an 
indefinite period of time.  The Vance-Owen Plan contained the same fatal 
drawback that Vietnamization had had as an exit strategy in that the date at 
which foreign forces could leave Bosnia would be decided by factors beyond 
the control of the US.  Under the Vance-Owen Plan, foreign forces could only 
leave when Bosnias various communities were prepared to leave in peace with 
each other without an international military presence.  Given the centuries of 
enmity between these different groups, nobody could say when that would be 
or how long foreign forces might have to be committed to Bosnia.  In other 
words, it could be said that Vance and Owen were making the same mistake 
that the Johnson Administration made, that is to say, committing troops in 
order mask fundamental underlying weaknesses that a commitment of military 
force might temporarily alleviate but could not solve. 
 
Added to this was the fact that there did not seem to be a readily available 
alternative.  The same objections to military intervention that had confronted 
Bush confronted Clinton.  Every time the option of airstrikes was considered, 
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the question the military always posed in response was what if airstrikes dont 
work? Was the Clinton Administration prepared to commit overwhelming 
force?57 And was the Administration prepared for the potential long-drawn out 
commitment to Bosnia? UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright sums up 
Powells attitude with the following observation: 
 
He replied consistent with his commitment to the doctrine of 
overwhelming forcesaying it would take tens of thousands of troops, 
cost billions of dollars, probably result in numerous casualties, and 
require a long and open-ended commitment of US forces. Time and again 
he led us up the hill of possibilities and dropped us off on the other side 
with the practical equivalent of No can do58. 
 
What we can see from Albrights quotation is that Powell considered any 
strategy based purely on American airstrikes, whether intended to alter the 
behaviour of Bosnian-Serbs, or to equalise the battlefield between Bosnias 
Serbs, Muslims and Croats, was that, by the act of airstrikes, the United States 
was committing itself to a role in the conflict without committing enough to 
ensure that its objectives were met.  If airstrikes did not achieve their objective, 
the US would be left in the position of having to continue to engage in military 
action on an open-ended basis.  In terms of an exit strategy, airstrikes alone 
had the same fundamental problem that the Vance-Owen Plan suffered from, in 
that the exit from such a commitment relied on factors beyond US control.  It 
would depend on how much punishment the Serbs were willing to take before 
                                                            
57 See Chapter 3. 
58 Soldier. Pp.235-6. 
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they changed their behaviour, a threshold the United States could not know 
beforehand.  It also relied on the Muslims and Croats being able to take 
advantage of the cover US airstrikes provided.  Again, the US could not 
guarantee that that would necessarily materialise before undertaking airstrikes.  
Airstrikes alone offered the possibility that the US would find itself committed 
to a course of action the ultimate outcome of which it was beyond its power to 
determine. 
 
This reluctance should not be taken for insubordination.  If Clinton had ordered 
airstrikes early in his Administration they would have been carried out 
aggressively and the Navy and Air Force would have done everything in their 
power to make sure that they were successful.  The question the Military was 
really asking of its civilian masters was, how committed are you to military 
action?  What price are you prepared to pay?  And if we get into Bosnia, how 
do we get out again?  
 
So the Clinton Administration was prevented from taking part in a 
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia by the lack of an exit strategy.  It was also 
prevented from the selective use of air power to try and balance the military 
capabilities of the warring factions again by the lack of an exit strategy.  The 
lack of a readily defined exit strategy made the Vance-Owen Plan unattractive, 
and the lack of control over the response of the combatants to a strategy based 
on airstrikes alone meant that this policy option also lacked an exit strategy 
that the United States could be certain of:  
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He [Powell] thought that no one in Washington was willing to pay the 
price that a commitment like this [military intervention in Bosnia] might 
demand. To him the interventionists were talking a policy based on hope 
rather than reality, a hope that things could be affected with a minimum, 
casualty-free application of airpower59. 
 
Powells objective in raising these issues is perhaps best summed up by an 
observation Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander of NATO forces in the 
Mediterranean, made:  
 
If you are in a position to talk to the political bodies that guide you, and 
give you your missions; if you are not honest with them, and tell them 
precisely what you think, no matter what the personal consequences, you 
deserve whatever the hell you get. And you ought not be in command.60 
 
The fact of the matter was that nobody really had any answers to these 
questions.  In the absence of a plan to end the fighting, smaller scale military 
options were also considered, such as the use of U.S. forces that would open a 
permanent land corridor between Sarajevo and the outside world.  However, 
these schemes too ran into a problem.  When asked how many troops it would 
take to accomplish this, the Military, in line with the Powell Doctrine, erred on 
the side of overwhelming force and produced an estimate of up to 50,000 
troops.  If the Administration was prepared to make that large a commitment of 
troops for a very limited objective, why not commit more troops and try to find 
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a solution to the underlying problem of the war?61  And, crucially in the 
context of this chapter, what was the exit strategy?  Again, we can see here a 
clear echo of the failures of Vietnamization as a credible exit strategy.  The 
end of any military action, the objective of which was the safe delivery of 
humanitarian aid, would, by definition, lack an exit strategy, as the end of 
this mission would be dependent upon factors that the United States had no 
means of exerting decisive influence over.  The United States could offer to 
mediate the conflict, it could put forward its own plan to end the conflict, or it 
could try and hand off the protection of aid to the international community.  
It could do all of these things, but none of them could guarantee a willingness 
on behalf of the combatants to end the war or guarantee an international 
willingness to take over any mission from the United States.  The US could 
then simply stop protecting the delivery of aid, but that would be an exit 
rather than an exit strategy because, presumably, if the United States simply 
stopped offering protection, that would not obviate the need for that protection. 
 
In the end, the US position on Vance-Owen was neither to support nor reject 
the plan.  If all sides agreed to it and a cease-fire was put in place, the US 
would send a limited number of troops to act as peacekeepers  25,000 was the 
number usually mentioned.  However, the US would exert no pressure to sign 
the agreement on any of the parties.  Just how reluctant the US was to support 
the Vance-Owen plan can be seen from comments made by a State Department 
spokesman: the State Department spokesman remarked that the incoming 
secretary of state had expressed doubts about whether it can realistically be 
                                                            
61 For a discussion of plans to end the siege of Sarajevo, see, Elizabeth Drew, On the 
Edge: The Clinton Presidency (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1994). Chapter 14.  
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achieved, whether they can, in fact, find an agreement.62 President Clinton 
was even more emphatic in his non-endorsement of the plan: Even President 
Clinton weighed in, describing the plan as flawed and making clear that the 
United States would not pressure the Muslims into accepting an agreement 
they would be unwilling to live by on their own.63  The Clinton 
Administration also, in the end, rejected any limited military action to 
guarantee the supply of humanitarian aid. 
 
With Vance-Owen safely disposed of, Clintons national security team was 
free to fashion its own policy.  However, this was done with remarkably little 
input from the President himself.  For reasons laid out above, foreign policy 
did not command the same level of priority in the Clinton White House that it 
had in previous Administrations, and Bosnia had to compete for the Presidents 
time with Clintons efforts to massively reduce the federal deficit64 and launch 
an ambitious healthcare plan that was deeply controversial65.   
 
The Bosnia strategy that was finally agreed came to be known as Lift and 
Strike.  This policy called for the lifting of an arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims.  However, the problem with simply lifting the arms embargo was that 
the Serbs massive inbuilt advantage in fire power was not likely to be offset 
for some time, even with an influx of arms to the Muslims, and it would be 
necessary to mount airstrikes against the Serbs in the interregnum to prevent 
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them from ending the war on their own terms before the Muslims could benefit 
from new weaponry.  The basic premise behind the strategy was that by arming 
the Muslims the US could create a level playing field between the various 
armies, thus leading to a stalemate and renewed interest in negotiation.  This 
strategy had three principal advantages: first, it would require no US ground 
presence as the peace could be maintained by a balance of power between the 
factions themselves; second, it promised to end the war on negotiated terms, 
which the parties themselves could agree to; and third, by linking the airstrikes 
to the embargo, it promised to reduce the level at which and the period of time 
that the US was committed to airstrikes.  In terms of an exit strategy, Lift and 
Strike had the advantage that it did not require an exit strategy because it did 
not envisage the US having to directly enter the conflict.  However, for 
advocates of the Powell Doctrine it did have crippling disadvantages.  Because 
of the limited nature of the proposed US intervention, there was no way that 
Lift and Strike could guarantee the outcome that its supporters promised.  
Second, returning to the theme of exit strategy, opponents of Lift and Strike 
wondered what would happen if US aircraft were shot down and their crews 
needed to be rescued.  The US would then have to send in troops to rescue the 
pilots, who in turn could be engaged by the Serbs.  In other words, Lift and 
Strike held within it the possibility of incrementally increasing the US 
commitment to the conflict with no obvious point at which the US could 
disengage itself. 
 
However, the President approved the plan on the condition that it was agreed to 
by the Europeans.  This condition can be seen in one of two ways: either that 
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Clinton was not completely convinced by the policy and hoped that the 
Europeans would reject it for him, or that, with Europeans troops already 
deployed to Bosnia, Clinton did not want to strain NATO any further by taking 
unilateral action.  In any event, the European allies were not convinced that 
Lift and Strike was a viable policy, and Secretary of State Christopher was 
distinctly lukewarm in selling the plan:   
 
He [Christopher] would note that there were no good options for 
dealing with Bosnia, but that lift and strike was the least worst among 
them.  The tone of the secretary of states presentation reflected the long 
internal discussions and bore the unmistakable imprint of General 
Powell, notably in denigrating the effectiveness of air power and other 
limited forms of military force.66 
 
Lift and Strike was essentially intervention on the cheap.  Halberstam fairly 
describes Lift and Strike in the following terms: America sought to be 
internationalist on the cheap and remain partially isolationist.67  It did not 
meet at least three of the tests laid down by the Powell Doctrine.  It did not 
promise intervention with overwhelming force.  Its objective was somewhat 
fuzzy insofar as it had nothing to say about what would happen if the Sarajevo 
government could not turn its position around, even with additional weaponry.  
And finally, Lift and Strike threatened to entangle the US in a war where its 
interests were poorly defined.  In terms of an exit strategy, Lift and Strike 
was better than a policy based on airstrikes alone insofar as Lift and Strike did 
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at least offer a mechanism by which Bosnias Muslims and Croats could even 
the military balance with the Serbs for themselves.  However, it was still 
flawed insofar as exit strategy was concerned because it still relied, as 
Vietnamization had, on the ability of an indigenous force to absorb aid 
proffered by the United States.  There was also the question of what would 
happen if the scales tipped too far in the opposite direction.  Would the US be 
infinitely committed to ensuring a balance of force between the various parties 
to the Bosnian conflict?  Lift and Strike ultimately suffered from the same flaw 
as the Vance-Owen Plan and all other military options considered by the 
Clinton Administration in that, in order to get to the end-state the Clinton 
Adminstration desired, the United States was reliant on other actors behaving 
as the United States would want them to behave, whilst, at the same time, the 
US had limited leverage to make sure that other actors would act as the United 
States wanted them to. 
 
Between the springs of 1993 and 1995, US policy towards Bosnia could 
accurately be summed up as one of containment to try and limit the conflicts 
intensity and to try and alleviate human suffering by continuing the supply of 
aid and to prevent the conflict from spreading outside the borders of the former 
Yugoslavia.  During this period there was a whole plethora of peace plans and 
initiatives put forward.  As the Serb author Dusko Doder observed, 
 
The Bosnian war dragged on.  Month after month, year in year out, peace 
negotiators raised hopes that major breakthroughs had been achieved.  
But the people of Bosnia continued to die; many more were left 
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homeless.  The world had become impervious to the daily Serb shellings 
of Sarajevo; it blamed UN generals and international bureaucrats for their 
prevarications, indeed stigmatized them as men with feet of clay, hearts 
of stone, and heads of wood.  In reality this merely obscured the 
unwillingness of top Western leaders to get embroiled in the Yugoslav 
mess68. 
 
All of these well-intentioned plans came to nought because they ran up against 
two fundamental facts.  First, without outside intervention to alter the military 
balance of power there was no reason for the Serbs to negotiate.  They were in 
by far the strongest military position and could effectively take and keep what 
they wanted through force.  Second, the inverse of that was also true in that the 
Bosnian Muslims desperately wanted negotiations, but had no leverage with 
which to bargain. And finally, without some neutral but heavily armed arbiter 
to enforce the peace, no agreement was likely to stick amongst the mutual hate 
and suspicion of the warring parties. 
 
By 1995, although the situation on the ground in Bosnia remained relatively 
static, the situation in Washington was beginning to shift dramatically. The 
Presidency of Bill Clinton had been through a rocky ride. Although for the first 
two years of his Administration the Democrats had for the first time in twelve 
years controlled both the Presidency and Congress, Clinton had never been 
able to establish a very comfortable relationship with Congress and had 
struggled to pass key elements of his economic recovery plan and other 
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important pieces of legislation. On top of these domestic troubles69, Clintons 
foreign policy was scattered with crises which had either not been dealt with, 
or were seen not to have been dealt with well. The US humanitarian mission to 
Somalia had met with loss of life and embarrassing withdrawal, attempts to 
restore the democratically elected government of Haiti had been halting, if 
ultimately successful, and there was a general sense that foreign policy was not 
an area in which Clinton was particularly comfortable. Bosnia had become 
more than just a series of facts on the ground, it had become a symbol of an 
Administration that was skating from crisis to crisis, and had yet to set a firm 
direction for US foreign policy in the post Cold War world. As Clinton himself 
acknowledged,  
 
Were in the worst possible situation.  We are not in a position we can 
sustain.  The Europeans could bring forces to bear but they prefer to 
whine at us.  We have a war by CNN.  Our position is unsustainable, its 
killing the U.S. position of strength in the world.70 
 
The second major domestic factor which drove a reappraisal of US policy 
towards Bosnia was that the Republican Party gained control of Congress after 
the 1994 mid-term elections71. Just as Clinton had used Bosnia as a stick to 
beat George Bush in 1992, so the Republicans had used it against Clinton in 
1994. Shortly after Congress reconvened, a Bill was introduced that would 
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mean that the US would no longer enforce the UN mandated arms embargo on 
the former Yugoslavia, and would provide $ 200 million worth of arms to the 
Bosnian Muslim government: 
 
Among its [Congress] very first acts was the introduction on January 4, 
1995, of a bill by Senate majority leader Bob Dole [Republican, Kansas] 
to lift the arms embargo under one of two conditions: if the Bosnian 
government asked it to be lifted; or once the four-month cease-fire 
expired on April 30, 1995. In either case, the embargo would be lifted 
unilaterally72. 
 
 From Clintons point of view this Bill was damaging on three fronts; first, to 
sign such a Bill would effectively seed control over Bosnian policy to 
Congress; second, it was likely to lead to a major crisis in the relationship 
between the US and the UN, and by extension a crisis in the relationship 
between the US and a variety of western European countries, in particular 
Britain and France, whose troops on the ground would be left exposed to even 
greater risk, and third, there was the possibility that such an infusion of arms 
would not do anything to end the war but merely escalate it to new levels of 
violence, prompting even greater pressure for eventual US intervention.  And, 
to add to President Clintons worries, from late 1994 onwards public opinion 
had begun to turn against Clintons handling of Bosnia.73   
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Also, factors on the international stage were driving the US towards a more 
robust stance over Bosnia. Bosnia was becoming a road block to improving 
relations with Russia74, and also the issue had the effect of completely 
overshadowing the USs other priorities for its European policy. Second, 
attitudes in Europe were changing. Although the British remained stubbornly 
opposed to the use of force to try to bring the conflict to an end, the French, 
who were the largest contributors to UNPROFOR, had begun to shift their 
position towards being ready to consider intervention in order to bring what 
seemed like a never ending presence in the middle of a civil war to an end:  
 
Chirac was a genuine hawk who wanted to do more but was willing, if 
that was not possible, to do less. He would no longer accept the status 
quo. He talked with John Major about the creation of a Rapid Reaction 
Force, an elite French-British unit, far better armed with much heavier 
weapons, which, with American air support and helicopters, could move 
quickly and strike the Serbs with genuine force if they violated any more 
agreements75. 
 
The position of the US Military had also begun to change in subtle ways. Colin 
Powell was no longer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. His replacement was 
Lieutenant General John Shalikashvilli. Although Shalikashvilli broadly agreed 
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with the Powell Doctrine, his experience of the Military and his background 
was somewhat different from Powells. Shalikashvilli had come to America as 
a fifteen year old, his family was Georgian in origin, and he spent his formative 
years growing up in Poland. The point to be noted here is that his family had 
fled to the United States as refugees from post-war Europe. This may have 
served to give him a sense of empathy with people facing similar situations, 
and he certainly had an intimate knowledge of the history of Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans. Although like Powell, Shalikashvilli had served in Vietnam, 
his later career had taken him in a very different direction from Powell  whilst 
Powell had been serving in the military bureaucracy in Washington, 
Shalikashvilli had been serving in a variety of European commands and 
assignments. And whilst Powell was serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
Shalikashvilli had been serving as Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe). As such he had been responsible for organizing the relief 
operation for the Iraqi Kurds at the end of the first Gulf War. The lesson he 
took from this was that whilst the Powell Doctrine was certainly valid, it had to 
be applied more flexibly in the post Cold War world, where the US was likely 
to find itself faced with a variety of challenges which would involve civil wars 
and civilian displacement:  Shalikashvili would go around saying that the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs did not have the right to put a notice on his door 
saying, Im sorry  we only do the big ones, and signed John 
Shalikashvili.76  But engaging in humanitarian missions was not just a matter 
of finding a rationale for the Militarys existence.  Shalikashvili also believed 
                                                            
76 Ibid., p.391. 
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that they were intrinsically worthwhile: Shalikashvilis sensitivity to the plight 
of refugees was genuine, and it was to be a consistent part of his career77.  
 
The following quotation is taken from a report of a conversation between 
Shalikashvili and US troops in Haiti: 
 
I know youre all tough warriors, and I know that sometimes some of you 
feel that being here is something of a disappointment and that this is not 
exactly your kind of mission. But when you wake up tomorrow, I want 
you to look in the mirror and say to yourselves, I think I saved a lot of 
lives today  I think Ive done something of value. You have a right to 
feel good about yourselves and I hope you do78. 
 
Shalikashvilli was not alone in reassessing the Militarys attitude towards 
Bosnia. Because European NATO members had taken it upon themselves to 
become involved with the UNPROFOR, NATO had steadily acquired a role in 
supporting the UNs activities in Bosnia; this changed the nature of the stakes 
in Bosnia in a significant way. No longer was Bosnia somebody elses civil 
war, it had become a test of NATOs relevance in the post Cold War world. As 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke put it: 
 
We could not remain aloof from this. For larger strategic reasons, for 
historical reasons, and for humanitarian and moral reasons, American 
leadership was still needed in Europe, and that leadership was essential, 
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because, left to themselves, the European Union members could not deal 
with the problem.79 
 
This led senior US officers within NATO, in particular SACEUR George 
Joulwan, to press for a more forceful response to Serb actions against UN 
designated safe areas. This brings us on to the final catalyst for US and NATO 
intervention:  
 
As the war escalated in the autumn of 1994, senior American officers, 
such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John 
Shalikashvilli, and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander [SACEUR], 
General George Joulwan, began to see the reputation of the NATO 
alliance being undermined80.  
 
If Shalikashvilli and Joulwan were moving towards a more activist stance, then 
the immediate commander on the ground, Admiral Leighton Snuffy Smith, 
was much more reluctant. Smiths attitude and biography fitted the Powell 
Doctrine like a glove. Smith graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1962 
and went on to fly combat missions over North Vietnam, earning two 
Distinguished Service medals in the process. The two principal lessons that 
Smith seems to have taken from his experience in Vietnam are, first, a very 
strong distrust of politicians,  
 
                                                            
79 Interview with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. PBS. Frontline. Full text available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/guys/holbrooke.html. 
80 Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force. The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia 1995 
(CDISS, Lancaster, 1999). p.92. 
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If you and a politician are bantering back and forth about the use of 
military, military officers are not trained to be politicians. We don't eat 
like them, sleep like them, drink like them, talk like them, think like 
them. And that's neither good nor bad, it's just a fact of life.81 
 
While Shalikashvilli and Joulwan may have been thinking about the broader 
geopolitical implications of Bosnia, Smith was dealing with the complex and 
messy reality of day to day operations in Bosnia: now you're trying to sort 
out claims of territory, because that's where my ancestor lived seven hundred 
years ago. ... It's a terribly terrible complex issue...82 Smith was not 
necessarily completely opposed to any kind of US intervention in Bosnia, but if 
intervention was going to happen, he wanted it to be as small scale as possible, 
as short as possible, and with very limited objectives:  
 
get the military mission as clear as you can. Colin Powell and others 
before him have said, give me clear statement, give me a clear mission, 
it's got to be unambiguous. What you need to understand is, when you've 
got 54,000 soldiers from 34 to 35 different nations involved, you've got 
to make it as plain as possible...83  
 
In terms of keeping any US commitment as small scale as possible, Smith took 
the very strong view that the limit of US involvement should be the separation 
of opposing forces. Smith was very strongly against any kind of policing or 
                                                            
81 Interview with Admiral Leighton Smith. PBS. Frontline. Full text available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/guys/smith.html 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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humanitarian mission, soldiers do not make good policemen, this is not a 
good idea. Don't send these guys on police missions; they are not policemen84.  
 
So to summarise, by the spring and summer of early 1995, of the three most 
crucial uniformed military commanders dealing with Bosnia, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs, Commander Allied Forces Europe, and the Operational 
Commander of NATO Forces in the Mediterranean, two out of the three were 
moving towards a position of supporting US intervention, and the third was 
prepared to accept intervention under certain very specific conditions.  The 
point to be noted here is that, from first to last, the Clinton Administration 
never came up with a Bosnian policy that included a viable exit strategy.  
However, by the spring of 1995, this concern had been overtaken by larger 
concerns about the future credibility of NATO, the credibility of the United 
States as an actor involved in European security issues, and the credibility of 
Bill Clinton as Commander-in-Chief. 
 
It fell to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to be the man who formed 
the sense that something had to be done into a coherent plan.  As was 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Lake had always been something of an 
advocate of stronger action over Bosnia, but had not wanted to get out in front 
of the President he served.  Now it was the Presidents turn to be urging Lake 
on.  Bob Woodward describes Clintons reaction to Lakes urging that policy 
on Bosnia needed to change:  The current position was untenable.  He wanted 
rethinking.  They had to break out of the old mind-set.  He hadnt heard 
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anything new, Clinton said, and new was what he wanted.85  Lakes approach 
to the Bosnia problem was to ask, where did the United States want the 
situation in Bosnia to be in six months?, and then to work backwards from that 
point: Suppose, Lake proposed, they calculated where they wanted to be six 
months from now?  Define that place and then work backwards?  Lets think 
from the end backwards, Lake said.  I dont want to hear about what next.86 
 
The strategy Lake developed called for the US and NATO to use a 
combination of sticks and carrots to cajole all three sides into negotiation.  For 
the Serbs, the stick was to be the threat of strategic airstrikes, and the carrot 
was to be the removal of sanctions on Belgrade.  And for the Muslims and 
Croats, the carrot was to be the threat of strategic bombing against the Serbs if 
they did not agree to negotiate, and the stick was to be a threat that the US and 
Western Europe would walk away and leave Bosnia to its fate if they failed to 
negotiate.  The basis for this negotiation was to be a map which divided 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities  a Muslim-Croat federation, which 
had been agreed to in 1994, and a Bosnian-Serb entity.  Both of these entities 
would have broad powers over domestic issues, leaving a federal government 
headed by a joint presidency, including one Muslim, one Croat and one Serb, 
to deal with external relations and monetary affairs.  The map split Bosnia 51 
per cent to 49 per cent in favour of the federation.  This would mean that under 
the plan the Serbs would have to give up approximately 20 per cent of the land 
they currently occupied.  This plan had been formulated by the so-called 
                                                            
85 The Choice. p.258. 
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Contact Group.  This was the US, Britain, France, Russia, Germany and the 
UN.  As such, this plan was able to win broad acceptance within NATO.87 
 
At the same time that Lake was formulating his strategy, American and 
European leaders were meeting in London to decide what to do to protect the 
remaining safe areas in the wake of Srebrenica.  Holbrooke describes the 
London conference as effectively an act of desperation on the part of the 
Western alliance, but one that had far-reaching consequences: The London 
conference was one of those remarkable events in which something 
unexpectedly positive emerges from an initially unpromising idea.88   
 
Essentially, two decisions were reached.  First, that the safe area of Zepa would 
effectively be abandoned as there was no effective means of preventing the 
Serbs from overrunning it.  The remaining safe areas of Sarajevo, Gorade, and 
Bihac would be defended by air power.  Any Serb action against any of these 
three cities would be met not only by retaliatory airstrikes against positions or 
troops moving or firing against them, but would also be met by strategic 
bombing of key military communications facilities, ammunition dumps and 
other infrastructure directly supporting the Bosnian-Serb Military.  In addition 
to this, UNPROFOR would consolidate its forces into central Bosnia and 
would also be reinforced by a mixed British, French and Dutch force of heavy 
armour and artillery.  Known as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), this would 
massively increase the fire power available to UN commanders on the ground, 
and the process of consolidation would reduce the risk of isolated outposts 
                                                            
87 For a description of Lakes plan by the man who had to negotiate for its acceptance, see 
Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (The Modern Library: New York, 1998). Pp.78-79. 
88 Ibid., p.71. 
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being taken hostage. British Chief of Defence Staff Sir Peter Inge described the 
outcome of the London conference as follows: We got a way ahead.  I dont 
think anyone expected it wouldnt be.  Some very hard decisions would have to 
be taken if we were going to be successful.  Military operations are not neat 
and tidy.89 It is important to note that the decisions of the London conference 
and Lakes strategy for ending the war were not coordinated with each other.  
In the immediate aftermath of the war, a myth grew up that the London 
conference and Lakes policy review were part of a coordinated strategy.  This 
is simply not true  they were separate events taking place at the same time.  
The interesting point to be noted is that neither the London Conference nor 
Lakes strategy review ever directly addressed the question of exit strategy.  
Both these events were principally concerned with how to end the war in 
Bosnia and deal with its immediate aftermath.  Neither the London Conference 
nor Lake paid any particular attention to how long a peace-keeping mission in 
Bosnia might last, and under what circumstances it might be brought to a close.  
There was the implicit understanding that disarming the various warring parties 
and enforcing a ceasefire would be potentially time-consuming, but little 
thought was given to exactly how time-consuming this process might be.  In 
other words, the exit strategy was left undefined because the entry strategy 
was seen as being complicated enough. 
 
Were airstrikes to be launched by NATO, the man in charge would be 
Commander Allied Forces Southern Europe Admiral Leighton Smith.  Smith 
already had responsibility for enforcing the UN-mandated no-fly-zone over the 
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former Yugoslavia, and his staff had planned for years for the potential need to 
launch the kind of air campaign that was being contemplated.  However, Smith 
personally was not convinced that the US should take a major role in enforcing 
an end to the Bosnian war.  He was acutely aware of the possibility for 
guerrilla warfare and sceptical of the idea that air power alone could guarantee 
a change in Serb behaviour.  Nevertheless, Smith was determined that if called 
upon to execute an air campaign it would be swift and massive: 
 
The plan entailed striking the eastern IADS [Integrated Air Defence 
Systems] first with SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defences]attacking the BSAs [Bosnian Serb Army] air facilities at 
night to minimize civilian casualties.  By this time, it would be first light 
and NATO aircraft could fly against heavy weapons in the Sarajevo 
exclusion zone.90 
 
In late September 1995, the issue was finally settled when a Serb mortar landed 
in a Sarajevo marketplace.  Immediately following this, the plans agreed at the 
London conference were put into effect.  NATO aircraft began a series of 
coordinated strikes against Serb positions around Sarajevo.  These strikes were 
backed up by artillery fire from the RRF.  Within two days the Serb gun 
positions around Sarajevo had been silenced and the air campaign had 
expanded to cover a broad range of military targets across Serb-held areas of 
Bosnia.   
                                                            
90 David L. Dittmer and Stephen P. Dawkins, Deliberate Force: NATOs First Extended Air 
Operation, The View from AFSOUTH (Center for Naval Analyses: Alexandria, June 1998). 
p.19. Dawkins served as Political Advisor to Admiral Smith and Dittmer was embedded with 
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At the same time, although unconnected to the air campaign, the Croatian army 
launched a massive ground offensive to retake areas of Croatia occupied by a 
rebel Serbian Croat army in 1991.  Since the cease fire in Croatia had gone into 
effect in 1992, the Croat army had been completely re-equipped with supplies 
shipped in defiance of the UN arms embargo: Croatian forces on what was the 
Serb western front, somewhat belatedly armed by the outside world, had been 
in training under former American army officers for more than half a year and 
could for the first time match the Serbs in firepower.91  
 
The net result of this was that the Croats were far better armed and far better 
trained than their Serb opponents, the predictable result being that the Serb-
held enclave in Croatia all but collapsed within a matter of weeks.  This Croat 
offensive threatened to spill over into Western Bosnia.  Croat and federation 
forces had already been cooperating with each other for some time, and under 
the cover of allied airstrikes federation forces had already managed to launch 
their own offensive on Western Bosnia, driving large numbers of Serb refugees 
before them, and threatening to take the largest city in Serb hands, Banja Luka.   
 
It was at this point that the president of Serbia proper, Slobodan Milosevic, 
decided to take matters into his own hands.  He arranged for a meeting between 
himself and the Bosnian Serb leaders, at which it was agreed that Milosevic 
would head a joint Bosnian Serb/Serb delegation to peace talks at an American 
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Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio.  As Holbrooke relates, this joint delegation 
served to make the negotiating process much easier:   
 
For sixteen months, the Contact Group had argued fruitlessly with 
Milosevic over how to get the Bosnian Serbs to participate in 
negotiationsNow we had the answer to the question we had asked for 
those sixteen months: who would speak for Pale?  And the answer was: 
Slobodan Milosevic.92 
 
After more than two weeks of talks, an agreement broadly in line with the 
Contact Group Map was initialled.  As part of this agreement, a multi-national 
peacekeeping force known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was formed.  As 
part of this force, the US agreed to deploy 25,000 troops for one year:  The 
plausibility of this statement, even when slightly softened by the President a 
few days later, was widely questioned at the time  and would cause serious 
difficulty for the Administration later.93  This year was likely to be extended, 
and eventually the US presence became open-ended.  Holbrooke understood 
that this one-year deadline would not prove helpful: Nevertheless, announcing 
before the peace talks began that we would withdraw in twelve months, no 
matter what happened on the ground, was not an exit strategy but an exit 
deadline  something quite different, and quite misleading.94  The last US 
troops were withdrawn from Bosnia in 2005.  US troops were deployed to 
Bosnia on a one-year timetable so that they would have a guaranteed exit 
strategy.  However, this rather neat assumption simply did not take into 
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account the reality of the situation on the ground.  It took US forces several 
months of the year they were notionally supposed to be in Bosnia just to finish 
deploying to the region.  Even without the Holy Grail of a guaranteed exit, US 
forces in Bosnia were not to suffer a single casualty as a result of hostile action.  
Far from being a quagmire, US involvement in Bosnia after 1995 was a 
cakewalk.  It is interesting to note that the strictures laid down by PDD 25, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, when they came into contact with the reality of 
the situation on the ground in Bosnia, were ignored as American troops ended 
up being deployed in Bosnia on peacekeeping duties on an open-ended basis. 
 
What we have seen in this chapter is that a successful exit strategy depends on 
the ability of the US to shape the circumstances of its environment so that it 
can choose a point at which to exit a conflict.  However, conflicts are by 
definition never one-sided affairs.  The opponent will always have at least a 
degree of control over the environment in which the conflict takes place.  
Therefore, an exit strategy in the sense of having a defined means of bringing a 
conflict to an end before you engage in it, whilst at the same time not 
undermining the objectives you are fighting for, is almost an impossibility.  
Therefore, an exit strategy as defined by the Powell Doctrine can only rarely be 
achieved.  Perhaps a better way of proceeding would be to rely instead on the 
element of the Powell Doctrine which requires clear objectives.  This would 
give policy makers the chance to identify when they had reached a conclusion 
to a conflict rather than the near impossible proposition that they should know 
when and exactly how to end a conflict before it has begun. 
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We will now move on to look at how the need for a clear exit strategy meshes 
with the rest of the Powell Doctrine, in particular, we will look at the 
relationship between the need to maintain public and Congressional 
support95and the need for clear objectives96.  
 
The need for an exit strategy and the need to maintain public support are linked 
by the notion that there is a finite amount of time that the public is prepared to 
support any commitment, and also the fact that it is easier to maintain public 
support if you can explain in simple terms when and under what conditions you 
expect to be able to bring military commitment to a close. Extended military 
operations by their very nature are monetarily expensive. If you add to this the 
fact that they may ultimately also turn out to be costly in terms of life, it is 
clear that in a democratic system people will only support this kind of 
expenditure for a limited amount of time. As we have seen earlier in this 
chapter, it had become clear to US policy makers by 1968 that the point of 
diminishing public support had been reached. However, because policy makers 
had no well thought out plan to leave Vietnam and were essentially dependent 
upon an improving political and military situation in South Vietnam in order to 
allow them to withdraw, the US found itself in the invidious position of having 
to continue to fight with ever diminishing public and legislative support 
because public support for the war ebbed away faster than US forces could be 
withdrawn. Therefore in order for these two elements of the Powell Doctrine to 
make logical sense, they have to work in tandem. A withdrawal cannot go on 
past the point at which public support has been lost for a particular deployment, 
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otherwise the situation will become corrosive as with Vietnam, and the public 
will begin not only to lose support for a particular operation or undertaking, but 
will begin to withdraw support from the Armed Forces themselves and the 
institutions that support them. Likewise, a well founded exit strategy will 
inevitably be based on how long the planners think that public support can be 
maintained. So for example the initial one-year deadline on troop deployments 
to Bosnia was premised on the idea that the public and Congress would only 
support a sharply limited deployment, both in terms of the time US troops 
would actually spend on the ground, and also the limit that such a short period 
of deployment would put on the tasks that US forces could perform. When 
Admiral Smith took command of SFOR [Stabilization Force], he made it clear 
that the forces mission was to maintain a ceasefire and compel the warring 
parties to withdraw heavy weaponry from the front lines. Smith made it clear 
he was less interested in tasks such as the arrests of war criminals, building the 
institutions laid out by the Dayton Agreement or the return of refugees. Smith 
was able to take these stands partly because the force he was in command of 
had a very short space of time in which to operate. In other words, a time 
limited deployment serves to reinforce public support not only because it 
defines that a US presence is limited in timescale, it also implicitly limits the 
risks that US forces might have to face because it reduces US forces to carrying 
out the simplest and therefore quickest tasks.  
 
Interestingly in the case of Bosnia, this initial exit strategy was abandoned and 
public support for the deployment did not significantly suffer. Yet US forces 
remained extremely reluctant to build on this initial success and carry out some 
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of the more complex and potentially riskier tasks laid down in the Dayton 
Accords. The logical reasons for this would be that US planners retained the 
fear that taking on these additional risks might have undermined support or 
more likely, these tasks may have resulted in increased US casualties which 
would also have had the effect of undermining public support for the mission.  
 
In terms of the connection between the need for a clear exit strategy and the 
need for clear objectives, one clearly follows from the other. In order to know 
when the time has come to wind down a particular operation, there needs to be 
a clearly defined objective that can be said to have been achieved. An exit 
strategy need not necessarily be one based on a period of time, it could be a 
strategy based on the achievement of a very clearly measurable objective. For 
example, if we look at the Bosnian case study, a different exit strategy could 
have been adopted based on setting up the federal structures agreed to in the 
Dayton Agreement, and returning refugees. US forces could have been 
deployed to Bosnia for as long as it took to establish these institutions and then 
begin to withdraw once these institutions were functional. Eventually this was 
to become the de facto exit strategy that the US would adopt. The problem with 
tying an exit strategy to a particular objective is that the objective needs to be 
quantifiable. For instance, if an exit strategy was predicated on the basis of, for 
example, creating a stable and secure environment in Bosnia, this would not be 
a particularly credible exit strategy because there are numerous different ways 
one could go about defining stable and secure. It would not be an easy matter 
to define how far you are from achieving this objective, and so your presence 
could easily become an open-ended one, whilst a never ending debate about 
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what constitutes progress means that a credible exit strategy can never be 
agreed upon. To some extent this was the problem that the US faced in 
Vietnam, in that there was consensus within the Nixon Administration that the 
US forces would not be able to leave Vietnam until the capabilities of the 
South Vietnamese armed forces had been improved. But the question of how 
and what measures should be used to define increased capability became a 
vexed one. Was it a matter of just measuring the size and sophistication of the 
South Vietnamese armed forces?  Was it a matter of how much territory they 
controlled (and if so, how do you define control)? Or was it a matter of how 
they performed in combat? And what happens if there is no improvement? It is 
at least partially because this debate over what constituted progress towards US 
objectives, that the withdrawal of US ground troops in effect became an 
exercise that was, to a large extent unrelated to the situation on the ground in 
Vietnam and a process that owed much more to the state of domestic politics in 
the US.  
 
Before closing this chapter it seems appropriate to return briefly to the 
definition of an exit strategy given at the opening of this chapter. How often is 
it possible for the US, or for that matter any single actor, in anything as 
complex and involved as conventional military operations, to have the degree 
of control over the circumstances surrounding it as is required by a successful 
exit strategy. Certainly this is easier in the context of a conventional war 
between two states. In this context the US can simply set its objective as the 
destruction of the enemys capability to make war and with the massive 
industrial and technological advantage the US enjoys over any conceivable 
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opponent, it can shape the circumstances of the battlefield to achieve this 
objective and there is little that an opponent can do to prevent this.  
 
However, in the context of a situation such as Bosnia, where the USs objective 
is not to defeat an enemy but to create a political and military process which is 
compatible with its interests; the question of how much control any single actor 
can have over that process is questionable. On paper, the need for a clear exit 
strategy sounds eminently sensible and the connection between this element 
and other elements of the Powell Doctrine is a matter of simple deductive 
logic. However, in reality there are too many competing political, strategic, 
economic and perhaps even moral considerations to allow the US to have the 
freedom of action that a true exit strategy needs in order to succeed. If the 
Powell Doctrine had been strictly applied to the Bosnian case study the US 
would never have become involved. There was simply too much about the 
situation that the US could not control, and that therefore a clear exit strategy 
could not be envisioned. It was only when the political consequences of doing 
nothing had reached critical mass for the Clinton Administration, and the exit 
strategy point of the Powell Doctrine for Bosnia was essentially fudged, the 
imposition of a one year deadline on US involvement was widely seen as being 
unrealistic, and it came as no great surprise when that deadline was extended 
and then abandoned. 
 
Perhaps then, rather than insisting upon the need for an exit strategy at the 
outset, a better question for policy makers to ask might be, is the operation that 
we are about to undertake worth the possibility of an open ended military 
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commitment? The answer to that question ultimately lies in how a President 
defines a national interest, and their confidence in their ability to convince 
the majority of the American people that this definition is the correct one, and 
their confidence in their ability to maintain that conviction through potentially 
serious US loss of life.  
 
What we have seen in this chapter then is that the Powell Doctrines insistence 
on an exit strategy was borne from the fact that in Vietnam the US found itself 
continuing to fight a war its political class and the public at large had given up 
on winning, simply because the Nixon Administration tried to tie US 
withdrawal to factors that were largely beyond its control. When this effort 
failed the Nixon Administration unilaterally withdrew from Vietnam, leading 
to the ultimate defeat of South Vietnam. The result of this was that the US 
Armed Forces had been asked to fight for five years from 1968-1973 for 
essentially no purpose and also that the Nixon Administrations efforts to 
maintain the US presence whilst simultaneously admitting that the US had to 
withdraw, led to a political crisis that was to inflict long term damage on the 
American peoples confidence in their own institutions of government. Second, 
we have seen how the need for an exit strategy was one of the factors that 
stymied serious US involvement in the worst European war in fifty years, and 
third we have seen that the need for a clear exit strategy has to be an element of 
the Powell Doctrine if we are to properly to understand the Doctrines 
insistence on the need for clear objectives and public support. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
After Vietnam, I never envisioned that I would again know so many who died 
so young.  What angered me after six years of reporting from the lines was how 
many at the top talked mainly to one another and did not take the time to study 
the war.  The same was true of the wars critics. 
Francis West, a Vietnam veteran, author and reporter1 
 
We are a civilian-controlled military, and it is our business to stay out of 
politics. 
LtGen Ricardo Sanchez2 
 
In this thesis, we have seen the influence that the Powell Doctrine and the 
intellectual climate that gave birth to it have had on US foreign policy over the 
20 years between the end of the Vietnam War and the mid-1990s.  We have 
seen, in each of our case studies, that the ideas that form the Powell Doctrine 
can be traced back to the US experience in Vietnam and the attempt to learn 
the lessons of that war.  We have also seen that, generally within the US 
Military, the strategy adopted by the United States in Vietnam was seen as 
fundamentally flawed and that the Powell Doctrine was an attempt to make 
sure that what were seen as strategic mistakes on the part of the United States 
were not repeated.   
 
                                                            
1 Quoted in Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (Random 
House: New York, 2008). Preface, xix. 
2 Op cit. Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (Bantam 
Books: New York, 2005).  p.223. 
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Added to this, we have seen that no single element of the Powell Doctrine can 
be treated as if it were the preeminent or most salient element of the Doctrine.  
We have seen that, for each element of the Doctrine, other elements of the 
Doctrine have an influence and a bearing on them.  So, in order to adequately 
understand the full significance of the Powell Doctrine and the debates within 
the US Army that gave rise to it, one must look at the Doctrine in its totality. 
 
We have also seen that, whilst Colin Powells 1992 Foreign Affairs article can 
be treated as the definitive statement of the Powell Doctrine, Powell was not 
breaking new intellectual ground.  The points that Powell raises in that article 
are strongly influenced by the historical and theoretical work of Officers such 
as Harry Summers, Douglas Kinnard, and the retrospective attempts to 
understand the lessons of the war undertaken by those who were in senior 
command positions at the time, such as U.S. Grant Sharp, William 
Westmoreland, Philip Davidson and Bruce Palmer among others. 
 
The one remaining question that we can only provide a tentative answer to is, 
what is the future of the Powell Doctrine?  The aim here is not to give a 
definitive answer as to what the future of the Powell Doctrine will be, but 
simply to suggest what could be seen as likely possibilities for the Powell 
Doctrines future and to describe the political and strategic contexts that would 
need to exist in order for these possibilities to come to pass. 
 
In order to provide a tentative answer to this question, we will analyse a 
number of possible alternatives.  The first answer we will look at is perhaps the 
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easiest answer: that the Powell Doctrine has no future.  The second answer we 
will look at is that the some of the elements of the Powell Doctrine will 
continue to survive and be influential in some kind of modified form.  The final 
answer we will look at is that the Powell Doctrine in its totality will experience 
a renaissance.  For any of these three answers to hold any water, we must 
assess them by the yardstick of the US Militarys experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Any analyses of these experiences are by definition incomplete.  The 
US Military is likely to remain in strength in both countries for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
We will start by looking at the simplest and most pessimistic answer, what we 
could call the death of the Powell Doctrine.  The first issue that may kill the 
Powell Doctrine is that it is so tied up with and historically contingent upon the 
US experience in Vietnam that once the generation of officers who had any 
kind of experience in Vietnam retires or passes from the scene, the Powell 
Doctrine will simply fade from memory as lessons of a war now finally 
consigned to the history books.  The moment that the last Vietnam veterans 
pass out of military service is approaching fast.  David Petraeus, the current 
CINC -CENTCOM, graduated West Point in 1974, the year after US 
involvement in Vietnam formally ended.  Linda Robinson, who has written an 
account of Petraeuss time in Iraq with his extensive cooperation, describes the 
impact of Vietnam on the graduating class of 1974 as follows: The Vietnam 
War was not far from the minds of the cadets at West PointThey were 
beginning their careers in the shadow of the lost war.3  The current cadre of 
                                                            
3 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How this Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way 
Out of Iraq (Public Affairs: New York, 2008). p.53. 
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four star officers is going to be the last that had any firsthand experience of 
Vietnam. As weve seen throughout this thesis, every element of the Powell 
Doctrine can ultimately be traced back to some facet of the Vietnam War. Once 
this war is no longer part of the living memory of the United States Military, it 
is questionable whether the Powell Doctrine will carry the same intellectual 
force. 
 
Historical contingency may undermine the Powell Doctrine from another 
direction.  The Powell Doctrine may have been formulated as a guide to help 
orientate US policy towards limited war.  However, this does not mean that it is 
strictly applicable to the situations in which the US finds itself in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In other words, the lessons learned from one limited war, 
Vietnam, may not be of much use in the limited wars the US finds itself 
fighting today.  This is particularly true when it is borne in mind that, as we 
saw in Chapter Three, those elements of the US Armys Officer Corps whose 
ideas led to the intellectual climate that led to the Powell Doctrine, tended to 
see Vietnam through the prism of a conventional threat against South Vietnam 
by North Vietnam.4 
 
It is true to say that Vietnam in some senses prefigured Iraq and Afghanistan in 
terms of the tactics the Vietcong used and the problems the US had in trying to 
build up a viable South Vietnamese government, economy and society.  
However, as we saw in Chapter Three, it would be too simplistic to stick the 
label of guerrilla war on Vietnam.  There were many elements of 
                                                            
4 See pp.130-133. 
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conventional conflict that the Powell Doctrine sought to address that were 
present in Vietnam that are not present in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
First, as we have seen, although the extent of North Vietnamese support and its 
bearing on the ultimate outcome of the conflict are matters of historical debate, 
what cannot be denied is that, to some extent, the Communist war effort was 
directed, supported and the burden of it shouldered by a conventional State.  
So, whilst in a tactical sense certainly Vietnam bore some of the hallmarks of a 
guerrilla war, in the strategic sense of identifying where the enemys centre of 
gravity was located, Vietnam is a more ambiguous case than either Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  As Summers puts it: 
 
Instead of focusing our attention on the external enemy, North Vietnam  
the source of the war  we turned our attention to the symptom  the 
guerrilla war in the south  and limited our attacks on the North to air and 
sea actions only.  In other words, we took the political task (nation 
building/counterinsurgency) as our primary mission and relegated the 
military task (defeating external aggression) to a secondary 
consideration.5 
 
 It can be argued that Vietnam was a much more conventional war than the 
current conflicts the United States finds itself in.6  The quotation below 
demonstrates just how diffuse the threats the US finds itself fighting have 
become: 
                                                            
5 Colonel Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: 
Dell, 1982), p.145. Emphases in original 
6 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the historical debate about the nature of the war in 
Vietnam and the position that various writers within the US Military have taken on the issue. 
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Many of these terrorists  some loosely organized and some representing 
groups  claimed to act for Islam and operated, increasingly, on a global 
scale.  These transnational terrorists benefit from modern 
communications and transportation, have global sources of funding, are 
knowledgeable about modern explosives and weapons, and are much 
more difficult to track and apprehend than members of the old 
established groups or those sponsored by states.7 
 
Aside from the tactical similarity between the Vietcong and Iraqi and Afghan 
insurgents, there is one other important respect in which these wars are similar 
to one another, and that is the extent to which the US has found itself in the 
middle of interethnic, interreligious conflict that it does not adequately 
understand. 
 
In all three wars, to a certain extent, the US is a bystander to conflicts that have 
been going on before US intervention and will carry on after the US has left in 
some form.  As General Petraeus put it in his 2007 Progress Report to 
Congress,  
 
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among 
ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This 
competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-
                                                            
7 Quote taken from Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, 3rd edition 
(Penguin: London, 2007). p.5. Originally published 2003. 
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term stability in the new Iraq [emphasis added]. The question is whether 
the competition takes place more  or less  violently.8  
 
In this discussion of interethnic and sectarian competition, we can certainly see 
echoes of Vietnam.  The following quotation is taken from a policy paper 
prepared by Chester Cooper of the National Security Council staff in January 
1965: 
 
However, we still confront the Buddhists, who will continue to retain the 
power to move [make] any government unworkable, even if they cannot 
actually topple it--a fact of contemporary Vietnamese political life we 
will simply have to accept and reckon with. The problem is that the 
Buddhists--or, more accurately, the militant bonzes who now control the 
"Buddhist movement"--don't know what they want, in a positive sense. 
The Buddhist leadership enjoys the exercise of political power but 
prefers to veto rather than propose. It does not want the responsibility of 
office or, actually, direct participation in the governmental process. This 
leadership is hypersensitive to affronts to its honor or present political 
position, and to any recrudescence of what it considers "Neo-Diemist" or 
"Catholic" authority.9 
 
                                                            
8 General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Report to Congress on 
the Situation in Iraq, September  10th-11th 2007.  Full text available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf. 
9 Paper Prepared by Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, 
January 6, 1965, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Special 
Intelligence Material, Vol. III.  Full text available at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/10_18.html. 
358 
  
However, the US has an additional problem to face in Iraq and Afghanistan 
that it did not have to deal with in Vietnam.  The US has had to face the 
problems of general lawlessness and chaos that have accompanied the fall of 
repressive regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan:  Various elements push Iraqs 
ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia 
extremists, and criminal gangs pose significant threats.10 
 
There are other similarities and differences between Vietnam, Iraq and 
Afghanistan that call the Powell Doctrines usefulness into question.  This 
revolves around the nature of the US commitment to these wars.  It could be 
argued that, in the case of all three wars, the US had a moral obligation to 
maintain its involvement.  By removing the Taliban, overthrowing Saddam 
Hussein and conspiring in the coup that removed South Vietnamese President 
Diem, the US had an obligation to see that something was put in their place, as 
Secretary of State Colin Powell recognised: You are going to be the proud 
owner of 25 million people...Privately, Powell and his deputy and closest 
friend, Richard Armitage, referred to this as the Pottery Barn rule: you break it, 
you own it.11  However, in a practical, more self-interested sense, the US was 
much less committed to Vietnam than it is to Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although 
it was frequently argued, both by contemporaries and by some historians, that a 
defeat in Vietnam would weaken US credibility, no-one has ever argued that a 
Communist victory in Vietnam would have led to a direct threat against the 
                                                            
10 General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National ForceIraq, Report to Congress on 
the Situation in Iraq, April 8th-9th 2008.  Full text available online at 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/General%20Petraeus%20Testimony%20t
o%20Congress%208%20April%202008.pdf. 
11 Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008 (Simon and 
Schuster: London, 2008).  Pp.328-329. 
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United States.  Therefore, the US could afford to follow the policy of 
Vietnamization, which, as we have seen, was fatally flawed, without 
impinging on its own physical security.  Former Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara goes so far as to speculate that, had he lived, President Kennedy 
would never have committed large numbers of troops to Vietnam in the first 
place: 
 
He [Kennedy] would have concluded that the South Vietnamese were 
incapable of defending themselves, and that Saigons grave political 
weaknesses made it unwise to try to offset the limitations of South 
Vietnamese forces by sending U.S. combat troops on a large scale.  I 
think he would have come to that conclusion even if he reasoned, as I 
believe he would have, that South Vietnam and, ultimately, Southeast 
Asia would then be lost to Communism.12 
 
However, the physical danger to the US of defeat in Afghanistan or Iraq is 
arguably much greater. Ahmed Rashid notes that the Soviet-Afghan War, 
 
left a legacy of expert and experienced fighters, training camps and 
logistical facilities, elaborate trans-Islam networks of personal and 
organization relationship, a substantial amount of military equipment 
including 300 to 500 unaccounted-for Stinger missiles, and, most 
                                                            
12 Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of 
Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1996), p.96. 
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important, a heady sense of power and self-confidence over what had 
been achieved and a driving desire to move on to other victories.13 
 
As we have seen, the Powell Doctrine stipulates that vital national interests 
of the United States should be at stake before the US considers military 
intervention.  There is a difference between interests in the abstract sense of 
issues of the balance of power or credibility and the more tangible interests of 
physical security.  This places the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in a different 
realm from the cases we have looked at in this thesis and Vietnam. 
 
The practical implications for the usefulness of the Powell Doctrine of these 
differences and similarities between the issues the US faced in Vietnam and in 
the period covered by this thesis and it faces at present are huge.  In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the US is fighting an enemy lacking the conventional apparatus of 
a State, so there is no central authority upon which the United States can seek 
to impose its will.  The concept of overwhelming force is useful in situations 
such as the first Gulf War,14 where the US is seeking to impose its will upon 
another state.  But, in the context the US finds itself in, it could be argued the 
Powell Doctrines reliance on overwhelming force can be counterproductive, 
creating new recruits for the insurgents and undermining domestic support for 
the war by creating large-scale civilian casualties.  The following quotation is 
taken from instructions issued to marines deploying to Iraq in 2004: 
 
                                                            
13 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p.130. 
14 See Chapter 3. 
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If shot at, no fusillade would be loosed in response.  Mattis [James N. 
Mattis, Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Division] emphasized 
marksmanship  one shot, one kill.  The hope was that restraint in 
attitude and firepower would lead to more toleration of U.S. troops and 
less toleration of the armed resistance.15 
 
This criticism that the use of overwhelming force is inappropriate to a 
guerrilla war is exactly the same criticism that was levelled at the Search and 
Destroy missions US troops undertook in Vietnam.  In the case of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, this criticism was even more pointed.  There are no main force 
Vietcong or conventional North Vietnam units against which overwhelming 
force could be used.  Neither is there an option of launching conventional 
invasions of North Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos.  In other words, whilst 
Vietnam contained within it both elements of conventional and unconventional 
warfare, in Iraq and Afghanistan the US finds itself fighting a completely 
unconventional war against an enemy with none of the attributes of a state. 
 
Also, the Powell Doctrines insistence on a pre-planned exit strategy, as we 
have seen earlier in the thesis, was problematic when faced with an issue like 
the Bosnian civil war.16  In Afghanistan, the US is faced with a country which 
has had no legitimate central government for 30 years.  British author James 
Fergusson describes the situation in Afghanistan just prior to the initial rise of 
the Taliban in 1994: In those days it was hardly possible to drive a mile 
without encountering a chain across the road, manned by some Kalashnikov-
                                                            
15 No True Glory. p.50. 
16 See Chapter 6. 
362 
  
toting militiaman demanding money.  Farmers were unable to get their crops to 
market, ordinary trade was paralysed and the economy was stalled.17 
 
 Afghanistan is also a country facing a major narcotics problem,18 and a 
country where US vital interests are certainly at stake given the fact that the 
most deadly attack on the US mainland ever staged was launched from that 
country.  It seems wildly implausible to insist that any US government has a 
completely pre-planned exit strategy before committing US troops.  Certainly 
President George W. Bush seemed to accept that the stakes in Afghanistan for 
the US were effectively so large that to put any kind of timescale on the US 
presence in the country would be imprudent to say the least.  It is not only 
repressing its own people; it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring 
and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the 
Taliban regime is committing murder.19 
 
The overriding point here is that the situation the United States has found itself 
in, in the opening decade of the 21st century is in many respects very different 
to the situation the Officers who created the intellectual climate behind the 
Powell Doctrine perceived that they had encountered in Vietnam. Among the 
most salient of these differences is the fact that in 9/11 the US homeland was 
attacked so, unlike the Viet Cong, the transnational networks of Islamist 
fighters do pose a clear and direct danger to the US.  Also, the US finds itself 
                                                            
17 James Fergusson, A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan 
(Bantam Press: New York, 2008). p.31. 
18 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords, 2nd ed., (Pan Books: 
London, 2001). Chapter 9. 
19 George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20th, 2001, Public Papers of 
the President George W. Bush, Book II  July 1- December 31, 2001. p.1159. 
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in a position where there is no conventional state for it to coerce.  No 
equivalent of the North Vietnamese Government is supporting the Taliban in 
Afghanistan or Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  The question has to be asked, can the Powell 
Doctrine, a set of ideas so closely associated with one particular war, still play 
a valuable role in the vastly different circumstances of which the US Military 
now finds itself? 
 
The third key historical change which may kill the Powell Doctrine is that 
civilian policy makers no longer seem to be cowed by the spectre of Vietnam.  
Between the end of the first Gulf War and the beginning of the second Gulf 
War, the US enjoyed an unprecedented run of military success in Bosnia, in 
Haiti, in Kosovo: Franks was a product of his Army, and his faults reflected 
those of that institution.  The Army went into Iraq with a considerable amount 
of hubris, a circumstance notably different from that of the First Gulf War, 
whose leaders had been the junior officers of the Vietnam War.20   
 
This hubris paradoxically left the US Armed Forces in a weaker position to 
lecture civilians on the dangers of intervention overseas.  Madeleine Albrights 
question about the reluctance of the US Military to act when it was receiving 
the better part of $500 billion a year in funding became more and more urgent 
as advocates of intervention could point towards recent successes when the 
Military could only point to a failure that was receding into the distant past.  
Furthermore, a generation of officers was moving towards senior positions who 
not only had not experienced Vietnam but had experienced an unbroken string 
                                                            
20 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2nd ed., (Penguin: 
London, 2007). p.129. 
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of successes, both on the battlefield and as peacekeepers, and that moreover 
was more confident than Powells generation of the ability of US Armed 
Forces to intervene successfully. 
 
Iraq and Afghanistan have certainly done much to dent this confidence.  
Nevertheless, Iraq and Afghanistan will only be two campaigns mixed in with 
a string of successes.  The Vietnam generation of officers had no such 
comparable experiences.  Vietnam was their war, their only war, and there 
were no Bosnias or Kosovos to take the edge off the failure in Vietnam. This 
run of success makes it harder for the US Military to be able to stray beyond 
the confines of traditional military doctrine. Faced with a run of successes, 
civilian policy makers are less likely to be intimidated by the dire predictions 
of a Military determined not to underestimate the difficulty of any intervention. 
Equally civilian policy makers are likely to be less tolerant of the Military 
straying beyond the traditional limits of military doctrine as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, and moving onto the much more overtly political 
terrain which, as we have seen, is covered by the Powell Doctrine. 
 
We can certainly see, from the history of George W. Bushs Administration, 
that to a degree unprecedented since the McNamara era, civilian officials, 
particularly in the Department of Defense, have been willing to overrule the 
uniformed Military.  Donald Rumsfelds controversial tenure at the Pentagon 
left perhaps the greatest strain on civil-military relations in the US since the 
1960s.  Rumsfeld came to office having had the unique experience of being 
Secretary of Defense once before: [i]t was unprecedented for someone who 
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had served as Secretary of Defense  or for that matter any top cabinet post  to 
come back 25 years later to the same job.  It was a chance to play the hand 
again.  Rumsfeld was determined to play it better.21  Rumsfeld also had very 
definite ideas about what he wanted to achieve.  Essentially, Rumsfelds vision 
was of smaller, more flexible Armed Forces that were easy to deploy:  The 
only way these things can be done well is if risk is elevated, put on the table 
and discussed, instead of trying to mitigate it down below at a level where you 
dont have the benefit of trading off with and balancing risk.22 It was 
Rumsfelds aim to come up with a more flexible alternative to the Powell 
Doctrine, something that would allow force to be used in a rational and focused 
way.  Bob Woodward records Rumsfelds reaction on being briefed on existing 
US war plans: That is insane, that is crazy.  Either its world peace or its 
World War III.  Either the switch is off or on.  Were not going to do it that 
way.23   
 
This was not out of step with what many inside the Military wanted.24  
Rumsfeld tended to cause tension not necessarily because of his ideas but 
because of his management style, which was to place a great deal of power in 
the hands of relatively junior civilian officials whilst at the same time treating 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his own personal planning staff rather than as 
military advisers to the President.  Thomas Ricks quotes Norman 
                                                            
21 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon and Schuster: New York, 2004). p.16. 
22 Ibid., p.35. 
23 Ibid., p.35. 
24 For an example of the kind of thinking in the Pentagon on the need for military 
transformation before Rumsfelds appointment, see Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking The 
Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Greenwood Publishing Group: 
Washington D.C., 1997). 
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Schwarzkopfs opinion of the relationship between civilians and the Military in 
Rumsfelds Pentagon, 
 
Its scary, okay?  Lets face it: There are guys at the Pentagon who have 
been involved in operational planning for their entire lives, okay?...And 
for this wisdom, acquired during many operations, wars, schools, for that 
just to be ignored, and in its place have somebody who doesnt have any 
of that training, is of concern.25 
 
What concerned Schwarzkopf in retirement infuriated those still serving.  The 
following quotations contain descriptions of Rumsfelds Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith: Rumsfeld, not a man to give praise easily, 
describes Feith: just a rare talent.  And from my standpoint, working with him 
is always interesting.  Hes been one of the really intellectual leaders in the 
Administration in defense policy aspects of our work here.26  However, 
within the uniformed Military, Feith was nowhere near as highly thought of.  
Jay Garner describes Feith as follows:  I think hes incredibly dangerous.  
Hes a very smart guy whose electrons arent connected, so he arc lights all the 
time.  He cant organize anything.27  And General Franks describes him in 
typically pungent terms as the dumbest fucking guy on the planet.28 
 
This kind of relationship has profound implications for the future of the Powell 
Doctrine. The whole point of the Powell Doctrine was to make sure that the 
                                                            
25 Fiasco, p.83. 
26 Ibid., p.77. 
27 Ibid., p.78. 
28 Ibid., p.78. 
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Military would have a cohesive position that it could aggressively argue for in 
debates at the highest level of government when it came to deciding what US 
National Security policy ought to be, particularly when it came to Military 
interventions overseas.  It is frankly too soon to tell whether Rumsfelds more 
aggressive and civilian-led management style was simply a reflection of the 
personality and priorities of Donald Rumsfeld or whether it signals a more 
permanent shift in the balance of power between the civilian and military sides 
of the Defense Department.  One thing is certain: any future Secretary of 
Defense would certainly want to avoid the kind of public acrimony that erupted 
between Rumsfeld and the Military.  Although written in fairly bland language, 
the final report of the Iraq study group makes clear that under Donald 
Rumsfeld, the relationship between the civilian and military sides of the 
Department of Defense had become enormously strained. 
 
The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between the 
civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformed 
services. Both have long benefited from a relationship in which the 
civilian leadership exercises control with the advantage of fully candid 
professional advice, and the military serves loyally with the 
understanding that its advice has been heard and valued. That tradition 
has frayed, and civil-military relations need to be repaired.29  
 
So, if one were to argue that the Powell Doctrine is too much a product of the 
debates surrounding the US experience of the Vietnam War, to be the compass 
                                                            
29 James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, p.52.  Full 
text available at: http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf. 
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by which the US Army sets its course in the early decades of the twenty-first 
century, what individual elements of the Powell Doctrine might continue to be 
seen as useful guidance?  As we have seen throughout this thesis, although 
some individual elements of the Powell Doctrine might continue to be useful, 
those elements by themselves should not be thought of as the Powell Doctrine.  
Because of the influence and the intellectual relationship that we have seen 
between different elements of the Powell Doctrine, only when all the elements 
of the Doctrine are taken together can they be considered as part of the Powell 
Doctrine. 
 
We will first look at those elements of the Powell Doctrine which are most 
likely to survive without any modification. The first of these is the need for 
clear public and Congressional support. Although the nature of the threat the 
United States faces has changed since the end of Vietnam, the same factors 
which produced the sensitivity to public and Congressional support after 
Vietnam remain intact. Principally, neither the general public nor Congress has 
shown itself willing to grant any executive branch of government the kind of 
long term deference that they were prepared to show in the pre-Vietnam Cold 
War period.  The following quotation is Bob Woodwards description of how 
difficult Petraeus found giving Congressional testimony: 
 
He said hed been prepared for the policy disagreements, but hed been 
taken aback by the assaults on his characterEverybody sort of gets 
used to that, Petraeus said, because everybody talks about it.  But when 
its you, when its your name and your picture thats there, its definitely 
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an assault on your character.  He said he didnt know if he could ever 
get over it.30 
 
We can see the consequences of not having clear and consistent public support 
when we look at US policy regarding Iraq between 2006 and 2008. The second 
Bush Administration was forced to fight a series of political rearguard actions 
to stave off Congressional attempts to tie further funding of the war to a 
specific time frame for withdrawal. If Congress and the general public are not 
prepared to trust the executive to carry out foreign policy unsupervised, then 
the media is even less willing. As we can see from coverage of the Abu Ghraib 
torture scandal, the American Government is yet to close the credibility gap 
which first opened in Vietnam.  The following quotation, taken from an article 
in the Washington Post, demonstrates, even with the demise of the Bush 
Administration, large parts of the American media are still demanding that 
senior Administration officials are called to account for what happened at Abu 
Ghraib, and also demonstrates the level of cynicism surrounding the official 
Schlessinger Report into what happened at the prison: 
 
When the photos of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
surfaced in 2004, U.S. officials portrayed Army Pvt. Charles A. Graner 
Jr. as the ringleader of a few low-ranking "bad apples"Now, the recent 
release of Justice Department memos authorizing the use of harsh 
interrogation techniques has given Graner and other soldiers new reason 
                                                            
30 The War Within. p.391. 
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to argue that they were made scapegoats for policies approved at high 
levels.31  
 
The second element of the Powell Doctrine that is unlikely to change is the 
need for clear objectives. The need for clear objectives in clear military 
planning was not an invention of the Powell Doctrine, but has been seen since 
Sun Tzu as a prerequisite for successful military planning. The reason for this 
is a simple matter of logic  if you dont know what your objective is, how do 
you know what resources to allocate to achieve it? Also, how can you design a 
successful strategy if you are not clear on what constitutes success?  
 
We will move on now to look at the elements of the Powell Doctrine that may 
need to be modified or redefined, as part of the process of forming a new 
doctrine that still maintains elements of the Powell Doctrine.  
 
As has been discussed above, the concept of overwhelming force32 may not be 
suitable in the context of a counterinsurgency, but the argument given above 
largely depends on how one defines force. If force is defined as the application 
of firepower then, for the reasons cited above, overwhelming force is not an 
appropriate strategy for counterinsurgency. If we define force as the number of 
troops present in a theatre of operations then the argument against 
overwhelming force becomes slightly more complex. Certainly, large numbers 
of troops can be extremely useful in combating the early stages of an 
                                                            
31 Josh White, Abu Ghraib Guards Say Memos Show They Were Scapegoats, Washington 
Post, May 1st 2009.  Full text available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/30/AR2009043004077.html. 
32 See Chapter 3. 
371 
  
insurgency, by policing the population by controlling movement and generally 
by demonstrating the power and resolve of the authorities.  This has been seen 
in counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations across the world.  British 
Major General Tim Cross, who was Jay Garners Deputy in the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Activities, the first occupation Allied 
authority in Iraq and a man who had extensive experience in Northern Ireland 
and Kosovo: 
 
Therefore although the 150,000 [troops]  the Americans had  was 
fine for the main military campaigns to deal with this [the conventional 
war to remove Saddam Hussein]  if things did not go well afterwards, 
if there was a need to bring stability to the place [Iraq], the force ratios 
were dramatically too low.33 
 
The dramatic effect of this lack of manpower could be seen on the ground in 
Iraq.  Colonel Peter Mansoor, who commanded a brigade during the 
occupation of Iraq, describes the problem vividly: 
 
Shortage of forces left large swaths of Iraq untouched by a coalition 
presence and kept open borders through which foreign fighters and 
terrorists would soon filter.  Iraqis poured into the streets to loot and 
pillage any facility left unguarded, which, given the rapid collapse of the 
Baathist regime, included nearly all government buildings.  Not only 
would the coalition face a lack of civil servants to run a government, but 
                                                            
33 Tim Cross, interview with the author, February 2011. 
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the seat of government itself would require massive rebuilding and 
refurbishment.34 
 
 The usefulness of large numbers of troops may dwindle over time as consent 
for an occupation decreases, and large numbers of troops may in fact prove 
somewhat of a burden as the native armed forces and government tend to rely 
more on outside assistance than they do on developing their own institutions 
and capabilities. Even after the relative success of the US surge between 
2006 and 2008, there remains a feeling amongst some US observers that the 
only thing holding Iraq together is the continuing presence of large numbers of 
American troops.  The following is a quotation from John McCreary, a veteran 
analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 
 
The Americans have imposed power sharing on Iraqs factions, and that 
should worry us for several reasons.  First, it produces what looks like 
peace but isnt.  Second, in such situations eventually one of the factions 
seeks to break out of the arrangement.  Thus, power sharing is always a 
prelude to violence, usually after the force imposing it withdraws.35 
 
 So the requirements for overwhelming force may not be as irrelevant as it 
looks on first inspection. The usefulness of overwhelming force in an 
environment such as Iraq or Afghanistan depends on the first instance on how 
we go about defining force, and over what kind of timescale we plan on 
                                                            
34 Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commanders War in Iraq (Yale 
University Press: New Haven, 2008). p.108. 
35 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Untold Story of the American 
Surge in Iraq, 2006-2008, (Allen Lane: London, 2009). p.317. 
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keeping that force in place. And how much risk we wish to take in withdrawing 
that force. As outlined in Chapter Three, this continuing requirement for 
overwhelming force is likely to have an impact on the need for public and 
congressional support and on the need to set clear objectives. 
 
The Powell Doctrines insistence that force should only be used in the vital 
national interest36 may also need to be modified. Specifically, the problem is 
with the use of the word vital. The problem with restricting the use of force 
to national interests that are vital is that vital-ness is not a fixed concept. For 
instance, a strong argument could be made that the US had a national interest 
in preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for international terrorist 
organizations as early as the first World Trade Center bombings in 1993. 
Indeed the following quotation is an except from a diplomatic cable sent by the 
State Departments Special Representative to Afghanistan in October 1988: 
There is a growing frustration, bordering on hostility, among Afghans across 
the ideological spectrum and from abroad range of backgrounds, towards the 
government of Pakistan and toward the U.S.37 But it took until the Embassy 
bombings of 1998 for the US to mount any kind of military action:  
 
The Talibans hosting of Al Qaedas leadership gradually became the 
Clinton Administrations overriding agenda item with 
AfghanistanSome observers assert that the Administration missed 
several other opportunities to strike him, including following a purported 
sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone at his Karnak Farms camp 
                                                            
36 See Chapter 2. 
37 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars. The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin: London, 2004). p.183. 
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in Afghanistan in mid-2000. Clinton Administration officials say they did 
not try to oust the Taliban militarily because domestic and international 
support for doing so was lacking38.  
 
It took until September 11th 2001 for the US to decide that its interests in 
Afghanistan were vital enough to warrant large scale sustained military action. 
The point to be noted is that the level of American interest in Afghanistan 
varied markedly over a relatively short space of time. From concern over 
growing anti-Americanism in 1988, to cruise missile strikes in 1998, and 
regime change in 2001. If the Clinton Administration had decided that it had an 
interest worth pursuing militarily in Afghanistan in 1993, it could have pursued 
this interest at a far lower cost by arming one of the rival factions in 
Afghanistan in return for a commitment not to allow Afghanistan to become a 
haven for anti-American groups,39 rather than waiting until the US interest in 
Afghanistan had become vital and so acute that the only viable military 
option was a major involvement of US forces to tip the balance of the Afghan 
civil war, followed by an indefinite commitment to help build a modern 
Afghan state. 
 
We will now move on to look at those elements of the Powell Doctrine that are 
of least use in the context that US forces now find themselves operating in. 
 
                                                            
38 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy 
(Congressional Research Service, 2009). p. 11. Full text available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf. 
39 For an in depth discussion of the various factions competing for power in Afghanistan in the 
early 1990s, see Taliban, chapters 1-5.   
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The element of the Powell Doctrine most likely to be scrapped is the need for a 
clear exit strategy. This element of the Powell Doctrine simply places too 
great a burden on the advocates of military intervention. It effectively asks 
them to pre-ordain the future. If the test of the need for a clear exit strategy 
had been strictly adhered too, the US would not have committed itself to either 
Iraq or Afghanistan. Predictable and clear exit strategies only exist in a 
situation where the US finds itself fighting in other conventional armed forces. 
In this instance the exit strategy is obvious: defeat the enemy on the 
battlefield and destroy their ability to engage you in the future. In less 
conventional circumstances, a pre-planned exit strategy is more or less 
impossible to devise. For instance one may have the clear objective of building 
an Iraqi or an Afghan state that has the capability to defend its own borders and 
maintain itself against insurrection, but one cannot set a clear timeline in which 
this will be achieved, because one cannot guarantee that the Afghans or the 
Iraqis will work to the timetable. As an official US Government report 
understatedly puts it, US efforts in Afghanistan have been hampered by the 
effects of the years of war, the low literacy rate of the population, the difficult 
terrain and geography, and the relative lack of trained government workers.40  
This list of problems ignores tension between the various ethnic groups that 
make up Afghanistan, and the lack of any history of strong central government. 
As Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman put it,  
 
Once the Soviet-backed regime fell, war, anarchy, and fragmentation 
followed. The conflict became increasingly one of ethnic and sectarian 
                                                            
40 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. p.14. 
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groups, particularly Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Shia Hazaras. 
Without the glue of the common enemy, the opposition turned their guns 
on one another. During the battle for Kabul from 1992 to 1996, every 
major group had both allied with and fought against every other major 
group at one time or another. In many other parts of the country, warlords 
ruled41. 
 
The other great problem with setting an exit strategy in the context of an 
insurgency is that because the insurgent always has the possibility of 
withdrawing back into the civilian population, there is always time and space 
for the insurgent to become more innovative. In other words, unlike the 
conventional opponent, the insurgent always has the possibility of retreating 
and waiting for a more opportune moment. But anyone still alive to fight the 
Americans in Iraq in 2007 had learned a lot in the preceding years. In the 
spring and summer the American surge was met with a counteroffensive 
involving new tactics and more lethal weapons42. 
 
Instead of insisting on an exit strategy, a doctrine that drew on elements of 
the Powell Doctrine could instead focus more heavily on defining what the 
USs objective is in the first place, and making sure that that objective is 
militarily achievable. So a doctrine that drew on elements of the Powell 
Doctrine would be deeply suspicious of the rhetoric of George W. Bush with 
its emphasis on the spread of democracy and the promotion of liberal values 
                                                            
41 Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman, Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State, 
Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, p.3. Full text at 
http://www.twq.com/winter00/231Byman.pdf. Khalilzad later became the US Ambassador to 
Afghanistan under the Bush Administration.  
42 The Gamble. p.171. 
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around the world: So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support 
the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and 
culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.43  
 
As laudable as this might be as an objective, the instilling of democratic values 
is not something that the US Military can achieve.  Rather, it would insist on 
minimal objectives, consistent with the US national interest, such as the 
establishment of a viable state that can secure its borders and its population. 
This point was as good as acknowledged by Bushs Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice:  Rice asked if it were possible to scale back the goals.  
Suppose, she said, that the U.S. objective was simply to try to enforce a 
balance of power inside Iraq, to stabilize the existing and emerging divisions of 
political power.44  There is some evidence from the US experience in Iraq that 
this is exactly the position the US Military is moving towards. Thomas Ricks 
points out that, in his 2008 Congressional testimony, General Petraeus was less 
than enthusiastic about the chances of Iraq becoming a Jeffersonian 
democracy. 
 
On top of that, he [General Petraeus] was telling Republicans that the 
light at the end of the tunnel wouldnt be the bright beacon of democracy 
that the Bush Administration originally envisioned as the payoff for 
invading Iraq.  Reflecting the lowered goals of the U.S. effort in Iraq, 
Petraeus pointedly called himself a minimalist.45 
                                                            
43 George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, January 20th 2005. Full text available at 
http://www.bartelby.com/124/pres67.html. 
44 The War Within. Pp.184-185. 
45 The Gamble. p.287. 
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If elements of the Powell Doctrine are going to find renewed relevance in some 
form of new politico-military doctrine, who is likely to write this doctrine? As 
we have already seen from the above discussion, the level of civilian deference 
to military opinion was severely reduced under the Administration of George 
W. Bush and it was the civilian side of the defence establishment that 
increasingly came to decide policy and priorities. So it will not be surprising if 
future Presidents, in search of more flexibility than the Powell Doctrine is 
prepared to grant, should push the Military towards rethinking its relationship 
with the Powell Doctrine.  
 
We can also see evidence that the Military itself has started to push beyond the 
Powell Doctrine.  There seems to be an increasing recognition that whatever 
the strengths of the Powell Doctrine in dealing with the threats of the Cold 
War, it is not completely applicable to the situations the United States now 
finds itself in. For example, it is the Military arguing against a timetabled exit 
from either Iraq or Afghanistan, against civilian insistence on pursuing such a 
strategy. Over the next few years we may well find ourselves in the rather 
perverse situation of the Military arguing against the doctrine born in its own 
ranks when it is repeated back to them by civilians.  The following quotation is 
taken from a speech delivered by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV): 
 
And yet we hear little about the aftermath of war in Iraq. In the absence 
of plans, speculation abroad is rife. Will we seize Iraq's oil fields, 
becoming an occupying power which controls the price and supply of 
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that nation's oil for the foreseeable future? To whom do we propose to 
hand the reigns of power after Saddam Hussein?46 
 
One could not ask for a more succinct plea for the Iraq War to have a clear 
objective, and this speech is being delivered not by anybody with any recent 
military experience but by a veteran Senator. 
 
The third and final scenario we will look at is the re-emergence of the Powell 
Doctrine in an unmodified form.  This seems to be the least likely scenario we 
will deal with as it would require a major change not only in terms of specific 
policy but in terms of the way the United States conceives of its security 
interests in light of the events of 9/11. In order for this scenario to come to 
pass, the US Military would have to consider issues of national security that go 
far beyond the realms of traditional military doctrine. However, as we have 
seen in our study of the Powell Doctrine, the US Military has not been afraid of 
doing this. However, such activism is predicated upon the US Military being 
able to learn a single and widely accepted version of the lessons of Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  As we have seen throughout this thesis, Colin Powell was only 
lending his prestige and giving public voice to a set of ideas and an intellectual 
climate which existed long before the publication of his 1992 Foreign Affairs 
article. 
 
In this scenario, the US Military would become exasperated beyond the point 
of endurance with the long, open-ended commitment of troops to the kind of 
                                                            
46 US Senator Robert Byrd, Senate Floor Speech: We Stand Passively Mute, Wednesday, 
February 12th 2003.  Full text available at: http://www.prorev.com/byrdtalk.htm. 
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counter-insurgencies we see today in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Ironically, this 
attitude was perfectly summed up by George W. Bush, the then candidate, in a 
speech delivered in 1999 to the US Military Academy, the Citadel, in South 
Carolina:  But our military requires more than good treatment. It needs the 
rallying point of a defining mission. And that mission is to deter wars  and 
win wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless and 
endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale.47    
 
In this scenario we would see a renewed call for the Military to only be 
committed in situations where the US objective was military victory in the 
classical sense, that is to say, the destruction of an enemys armed forces or 
their will to use them.  In this context, the Powell Doctrine has shown itself, 
particularly by its application in the first Gulf War48, to be an excellent means 
of ensuring quick, decisive conventional military victory, and with the US 
continuing to enjoy a massive lead in terms of the technology it can bring to 
bear on the battlefield and the sheer size, professionalism and enormous 
financial resources that its Armed Forces enjoys, the United States is well 
placed to dominate any conventional battlefield, well into the twentieth-first 
century.49   
 
This scenario would require the US to redefine its view of terrorism.  In 
essence, such a redefinition would involve the reclassification of terrorism 
                                                            
47 George W. Bush, A Period of Consequences, The Citadel, South Carolina, Thursday, 
September 23rd, 1999.  Full text available at: 
http://www.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html. 
48 See Chapter 3. 
49 See the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2007.  In dollars 
adjusted for purchasing power, the US spent $528.7 billion compared to China and Russia, 
who spent $188.2 and $82.8 billion respectively.  See 
http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/files/YB0708.pdf. 
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from a national security threat that could be dealt with in terms of military 
force, as has been the policy under the second Bush Administration, to a 
problem of law enforcement to be dealt with by civilian investigative agencies 
such as the FBI.  Such a redefinition of the problem is certainly plausible.  
Before 9/11, the Clinton Administration very much saw terrorism as a law 
enforcement problem rather than as a threat to national security.  This approach 
was described pejoratively but accurately by former Vice President Dick 
Cheney in a 2009 speech to the American Enterprise Institute: The first attack 
on the World Trade Center was treated as a law enforcement problem, with 
everything handled after the fact  crime scene, arrests, indictments, 
convictions, prison sentences, case closed.50 
 
This scenario would also require the emergence of a credible conventional 
threat to the United States.  In the absence of such a threat, it would seem to be 
politically implausible for the US Military to continue to receive its current 
level of funding whilst primarily focusing on a threat that does not yet exist.  
Certainly, the re-emergence of a conventional competitor to the United States 
is not beyond the realms of possibility.  Both the Russian Federation and the 
Peoples Republic of China continue to possess large conventional forces and, 
given the right economic circumstances, could begin to narrow the gap with the 
United States in terms of research and development. 
 
                                                            
50 Transcript of Former Vice President Dick Cheney's Speech on Interrogation, Delivered to 
American Enterprise Institute, May 21st 2009.  Full text available at: 
http://usconservatives.about.com/od/capitalpunishment/a/Cheney_AEI_Speech.htm. 
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However, there are a number of reasons to doubt the plausibility of this 
scenario. 
 
First, in the current context, it is hard to see the kind of mass public reaction 
that was seen in response to US policy in Vietnam being repeated towards US 
policy in the war on terror.  This is because the United States now operates an 
all-volunteer Armed Forces, whereas during Vietnam the US Armed Forces 
met its manpower requirements by means of a draft by which, in theory at 
least, every US male between the ages of 19 and 25 had an equal chance of 
being drafted.  This gave a vast swath of the population a direct stake in what 
US policy towards Vietnam ought to have been.  The draft acted as a kind of 
Sword of Damocles, which meant that at any time for a six-year period any 
male could become directly involved in a war.  Not only did this serve to 
energise the people directly affected but also, and for obvious reasons, it served 
to energise the family and friends of those people.  In the context of an all-
volunteer army, the individual citizen is as involved in national defence as he 
or she chooses to be.  In a sense, the biggest act of protest against US policy 
has been falling rates of recruitment rather than the kind of massive protest that 
characterized the Vietnam era. 
 
Politicians are unlikely to respond as forcefully to public pressure when it is 
expressed in such a passive fashion.  Also, it is possible to argue that drop-offs 
in recruitment are not politically motivated or a form of protest.  Not only does 
the voluntary army make a contribution to the national defence optional, it also 
serves to pass on apathy to the relatives of those who have chosen not to serve.  
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Finally, the voluntary system means that the vast majority of the American 
public has no experience of what military life is actually like beyond the 
mediated experience of reading a newspaper or watching television news.  This 
means that, although the public may be sympathetic towards the troops and the 
sacrifices they make, they have little to no understanding of what these 
sacrifices mean in a practical sense, and therefore little interest or 
understanding in military and defence affairs. 
 
Second, a reversion to simply dealing with the kind of conventional threats that 
the Powell Doctrine has proven so well suited towards leaves unanswered the 
very important question of how the US actually wants to deal with unstable or 
failed states around the world.  Even if we view the phenomenon of global 
terrorism through the prism of law enforcement, it cannot be ignored that failed 
states such as Afghanistan and Somalia represent the perfect training ground 
for the next generation of terrorists.  The kind of chaos and grinding poverty 
creates its own set of problems independent of terrorism, particularly 
involvement in the international narcotics trade, piracy and general lawlessness 
that threatens to spill over borders. 
 
The other major danger to any reversion towards an unadulterated version of 
the Powell Doctrine is that, if the conventional Military is seen as unwilling or 
unable to deal with security considerations beyond traditional conventional 
warfare, governments will seek solutions outside of the traditional Military and 
traditional foreign policymaking structures.  As we have already seen in our 
case study of US policy towards Nicaragua, when unable to meet the criteria 
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set down by the Powell Doctrine, past US Administrations have resorted to 
bypassing the Military altogether. 
 
In the context of the so-called War on Terror, this kind of covert policymaking 
could be seen in a massive proliferation of private security companies, 
otherwise known as mercenaries.  Companies such as Blackwater,51 Dyncorp 
and Triple Canopy have already stepped into the breach in Afghanistan and 
Iraq to provide a wide array of security and even combat services to the United 
States in order to allow the more parsimonious use of conventional military 
forces52.  Were the United States to base its defence policy in the future on a 
strict interpretation of the Powell Doctrine, it is reasonable to expect that these 
companies would move even more aggressively to take on missions that the 
Powell Doctrine would not be prepared to contemplate. 
 
If we accept that the problems of such states cannot be confined within the 
borders and are in fact likely to have massive ramifications, then the rational 
response is to help these countries set up viable states that can control their 
territory and enforce a minimum standard of law and order.  Such assistance 
requires a military element to it, and by definition this means that Militaries in 
the twenty-first century cannot be focused solely on conventional threats. 
 
Therefore, if the US Armed Forces wished to maintain their relevance 
regardless of how we view the threat of terrorism, they are going to have to 
                                                            
51 See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army, 
updated ed., (Serpent's Tail: London, 2008). Originally published 2007. 
52 In terms of demonstrating just how dependent the US military has become on civilian 
security contractors, see US Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006. p.75. Full text available at: 
http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf. 
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have the capability to intervene in failed or failing states and the ability as part 
of an overall international or governmental effort to restore a functioning state.   
 
Overall, the prognosis for the Powell Doctrine surviving completely intact is 
bleak. The Powell Doctrine is simply too closely tied to the US experience in 
Vietnam; not only are those who served in Vietnam now a distinct minority 
within both civilian and military policy making circles, but also the 
circumstances the US finds itself in are as different from one another as they 
are similar to the situation the Officers who created the intellectual climate that 
led to the Powell Doctrine perceived as existing in Vietnam. However, this is 
not the same thing as saying that the Powell Doctrine does not hold within it 
some important lessons for the future. In particular, the emphasis on 
overwhelming force,53 perhaps defined more in terms of numbers than in 
kinetic force, will undoubtedly remain important as it has since the writings of 
Sun Tzu.  Likewise, the need for clear objectives54, the need for the Military to 
understand what it is trying to do, and for those objectives to be militarily 
achievable will be needed in whatever context US forces find themselves 
fighting.  In particular, in situations other than conventional warfare it will 
probably become increasingly important for military authorities to help civilian 
leaders define what are and are not militarily achievable objectives.  The need 
for an exit strategy, as has been pointed out earlier in this thesis and earlier in 
this chapter, is unlikely to survive in situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where the military objective is not to defeat a conventional enemy but to 
provide a benign security environment under which states can be built.  It is 
                                                            
53 See Chapter 3. 
54 See Chapter 5. 
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simply too difficult to predefine an exit strategy.  Likewise, the need for 
overwhelming public and Congressional support55 is likely to remain less 
salient than it was in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, simply because, for 
the vast majority of American citizens, war has become a spectator sport in 
which they can be as involved or uninvolved as they wish.  Finally, the need 
for force only to be used in the vital national interest is very unlikely to be 
observed in the future.  First, because the issue of vital-ness56 is such a 
subjective and fluid notion, and second, because we have seen, particularly in 
the case of Afghanistan, an area that was considered peripheral to US interests 
can suddenly and unexpectedly move to the forefront of the nations foreign 
policy concerns.  So, the most likely scenario for the future is that elements of 
the Powell Doctrine will survive and continue to be important, but the Powell 
Doctrine, as such, as an integrated, coherent body of thought, is not likely to 
stage a comeback at any point in the near future. 
 
What we have laid out in this conclusion are three plausible scenarios for the 
future of the Powell Doctrine.  All of them have elements to them that suggest 
they could be the way of the future and all of them have problems which affect 
their practicality.  The most likely scenario, however, would be some kind of 
new doctrine that incorporates elements of the Powell Doctrine, as laid out 
above.  The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that the 
Powell Doctrine will continue to be influential in two never-ending debates.  
The first debate is, what is the proper balance of power between the Military 
and its civilian masters in the context of a democracy? The second is what 
                                                            
55 See Chapter 4. 
56 See Chapter 2. 
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should be the foreign policy of the worlds only superpower, and what limits 
does that super power operate under?
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